Huawei対ZTE事件CJEU判決後の判例法
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Updated 6 3月 2018

OLG Düsseldorf

OLG Düsseldorf
18 7月 2017 - Case No. I-2 U 23/17

A. Facts

The Claimant is holder of a patent declared as essential to a standard (Standard Essential Patent, SEP). The Defendant is a provider of telecommuni­cation services. Under the policy governing the relevant standard, the Claimant is obliged to license its SEP on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions. Against Claimant’s SEP a nullity action is pending. The Claimant, nevertheless, concluded portfolio licensing agreements also covering the SEP in question with two companies.

Since November 2012, the Claimant made efforts to license his SEP also to the Defendant. The parties could, however, not reach an agreement. In January 2016, the Claimant brought an action against the Defendant before the Regional Court of Düsseldorf requesting for a declaration of the Defendant’s liability for damages as well as rendering of accounts (main proceedings). After the main proceedings were ini­tiated, the Claimant made two offers for a license agreement to the Defendant. In order to protect busi­ness secrets connected with these offers, the Claimant requested the Defendant to sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). The Defendant refused to sign a NDA. Moreover, the Defendant brought an action against the Claimant before an Irish Court requesting for a declaration that Claimant’s offers did not comply with FRAND.

Subsequently, the Claimant filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the Defendant before the Regional Court of Düsseldorf. The Regional Court of Düsseldorf dismissed Claimant’s motion. The Claimant appealed this judgement. With the present ruling the competent Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf in­dicated that the Claimant’s appeal has no prospects of success.

B. Court’s reasoning

The court made clear that preliminary injunctions involving SEPs are subject to the same strict prerequi­sites as injunctions referring to non-SEPs. The SEP-holder has, therefore, to adequately establish the va­lidity of the SEP, its use by the alleged infringer as well as the urgency of its request for a preliminary injunction.

Besides this, prior to seeking for a preliminary injunction, the SEP holder also has to fulfill the require­ments set forth by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its decision in the matter Huawei ./. ZTE (Huawei judgement). This follows from the fact that SEP-holders’ claims for injunctive relief are, in prin­ciple, only enforceable, after the prerequisites established by the Huawei judgement have been fully met.

Since preliminary injunctions may severely affect alleged infringer’s ongoing business, such injunctions can only be granted, when both the validity and the use of the SEP by the alleged infringer appear to be given with a high degree of certainty.

The validity of a SEP is deemed to be given, when the SEP has been confirmed in patent opposition or nullity proceedings. Without a prior confirming decision, the validity of a SEP can, exceptionally, also be regarded as being given, when

  • the alleged infringer has unsuccessfully intervened in the proceedings, in which the SEP was granted,
  • no opposition or nullity proceedings were initiated against the SEP, because it is universally consid­ered to be able to receive patent protection (one indication for this being, for instance, the fact that the SEP was licensed to renowned licensees),
  • the objections raised against SEP’s validity can be proven to be unfounded even by the limited means of the summary examination foreseen in proceedings for interim relief, as well as
  • in “extraordinary circumstances”, in which the SEP-holder will face substantial disadvantages, if he is forced to wait with the initiation of proceedings against the infringer, until after the end of opposition or nullity proceedings pending against the SEP.

Against this background, the court argued that the Claimant is most likely not entitled to the requested preliminary injunction.

First, the Claimant failed to establish the validity of the SEP in dispute with the required high degree of certainty. A decision confirming the SEP in dispute is missing, since the nullity proceedings are still pending. Furthermore, the exceptions allowing this conclusion to be drawn, even without a prior con­firming decision, do most likely not apply. In particular, the fact that the Claimant concluded portfolio licensing agreements with two other companies covering also the SEP in question, does not suffice to adequately establish its validity. This fact only proves that the licensees held the SEP-holder’s portfolio as being able to receive patent protection as a whole, not, however, that they considered the SEP itself as being worthy of such protection. Furthermore, due to the high level of technical complexity, the court does not expect that the objections raised against the validity of the SEP can be proven as being unfounded solely on basis of the limited examination means available to the court in the present pro­ceedings for interim relief.

Second, the court has also substantial doubts that urgency is given. The Claimant was aware of the alleged infringement since 2012. Nevertheless, the Claimant refrained from making his claim for injunctive relief enforceable by fulfilling the Huawei judgement requirements. Furthermore, in the main proceedings ini­tiated prior to the present proceedings for preliminary injunction, the Claimant did not request for injunc­tive relief, but limited his action against the Defendant to damages and rendering of accounts. In terms of urgency, it could be expected from the Claimant to request for injunctive relief already in the main proceedings. Furthermore, the fact that the Defendant brought an action before an Irish Court requesting a declaration that Claimant’s offers did not comply with FRAND, also fails to establish urgency. It is the Defendant’s right to seek legal redress.

C. Other issues

In addition, the court expressed its view regarding the consequences of the refusal of a potential licensee to sign a NDA covering information connected with the SEP-holder’s offer for a licensing agreement on FRAND terms, without, however, ruling on this question on the merits of the present case.

The court suggested that the unjustified refusal of a licensee to enter into a NDA does not release the SEP-holder from the obligations established by the Huawei judgement, namely the obligation to make a FRAND offer to the licensee and specify the underlying conditions (particularly the price calculation). An unjusti­fied refusal of the licensee to sign a NDA shall, however, lead to easing the SEP-holder’s burden to provide the licensee with detailed explanations regarding the justification of its licensing conditions, to the extent that this is required for protecting its justified confidentiality interests. Instead of detailed information, “merely indicative observations would, basically, suffice. The licensee cannot object the FRAND con­formity of the SEP-holder’s offer based on the insufficient specification of the licensing terms.
Updated 23 1月 2018

LG Mannheim

LG Mannheim
4 3月 2016 - Case No. 7 O 24/14

A. Facts

Case No. 7 O 24/14 [1] related to the infringement of patent EP 0.734.181.B1, which covered technology for decoding video signals in the DVD standard (‘subtitle data encoding/decoding and recording medium for the same’). [2] The defendant was a German subsidiary of a Taiwanese electronics company. It sold computers that used such DVD-software. The claimant, a Japanese electronics company, commercialised the patent in question through a patent pool. In early 2013, the patent pool approached the defendant’s parent company about the use of their patents in general.

On 30 May 2014, the defendant offered to enter into a license agreement for the respective German patent. The defendant indicated that it was willing to enter into negotiations for a portfolio license (but for Germany only). It was also willing to have the claimant determine the royalties owed under section 315 of the German Civil Code. On 25 July 2014, the claimant suggested to change the license offer to a worldwide portfolio license. The defendant rejected and informed the claimant on 22 August 2014 as to the number of respective computers they put into circulation between July 2013 and June 2014 in Germany.

On 13 March 2015, the claimant made an offer for a worldwide portfolio license. On 5 May 2015, the defendant requested the relevant claim charts and further details as to how the license fees had been calculated. On 25 June 2015, the claimant sent the claim charts but refused to elaborate on the calculation method. The claimant suggested a meeting in which it would answer further questions. The defendant responded on 13 July 2015 that most of the claim charts lacked necessary details. In a meeting between the claimant and the defendant’s parent company on 3 September 2015, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. On 30 September 2015, the claimant sent a PowerPoint presentation containing explanations regarding the patent and the calculation of the license fees.

The District Court of Mannheim granted an injunction order on 4 March 2016. [3] It also held that the defendant was liable for compensation and ordered it to render full and detailed accounts of its sales to determine the amount of compensation owed. Further, the District Court ordered a recall and removal of all infringing products from the relevant distribution channels.

B. Court’s Reasoning

1. Notice of Infringement

According to the Huawei/ZTE ruling, the claimant is required to notify the defendant of the alleged patent infringement. According to the District Court, this notice is supposed to provide the defendant an opportunity to assess the patent situation. [4] Thus, it is insufficient to notify the defendant that its products contain the respective standard and it is therefore infringing the SEP. Instead, the claimant is required to specify the infringed patent, the standard in question, and that the patent has been declared essential. The level of detail required depends on the respective situation. [5] However, the description does not need to be as thorough as a statement of claim in patent litigation. In the eyes of the court, the customary claim charts (which show the relevant patent claims and the corresponding passages of the standard) will typically be sufficient. By sending the charts to the defendant, the claimant had met its obligations under the Huawei/ZTE ruling. [6]

The Huawei/ZTE principles require the SEP holder to give notice of infringement before commencing patent infringement proceedings. Otherwise, the SEP holder would abuse its market power, which would mean that the patent infringement court would not be able to grant an injunction order. However, according to the District Court, in such a situation the SEP holder would not lose its patent rights, but would be prevented from exercising those rights in court. [7] Proceedings that had been commenced prior to the Huawei/ZTE ruling present a special case. In that situation, the SEP holder could not have been aware of the obligations that the CJEU subsequently imposed on claimants. Thus, it must be possible for an SEP holder to go through the Huawei/ZTE process subsequently without losing the pending lawsuit. [8] On this basis, the District Could held that the claimant had taken all necessary steps after commencing proceedings, which met the Huawei/ZTE requirements. [9]

2. The SEP Owner’s Licensing Offer

The District Court expressed its view that the CJEU had wanted to establish a procedure that keeps the infringement proceedings free of complicated deliberations about the conditions of the offer, similarly to the German Federal Court of Justice decision Orange Book Standard. [10] If the alleged infringer argues that the conditions of the offer are not FRAND – and, according to the court, alleged infringers typically do so – it is not the role of the infringement court to examine the conditions of the offer and decide whether they are FRAND or not. [5] Thus, the District Court took the view that an infringement court only assesses in a summary review whether the conditions were not evidently non-FRAND. An offer is only non-FRAND if it is under the relevant circumstances abusive. For example, this would be the case if the conditions offered to the alleged infringer were significantly worse than those offered to third parties. [11] The District Court held that in the case in issue the royalties were not evidently non-FRAND because the royalty rates were generally accepted in the market. [12]

The offer needs to include the calculation method in respect of the royalties. [11] However, the CJEU did not elaborate on the level of detail required. [13] The District Court took the view that the SEP holder needs to enable the alleged infringer to understand why the offer is FRAND. In the case in issue, the claimant had included the calculation method. It had also provided further explanations regarding the calculation, which met the Huawei/ZTE requirements. [14]

3. The standard implementer’s reaction

The alleged infringer is required to respond to the SEP proprietor’s license offer, even if the infringer is of the opinion that the offer does not meet the FRAND criteria. [13] The only possible exception is an offer that, by means of summary examination, is clearly not FRAND, which would constitute an abuse of market power. A counter-offer would need to be made as soon as possible, taking into account recognized commercial practices in the field and good faith. The District Court held that the defendant had not made an adequate counter-offer. It is common business practice to enter into license agreements in respect of worldwide portfolio licenses. [15] The defendant’s counter-offer only included the respective German license, which was deemed by the District Court as insufficient. [15] Further, the defendant had not made an adequate deposit into the court as required under the Huawei/ZTE principles. [16]

C. Other Important Issues

The court held that the procedures prescribed by the Huawei/ZTE ruling apply to applications for injunctions and recall orders, but not to rendering accounts and compensation. Regarding rendering accounts and compensation, SEP holders could pursue their rights in court without additional requirements. [13]

Further, the District Court was of the opinion that an alleged breach of Art. 101 TFEU could not be raised as a defence in patent infringement proceedings. Even if the claimant’s conduct was anti-competitive pursuant to Art. 101 TFEU, the standardisation agreement would be void. [17] This has no implications for patent infringement proceedings.

The court also held that there was no general rule that the SEP holder could only bring proceedings against the manufacturer of the infringing product. [18] In the eyes of the District Court, the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe decision 6 U 44/15 (23 April 2015) did not establish such a principle. In that case, the defendant was a company that acted merely as a distributor of infringing products (which means it was reselling the products without making any alterations). In contrast, the defendant in the present case had installed the infringing software onto laptops and then sold them under its own brand name. Thus, the two cases were not comparable. [18]

  • [1] See also OLG Karlsruhe, 8 September 2016, 6 U 58/16 (application to stay execution of LG Mannheim, 7 O 24/14).
  • [2]  LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, pp. 4-6.
  • [3] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, pp. 2-3.
  • [4] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 22.
  • [5] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 23.
  • [6] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 34/35.
  • [7] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 26.
  • [8] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, pp. 27-30.
  • [9] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 33.
  • [10] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 21.
  • [11] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 24.
  • [12] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 37.
  • [13] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 25.
  • [14] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 35/36.
  • [15] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 38.
  • [16] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, pp. 38-40.
  • [17] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 43.
  • [18] LG Mannheim, 4 March 2016, 7 O 24/14, p. 44.

Updated 20 2月 2018

TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, [2017] EWHC 3305 (Pat)

英国裁判所の決定
21 11月 2017 - Case No. HP-2017-000045

A. Facts

The Claimant is holder of two patents declared as essential to the implementation of the DSL standard under the relevant policy (ITU Recommen­dations). According to this policy he is required to license these patents on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The Defendants manufacture and sell various types of equipment complying with the DSL standard.

The parties were unable to reach an agreement on a worldwide portfolio license. The Claimant argued that the Defendants followed a “hold-out” strategy by trying to delay negotiations and litigation as long as possible, in order to avoid royalty payments.

The actions brought before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (EWHC) involve, on the one hand, the technical issues of validity, essentiality and infringement (technical trials) and, on the other hand, non-technical issues regarding licensing on FRAND terms (non-technical trial).

The parties agreed that the technical trials should be tried separately from, and before, the non-technical trial. After holding a case management conference, the court complied with the parties’ agreement to hold the technical trials first. The court, however, refrained from ordering the stay of the non-technical trial until the completion of the technical trials. Instead, the court allowed it to go ahead.

B. Court’s reasoning

In light of both the decision of the European Union Court of Justice in the matter Huawei v ZTE and the recent decision of the EWHC in the matter Unwired Planet v Huawei the court questioned the practice it followed so far, to hold FRAND related trials after technical trials.

In the court’s opinion, particularly if a global license for a global portfolio is in dispute between the parties, it is worth considering whether the prioritization of the trials should be altered, so that the non-technical trial comes first. If the defendant (potential infringer) wishes to argue that it does not need to take any license under any of the patents in suit, it is not compelled to do so. In this case, however, the defendant risks that it will, subsequently, be injuncted in infringement proceedings.

To justify its decision not to stay the non-technical trial, the Court referred to EWHC’s decision in the matter Unwired Planet v Huawei and pointed out, that the longer these proceedings are postponed, the longer their objective from the Claimant's perspective is frustrated, that is to obtain appropriate relief by way of injunction and/or financial compensation.

C. Other issues

Although the court did not rule on Claimant’s allegation that the Defendants pursued a “hold out” strategy, it made clear – again under reference to the matter Unwired Planet v Huawei that if that is the case, then the Defendants face the risk of being injuncted, if they should be unsuccessful in either of the technical trials.


Updated 26 1月 2017

Saint Lawrence v Vodafone

LG Düsseldorf
31 3月 2016 - Case No. 4a O 73/14

  1. Facts
    Since 28 August 2014 Claimant, a non-practicing entity, is the proprietor of the European patent EP 1 125 276 B1 “J”, originally granted to applicants “Voiceage, and allegedly covering part of the AMR-WB standard. Defendant is a company active in the telecommunications sector and which markets AMR-WB-based devices, inter alia devices produced by the Intervener in this case. After the adoption (“freeze”) of AMR-WB by ETSI on 10 April 2001, Claimant (who was not an ETSI member during the setting of the AMR-WB standard) made, on 29 May 2001, a commitment towards ETSI to grant licenses on FRAND terms inter alia for patent EP J. Claimant and its parent company “O” offer the SEP and all other patents of the same family to third parties by means of a portfolio license. Licensing conditions are accessible on the Internet and various producers in the sector have taken a license under these conditions. Prior to the submission of the patent infringement action on 23 July 2014 and to the advance payments on costs on 29 July 2014, Claimant alerted neither Defendant nor the manufacturer of the contested embodiments, who acted as an intervener in the present proceedings and became aware of the lawsuit in August 2014. By e-mails on 31 July and (as a reminder) on 9 December 2014, the first of which included a copy of the statement of claims and reached the defendant before it was formally served with the statement, Claimant notified the alleged patent violation to Defendant. After Defendant’s reply as of 12 January 2015, Claimant presented a draft licensing agreement to Defendant by letter as of 22 April 2015. On 9 December 2014, the Intervener (HTC) declared willingness to take a license for that patent, inter alia for the patent-in-suit, provided infringement was found in Mannheim’s District Court. It further declared that it would accept royalties determined by a court or arbitration tribunal. Claimant, in turn, offered a licensing agreement by letters as of 12 January 2015 and 25 March 2015 respectively. In the course of meetings taking place since 23 January 2014, [105] Claimant offered a license to the Intervener. On 23 February 2015 and on 2 April 2015 respectively, the Intervener made two licensing offers, including third party determination (arbitration panel or English court) of the amount of royalty, for the whole German patent portfolio of Claimant. An additional offer for a licensing agreement, limited to Germany and implementing a royalty of USD 0.0055 per patent by reference to the “WCDMA Patent Pools”, was made by the Intervener on 6 March 2015 and 24 September 2015 respectively, but it was finally refused by Claimant on 4 October 2015. Moreover, the Intervener provided a bank “guarantee of payment” as of 3 September 2015, being modified by letter as of 10 November 2015, and also rendered account of past and prospective sales in Germany since 2011.
  2. Court’s reasoning
    1. Market power and notice of infringement
      The court leaves open the question of whether the SEP conferred market power to Claimant since it did, in any case, find no abuse of such potential market power. [106] The court declared the Huawei rules applicable to claims for the recall of products. [107] As regards the Huawei requirement to alert the standard user of the infringement, the decision arrived at various findings of interest: Firstly, the judges found that—in “non-transitional” cases where the lawsuit was brought after the Huawei decision—the infringement notification has to take place before the action is filed, or the latest before the advance payment on costs is made. In transitional cases, such as the present case, a delayed infringement notification, taking place after the advance payment on costs as well as the submission of the court action, but before the statement of claims is served, is admissible. [108] Moreover, an infringement notification could possibly be omitted (in particular) if—as in the present case—the patent user already disposes of all necessary information and lacks willingness to license. [109] In non-transitional cases, however, the court doubts whether it is possible to rectify an omitted infringement notification without withdrawing the action. [110] Secondly, the court specified the minimum content of the infringement notification which has to indicate at least the number of the patent, the contested embodiments and the alleged acts of use performed by the standard implementer. The court did not decide whether additional information has to be provided, in particular regarding the interpretation of the patent claims or on which part of the standard the patent reads, but it stated that such additional information is not harmful to the patent proprietor. [111] Lastly, the court detailed on the particular situation of the Intervener, being Defendant’s manufacturer and supplier in the present case: Even though a FRAND defense successfully raised by the Intervener would in general also cover subsequent levels of the distribution chain, the Huawei requirements apply only indirectly to suppliers of contested embodiments which have not been sued themselves. Accordingly, the SEP proprietor is not obliged to notify the patent infringement to third parties, but as soon as a request to grant a license on FRAND terms is submitted the (adapted) Huawei procedure applies. [112] In casu, no separate infringement notice vis-à-vis the Intervener was required since the Intervener was, since August 2014, aware of the action having been brought.
    2. The SEP owner’s licensing offer
      Since the patent user did not express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement in due time, the court found Claimant to comply with the Huawei requirement to submit a licensing offer on FRAND terms even though the offer was made in the course of the ongoing litigation. For transitional cases, as the present one, this holds true even if infringement notification and court action take place at the same time. [113] Besides, the court analyzed under which circumstances licensing conditions can be considered as FRAND according to Huawei. In the opinion of the judges, the more licensing agreements implementing comparable terms the SEP proprietor has already concluded, the stronger is the presumption that these conditions are FRAND, unless factual reasons—which are to be demonstrated by the patent user—justify modified terms. Recognized commercial practice in the relevant sector has to be considered when defining the admissible scope of the licensing agreement. If patent portfolios are usually covered by group or worldwide licenses in the relevant market, a (worldwide) portfolio license will be FRAND unless the circumstances of the specific case, e.g. the SEP proprietor’s market activity being limited to one geographic market, require a modification. [114] Accordingly, Claimant’s (worldwide) licensing offer to Defendant for the whole AMR-WB pool, demanding royalties of USD 0.26 per mobile device that implemented the standard and was produced or marketed in countries in which the SEP was in force, and complying with Claimants existing licensing practice (accessible on the Internet and already implemented in 12 licensing agreements) was declared FRAND. While the court considered that comparable licensing agreements “represent an important indicator of the adequacy of the license terms offered” it clarified that the significance of a patent pool as an indication of FRAND conformity is “limited”. Defendant and the Intervener failed to show that the portfolio comprised (non-used) non-SEPs as well. [115] They further failed to show that the pre-concluded licensing agreements provided no valid basis for comparison as they were concluded under the threat of pending litigation. [116] In order to fulfill the Huawei obligation of specifying the calculation of royalties, the SEP proprietor only has to provide the information necessary to determine the amount of royalties to be paid, e.g. the royalty per unit and the products covered by the license. While the court left undecided whether additional indications, e.g. concerning the FRAND character of the licensing offer, are necessary to comply with Huawei, it found that the SEP proprietor’s duty to inform should not be interpreted too strictly as FRAND does regularly encompass a range of values that will be fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. [117] Claimant’s licensing offer presented to the Intervener was considered as being FRAND for the same reasons. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the contractual clause allowing for judicial review of the royalties offered could be a possible way to avoid abusive practices and to ensure that licensing offers correspond to FRAND terms. [118]
    3. The standard implementer’s reaction
      The court found that the more details the infringement notification contains, the less time remains for the standard user to examine the patent(s) at issue and to express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. In the present case, Defendant did not comply with Huawei because it took more than five months to react and then only asked for proof of the alleged infringement. Given this excessive delay, the court did not decide whether Defendant’s reaction satisfied the Huawei requirements in terms of content. It denied the possibility to remedy a belated reaction by a subsequent declaration of willingness to license. On the contrary, and as a consequence of the patent user’s non-compliance, the SEP proprietor may continue the infringement action without violating Article 102 TFEU, but it still has to grant licenses on FRAND terms. [119] Whether the Intervener satisfied the ECJ criteria was left undecided. [120] The court made some further remarks of interest as to the Huawei requirements concerning the standard implementer: Firstly, it left undecided whether the obligation of the patent user to diligently respond is caused also by a (potentially) non-FRAND licensing offer. [121] Secondly, a standard user who has taken a license is not prevented from challenging validity and essentiality of the SEP afterwards, nor is the SEP proprietor entitled to terminate the license if such a challenge takes place. However, the standard implementer may not delay the (unconditional) conclusion of the licensing agreement until a final court decision on these issues has been rendered. While validity and standard-essentiality is litigated, the licensee remains obliged to pay royalties and it cannot request to insert into the licensing contract a clause entitling it to reclaim paid royalties in case of its success in court. [122] Thirdly, as, in the present case, no specific counter-offers satisfying FRAND terms were submitted and Defendant could not establish that Claimant had waived this requirement the court did not decide on whether a SEP proprietor is obliged to negotiate further although itself and the patent user have submitted FRAND offers. [123] None of the counter-offers of the Intervener were FRAND in terms of content. They were either inadmissibly limited to Germany, contained no precise royalty, were not submitted “promptly” because the standard user had waited until the oral pleadings in the parallel procedure, or they proposed royalties per device which the court considered as too low. [124] While it was therefore held to be irrelevant whether, in the first place, the Intervener duly declared its willingness to license, the court emphasized that the Intervener’s readiness to take a license only after the SEP infringement was determined in court did not satisfy the Huawei standard of conduct. [125] Moreover, the obligation imposed by Huawei to provide appropriate security and to render account was not fulfilled. While Defendant refrained from taking any of these actions, the Intervener waited several months after the counter-offers were refused in order to submit its bank “guarantee of payment”, which was not recognized as “appropriate security” due to its amount and its limitation to acts of use in Germany. [126] Neither was the Intervener’s initial proposal to have the security—if requested by Claimant—determined by an arbitration tribunal or by an English court accepted as an appropriate way to provide security. [127]
  3. Other important issues
    According to the court, the Huawei requirements apply to both non-practicing entities and other market participants. [128] Suing a network operator instead of the undertakings producing devices operating in the network constitutes (at least under the circumstances of this case and absent selective enforcement) no violation of competition law even though this strategy might aim at using the action against the network operator as a “lever” to obtain licensing commitments from the device suppliers. On the other hand, device manufacturers are entitled to a FRAND license as well and can raise the FRAND defense if such a license is not granted. In consequence, the court perceives a fair balance of interests as the SEP proprietor can choose on which level of the chain of production to sue while the undertakings in the chain of production can choose on which level to take a license. [129] Furthermore, no patent ambush-defense based on § 242 BGB could be raised because, firstly, Defendant and the Intervener could not substantiate the alleged patent ambush by “Y” and “C”, being the original SEP proprietors; secondly, they could not show that a different patent declaration conduct would have resulted in a different version of the standard excluding the patent-in-suit; thirdly, the alleged patent ambush would, arguably, have resulted only in a FRAND-licensing obligation and, fourthly, Claimant had declared its willingness to grant a license on FRAND terms anyway. [130]
  • [105] This is the date mentioned by the Court although “23 January 2015” may seem more plausible and the date given by the Court may result from a scrivener’s error.
  • [106] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 184
  • [107] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 187
  • [108] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 195 et seq.
  • [109] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 208-210
  • [110] Case No. 4a O 126/14, para. IV, 3, a, bb, 2, c
  • [111] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 193
  • [112] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 270 et seq.
  • [113] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 222 et seq.
  • [114] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 225 et seq.
  • [115] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 225 et seq. On the relevance of the SIPRO-pool royalty rates, cf. LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 245-248. On the facts indicating that a worldwide license was appropriate LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 249-255.
  • [116] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 234-242. The court argued that it is questionable in principle how much the threat of a claim for injunctive relief can (inadmissibly) affect license agreement negotiations, since the Orange Book case law of the BGH (German Federal Court of Justice), the Motorola decision of the European Commission, and now the CJEU judgment in the Huawei Technologies/ZTE Case could be and can be invoked against inappropriate demands that are in breach of antitrust law.
  • [117] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 256 et seq.
  • [118] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 279 et seq.
  • [119] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 214-220
  • [120] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 214-220; 278
  • [121] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 266
  • [122] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 185 et seq.; 262 et seq.
  • [123] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 264
  • [124] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 291 et seq.
  • [125] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 278
  • [126] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 267 et seq.; 299 et seq.
  • [127] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 304
  • [128] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 189
  • [129] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 309-313
  • [130] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 317 et seq.

Updated 9 11月 2020

シャープ対ダイムラー、ミュンヘン地方裁判所

LG Munich
10 9月 2020 - Case No. 7 O 8818/19

A. 内容

原告は、日本に本社を置くシャープグループ会社(シャープ)である。シャープは、欧州電気通信標準化機構(ETSI)が開発した各種無線通信規格(標準必須特許又はSEP)の実施に必須(と見込まれる)として宣言済みの特許ポートフォリオを保有している。

被告ダイムラーは、ドイツの大手自動車メーカーである。ダイムラーは、ETSIにより開発された規格を実施する接続機能を搭載した自動車をドイツで製造し、販売している。

シャープは、本事件に関係する特許について、4G/LTE規格に必須(と見込まれる)としてETSIに宣言した。ETSIは、規格の実施に必須であるか、必須となる特許を公正、合理的かつ非差別的(FRAND)条件にてユーザーの利用に供すると確約するよう権利保有者に要求している。

In 2017年、シャープは、Avanciライセンシングプラットフォームに参加した。Avanciは、標準ライセンス契約及び固定料率に基づき、接続規格に関するSEPのライセンスを自動車メーカーにオファーした。Avanciは、2016年9月以降、ライセンス契約締結に関し、既にダイムラーと接触していたが、契約締結には至らなかった。

On 20 May 2019年5月20日、最初の接触後、シャープは、対象規格の関連部分にかかわる自社のSEP(係争中の特許を含む)を図示したクレームチャートをダイムラーに送付した。

2019年6月7日、ダイムラーは、使用した特許につき原則としてライセンスを取得する意向である旨を回答したが、双方向ライセンスのオファー又はAvanciプラットフォームを経由したライセンス許諾を行うかどうかシャープに尋ねた。双方向ライセンスがオファーされていれば、ダイムラーは、自社のサプライヤーも同様にライセンスを取得できると想定したことを指摘した。

2019年7月23日、ダイムラーは、ダイムラーでなく自社のサプライヤー(ただし、個別の社名には言及されていない)にライセンスが許諾されるべきだとの書簡をあらためてシャープに送付した。ダイムラーは、ダイムラーのサプライヤーにライセンスがオファーされないのであればシャープのETSIに対するFRAND誓約に反していると主張し、シャープの締結済み契約、特にダイムラーに接続ユニットを供給している会社との契約に関する情報を要請した。

2019年8月8日、シャープは、個別ライセンスをオファーする意向であるとダイムラーに回答し、通知した。このため、シャープは、一定の情報、特にダイムラーのサプライヤーにかかわる情報をダイムラーに要請した。

2019年9月18日、ダイムラーは、シャープから要請された情報の提供を拒絶し、シャープによる適切なライセンス要求先として自社のサプライヤーに委ねるとした。

2019年10月22日、シャープは、ダイムラーに双方向のFRANDライセンスをオファーしたが、このオファーは承諾されなかった。

その後、シャープは、ダイムラーを相手取り、ミュンヘン地方裁判所(裁判所)に権利侵害訴訟を提起した。ダイムラーの複数のサプライヤーがダイムラーを援護するため当該訴訟に参加した。 2019年12月17日、訴訟が提起された後、ダイムラーは、係争中の権利侵害訴訟の停止に同意するようシャープに要請した後、カウンターオファーを行った。2019年12月31日、シャープは、ダイムラーのこのカウンターオファーを拒絶した。

審理の過程で、シャープは、訴訟に参加していたダイムラーのサプライヤー1社との間で、ライセンス契約に関し合意した。結果として、シャープは、審理での主張内容を修正した。

この判決 [89] をもって、裁判所は、ダイムラーに差止命令を下すとともに、ダイムラーの損害賠償責任を判示した。さらに裁判所は、侵害製品のリコール及び破棄、計算書の提出、並びにシャープに対する損害賠償金の算定に必要な情報の提供をするようダイムラーに命じた。
 

B. 判決理由

裁判所は、係争中の特許が4G/LTE規格の実施に必須 [90] であり、侵害されていた [91] と認めた。これにより、シャープは、差止命令の救済手段を求める権利がある [92] 。 ダイムラーは、いわゆる「FRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁」を展開し、シャープが権利侵害訴訟の提起によって市場支配的地位を濫用し、これがEU機能条約(TFEU)第102条に反していることから、差止命令の申立ては却下されるべきと主張した。特に、Huawei対ZTE事件 [93] でEU司法裁判所(CJEU)が示した行動要件(Huwaei決定又はフレームワーク)をシャープが遵守していなかった点について主張した。 裁判所は、ダイムラーによるFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁を却下し、ダイムラーが自社サプライヤー由来のFRAND抗弁に依拠することはできないと認定した [94]

市場支配力の濫用

裁判所によれば、特許保有者が支配的地位に付帯する「特段の責任」を果たすための「十分な努力」を怠った上、原則として「ライセンスを取得する意向である」実施者との契約締結を推進した場合、SEPの行使による市場支配的地位の濫用が生じうる [95] 。ただし、この場合、権利保有者の許諾を得ることなく保護対象の技術を既に使用している実施者がFRAND条件でライセンスを取得する意向でなければならない [96] 。裁判所は、SEP保有者が規格実施者にライセンス取得の「強要」を求めることはできないと説明した [96]

上記を踏まえ、裁判所は、シャープが本件訴訟を提起したことはTFEU第102条に定められる濫用にあたらないと認めた [97] 。裁判所は、シャープが市場支配的地位を有していたか否かについては確証せず、本件においては有していたと想定するに留めた [97] 。それにもかかわらず、(想定された)支配的地位の濫用が認められなかったのは、ダイムラーがシャープのSEPポートフォリオにかかわるライセンスの取得することについて十分に明確な意欲を表明しなかったためである [98]
 

Willingness

裁判所は、「実際にいかなるFRAND条件であろうと」、実施者がSEP保有者とのライセンス契約を締結し、爾後、「目標志向」の方法でライセンス協議に従事する誠実意思を有する場合、これを「明確に」かつ「疑義のないよう」宣言しなければならないと説明した(引用判例、連邦司法裁判所、2020年5月5日判決、Sisvel対Haier、事件番号KZR 36/17、及び英国高等法院、2017年4月5日判決、事件番号[2017] EWHC 711(Pat) – Unwired Planet対Huawei) [96]

つまり、実施者は、ライセンス協議を遅延させてはならない [99] 。裁判所の見地からすると、特許で保護された標準化技術を協議前に既に利用している実施者はその特許が満了するまでライセンス契約の締結を遅延させる単独の利益又は優勢な利益を有しているため、遅延させてはならない点が特に重要である [99]

その上で、裁判所は、ダイムラーが「誠実意思を有する」実施者としてふるまっていなかったと認定した [98]

シャープへのカウンターオファー前のダイムラーの行動を見た上で、裁判所は、「明確な」誠実意思の宣言が欠落していたと判示した [100] 。2019年6月7日のシャープに対する最初の回答で、ダイムラーは、シャープの特許が使用されている場合でも、ライセンス協議に関する一般的な意思を超える確約をするとの表明を一切しなかった [101] 。さらに言えば、2019年7月23日付のダイムラーの書簡では、ダイムラーは、シャープに対して自社のサプライヤー(特定しないで)に差し向け、シャープがサプライヤーにライセンスを許諾する義務を負っていると主張しており、適切な誠実意思が宣言されていなかった [102] 。2019年9月18日の陳述書でも、ダイムラーは、自社のサプライヤーに委ねるとし、かつ、ライセンスオファーに必要な情報をシャープに提供することを拒絶していた [103] 。裁判所は、シャープから要請される情報を提供する法的義務はないが、ダイムラーがその提供を拒絶したことで、「目標志向」で協議に従事しなかっただけでなく、当該協議を遅延させることがねらいであったことが明らかになった点に着目した [104] 。これは、ダイムラーの回答がシャープの要請の都度およそ6週間後に行われていた事実からも確認されている。裁判所は、ダイムラーが回答に時間を要した理由を確認しなかった [104]

さらに、裁判所は、ダイムラーの「誠実意思を有しない」実施者としての行為は、Avanciプラットフォームとの協議でのダイムラーの全体的な態度からも明らかであると事実認定した [105] 。裁判所は、FRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁を申し立てる実施者の「誠実意思」を評価するにあたっては、時機的に、権利侵害通知受領後直接に発生した事実のみならず、全体的な行為を考慮に入れなければならないと判示した [106] 。誠実意思評価の基準は、特許保有者が先に実施者に接近したか、実施者が主導してライセンスを求めたかの「やや行き当たりばったりの」事実に依拠するものであってはならない [107] 。Huawei判決において示された義務(そのひとつが、ライセンス取得の「誠実意思」を表明することにより権利侵害通知に反応すること)は、原則としてCJEUの命令において「措置」として従うべきものであるが、両当事者の行動上例外が認められ、かつ、Huaweiフレームワークの純粋な「形式的」見解が適切でないと思われる場合には、ケースバイケースで例外を認めなければならない [108] 。裁判所によれば、ダイムラーが2016年9月以後Avanciと接触しており、いずれの時間的段階においてもライセンス取得の意向を表明していないことから、本件はその例外に該当した [109]

さらに裁判所は、2019年12月17日付のダイムラーによるカウンターオファーについて、権利侵害訴訟提起後になされたものに過ぎず、意向表明の欠如を是正することにならないと認定した [110] 。裁判所の見解によれば、本件において係属中の訴訟手続の停止についてシャープに同意が求め後カウンターオファーがなされた事実は、ダイムラーが専ら遅延を生じさせようとして行ったことを示しており、よって、当該カウンターオファーはその時点までにダイムラーが示していた「明らかな意向の欠如」を補うに値するものでなかった [111] 。この点に関し、裁判所は、審理が進むにつれ厳格さが増す要件が求められるが、係属中の訴訟手続中、(カウンターオファー等により)不備を是正する機会が原則として与えられていると述べた [112] 。 さらに裁判所は、ダイムラーのカウンターオファーが内容の点で、「実際にいかなるFRAND条件であろうと」ライセンスを取得する意向を表明するものでなかったと強調した [113] 。ロイヤルティ計算に異なる複数の「基準」を用いることで、ダイムラーは、シャープからオファーされたか、Avanciが競業者をとりまとめたオファーののごく一部のみについてカウンターオファーを行い、カウンターオファーの拒絶が「論理上必要」となるように仕向けていた [114]

この流れにおいて、裁判所は、意向の評価にはダイムラーの態度のみが関係すると明言した [115] 。さらに、ダイムラーは、差止命令を回避するために、訴訟に参加していたサプライヤーがシャープからライセンスを取得する意向を有していたとする「主張」には依拠することができなかった [116] 。よって、裁判所は、ダイムラーのサプライヤーが実際に「誠実意思を有するライセンシー」として行為していたかどうか調査しなかった [116]

非差別性/ライセンス許諾レベル

上記に加え、裁判所は、シャープがエンドデバイスメーカーであるダイムラーのみにライセンス取得を求めることにより、濫用的又は非差別的に行動していたのではなかったと説示した [117] 。 裁判所の見解では、シャープはダイムラーのサプライヤーにライセンスを許諾する義務を負っていなかった [118] 。(ドイツの)自動車業界においては自動車メーカーにコンポーネントを販売するサプライヤーが当該コンポーネントに関するライセンスを取得するのが一般的であるとはいえ、シャープがその慣行を尊重し、受け入れる義務を負うものではない [119] 。反対に、ダイムラーは、自社製品での無線通信技術の利用度が増す限り、その分野で一般的な、エンドデバイスメーカーへもライセンスを許諾するという慣行を受け入れなければならない [119]

上記にかかわらず、シャープは、コンポーネントメーカーにライセンスを許諾する法的義務を一切負っていない。シャープが負っているのは、自社のSEPがカバーする規格への「アクセス権」を付与する義務である [120] 。特許保有者がETSIに確約することにより、SEPのライセンスを第三者に許諾する義務が生じる [121] 41。しかしながら裁判所は、これにより、バリューチェーンのあらゆるレベルでライセンスを許諾する義務が必ずしも生じるわけではないことを強調した [122] 。そのような義務は、競争法又は特許法若しくはETSIのFRAND規約に対する契約法のいずれからも生じない [122] 。 特に、EU競争法では、バリューチェーンのあらゆるレベルでSEPのライセンスを許諾する義務を定めていない [123] 。裁判所によれば、特許保有者は原則として、バリューチェーンのどのレベルをライセンス許諾の対象とするか、自由裁量により選択することができる [124] 。Huawei判決において、CJEUは、FRAND引受けにより、特許保有者からライセンスを許諾される第三者の側に「正当な期待」が生じると指摘した。しかしながら裁判所は、これにより、エンドデバイスメーカーの全サプライヤーにライセンスを許諾する義務が生じるものではないと判示した。市場へのアクセスに必要とされるのは、必ずしもライセンスではなく、「法的に使用できること」である。これは例えばバリューチェーンの最終レベルで付与されるライセンス等を通じて与えられ、サプライヤーはこれに基づき「have-made-rights製造委託権」下で製造することができる [124]

また裁判所は、特許法においても、バリューチェーンの中でSEPライセンスが付与されるべきレベルは定められていないと説明した同判決、paras. 173節以下。。とりわけ、SEPポートフォリオに含まれる特許のすべてが常にコンポーネントメーカーのレベルで消尽するわけではないという事実が、(この場合に見込まれるライセンス料のより効率的な「管理」に加え)エンドデバイスレベルでのライセンス許諾の正当性を示している [126]

最後に、裁判所は、ETSIのFRAND規定は、契約法によって利害関係者たるすべての第三者にライセンスを許諾する義務が特許保有者に課すものではない旨を指摘した [127] 。適用されるフランス法に基づき、ETSI IPRポリシー第6.1条は、ライセンスを求める当事者との間でFRAND契約について協議する義務のみが課されると理解される [128] 。ただし、「装置」に言及した場合、本規定は、すべてのコンポーネントが必ずしも規格全体を実装するわけではないことから、エンドデバイスメーカーにのみ対応することとなる [129] 。裁判所の見地において、以前別の事例において欧州委員会が示した見解に拠っても、別の結論が導き出されることはない同判決、第180~183節。裁判所は、とりわけ、欧州委員会の決定(事件番号AT.39985 – Motorola)、水平的協力協定へのTFEU第101条の適用に関するガイドラインの通達(2011/C 11/01)、及びデジタル単一市場へのICT標準化優先性の通達(COM(2016) 176確定版)に言及した。

サプライヤーのFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁

さらに裁判所は、サプライヤーによりなされたFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁をダイムラーが利用することはできないと認めた [131] 。被告がそのような抗弁に依拠できるのは、特許保有者がサプライヤーにライセンスを許諾する義務を負っている場合に限られる。ただし、被告自らが、関連するバリューチェーンでの特許消尽を十分に考慮しSEP保有者との間でライセンス契約を締結する立場にある場合、上記の定めは適用されない [131]

裁判所は、本件がこれにあたるとみなした。ダイムラーのサプライヤーは、シャープに対しライセンスの許諾を請求する権利を有しておらず、標準化技術に対し「法的に保護されたアクセス権」を請求する権利を有していた。これをダイムラーに有利になるよう考慮することはできない [132]
 

C. その他の問題

さらに、裁判所は、比例性の原則(proportionality considerations)に基づくシャープの差止命令請求を制限する根拠はないと裁定した [133] 。ダイムラーは、自社製造の自動車が多数のコンポーネントを組み込んだ「複雑」な製品であり、シャープのSEPに関係するテレマティクス制御ユニットは当該自動車にとって重要性が低いとして、係争中の特許に基づき差止命令が下されるべきでないと論じた。

裁判所は、比例性がドイツ法において、原告から異議が申し立てられる都度検討される、憲法と同等の順位を有する一般原則であり、差止命令による救済手段に関しても考慮される旨を明言した [134] 。連邦裁判所の判例によれば、差止命令は、例外的に、信義則に反する特許保有者の正当化できない排他権で、実施者が不都合を被るおそれがあると即時に執行されない場合があり、 [135] 。 裁判所の見地から、差止命令による救済を求める権利の制限が問題になるのは「ごくわずかな例外的な事例」であることから、その制限に際しては、厳格な条件を定め、特に「法秩序」のみならず「法的な確実性及び予測可能性」を保護しなければならない [136] 。関係事実すべてをケースバイケースで評価する必要がある一方で、実体的及び手続上の包括的なフレームワーク(最初の差止命令の執行を求める場合の供託金差出しの必要性を含む)についても検討する必要がある [136]

裁判所は、差止命令により通常もたらされる結果を超える不都合のみが考慮の対象となりうることを説明した [136] 。権利侵害者には、可能な限り早急にライセンス契約を締結するよう努力し、かつ、遅くとも権利侵害通知受領後、見込まれる差止命令に対する予防措置を講じることが求められる [136]

この背景を鑑み、裁判所は、本件において、対象となるのがダイムラーの自動車に含まれる単一のコンポーネントのみであったとしても、複雑な特許ポートフォリオ(シャープのポートフォリオか、Avanciのポートフォリオかを問わない)に基づくライセンス許諾を巡り紛争が展開されると述べた [137] 。「コネクテッドカー」を参照する技術革新の重大部分は技術的・経済的双方の観点においてモバイル通信技術と密接に関連していることから、シャープの特許により実装された機能がダイムラーの車両にとってさほど重要でないとの反論は、裁判所を説得する材料とならなかった [138] 。最後に裁判所は、ダイムラーがシャープ又はAvanciのいずれともライセンス契約を締結すべく真摯な努力を尽くさなかったとして批判した [139]

  • [89] シャープ対ダイムラー、ミュンヘン地方裁判所、2020年9月10日判決、事件番号7O8818/19(https://www.gesetze-bayern.de/Content/Document/Y-300-Z-BECKRS-B-2020-N-22577?hl=trueから引用)
  • [90] 同判決、第68節以下。
  • [91] 同判決、第 25節以下。
  • [92] 同判決、第90節。
  • [93] Huawei対ZTE、EU司法裁判所、2015年7月16日判決、事件番号C-170/13
  • [94] シャープ対ダイムラー、ミュンヘン地方裁判所、2020年9月10日判決、事件番号7O8818/19第121節。
  • [95] 同判決、第124節。
  • [96] 同判決、第125節。
  • [97] 同判決、第128節。
  • [98] 同判決、第130節以下。
  • [99] 同判決、第126節。
  • [100] 同判決、第132節以下。
  • [101] 同判決、第134節以下。
  • [102] 同判決、第136節以下。
  • [103] 同判決、第138節以下。
  • [104] 同判決、第140節。
  • [105] 同判決、第141節。
  • [106] 同判決、第142節以下。
  • [107] 同判決、第143節以下。
  • [108] 同判決、第144節。
  • [109] 同判決、第146~149節。
  • [110] 同判決、第150節。
  • [111] 同判決、第151及び153節。
  • [112] 同判決、第152節。
  • [113] 同判決、第154節。
  • [114] 同判決、第154節以下。
  • [115] 同判決、第158節及び159節。
  • [116] 同判決、第158節。
  • [117] 同判決、第161節以下。
  • [118] 同判決、第162節。
  • [119] 同判決、第164節。
  • [120] 同判決、第165節。
  • [121] 同判決、第168節。
  • [122] 同判決、第169節。
  • [123] 同判決、第170節以下。
  • [124] 同判決、第171節。
  • [125] 同判決、paras. 173節以下。
  • [126] 同判決、第174節。
  • [127] 同判決、第175節以下。
  • [128] 同判決、第177節以下。
  • [129] 同判決、第178節。
  • [130] 同判決、第180~183節。裁判所は、とりわけ、欧州委員会の決定(事件番号AT.39985 – Motorola)、水平的協力協定へのTFEU第101条の適用に関するガイドラインの通達(2011/C 11/01)、及びデジタル単一市場へのICT標準化優先性の通達(COM(2016) 176確定版)に言及した。
  • [131] 同判決、第167節。
  • [132] 同判決、第185節。
  • [133] 同判決、第92~102節。
  • [134] 同判決、第93節。
  • [135] 同判決、第94節。
  • [136] 同判決、第95節。
  • [137] 同判決、第97節以下。
  • [138] 同判決、第100節以下。
  • [139] 同判決、第99節。

Updated 24 7月 2020

Sisvel 対 Haier、ドイツ連邦最高裁判所(Bundesgerichtshof)

Federal Court of Justice - BGH
5 5月 2020 - Case No. KZR 36/17

A. 事実

原告であるSisvelは、各種無線通信規格の実施において必須な(と見込まれる)ものとして宣言された特許(標準必須特許、又はSEP)を保有する。

被告は、中国に本社を置くHaier groupのドイツ及びフランスの子会社である(Haier)。Haierグループは、とりわけ、GPRS規格に適合した電子機器の製造及びマーケティングを行なっている。

2012年12月20日、Sisvelは、Haier groupの親会社(Haier China)に対し、SisvelのSEPの使用侵害について通知した。Sisvelは、そのポートフォリオに包含されたおよそ450件の特許の一覧を提示すると共に、自社のSEPについてライセンスの申出を行う旨をHaierに知らせた。

2013年4月10日、Sisvelは、公平、合理的、かつ非差別的(FRAND)な条件にて規格ユーザにSEPの利用を認めることを欧州電気通信標準化機構(「ETSI」)に確約した。

2013年8月及び11月に、Sisvelは、Haier Chinaに対し、自社のライセンスプログラムに関する情報を記した追加の書簡を送付した。Haier Chinaは、2013年12月のみ、Sisvelに対して回答し、Sisvelと「正式な交渉(formal negotiation)」を行うことを望んでいる旨を明示すると共に、これまでのやりとりでSisvelが提示した割引の可能性に関する情報の提供を求めた。

2014年8月、Sisvelは、Haierに対してライセンスの申出を行ったが、この申出は、2014年9月に拒絶された。その直後、Sisvelは、Haierに対し、GPRS規格に従い、データ送信技術を対象としたSEPに基づき、デュッセルドルフの地方裁判所(本地方裁判所)に権利侵害訴訟を申し立てた(係争特許)。これに対応して、Haierは、2015年3月に、係争特許の無効の訴えを求め、ドイツ連邦特許裁判所に訴訟を提起した。

2015年11月3日に、本地方裁判所は、Haierに対して差止命令を出した [152] 。本地方裁判所はまた、侵害製品のリコール及び破棄を命じた。さらに本地方裁判所は、実体的事項に関するHaierの損害賠償責任を認めると共に、Haierに対して、Sisvelに対する侵害製品の販売にかかわる完全かつ詳細な会計書類の提示を命じた。

Haierは、この決定を上訴すると共に、本地方裁判所により下された差止命令の執行の停止を命じるよう、デュッセルドルフ高等裁判所(Higher District Court of Duesseldorf)(本上訴裁判所)に要請した。2016年1月、本控訴裁判所は、それぞれの命令を言い渡した [153]

上訴手続きにおいて、Haierは、とりわけ、Sisvelが侵害訴訟を提起した後の、Huawei対ZTE事件の2015年7月に下された判決(Huawei判決)において欧州司法裁判所(CJEU)がSEP保有者に課した行動要件について、本地方裁判所が、これを適切に考慮しなかった旨を主張した [154] 。 本控訴裁判所での手続き中、2016年1月16日に、Haierはさらに、ドイツの裁判所が係争特許の有効性及び侵害性を最終的に認めた場合のみ、SisvelからFRANDライセンスを受けるつもりであることを宣言した。2016年3月23日に、Haierは、Sisvelに別の書簡を送り、状況が何も変わっていないことを示した。さらに、Haierは、Sisvelの全ての特許に関するクレームチャート及びロイヤルティの算定についての追加の情報を要請した。2016年12月、Sisvelは、Haierに対して新たなライセンスの申出を行ったが、この申出はまた拒絶された。

2017年3月30日付の判決により、本控訴裁判所は、Haierの上訴を部分的に認めた [155] 。本控訴裁判所は、実体的事項に関するHaierの損害賠償責任及び会計書類の提示義務を確認した。しかしながら、本上訴裁判所は、Haierが侵害製品のリコール及び破棄についていかなる義務も負うものではないと判断した。Sisvelが、特にHaierに対してFRANDライセンスの申出を行わなかったことにより、Huawei判決に基づく自らの義務を遵守しなかったからである。本上訴裁判所は、両当事者が本件については和解することに合意したため、差止命令による救済の請求について決定を下す必要はなかった。係争特許が2016年9月に満了となるからである。Sisvelは、本控訴裁判所の決定に対して不服申し立てを行った。

2017年10月、係争特許の特定のクレームの範囲を狭め、別途その有効性を確認した [156] 。2020年3月に、ドイツ連邦最高裁判所(FCJ又は本裁判所)は、第二審として本決定を概ね容認した [157]

2020年5月5日付のこの判決により  [158] (引用元 https://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=3abd1ba29fc1a5b129c0360985553448&nr=107755&pos=0&anz=1)、FCJは、本控訴裁判所の判決を破棄した。第一審における本地方裁判所の裁定は、Sisvelの損害賠償請求及び情報及び会計書類の提示請求に関して維持された。Sisvelによる侵害製品のリコール及び破棄についての請求は、Haierが所有している製品又は係争特許が2016年9月に満了となるまでに製造され、もしくは引き渡された製品に制限された。Sisvelによる差止命令による救済の請求は、これが係争特許が失効した後に本控訴裁判所における従前の手続き中に撤回されたため、本裁判所の裁定の対象とはならなかった。


B. 判決理由 本裁判所は、係争特許がGPRS規格に必須であり、侵害を受けているとの判決を下した [159]

さらに、本裁判所は、Haierに対する侵害訴訟を開始することにより、SisvelがEU機能条約(TFEU)第102条を違反して支配的市場地位を濫用していなかったと判決を下した [160]

本裁判所の見地からは、Sisvelは、侵害訴訟を提起する前に、自らのSEPの侵害使用についてHaierに通知を交付する、Huawei判決に基づく自らの義務を履行している。一方、Haierは、Sisvelとライセンス契約を締結するという自らの誠実意思を適切に示す、自らのHuawei義務を履行しなかった。この事実は、もはや本件において決め手となるものではないが、本裁判所は、SisvelがそれぞれのHuawei要件に従ってHaierにFRANDライセンスの申出を行ったとの見解を示した。

支配的市場地位

本裁判所は、SisvelがTFEU第102条の意味の範囲内で支配的市場地位にあるとの判決を下した  [161]

FCJは、支配的市場地位が、特許により付与される独占的な権利のみによって生じるものではないと説明した [162] 。従って、いくつかの要因を考慮する必要がある [163] 。1つ目の重要な要因は関連市場である。特許が、標準化団体によって策定された基準(又はデファクトスタンダード(事実上の標準))に適合する上で技術的に必須であって、かつ、下流市場で付された製品について、当該基準に代わる技術的な手段が利用できない場合、支配性の評価に適すのは、当該特許のライセンスが提供される(個々の)市場である [164]  。

これに基づき、本裁判所は、Sisvelが支配的市場地位にあると判示した:係争特許は、GPRS規格の実施に必須であること、また、GPRS規格に適合したいかなる携帯電話も、従前の規格の世代も今後の規格の世代も同一の機能を備えることが認められていないため、(下流)市場において競業するものではないこと [165]

この状況において、FCJは、規格実施者が、商品及びサービスの市場の買主と比較して、交渉において有利な立場を得る場合が多いという事実により、SEP保有者の市場支配が制限されるというSisvelの意見を認めなかった [166] 。本裁判所は、商品やサービスの買主とは異なり、規格実施者が、特許保有者との合意を締結していなくとも、規格に準拠した製品を製造するために必要な保護された技術にアクセスできるという有利な立場にいると判断した  [167] 。しかしながら、本裁判所によると、この事実は、市場支配を除外するには十分ではない。ライセンスの交渉において個々の実施者に対するSEP保有者の交渉力の度合いは関係ない [168] 。 支配的市場地位は、独占的権利を行使して市場から実施者を排除する法的能力から生じる、特許保有者の優越した構造的な市場支配力によりもたらされる [169]

同様に、本裁判所は、SEPの行使に関するHuawei判決により課せられた制限が、市場支配(的地位)を損なうものではないことを指摘した [170] 。 本裁判所は、対等な立場で交渉を行うための手段をSEP保有者が最大限に利用できないため、これらの制限がSEP保有者の交渉上の立場を著しく弱めていると指摘した [170] 。 それにも関わらず、実施者が、特許が満了となるまで交渉を遅延することにより「ホールドアウト」行為を行うような場合でさえ、これは、特許保有者の支配的地位を問題として取り上げるには十分ではない  [170]

それでもやはり、本裁判所は、係争特許が満了したので、Sisvelの支配的市場地位が終結したことを指摘した  [171]

侵害製品を(下流)市場参入から排除する法的権利がこれ以上付与されなくなる場合、SEP保有者はもはや支配力を有しない  [171]

市場支配的地位の濫用

両当事者の行為を検討し、本裁判所は、本控訴裁判所とは異なり、Sisvelがその市場支配的地位を濫用していないと判断した  [172]  。

本裁判所は、SEP保有者が、本質的には自らの特許から生じる独占的な権利を行使することを妨げられていないことを明言した  [173] 。特許が標準必須特許であるという事実は、その特許保有者が、支配的な市場地位を有することにより、その技術の使用を許可しているか、許可するよう義務付けられていない限り、かかる使用を容認しなければならないということを意味するものではない。 [173] 。しかしながら、FCJによると、SEPの使用を許可しなければならないという義務は、実施者がFRAND条件にてライセンスを取得するつもりのない場合には存在しない。特許保有者は、とりわけライセンス契約の締結を要請する法的権利を有しないため、支配的な市場地位を有するとしても、標準必須特許の使用者に対してライセンスを「課す」義務はない。 [174]  。

こうした背景のもと、本裁判所は、SEP保有者による独占的な権利の主張(差止命令による救済並びに/又は侵害製品のリコール及び破棄の請求)が市場独占性の濫用に相当し得るという、2つの事案を特定した。

  1. 特許保有者がその支配的な市場地位を濫用したり、非差別性に関わる義務を違反することなく、かかる特許保有者によって拒絶され得ない条件にて、実施者が無条件のライセンスの申出を行なった場合(本裁判所が2009年5月6日付の「オレンジブックスタンダート事件」判決(事件番号 KZR 39/06)における従前の裁定を反芻した限りにおいて) [175]  。
  2. 実施者が、基本的に、ライセンスを取得するつもりであるが、SEP保有者がその支配的市場地位に付される「固有の責任」に従ってライセンス契約の締結を円滑に進める「十分な努力」を尽くしていない場合 [176]

権利侵害通知

結果的に、本裁判所は、SEP保有者が、侵害請求訴訟を提起する前に係争特許の侵害使用について実施者に対して通知義務を負うという見解を示した [177] 。実施者が未だ侵害を認識していない場合に限り当該義務が発生するとFCJが示唆したと思われる  [178]  。

本裁判所は、基本的には、技術実施者が、製品の製造や販売を担う前に第三者の権利が侵害されていないことを確認しなければならない旨を説示した [179]  。しかしながら、この責務は、とりわけ情報通信技術(ICT)分野においてはかなり困難なことである。ICT分野の製品は、多数の特許権の影響を受ける可能性がある  [179]  。特許保有者は、通常はすでに侵害について調査しているが、実施者がFRAND条件にてライセンスを取得する必要があるか否かを検討し、それにより差止命令を回避できるよう、裁判手続きの開始前に実施者に対して特許の使用についての情報を提供しなければならない。 [180]  。

本裁判所によると、それぞれの侵害通知は、通常、グループ会社の親会社宛に送付されることで十分とする  [181] [309] 。内容について言えば、通知には、侵害対象となった特許を明記すると共に、特定の侵害使用及び非難の対象たる実施形態について説明しなければならない [182]  。侵害の技術的かつ法的分析についての詳細は必要ない。従って、実施者は、最終的には専門家や弁護士の助言に従い、侵害の申立について専ら評価しなければならない [182]  。概して、実際にはクレームチャートを提示することで十分な場合多い(強制ではない)  [182]  。

さらに、侵害された特許及び影響を受けた規格に関する情報を提供した特許保有者は、実施者が受け取った情報が侵害を評価するには十分ではないと直ちに示すことを予測していることを、FCJは付言した [183] 。これは、多くの特許及び規格が関わる場合にも当てはまる [183]

上記の事項を考慮し、本裁判所は、Sisvelが所定の適切な侵害通知をHaierに交付したと判断した。2012年12月20日付の書簡及びその後のやりとりは、該当する要件を満たすものであった  [184]  。

誠実意思

その一方、Haierの行為を勘案し、本裁判所は、HaierがSisvelからFRAND条件によるライセンスを取得する意思のあるライセンシーとして行為しなかったと判断した [185] 。この点において、FCJは、逆の結論に至った本控訴裁判所によるそれぞれの評価に異議を示した。

本裁判所は、Haierがほぼ1年にわたって(2012年12月から2013年12月まで)、対応することをとどまっていたため、Sisvelからの通知に対するHaier Chinaの当初の回答が遅かったことに注視した [186] 。侵害通知に回答するのに数ヶ月を要する実施者というのは、通常は、ライセンスを取得することに関心のないこと示す  [186]  。Sisvelが、2012年12月のHaierに対する最初の通知の送付後になって、Sisvelが係争特許を対象としてETSIに対してFRAND確約を行なったという事実は、適時性を評価する上でいかなる意味もなさない。2012年12月20日付の書簡において、Sisvelはすでに、Haierに対してFRANDライセンスを申し出るつもりであることを宣言している [186] 。侵害訴訟手続きの開始前に行われた遅延された回答が(2013年12月からのHaierの回答と同様に)、それでもやはり、当事者らによるHuawei判決(本上訴裁判所が行なった通り)の遵守を評価する際に考慮されるか否かについての疑義は、FCJによって判断されなかった  [187]  。本件では、この疑義は関連性がない。というのは、内容の点から言えば、Haierによるいかなる回答にも、ライセンスを取得する意思が十分に示されていないからである  [188]  。

本裁判所の見地から、実施者は、「どのような条件が実際にFRANDにあたるのかにかかわらず」SEP保有者とのライセンス契約を締結する意思について、「明確に」かつ「疑義の生じないよう」宣言しなければならない(Unwired Planet 対 Huawei(英国及びウェールズ高等法院、2017年4月5日付、事件番号[2017] EWHC 711(Pat)の判決を引用)  [189]  。実施者は、その後、「目的志向」の態度にてライセンス供与の協議に参加する義務がある [317] 。むしろ、権利侵害の通知に対して、ライセンス契約締結を検討する意思を示したり、ライセンス取得の是非及びその条件についての協議に入る意思を示したりするだけでは不十分である  [189]  。

これに基づき、本裁判所は、Haierの2014年12月の回答が、「正式な交渉」を行うという見込みのみが示されているだけであって、誠実意思を宣言するには不十分であると判断した。この宣言は、上記の「明確なもの」でも「疑義の生じないもの」でもなかった  [190]

同様に、2016年1月16日付のHaierの書簡には、Haierがドイツの裁判所による係争特許の有効性及び侵害についての従前の確認を条件としてライセンス契約を締結したため、誠実意思についての十分な宣言が記載されていなかった [191]  。実施者は、原則として、ライセンス契約の締結後にはライセンス対象特許の有効性に異議を申し立てる権利を留保することができるが、本裁判所は、それぞれの条件下での誠実意思の宣言を行うことはできないと判断した [191]  。

さらに、FCJは、Haierが2016年3月23日付の書面により自らの誠実意思を十分に明示してはいなかったと判断した。Haierが上記の許容できない条件を撤回しなかったという事実とは別に、本裁判所は、侵害通知の受領後およそ3年間に渡って、全てのSisvelの特許に関するクレームチャートの作成を要請することは、Haierが係争特許が満了となるまで交渉を遅延させることにしか関心がないことを示すものであるとの見解を示した  [192]  。

Haierが誠実意思を適切に宣言しなかったため、本裁判所は、侵害手続きが開始された後に、実施者がこの義務を履行することが可能であるか否かについて回答しなかった  [193]  。

 

  • [152] Sisvel 対 Haier、デュッセルドルフ地方裁判所、2015年11月3日付判決、事件番号No. 4a O 93/14。
  • [153] Sisvel 対 Haier、 デュッセルドルフ高等裁判所、2016年1月13日付判決、事件番号No. I-15 U 66/15。
  • [154] Huawei対ZTE、欧州司法裁判所、2015年7月16日付判決、事件番号No. C-170/13。
  • [155] Sisvel v Haier、デュッセルドルフ高等裁判所、2017年3月30日付判決、事件番号No. I-15 U 66/15。
  • [156] 連邦特許裁判所、2017年10月6日付判決、事件番号No. 6 Ni 10/15 (EP)。
  • [157] 連邦裁判所、2020年3月10日付判決、事件番号No. X ZR 44/18。
  • [158] Sisvel 対Haier、連邦裁判所、2020年5月5日付判決、事件番号KZR 36/17。
  • [159] 同判決、第9節以下、及び第59節。
  • [160] 同判決、第52節。
  • [161] 同判決、第54節。
  • [162] 同判決、第56節。
  • [163] 同判決、第 57節以下。
  • [164] 同判決、第58節。
  • [165] 同判決、第59節以下。
  • [166] 同判決、第61節。
  • [167] 同判決、第63節。
  • [168] 同判決、第62節。
  • [169] 同判決、第61節以下。FCJによると、それぞれの法的障害により、会社が市場に参入することが不合理なものとなっている事実により、事前にライセンスを得ていなくとも、市場参入の障壁はすでに構築されている。第63項を参照。
  • [170] 同判決、第64節。
  • [171] 同判決、第65節。
  • [172] 同判決、第67節以下。
  • [173] 同判決、第69節。
  • [174] 同判決、第70節。
  • [175] 同判決、第71節。
  • [176] 同判決、第72節。
  • [177] 同判決、第73節以下。
  • [178] 同判決、第73節以下。 本裁判所によると、特許保有者は、規格の使用者に対し、当該使用者が規格を実施することによりその特許の内容が許可なく使用されることになるという「事実を認識していない」場合には、特許の侵害について通知しなければならない。
  • [179] 同判決、第74節。
  • [180] 同判決、第74節及び第85節。
  • [181] 同判決、第89節。
  • [182] 同判決、第85節。
  • [183] 同判決、第87節。
  • [184] 同判決、第86 節以下。
  • [185] 同判決、第91節以下。
  • [186] 同判決、第92節。
  • [187] 同判決、第93節以下。
  • [188] 同判決、第94節。
  • [189] 同判決、第83節。
  • [190] 同判決、第95節。
  • [191] 同判決、第96節。
  • [192] 同判決、第98節。
  • [193] 同判決、第97節。

Updated 23 1月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat)

英国裁判所の決定
5 4月 2017 - Case No. HP-2014-000005

A. Facts

The claimant is a company that grants licenses for patented technologies in the telecommunications industry. The patents at issue (EP (UK) 2 229 744, EP (UK) 2 119 287, EP (UK) 2 485 514, EP (UK) 1 230 818, EP (UK) 1 105 991, EP (UK) 0 989 712) relate to telecommunication network coding and procedures. [193] Most were part of a large patent portfolio that the claimant had acquired from a major telecommunications company in 2013. [194] In 2014, the claimant made a declaration under the ETSI IPR Policy that it was willing to grant licenses on FRAND terms. There were five technical trials relating to the validity, infringement and essentiality of these patents. This summary focuses on the non-technical trial addressed competition law issues, FRAND issues, injunctive relief and damages for past infringements. [195]

In April 2014 the claimant made an open offer to the defendant, a major international smartphone manufacturer, to grant a license in respect of the claimant’s entire global patent portfolio (containing SEPs and non-SEPs). The defendant refused the offer, contending that there was no patent infringement, that the patents were not essential, and that they were invalid. The defendant also argued that the offer was not FRAND and thus did not constitute an abuse of a dominant market position under Art. 102 TFEU. In July 2014 the claimant made a further offer, limited to the claimant’s SEPs. Again, the defendant refused, arguing that the license conditions were not FRAND. [196] In June 2015 both parties made further offers. These offers were the result of directions from the court. The claimant offered a worldwide portfolio license while the defendant wanted to limit the territorial scope to the United Kingdom. [197] Between August and October 2016 the parties exchanged further offers without reaching an agreement. [198]

The Patents Court (Birrs J) held that the claimant was in a dominant position, but did not abuse this position. [199] The defendant was not prepared to take a license on FRAND conditions and the claimant was not in breach of competition law. Thus, the court held that a final injunction to restrain patent infringements should be granted. An injunction for infringements of patents EP (UK) 2 229 744 and EP (UK) 1 230 818 was granted on 7 June 2017. [200]

B. Court’s Reasoning

1. Market Power

The court defined the relevant market for assessing dominance as a distinct market for licensing each SEP individually. [201] European case law indicated that owning an SEP could be a rebuttable presumption for the existence of a dominant position. [202] The claimant’s pleaded position was a non-admission of dominance rather than a denial coupled with a positive case to the contrary. It was the view of the court that this was insufficient to rebut the presumption. In particular, the claimant’s argument of countervailing buyer power was unconvincing because it had not been supported by a proper economic analysis. [203]

2. SEP Proprietor’s Licensing Offer

a. FRAND Declaration as Conceptual Basis

The court pointed out that that the FRAND undertaking also applied in the case that the SEP proprietor was not in a dominant position. It held that the FRAND undertaking operated as a practical constraint on a SEP owner’s market power. [204] The ETSI declaration made by the SEP proprietor is also the starting point for determining the FRAND rate. The underlying issue, which is discussed at length by the court, [205] is if such a declaration forms a contract and whether that contract can benefit third parties. The court acknowledged that the legal effect of this declaration, in particular its enforceability, is a controversial issue under French law. [206] However, the court reasoned that the FRAND declaration is an important aspect of technology standardisation. Holders of SEPs are not compelled to give a FRAND declaration. If they do, the undertaking would be enforceable and irrevocable due to public interest. [206]

The court applied a procedural approach to FRAND. It emphasised that FRAND describes not only a set of license terms, but also the process by which a set of terms are agreed. [207] It applies to both the SEP-holder and the implementer/defendant. In particular, this approach allows for starting offers that leave room for negotiation. On the other hand, making extreme offers and taking an uncompromising approach which prejudices fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory negotiation is not a FRAND approach. [208] This approach also means that the SEP proprietor is under an obligation to make a FRAND offer and to enter into FRAND license agreements. [209]

b. ‘True FRAND Rate’

The court considered that there is only a single set of terms for a given set of circumstances that would meet FRAND conditions (‘true FRAND rate’). [210] This eliminates the so-called Vringo-problem, [211] i.e. if FRAND were a range there would be two different but equally FRAND offers. Thus, if the court would grant or not an injunction, it would be unfair for the alleged infringer or SEP holder respectively. [212]

The court was of the opinion that the true FRAND rate approach does not cause problems under competition law. Theoretically, if only one set of terms is truly FRAND, and if FRAND also represents the line between abusive and non-abusive conduct under Art. 102 TFEU, then every agreed SEP-licence could be at serious risk of being abusive. [213] However, the court took the view that FRAND-compliance and compliance with Art. 102 TFEU are not the same thing (the court pointed out that the CJEU in the Huawei ruling appears to equate an obligation to make a FRAND offer with compliance with Art 102 TFEU).Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 154./span> Since Art. 102 TFEU condemns excessive pricing, [215] a royalty rate can be somewhat higher than the true FRAND rate and still not be contrary to competition law. Conversely, for a breach of competition law, it will be necessary but not sufficient that the rate is not the true FRAND rate. [215]

c. Discrimination

The court held that the correct approach is to start from a global rate as a benchmark and to then adjust this rate as appropriate. [216] It distinguished between two concepts of discrimination. First, the ‘general’ concept of non-discrimination describes an overall assessment of FRAND which can be used to derive the benchmark mentioned above. [217] It is based on the intrinsic value of the patent portfolio, but it does not depend on the licensee. The court held that this benchmark should be applied to all licensees seeking the same kind of license. [218]

Second, the ‘hard-edged’ non-discrimination obligation, which takes into account the nature of the potential licensee, [217] is a distinct concept that could be used to adjust license terms. However, the court held that the FRAND declaration does not introduce such a hard-edged non-discrimination concept. [219] If, contrary to the view taken by the court, the FRAND undertaking did include hard-edged non-discrimination, a licensee could only have the right to a lower rate granted to another licensee (i.e. a specific non-discrimination obligation resulting from the FRAND declaration) if the difference would otherwise distort competition between the two licensees. [218]

d. Territorial Scope of License

The court held that the defendant’s offer that was limited to UK licenses was not FRAND. In the court’s opinion country by country licensing is inefficient for goods such as mobile telecommunications devices that are distributed across borders. [220] It would also be inefficient to negotiate many different licenses and then to keep track of so many different royalty calculations and payments. No rational business would do this, if it could be avoided. [220] This was illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of licenses introduced in the trial were worldwide licenses. [221] Further, it is common ground that the industry assesses patent families rather than individual patents within the family. Assessing portfolios on a family basis inevitably involved tying a patent in one jurisdiction with a patent in another. [222] Thus, according to the court, a worldwide license would not be contrary to competition law. As willing and reasonable parties would agree on a worldwide licence, the insistence by the defendant on a license which was limited to the UK was not FRAND. [223]

C. Other Important Issues

1. Comparable agreements and reasonable aggregate royalty rate

The court held that for determining the royalty rate, the evidence of the parties would be relevant, including evidence of how negotiations actually work in the industry. [224] Other freely-negotiated license agreements might be used as comparables. [225] This may be compared with a top down approach [226] can also be used in which the rate is set by determining the patentee’s share of relevant SEPs and applying that to the total aggregate royalty for a standard, but this may be more useful as a cross-check. [227] Royalty rates determined by other courts might be useful as persuasive precedents. However, in the eyes of the court, a license rate determined at a binding arbitration does not carry much weight as to what parties are usually paying. [224] License agreements must meet certain criteria to be comparable. [228] First, the licensor is the claimant. Second, the license agreement is recent. However, it is not necessary that the licensee is the defendant or a comparable company because different market participants have different bargaining powers, which is reflected in the negotiations and the resulting royalty rates. [228] Finally the court confirmed that a royalty based on the handset price was appropriate and implied a reasonable aggregate royalty rate of 8.8%of the handset price. The court found that the 8.8% was reasonable, in part, because the aggregate implied by either party’s case was higher (10.4% and 13.3%). [229]

2. Principles derived from Huawei v. ZTE

The court also provided a compiled overview of its interpretation of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling. [230] In the eyes of the court, the ‘willingness to conclude a licence on FRAND terms’ refers to a willingness in general. The fact that concrete proposals are also required does not mean it is relevant to ask whether the proposals are actually FRAND or not. If the patentee complies with the procedure as set out by the CJEU, then bringing a claim for injunction is not abusive under Art 102. But even if sufficient notice is given, bringing a claim can constitute an abuse because complying with the procedure does not mean that a patentee can behave with impunity. In other words, there might be other aspects that make the claim abusive. Conversely, bringing such a claim without prior notice will necessarily be abusive.

Significantly, the court held, the legal circumstances of this case differ from the circumstances assumed by the CJEU in a crucial respect. A FRAND undertaking can be effectively enforced irrespective of Art 102. The defendant does not need Art 102 TFEU to have a defence to the injunction claim.
  • [193] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 2.
  • [194] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 54 et seqq.
  • [195] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 3.
  • [196] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 5.
  • [197] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 7-8.
  • [198] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 11-14.
  • [199] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 807.
  • [200] Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC 1304 (Pat).
  • [201] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 631.
  • [202] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 634.
  • [203] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 636-646.
  • [204] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 656.
  • [205] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 108-145.
  • [206] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 146.
  • [207] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 162.
  • [208] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 163.
  • [209] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 159.
  • [210] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 164.
  • [211] See Vringo v ZTE [2013] EWHC 1591 (Pat) and [2015] EWHC 214 (Pat).
  • [212] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 158.
  • [213] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 152.
  • [214] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 154./span> Since Art. 102 TFEU condemns excessive pricing,Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 153. a royalty rate can be somewhat higher than the true FRAND rate and still not be contrary to competition law. Conversely, for a breach of competition law, it will be necessary but not sufficient that the rate is not the true FRAND rate.Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 153.
  • [215] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 153.
  • [216] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 176.
  • [217] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 177.
  • [218] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 503.
  • [219] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 501.
  • [220] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 544.
  • [221] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 534.
  • [222] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 546.
  • [223] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 572.
  • [224] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 171.
  • [225] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 170
  • [226] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 178
  • [227] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 806 (10)
  • [228] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 175.
  • [229] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 476.
  • [230] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), 744.

Updated 6 5月 2021

Sisvel v Haier

Federal Court of Justice - BGH
24 11月 2020 - Case No. KZR 35/17

A. Facts

The claimant, Sisvel, holds patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of several wireless telecommunications standards (standard essential patents, or SEPs). Sisvel has made a commitment towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to make SEPs accessible to users on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.

The defendants are two European subsidiaries of the Haier group (Haier), which has its headquarters in China. The Haier group produces and markets -among other things- mobile phones and tablets complying with various standards, including the GPRS and UMTS standards developed by ETSI.

On 20 December 2012, Sisvel informed the parent company of the Haier group (Haier China) that it offers licences for its SEPs and shared a list of approx. 235 patents included in its portfolio. In August and November 2013, Sisvel sent further letters with information about its licensing program to Haier China.

Haier China replied to Sisvel only in December 2013. It expressed 'hope' to have 'a formal negotiation' with Sisvel and asked for information regarding potential discounts mentioned in previous communi­cations.

In August 2014, Sisvel made an offer for a global portfolio licence to Haier, which was rejected.

Shortly after that, Sisvel filed infringement actions against Haier before the District Court of Duesseldorf (District Court). One of the actions was based on a SEP reading on the UMTS standard (patent in suit). The other action involved a patent reading on the GPRS standard. Haier filed nullity actions against both patents asserted before the German Federal Patent Court.

During the infringement proceedings, Haier made certain counteroffers to Sisvel. These offers had a limited scope, since they covered only the patents (patent families) asserted against Haier in court.

On 3 November 2015, the District Court decided in favour of Sisvel in both cases [1] . It granted injunctions against Haier and ordered the recall and destruction of infringing products. The District Court further recognised Haier's liability for damages on the merits and ordered Haier to render full and detailed account of the sales of infringing products to Sisvel. Haier appealed both decisions.

In the subsequent proceedings before the Higher District Court of Duesseldorf (Appeal Court), Haier argued –among other things– that the District Court had not adequately taken into account the conduct requirements imposed on SEP holders by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the Huawei v ZTE ruling [2] (Huawei judgment) rendered after Sisvel had filed the infringement actions.

On 16 January 2016, during the course of the proceedings before the Appeal Court, Haier declared that it was willing to take a FRAND licence from Sisvel, however, only in case that the German courts would finally confirm the validity and infringement of the patent in suit. Haier also requested claim charts with respect to all patents included in Sisvel's portfolio.

In December 2016, Sisvel made a further licensing offer to Haier, which was also rejected.

On 20 January 2017, that is a few weeks prior to the end of the oral arguments in the appeal proceedings, Haier made a further counteroffer to Sisvel. The licence offered would cover only the two subsidiaries of the Haier group sued in Germany. An agreement was not reached.

By two judgments dated 30 March 2017, the Appeal Court partially granted Haier's appeals in both parallel proceedings [3] . The claims for injunctive relief as well as the recall and destruction of infringing products were dismissed on the grounds that Sisvel had not complied with its obligations under the Huawei judgment, especially by failing to make a FRAND licensing offer to Haier.

Sisvel appealed the decisions of the Appeal Court.

In April 2020, the Federal Court of Justice (FCJ or Court) finally dismissed the invalidity action filed by Haier against the patent in suitFederal Court of Justice, judgment dated 28 April 2020, Case No. X ZR 35/18..

On 5 May 2020, FCJ rendered a judgment in the parallel proceedings pending between the parties concerning the patent reading on the GPRS standard [5] . The Court decided in favour of Sisvel and reversed the judgment of the Appeal Court. With the present judgmentSisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17 (cited by )., the Court reversed the decision of the Appeal Court also in the case involving the patent in suit.
 

B. Court's reasoning

The Court found that the patent in suit was essential to the UMTS standard and infringedIbid, paras. 10-43..

Contrary to the view previously taken by the Appeal Court, FCJ found that by initiating infringement proceedings against Haier, Sisvel had not abused a dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) [8] .
 

Dominant market position

The Court held that Sisvel had a dominant market position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEUIbid, paras. 48 et seqq..

FCJ explained that a dominant market position is given, when a patent is technically essential for comply­ing with a standard developed by a standardisation body (or a de facto standard) and technical alterna­tives to the standard are not available for products brought on a downstream marketIbid, para. 49.. Even when alternative (technical) options exist, market domi­nance can arise as long as products not using the teaching of the patent cannot compete in a (downstream) market.Ibid, para. 49. According to the FCJ, this applied with respect to the patent in suit.
 

Abuse of market dominance

The Court found, however, that Sisvel had not abused its dominant market position by filing infringement actions against HaierIbid, para. 52.. An abuse of market dominance can occur, when the SEP holder
 

  • refuses to grant a FRAND licence to an implementer willing to take such licence and brings a court action against the latter, asserting claims for injunctive relief (and/or the recall and destruction of infringing products), or
  • has not made 'sufficient efforts' in line with the 'particular responsibility' attached to its dominant position to facilitate the signing of a licence agreement with an implementer, who is, basically, willing to take a licenceIbid, para. 53..

In the eyes of the Court, in both above scenarios, the filing of an action against a 'willing' implementer amounts to an abuse, only because the latter has a claim to be contractually allowed by the SEP holder to use the teachings of the patent under FRAND conditionsIbid, para. 54.. On the other hand, an abuse is regularly not per se established by an offer made by the patent holder at the beginning of negotiations, even when the terms offered would unreasonably impede or discriminate the implementer, if contractually agreed.Ibid, para. 54. An abuse would be given, if the SEP holder insisted on such conditions also at the end of licensing negotiations with the imple­menter.Ibid, para. 54.
 

Notification of infringement

The Court explained that the 'particular responsibility' of a market dominant patent holder materializes in an obligation to notify the implementer about the infringement of the patent in suit prior to filing an action, in case that the implementer is (potentially) not aware that by complying with the standard said patent is usedIbid, para. 55..

In the present case, the Court found that by the letter dated 20 December 2012 and the following correspondence Sisvel had given proper notification of infringement to HaierIbid, para. 84..
 

Willingness

On the other hand, the Court found that Haier did not act as a licensee willing to obtain a FRAND licence from SisvelIbid, paras. 86 et seqq.. In this respect, FCJ disagreed with the Appeal Court, which had taken the opposite view.

In the Court's eyes, the implementer must 'clearly' and 'unambiguously' declare willingness to conclude a licence agreement with the SEP holder on FRAND terms and, subsequently, engage in negotiations in a 'target-oriented' manner [17] . By contrast, it is not sufficient, in response to a notification of infringement, to just demonstrate willingness to consider signing a licensing agreement or to enter into negotiations about whether and under which conditions taking a licence comes into question [17] .

The Court reasoned that the willingness of the implementer to legitimise the unauthorized use of the patent for the future by creating a respective contractual base is a prerequisite for placing the burden on the SEP holder to negotiate a FRAND licence with the implementer. [18] What is more, willingness (on both sides) is essential, because an adequate solution balancing the opposing interests of the parties results, as a rule, from an interest-based negotiation. [19] The fact that a party fails to contribute in negotiations towards a FRAND agreement will regularly be considered to its detriment. [20] An implementer, who has not shown interest in a FRAND-licence over a longer period after receipt of an infringement notification will have to undertake 'additional efforts' to make sure, that despite the delay caused a licence can be signed as soon as possible. [21]

The Court highlighted particularly that implementers should not engage in 'patent hold-out' by exploiting the 'structural disadvantage', which SEP holders face due to the limitation of their right to assert patents in court. [22] Otherwise, competition could be distorted, because the infringer would gain unfair advantages over implementers that have taken a licence in a timely manner. [22]

FCJ took the view that the above interpretation of the requirements related to the implementers' obligation to demonstrate willingness to obtain a FRAND-licence is in line with the Huawei judgment; a new referral of the respective questions to the CJEU, as requested by Haier, was not needed.Ibid, para. 63. The Huawei judgment created a 'safe harbour' against antitrust liability in the sense that compliance with the obligations established will regularly suffice to exclude an abuse of market dominance.Ibid, para. 65. Under special circumstances, however, stricter or less strict conduct duties of the parties could be justified.Ibid, para. 65.

The Court observed that the Huawei judgment supports the notion that the implementer should remain willing to obtain a licence throughout the course of negotiations.Ibid, para. 65. The 'continuous' willingness is an 'indispensable condition' for successful negotiations or, in case negotiations fail, for a finding of abuse of market dominance on the side of the SEP holder.Ibid, para. 68. The refusal of SEP holder to grant a FRAND licence would, indeed, have no relevance in antitrust terms, when the implementer is not objectively willing and able to obtain such licence. [26]

Accordingly, FCJ explained that willingness shall (still) be in place, also when the SEP holder makes a licensing offer.Ibid, para. 69. In this regard, the Court disagreed with the District Court of Duesseldorf, which had expressed the opposite view in the recent referral of certain FRAND-related questions to the CJEU in the matter Nokia v Daimler.Ibid, para. 69. See Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Duesseldorf, order dated 26 November 2020, Case No. 4c O 17/19. According to FCJ, the offer of the SEP holder is just the 'starting point' of negotiations; since FRAND is a range, it is the goal of negotiations to reach a fair and reasonable result considering the interests of both sides.Ibid, paras. 70 and 71. The implementer has, therefore, a duty to examine the FRAND-conformity of the terms of the SEP holder's offer.Ibid, para. 71. If the offer is 'obviously' not FRAND, it will be sufficient that the implementer explains the reasons why this is the case.Ibid, para. 71.

In this context, the Court made clear that the implementer's duty to examine SEP-holder's licensing offer exists, irrespective of whether the offer is, in terms of content, FRAND-compliant in every respect.Ibid, para. 72. If one would require from the SEP holder to make a 'perfect' FRAND offer right away, licensing negotiations would be obsolete.Ibid, para. 73. It is also not possible to assess the FRAND-conformity of the offer in the abstract, without reference to the aspects which each side considers relevant.Ibid, para. 74. The Court reiterated that an non-FRAND licensing offer does not per se amount to an abuse of market dominance.Ibid, para. 76.

Having said that, FCJ noted that for the assessment of the willingness of the implementer its entire conduct (including its reaction to the SEP holder's licensing offer) must be taken into account.Ibid, para. 77. Consequently, willingness can change in the course of time: a court action filed by the SEP holder could become abusive at a later point in time, if the implementer adequately raises a request for a FRAND-licence.Ibid, paras. 79 et seqq. However, the longer the implementer waits with asserting such request, the higher the threshold for considering it as a willing licensee will be. [37] The Court again noted that the above inter­pretation is in line with the Huawei judgment, so that no additional referral to the CJEU is needed, as Haier had requested.Ibid, para. 77.

Against this background, the Court observed that the first response of Haier China to Sisvel's notification almost one year after receipt of the infringement notification was belated [38] . An implementer taking several months to respond to a notification of infringement, typically, sends a signal that there is no interest in taking a licence [38] . Besides that, FCJ found that Haier's response in December 2013, in which only the 'hope' to have a 'formal negotiation' was expressed, was not a sufficient declaration of willing­ness, in terms of content [39] . Since it had reacted belatedly to the notification of infringement, Haier should have undertaken 'additional efforts' to demonstrate willingness, which had been, however, not the case. [40]

Similarly, Haier's letter dated 16 January 2016 did not contain a sufficient declaration of willingness, since Haier had made the signing of a licence subject to the prior confirmation of the validity and infringement of the patent in suit by German courts [41] . Although the implementer is, in principle, allowed to preserve the right to contest the validity of a licensed patent after conclusion of an agreement, the Court held that a declaration of willingness cannot be placed under a respective conditionIbid, para. 95.. Besides that, requesting the production of claim charts for all patents of Sisvel's portfolio almost three years after the receipt of the notification of infringement was, according to the Court, an indication that Haier was only interested in delaying the negotiations until the expiration of the patent in suit [43] .

Furthermore, FCJ found that Haier's willingness to enter into a FRAND licence could also not be extracted from the counteroffers made during the infringement proceedings.Ibid, paras. 102 et seqq. The fact that these counteroffers were, in terms of scope, limited only to the patents asserted by Sisvel in court indicated that Haier had not seriously addressed Sisvel's request for a worldwide portfolio licence. [45] Given that it had more than sufficient time to examine Sisvel's portfolio, one could expect from Haier to provide substantive grounds for such 'selective licensing'. [45]

What is more, the Court held that the counteroffer dated 20 January 2017, which Haier had made shortly before the end of the appeal proceedings, was no sufficient demonstration of willingness either.Ibid, paras. 108 et seqq. The Court focused particularly on the fact that the licence would cover only the two affiliates of the Haier group sued in Germany.Ibid, para. 116. According to FCJ, Haier had no 'legitimate interest' on such 'selective licensing'; on the contrary, a limited licence would offer no sufficient protection against infringement by other companies of the Haier group and force Sisvel to a cost-intensive assertion of its SEPs 'patent to patent and country-by-country'.Ibid, para. 118.

In addition, the Court also criticised the proposed royalty regime.Ibid, paras. 124 et seqq. Haier based the royalty calculation only on a small portion (four patent families) of the SEPs that should be included in the licence, which, in its eyes, were 'probably' essential.Ibid, para. 124. The Court reasoned that the scope of the licence must be clarified in negotiations, whereas in the ICT-sector, due to the large number of relevant patents, it is common to rely on estimations regarding both essentiality and validity, which, on the one hand, allow to take 'necessary remaining uncertainties' adequately into account and, on the other hand, help to avoid disproportionate high transaction costs.Ibid, para. 125.

Apart from that, the fact that the counteroffer was made only in the 'last minute' of the appeal proceedings allowed the conclusion that Haier was not actually aiming at signing a FRAND licence, but was rather motivated by tactical considerations with respect to the pending proceedings.Ibid, para. 126.
 

SEP holder's licensing offer

Having found that Haier had not sufficiently demonstrated willingness to obtain a FRAND licence, the Court did not examine the FRAND-conformity of Sisvel's licensing offers to Haier in the present case [53] . According to FCJ, this question is not relevant, when the implementer has not adequately expressed willingness to sign a FRAND licence.Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17, para. 107.

The Court highlighted that -apart from the obligation to notify the implementer about the infringement- duties of the SEP holder (including the duty to make a FRAND licensing offer) arise only if the implementer has demonstrated willingness to obtain a licence on FRAND terms.Ibid, para. 56. The FRAND-undertaking of the patent holder towards the relevant standardisation body does not change the fact that the user of a patent is, in principle, obliged to seek a licence from the right holder.Ibid, para. 56.
 

C. Other important issues

Patent ambush

The Court dismissed Haier's defence based on the 'patent ambush' argument.Ibid, paras. 127 et seqq. Haier argued that the patent in suit was unenforceable, because the initial patent holder, from whom Sisvel had acquired said patent, had failed to disclose the patent towards ETSI in due course during the development of the UMTS standard.

The Court did not examine whether a 'patent ambush' in the above sense indeed occurred in the present case.Ibid, para. 130. FCJ took the view that an implementer can assert 'patent ambush' only against the patent holder that actually participated in the standard development process; on the contrary, such defence cannot be raised against its successor (here: Sisvel).Ibid, para. 130.

Notwithstanding the above, the Court noted that a 'patent ambush' requires that the decision-making process within the relevant standardisation body was distorted by the withheld information.Ibid, para. 131. Insofar, the implementer must establish at least some indication that the standard would have taken a different form, if the information considering the relevant patent application had been disclosed in time.Ibid, paras. 131 et seq. Haier had, however, failed to do so.Ibid, paras. 131 et seq.
 

Damages

Finally, the Court found that Sisvel's damage claims were given on the merits. Negligence establishing Haier's liability for damages was given: The implementer is, in principle, obliged to make sure that no third party rights are infringed, before starting manufacturing or selling products, which Haier had not done. [60]

What is more, Sisvel's claim for damages was not limited to the amount of a FRAND licensing rate ('licensing analogy'). [61] The SEP holder is entitled to full damages, unless the implementer can assert an own counterclaim, requesting to be placed in the position, in which it would have been, in case that the SEP holder had fulfilled the obligations arising from its dominant market position. [60] An implementer is, however, entitled to such (counter)claim, only when it adequately expressed its willingness to enter into a licence, which had not been the case here.77

  • [1] Sisvel v Haier, District Court of Duesseldorf, judgment dated 3 November 2015, Case No. 4a O 144/14 (UMTS-related patent) and Case No. 4a O 93/14 (GPRS-related patent).
  • [2] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [3] Sisvel v Haier, Higher District Court of Duesseldorf, judgment dated 30 March 2017, Case No. I-15 U 65/15 (UMTS-related patent) and Case No. I-15 U 66/15 (GPRS-related patent).
  • [4] Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 28 April 2020, Case No. X ZR 35/18.
  • [5] Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 5 May 2020, Case No. KZR 36/17.
  • [6] Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17 (cited by ).
  • [7] Ibid, paras. 10-43.
  • [8] Ibid, para. 44.
  • [9] Ibid, paras. 48 et seqq.
  • [10] Ibid, para. 49.
  • [11] Ibid, para. 52.
  • [12] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [13] Ibid, para. 54.
  • [14] Ibid, para. 55.
  • [15] Ibid, para. 84.
  • [16] Ibid, paras. 86 et seqq.
  • [17] Ibid, para. 57.
  • [18] Ibid, para. 58.
  • [19] Ibid, para. 59.
  • [20] Ibid, para. 60.
  • [21] Ibid, para. 62.
  • [22] Ibid, para. 61.
  • [23] Ibid, para. 63.
  • [24] Ibid, para. 65.
  • [25] Ibid, para. 68.
  • [26] Ibid, paras. 66 and 68.
  • [27] Ibid, para. 69.
  • [28] Ibid, para. 69. See Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Duesseldorf, order dated 26 November 2020, Case No. 4c O 17/19.
  • [29] Ibid, paras. 70 and 71.
  • [30] Ibid, para. 71.
  • [31] Ibid, para. 72.
  • [32] Ibid, para. 73.
  • [33] Ibid, para. 74.
  • [34] Ibid, para. 76.
  • [35] Ibid, para. 77.
  • [36] Ibid, paras. 79 et seqq.
  • [37] Ibid, para. 83.
  • [38] Ibid, para. 87.
  • [39] Ibid, paras. 88 et seqq.
  • [40] Ibid, para. 89.
  • [41] Ibid, paras. 93 et seqq.
  • [42] Ibid, para. 95.
  • [43] Ibid, paras. 96-99.
  • [44] Ibid, paras. 102 et seqq.
  • [45] Ibid, para. 102.
  • [46] Ibid, paras. 108 et seqq.
  • [47] Ibid, para. 116.
  • [48] Ibid, para. 118.
  • [49] Ibid, paras. 124 et seqq.
  • [50] Ibid, para. 124.
  • [51] Ibid, para. 125.
  • [52] Ibid, para. 126.
  • [53] The Court had, however, undertaken such analysis in its earlier decision between the same parties dated May 2020. See Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 5 May 2020, Case No. KZR 36/17, especially paras. 76-81 and 101 et seqq.
  • [54] Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17, para. 107.
  • [55] Ibid, para. 56.
  • [56] Ibid, paras. 127 et seqq.
  • [57] Ibid, para. 130.
  • [58] Ibid, para. 131.
  • [59] Ibid, paras. 131 et seq.
  • [60] Ibid, para. 135.
  • [61] Ibid, paras. 134 et seqq.

Updated 26 1月 2017

Saint Lawrence v Vodafone 2

LG Düsseldorf
31 3月 2016 - Case No. 4a O 126/14

  1. Facts
    Since 28 August 2014 Claimant, a non-practicing entity, is the proprietor of the European patent EP J, originally granted to applicants “Y” and “C”, and allegedly covering part of the AMR-WB standard. Defendant is a company active in the telecommunications sector and which markets AMR-WB-based devices, inter alia devices produced by the Intervener in this case. After the adoption (“freeze”) of AMR-WB by ETSI on 10 April 2001, Claimant (who was not an ETSI member during the setting of the AMR-WB standard) made, on 29 May 2001, a commitment towards ETSI to grant licenses on FRAND terms inter alia for patent EP J. Claimant and its parent company “O” offer the SEP and all other patents of the same family to third parties by means of a portfolio license. Licensing conditions are accessible on the Internet and various producers in the sector have taken a license under these conditions.
    Prior to the submission of the patent infringement action on 23 July 2014 and to the advance payments on costs on 29 July 2014, Claimant alerted neither Defendant nor the manufacturer of the contested embodiments, who acted as an intervener in the present proceedings and became aware of the lawsuit in August 2014. By e-mails on 31 July and (as a reminder) on 9 December 2014, the first of which included a copy of the statement of claims and reached the defendant before it was formally served with the statement, Claimant notified the alleged patent violation to Defendant. After Defendant’s reply as of 12 January 2015, Claimant presented a draft licensing agreement to Defendant by letter as of 22 April 2015.
    On 9 December 2014, the Intervener declared willingness to take a license, inter alia for the patent-in-suit, provided infringement was found in court. It further declared that it would accept royalties determined by a court or arbitration tribunal. Claimant, in turn, offered a licensing agreement by letters as of 12 January 2015 and 25 March 2015 respectively. In the course of meetings taking place since 23 January 2014, [308] Claimant offered a license to the Intervener. On 23 February 2015 and on 2 April 2015 respectively, the Intervener made two licensing offers, including third party determination (arbitration panel or English court) of the amount of royalty, for the whole German patent portfolio of Claimant. An additional offer for a licensing agreement, limited to Germany and implementing a royalty of USD 0.0055 per patent by reference to the “WCDMA Patent Pools”, was made by the Intervener on 6 March 2015 and 24 September 2015 respectively, but it was finally refused by Claimant on 4 October 2015. Moreover, the Intervener provided a bank “guarantee of payment” as of 3 September 2015, being modified by letter as of 10 November 2015, and also rendered account of past and prospective sales in Germany since 2011.
  2. Court’s reasoning
    The considerations of the court are almost exactly the same as those in the case LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14.
    1. Market power and notice of infringement
      The court leaves open the question of whether the SEP conferred market power to Claimant since it did, in any case, find no abuse of such potential market power. [309] The court declared the Huawei rules applicable to claims for the recall of products. [310]
      As regards the Huawei requirement to alert the standard user of the infringement, the decision arrived at various findings of interest: Firstly, the judges found that—in “non-transitional” cases where the lawsuit was brought after the Huawei decision—the infringement notification has to take place before the action is filed, or the latest before the advance payment on costs is made. In transitional cases, such as the present case, a delayed infringement notification, taking place after the advance payment on costs as well as the submission of the court action, but before the statement of claims is served, is admissible. [311] Moreover, an infringement notification could possibly be omitted (in particular) if—as in the present case—the patent user already disposes of all necessary information and lacks willingness to license. [312] In non-transitional cases, however, the court doubts whether it is possible to rectify an omitted infringement notification without withdrawing the action. [313]
      Secondly, the court specified the minimum content of the infringement notification which has to indicate at least the number of the patent, the contested embodiments and the alleged acts of use performed by the standard implementer. The court did not decide whether additional information has to be provided, in particular regarding the interpretation of the patent claims or on which part of the standard the patent reads, but it stated that such additional information is not harmful to the patent proprietor. [314]
      Lastly, the court detailed on the particular situation of the Intervener, being Defendant’s manufacturer and supplier in the present case: Even though a FRAND defense successfully raised by the Intervener would in general also cover subsequent levels of the distribution chain, the Huawei requirements apply only indirectly to suppliers of contested embodiments which have not been sued themselves. Accordingly, the SEP proprietor is not obliged to notify the patent infringement to third parties, but as soon as a request to grant a license on FRAND terms is submitted the (adapted) Huawei procedure applies. [315] In casu, no separate infringement notice vis-à-vis the Intervener was required since the Intervener was, since August 2014, aware of the action having been brought.
    2. The SEP owner’s licensing offer
      Since the patent user did not express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement in due time, the court found Claimant to comply with the Huawei requirement to submit a licensing offer on FRAND terms even though the offer was made in the course of the ongoing litigation. For transitional cases, as the present one, this holds true even if infringement notification and court action take place at the same time. [316]
      Besides, the court analyzed under which circumstances licensing conditions can be considered as FRAND according to Huawei. In the opinion of the judges, the more licensing agreements implementing comparable terms the SEP proprietor has already concluded, the stronger is the presumption that these conditions are FRAND, unless factual reasons—which are to be demonstrated by the patent user—justify modified terms. Recognized commercial practice in the relevant sector has to be considered when defining the admissible scope of the licensing agreement. If patent portfolios are usually covered by group or worldwide licenses in the relevant market, a (worldwide) portfolio license will be FRAND unless the circumstances of the specific case, e.g. the SEP proprietor’s market activity being limited to one geographic market, require a modification. [317] Accordingly, Claimant’s (worldwide) licensing offer to Defendant for the whole AMR-WB pool, demanding royalties of USD 0.26 per mobile device that implemented the standard and was produced or marketed in countries in which the SEP was in force, and complying with Claimants existing licensing practice (accessible on the Internet and already implemented in 12 licensing agreements) was declared FRAND. While the court considered that comparable licensing agreements “represent an important indicator of the adequacy of the license terms offered” it clarified that the significance of a patent pool as an indication of FRAND conformity is “limited”. Defendant and the Intervener failed to show that the portfolio comprised (non-used) non-SEPs as well. [318] They further failed to show that the pre-concluded licensing agreements provided no valid basis for comparison as they were concluded under the threat of pending litigation. [319]
      In order to fulfill the Huawei obligation of specifying the calculation of royalties, the SEP proprietor only has to provide the information necessary to determine the amount of royalties to be paid, e.g. the royalty per unit and the products covered by the license. While the court left undecided whether additional indications, e.g. concerning the FRAND character of the licensing offer, are necessary to comply with Huawei, it found that the SEP proprietor’s duty to inform should not be interpreted too strictly as FRAND does regularly encompass a range of values that will be fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. [320]
      Claimant’s licensing offer presented to the Intervener was considered as being FRAND for the same reasons. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the contractual clause allowing for judicial review of the royalties offered could be a possible way to avoid abusive practices and to ensure that licensing offers correspond to FRAND terms. [321]
    3. The standard implementer’s reaction
      The court found that the more details the infringement notification contains, the less time remains for the standard user to examine the patent(s) at issue and to express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. In the present case, Defendant did not comply with Huawei because it took more than five months to react and then only asked for proof of the alleged infringement. Given this excessive delay, the court did not decide whether Defendant’s reaction satisfied the Huawei requirements in terms of content. It denied the possibility to remedy a belated reaction by a subsequent declaration of willingness to license. On the contrary, and as a consequence of the patent user’s non-compliance, the SEP proprietor may continue the infringement action without violating Article 102 TFEU, but it still has to grant licenses on FRAND terms. [322] Whether the Intervener satisfied the ECJ criteria was left undecided. [323]
      The court made some further remarks of interest as to the Huawei requirements concerning the standard implementer: Firstly, it left undecided whether the obligation of the patent user to diligently respond is caused also by a (potentially) non-FRAND licensing offer. [324] Secondly, a standard user who has taken a license is not prevented from challenging validity and essentiality of the SEP afterwards, nor is the SEP proprietor entitled to terminate the license if such a challenge takes place. However, the standard implementer may not delay the (unconditional) conclusion of the licensing agreement until a final court decision on these issues has been rendered. While validity and standard-essentiality is litigated, the licensee remains obliged to pay royalties and it cannot request to insert into the licensing contract a clause entitling it to reclaim paid royalties in case of its success in court. [325] Thirdly, as, in the present case, no specific counter-offers satisfying FRAND terms were submitted and Defendant could not establish that Claimant had waived this requirement the court did not decide on whether a SEP proprietor is obliged to negotiate further although itself and the patent user have submitted FRAND offers. [326]
      None of the counter-offers of the Intervener were FRAND in terms of content. They were either inadmissibly limited to Germany, contained no precise royalty, were not submitted “promptly” because the standard user had waited until the oral pleadings in the parallel procedure, or they proposed royalties per device which the court considered as too low. [327] While it was therefore held to be irrelevant whether, in the first place, the Intervener duly declared its willingness to license, the court emphasized that the Intervener’s readiness to take a license only after the SEP infringement was determined in court did not satisfy the Huawei standard of conduct. [328]
      Moreover, the obligation imposed by Huawei to provide appropriate security and to render account was not fulfilled. While Defendant refrained from taking any of these actions, the Intervener waited several months after the counter-offers were refused in order to submit its bank “guarantee of payment”, which was not recognized as “appropriate security” due to its amount and its limitation to acts of use in Germany. [329] Neither was the Intervener’s initial proposal to have the security—if requested by Claimant—determined by an arbitration tribunal or by an English court accepted as an appropriate way to provide security. [330]
  3. Other important issues
    According to the court, the Huawei requirements apply to both non-practicing entities and other market participants. [331]
    Suing a network operator instead of the undertakings producing devices operating in the network constitutes (at least under the circumstances of this case and absent selective enforcement) no violation of competition law even though this strategy might aim at using the action against the network operator as a “lever” to obtain licensing commitments from the device suppliers. On the other hand, device manufacturers are entitled to a FRAND license as well and can raise the FRAND defense if such a license is not granted. In consequence, the court perceives a fair balance of interests as the SEP proprietor can choose on which level of the chain of production to sue while the undertakings in the chain of production can choose on which level to take a license. [332]
    Furthermore, no patent ambush-defense based on § 242 BGB could be raised because, firstly, Defendant and the Intervener could not substantiate the alleged patent ambush by “Y” and “C”, being the original SEP proprietors; secondly, they could not show that a different patent declaration conduct would have resulted in a different version of the standard excluding the patent-in-suit; thirdly, the alleged patent ambush would, arguably, have resulted only in a FRAND-licensing obligation and, fourthly, Claimant had declared its willingness to grant a license on FRAND terms anyway. [333]
  • [308] This is the date mentioned by the court although “23 January 2015” may seem more plausible and the date given by the court may result from a scrivener’s error.
  • [309] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 184
  • [310] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 187
  • [311] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 195 et seq.
  • [312] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 208-210
  • [313] Case No. 4a O 126/14, para. IV, 3, a, bb, 2, c
  • [314] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 193
  • [315] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 270 et seq.
  • [316] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 222 et seq.
  • [317] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 225 et seq.
  • [318] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 225 et seq. On the relevance of the SIPRO-pool royalty rates, cf. LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 245-248. On the facts indicating that a worldwide license was appropriate LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 249-255.
  • [319] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 234-242. The court argued that it is questionable in principle how much the threat of a claim for injunctive relief can (inadmissibly) affect license agreement negotiations, since the Orange Book case law of the BGH (German Federal Court of Justice), the Motorola decision of the European Commission, and now the CJEU judgment in the Huawei Technologies/ZTE Case could be and can be invoked against inappropriate demands that are in breach of antitrust law.
  • [320] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 256 et seq.
  • [321] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 279 et seq.
  • [322] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 214-220
  • [323] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 214-220; 278
  • [324] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 266
  • [325] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 185 et seq.; 262 et seq.
  • [326] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 264.
  • [327] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 291 et seq.
  • [328] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 278
  • [329] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 267 et seq.; 299 et seq.
  • [330] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 304
  • [331] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 189
  • [332] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 309-313
  • [333] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 317 et seq.

Updated 7 4月 2021

Sisvel v Wiko

OLG Karlsruhe
9 12月 2020 - Case No. 6 U 103/19

A. Facts

The claimant, Sisvel, holds patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of the UMTS and LTE wireless telecommunications standards, which are subject to a commitment to be made accessible to users on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions (standard-essential patents or SEPs). Sisvel also administrates a patent pool, comprising patents of several SEP holders, including Sisvel's own SEPs (patent pool).

The defendants are two companies that are part of the Wiko group (Wiko). [235] Wiko sells mobile phones complying with the LTE standard - among other markets- in Germany.

In June 2015, the patent pool informed Wiko for the first time about the need to obtain a licence. On 1 June 2016, Sisvel (as the patent pool's administrator) offered Wiko a portfolio licence, which also covered the patent in suit. Agreement was, however, not reached.

On 22 June 2016, Sisvel brought an action against Wiko before the District Court (Landgericht) of Mannheim in Germany (District Court) based on one patent reading on the LTE standard (infringement proceedings). Sisvel requested a declaratory judgment confirming Wiko's liability for damages on the merits, as well as information and rendering of accounts.

On 23 June 2016, Sisvel made an offer for a bilateral licence limited to its own SEP portfolio to the German subsidiary of Wiko. This offer was not accepted. Moreover, Wiko filed a nullity action against the SEP in suit before the German Federal Patent Court (nullity proceedings).

In October 2016, Sisvel extended the lawsuit. Claims for injunctive relief as well as the recall and destruction of infringing products were added to the other claims initially asserted.

On 11 November 2016, Wiko made a counteroffer to Sisvel. Some days prior to the oral hearing in the infringement proceedings, Wiko informed the Court that it had provided information to Sisvel and had also deposited a security amount for past uses.

On 8 November 2017, Sisvel made a new offer to Wiko with reduced royalty rates. Wiko did not immediately react to this offer.

On 22 December 2017, Sisvel asked the District Court to order a stay of the infringement proceedings, until the decision of the Federal Patent Court in the parallel nullity proceedings. Wiko agreed with Sisvel's motion. On 30 January 2018, the infringement proceedings were stayed.

On 9 February 2018, Sisvel sent a reminder to Wiko regarding the offer made on 8 November 2017. Wiko responded on 16 February 2018, requesting further claim charts and more time to examine the patents covered by the offer.

On 26 June 2018, during the stay of the infringement proceedings, Sisvel made another licensing offer to Wiko based on a new restructured licensing program (2018 offer). Along with the 2018 offer, Sisvel provided Wiko with claim charts regarding 20 selected patents and a list of existing licensees of both its new licensing program and two pre-existing programs. The list contained the date of the conclusion of each agreement as well as the agreed licence fees. The names of the licensees were, however, redacted.

Wiko did not react to the 2018 offer for more than three months. On 15 October 2018, following a respective reminder sent by Sisvel on 14 September 2018, Wiko replied, without, however, commenting the 2018 offer; it just referred back to its counteroffer dated 11 November 2016. Wiko also criticized the fact that Sisvel did not disclose the names of the existing licensees so far.

In response to that claim, Sisvel shared a draft Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) with Wiko on 22 October 2018, based on which it would be willing to disclose the names of the existing licensees. Wiko refused to sign the NDA proposed by Sisvel.

In October 2018, the Federal Patent Court upheld the SEP in suit in part. Subsequently, the District Court moved on with the infringement proceedings. After the end of the oral hearings in July 2019, Wiko made a new counteroffer to Sisvel and provided the latter with additional information. However, Wiko did not increase the amount of security deposited after its first counteroffer dated 11 November 2016.

In the beginning of September 2019, Sisvel set up an electronic data room containing redacted versions of Sisvel's existing licensing agreements with third parties and granted Wiko respective access rights. Wiko did not make use of this data room at any point in time.

On 4 September 2019, the District Court granted an injunction against Wiko and ordered the removal and destruction of infringing products from the market. It also confirmed Wiko's liability for damages on the merits and ordered Wiko to provide Sisvel with information required for the calculation of damages. Wiko appealed the decision of the District Court.

Shortly after the District Court rendered its decision, the term of the patent-in-suit expired. Sisvel, however, enforced the injunction granted by the District Court.

With the present judgment [236] (cited by http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-bin/laender_rechtsprechung/list.py?Gericht=bw&GerichtAuswahl=Oberlandesgerichte&Art=en&sid=2b226ea73cc9637362d8e1af04a34d05), the Higher District Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Karlsruhe (Court) predominantly upheld the judgment of the District Court [237] .
 

B. Court's reasoning

The Court found that Wiko could not successfully raise a so-called 'FRAND-defence' based on an alleged abuse of market dominance (Article 102 TFEU) against the claims for injunctive relief and the recall and destruction of infringing products asserted by Sisvel. [238]

This question was still decisive in the present case, despite the fact that the patent-in-suit expired before the start of the appeal proceedings. The Court explained that the expiration of a patent affects only future acts of use (which, then, no longer constitute infringement): On the contrary, claims that had arisen prior to expiration based on acts of use during the lifetime of the patent are not impaired. [239] Whether claims were given before the expiration of the patent-in-suit is of particular importance, especially when the patent holder has enforced a (first-instance) judgment delivered in proceedings conducted within the term of protection of the patent, as it was the case here. [240]
 

Dominant market position

Having said that, the Court agreed with the finding of the District Court that Sisvel had a market dominant position in terms of Article 102 TFEU with respect to the patent-in-suit in the relevant time period prior to its expiration. [241]

The Court followed the District Court also insofar, as it confirmed that, by filing an infringement action, Sisvel had not abused its market dominance.
 

Notification of infringement

In the eyes of the Court, Sisvel had sufficiently notified Wiko about the infringement of the patent-in-suit prior to filing a court action. [242] The purpose of the notification of infringement is to draw the implementer's attention to the infringement and the necessity of taking a license on FRAND terms and conditions. [243] In terms of content, the notification must identify the patent infringed, the form of infringement and also designate the infringing embodiments. [243] Detailed technical or legal analysis of the infringement allegation is not required. [243] The production of so-called 'claim charts', which is common in practice, will, as a rule, suffice, but is not mandatory. [243] If the patent holder offers a portfolio licence, respective extended information duties occur. [243]

In the present case, it was not disputed that Sisvel had notified Wiko about the patent-in-suit prior to litigation. [244] As far as Wiko complained that no claim charts were presented before trial, the Court reiterated that no respective obligation of Sisvel existed. [245] What is more, the Court held that the court action initially filed by Sisvel, which did not include claims for injunctive relief and the recall and destruction of infringing products, could also be seen as an adequate notification of infringement. [244]
 

Willingness to obtain a licence

The Court then found that Wiko behaved as an unwilling (potential) licensee both prior and during the infringement proceedings [246] . The Court agreed with the assessment of the District Court that Wiko delayed the licensing negotiations between the parties with the goal to avoid taking a licence for as long as possible, in order to gain economic benefits. [247]

According to the Court, the 'expression of a general willingness to license' is not sufficient for assuming that an implementer is a 'willing licensee'. [248] Moreover, the implementer must 'clearly and unambiguously' declare willingness to conclude a license agreement on FRAND terms, 'whatever FRAND terms may actually look like" [248] . The respective declaration must be 'serious and unconditional'. [248]

The Court highlighted that for the assessment of willingness the overall facts and the particular conduct of the implementer shall be taken into account. [248] Willingness is not 'static': the finding that an implementer was willing (or unwilling) at a certain moment in time does not remain unchanged henceforth. [248]

The implementer must always be willing to obtain a licence and participate in negotiations in a 'target-oriented manner'; since implementers might be inclined to delay negotiations until the expiration of the patent-in-suit, there is a need to make sure that their behaviour in negotiations will not lead to delays. [249] Moreover, it should be expected that a willing implementer would seek a license as soon as possible, in order to shorten the period, in which it makes use of the patent-in-suit or the SEP holder's portfolio without authorisation and without paying licensing fees. [250] Accordingly, a willing licensee would not consider the 'negotiation obligations' of the SEP holder primarily as a means to defend itself against a court action, but as a means to utilize in order to reach a FRAND agreement, if needed. [250]

In the view of the Court, the above requirements are in line with the Huawei v ZTE judgment (Huawei judgment or Huawei) [251] of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). [252] In Huawei, CJEU focused on the will of the infringer to conclude a license agreement on FRAND terms and emphasized that the latter must not pursue 'delaying tactics'. The Court explained that, although in Huawei the requirement to refrain from 'delaying tactics' is expressly mentioned only with respect to the duty of the implementer to react to a licensing offer of the SEP holder, it applies 'at all times' as long as the implementer uses the patents without a licence; otherwise, the suspension of SEP holder's right to the injunctive relief cannot be justified. [253]

In this context, the Court pointed out that not every 'reluctant involvement' of the implementer in licensing discussions will necessarily allow for the assumption of unwillingness. [254] Such behaviour could be justified in individual cases, especially when the SEP holder does not act in a 'target-oriented' manner itself. [254] Nevertheless, implementers must, as a rule, react timely even to a belated action of the SEP holder. [254] Furthermore, implementers must, in principle, inform the SEP holder of any objections at an early stage and should not wait to raise those much later in court proceedings. [254]

Looking at Wiko's conduct, the Court criticized especially the fact that it became active mostly as a reaction to new developments in the pending infringement proceedings. [255] A willing implementer would have, however, sought a licence independently of the initiation of legal steps and independently of the course of litigation. [256] As an example, the Court highlighted the fact that Wiko's counteroffer dated 11 November 2016 was made only shortly after Sisvel extended the infringement suit by adding a claim for injunctive relief. [257] Wiko also provided information on past acts of infringement only a few days prior to the first oral hearing in February 2017 (and refrained from constantly updating this information afterwards, as it would be expected by a willing licensee). [258]

The Court identified also further facts that indicate that Wiko engaged in delaying tactics. [259] Wiko reacted to Sisvel's licensing offers made during the course of the proceedings always belatedly and only after a reminder by Sisvel (for instance, it took Wiko more than three months to react to the 2018 offer) [260] . It also demanded further claim charts in February 2018, years after the action was filed. [261]

Wiko's refusal to sign the NDA offered by Sisvel -despite multiple reminders of the latter- without providing any reasons was also considered as a sign of unwillingness. [262] According to the Court, it should be expected by a willing licensee, who is not interested in delaying negotiations, to swiftly raise any criticisms regarding an NDA proposed by the SEP holder in writing or by e-mail, and not wait to raise any concerns several months later in the infringement proceedings, as Wiko had done here. [263] The Court also considered the fact that Wiko did not access the electronic data room set up by Sisvel containing redacted versions of Sisvel's third party agreements as an additional indication of unwillingness. [264]

Furthermore, the Court clarified that -contrary to Wiko's view- school holidays and/or staff shortages cannot provide sufficient justification for delays in negotiations. [265] Even if such circumstances occur, a willing implementer would have communicated any obstacles immediately. [265] Wiko failed to do so.
 

SEP holder's offer

Since Wiko was found to have been an unwilling licensee, the Court explained that the question whether Sisvel fulfilled its duty to make and adequately elaborate a FRAND licensing offer, was no longer decisive. [266] In fact, no such duty had arisen in the present case, due to Wiko's unwillingness to obtain a licence. [266] Notwithstanding the above, the Court provided guidance on the content and extend of the respective obligation of the SEP holder.

The Court first explained that FRAND is a 'range', which leaves room for flexibility. [267] As a rule, FRAND is determined in bilateral good faith negotiations between SEP holders and implementers, taking into account the specific circumstances of each individual case [267] ; indeed, parties are best situated to determine the exact content of FRAND in a specific setting. [267]

In order to meet its obligation, an SEP holder must present an offer to a willing licensee, which 'in general' complies with FRAND requirements and is fair, reasonable and not discriminatory with respect to the 'average licensee'. [268] The SEP holder shall further explain its offer in a way that permits the licensee to understand the assumptions, on which the offered rate and further conditions are based. [269] The rationale behind this obligation is to create a sufficient basis of information for the implementer for assessing the offer and eventually formulating a counteroffer. [270]

In this context, the Court made clear that implementers should not expect that the SEP holder individually adapts its (first) offer to the specific circumstances of each particular case. [271] The SEP holder's FRAND commitment does not give rise to such obligation. [271] The (first) offer is intended to launch the negotiations and provide an adequate information basis to the implementer, who will then be in a position to suggest necessary amendments by means of a counteroffer. [271] Accordingly, it will regularly be acceptable that the SEP holder's offer is 'not clearly and evidently' non-FRAND and sufficient information was provided to the implementer. [272]

The Court dismissed the notion that the implementer is obliged to negotiate (and eventually) make a counteroffer, only when the SEP holder's offer was fully FRAND-compliant. [272] This would bring the negotiations to a stand-still and, therefore, conflict with the spirit of the Huawei judgment, which is to encourage the parties to reach agreement on the licensing terms. [273] Moreover, the Court explained that –irrespective of whether the offer triggers an obligation of the implementer to submit a counter-offer– the latter will be regularly required, at least, to analyse the SEP holder's offer in due course and express any objections and queries without delay. [274]

Against this background, the Court found that none of the offers made to Wiko during the infringement proceedings was 'clearly and evidently' non-FRAND. [275] The fact that the offers did not define the start of the contract or the amount of royalties payable for past uses was not considered problematic. [276] The Court also found that the royalty rates offered were not 'evidently non-FRAND', since they were sufficiently substantiated by reference to existing licensing agreements and calculated on basis of a 'top-down' method. [277] A need to calculate royalties on grounds of the costs that incurred for the creation of the patented invention (cost-based approach) was not given, since this factor was not relevant for establishing value. [278]

In addition, the Court did not raise any concerns against the fact that Sisvel's offer concerned a worldwide portfolio licence: On the one hand, agreements with such scope are common in the telecommunications industry. [279] On the other hand, Wiko had worldwide activities, so that a licence with a limited scope would not provide sufficient coverage. [279]

The fact that some of the patents included in Sisvel's portfolio were -allegedly- not standard-essential did not render the offers 'un-FRAND'. [280] The Court stressed that, for the purpose of licensing negotiations and the conclusion of a licence, it is not necessary to conclusively clarify whether each portfolio patent is standard-essential. [281] Implementers can reserve the right to challenge the validity and essentiality of affected patents even after the conclusion of a licensing agreement. [281]

Similarly, the Court had no objections against a clause placing the burden of proof with regard to the exhaustion of licenced patents on Wiko. [282] This rule corresponds with the common allocation of the burden of proof under German law and does not place unreasonable weight on the licensee, since it will be better situated to trace the licensing chain by engaging with its suppliers. [283]

The question whether an adjustment clause is necessary for an offer to be considered FRAND was left unanswered by the Court. [284] Such clause would allow the implementer to adapt the agreed royalties, in case that patents fall out of the scope of the licence (e.g. due to expiration or invalidation). The Court saw no need for a respective contractual provision, since the licences offered by Sisvel would expire and, therefore, be re-negotiated after five years. [284] The Court did not express any concerns against the term of the offered licence or the termination clauses contained therein, either. [285]

Furthermore, the Court made clear that Sisvel had adequately elaborated the licensing rates offered to Wiko. [286] In the infringement proceedings, Sisvel responded to the 'top-down' calculation of Wiko in detail and made relevant clarifications. [287] According to the Court, Sisvel was under no circumstances obliged to elaborate on a cost-based calculation of royalties, as requested by Wiko; such demand was considered just another means to delay negotiations. [288]
 

Implementers' counteroffer

The Court also found that the counteroffers made by Wiko during the course of the first instance infringement proceedings were not FRAND. [289]

The Court highlighted that the obligation of the implementer to submit a FRAND counteroffer to the SEP holder is already triggered, when the previous licensing offer of the latter is not 'clearly and evidently' non-FRAND and sufficient information was provided, enabling the implementer to formulate its counteroffer. [290]

Having said that, the Court took the view that the royalty rates which Wiko offered were very low and, thus, not FRAND-compliant. [291] The Court criticized especially the fact that the rates were significantly lower than the rates which were considered to be adequate in previous court decisions. [292] Notwithstanding the above, the Court explained that, even if Wiko's counteroffer had been FRAND, this would not change the conclusion that Wiko had acted as an unwilling licensee. [293] According to the Court, a willing licensee would not have submitted a counteroffer around one year after receipt of the SEP holder's offer, as Wiko did. [294]
 

C. Other important issues

The Court stressed that for generating pressure-free licensing negotiations during pending infringement proceedings, it will, as a rule, be sufficient, if the proceedings are stayed with a view to parallel nullity proceedings concerning the patent-in-suit. [295] This is particularly true, when the SEP holder takes the respective initiative, as it was the case here. [295] Nevertheless, even if a pressure-free negotiation situation is not given, the infringers is not released from the obligation to act in good faith and engage in licensing negotiations, for instance by analysing a licensing offer of the SEP holder. [295] The refusal of the infringer to act accordingly could, in the eyes of the Court, allow the conclusion that it is an unwilling licensee. [295]

Apart from that, the Court confirmed that Wiko had no legal ground for requesting full disclosure of Sisvel's third party agreements [296] . Even if one would recognize a duty of the SEP holder to share information about the core content of existing licensing agreements (that are still in force), it is questionable whether this duty would also extend to agreements signed by previous patent holders. [297] The Court expressed particular doubts that this applies in cases in which a portfolio was assembled from patents acquired from different patent holders, since the relevance of bilateral or pool licensing agreements of the former patent holder can be limited in this case. [298]

Furthermore, the Court expressed the view that under German law a so-called 'covenant not to sue' does not have the effect of a (royalty-free) licence: such agreements will, as a rule, have only a procedural effect in terms of a pactum de non petendo, excluding only the initiation of court proceedings. [299]

Finally, the Court denied Wiko's motion to order a stay in the appeal proceedings due to the recent referral of several questions regarding the interpretation of the Huawei framework to the CJEU by the District Court of Düsseldorf in the matter Nokia v Daimler [300] . [301] According to the Court, it appears unlikely that the CJEU will establish criteria, by which SEP-based court actions against implementers engaging in delaying tactics would amount to an abuse of market dominance. [302]
 

  • [235] The action was extended to a third defendant, an individual person, who had served as a managing director for both aforementioned companies.
  • [236] Sisvel v Wiko, Higher Regional Court Karlsruhe, judgment dated 9 December 2020, Case-No. 6 U 103/19
  • [237] The claims for injunctive relief, rendering of accounts and damages asserted against the former managing director of the two Wiko companies were limited to the period of time until the end of its tenure; ibid, paras. 265-288.
  • [238] Ibid, para. 289.
  • [239] Ibid, paras. 284 et seqq.
  • [240] Ibid, para. 287.
  • [241] Ibid, paras. 290 et seq. Insofar, the Court made clear that a market dominant position ceases to exist after the expiration of the relevant patent.
  • [242] Ibid, paras. 292 et seqq.
  • [243] Ibid, para. 293.
  • [244] Ibid, para. 297.
  • [245] Ibid, paras. 297 et seq.
  • [246] Ibid, para. 299.
  • [247] Ibid, para. 299 and paras. 320 et seqq.
  • [248] Ibid, para. 301.
  • [249] Ibid, para. 302.
  • [250] Ibid, para. 303.
  • [251] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case-No. C-170/13.
  • [252] Sisvel v Wiko, Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, judgment dated 9 December 2020, para. 304.
  • [253] Ibid, para. 304.
  • [254] Ibid, para. 305.
  • [255] Ibid, paras. 321 et seqq.
  • [256] Ibid, para. 321.
  • [257] Ibid, para. 322.
  • [258] Ibid, paras. 323 et seq.
  • [259] In addition, the Court found that Wiko’s lack of willingness to obtain a license is also manifested in the fact that it (i) attempted to impede the enforcement of the first instance ruling of the District Court by questionable means (para. 335) and (ii) did not accept the offer of the District Court of The Hague, in which proceedings between the parties were pending in parallel, to engage in settlement negotiations (para. 336).
  • [260] Ibid, paras. 325, 328 and 331.
  • [261] Ibid, para. 327.
  • [262] Ibid, paras. 333 et seqq.
  • [263] Ibid, paras. 334 and 338.
  • [264] Ibid, paras. 337 and 341 et seqq.
  • [265] Ibid, para. 330.
  • [266] Ibid, para. 342.
  • [267] Ibid, para. 307.
  • [268] Ibid, para. 308.
  • [269] Ibid, paras. 308 and 310.
  • [270] Ibid, para. 309.
  • [271] Ibid, para. 310.
  • [272] Ibid, paras. 311 et seqq.
  • [273] Ibid, paras. 311 and 313 et seqq.
  • [274] Ibid, paras. 316 et seqq.
  • [275] Ibid, para. 352.
  • [276] Ibid, para. 353.
  • [277] Ibid, paras. 354 et seqq.
  • [278] Ibid, para. 358.
  • [279] Ibid, para. 359.
  • [280] Ibid, para. 360.
  • [281] Ibid, para. 361.
  • [282] Ibid, para. 362.
  • [283] Ibid, para. 363.
  • [284] Ibid, paras. 365 et seqq.
  • [285] Ibid, paras. 367 et seqq.
  • [286] Ibid, para. 366.
  • [287] Ibid, para. 344.
  • [288] Ibid, para. 346.
  • [289] Ibid, paras. 379 et seqq.
  • [290] Ibid, para. 311.
  • [291] Ibid, paras. 379 et seqq.
  • [292] Ibid, para. 380.
  • [293] Ibid, para. 378.
  • [294] Ibid, para. 384.
  • [295] Ibid, para. 348.
  • [296] Ibid, para. 389.
  • [297] Ibid, paras. 389 et seq.
  • [298] Ibid, para. 391.
  • [299] Ibid, paras. 260 et seqq.
  • [300] Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Düsseldorf, order dated 26 November 2020, Case No. 4c O 17/19.
  • [301] Sisvel v Wiko, Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, judgment dated 9 December 2020, para. 395.
  • [302] Ibid, para. 395.

Updated 6 6月 2017

Archos v. Philips, Rechtbank Den Haag

オランダ裁判所の決定
8 2月 2017 - Case No. C/09/505587 / HA ZA 16-206 (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025)

  1. Facts
    Defendant (Koninklijke Philips N.V.) is the proprietor of a number of patents declared essential to ETSI’s UMTS (3G) and LTE (4G) standards. Defendant made FRAND commitments towards ETSI on 15 January 1998 and 26 November 2009. Claimant (Archos S.A.) markets mobile devices which are alleged to infringe upon Defendant’s patents.
    By letter of 5 June 2014, Defendant brought her UMTS and LTE patent portfolio and her licensing program to the attention of Claimant. In this letter, Defendant made clear that Claimant was infringing her patents by marketing products incorporating the UMTS and LTE standards and explained the possibility of obtaining a FRAND license. On 15 September 2014, a meeting took place to inform Claimant of Defendant’s patent portfolio and to discuss the licensing offer. In another meeting on 25 November 2014, Claimant suggested Defendant to grant her a royalty-free license to all of Defendant’s patents (i.e. not only to the UMTS/LTE patents but also to other patents related to so-called ‘Portable Features’) in exchange for the transfer of certain patents of Claimant to Defendant. Defendant informed Claimant by email of 23 December 2014 that it was not interested in Claimant’s patents because it considered them to represent ‘relatively low value’.
    By letter of 28 July 2015 Defendant sent Claimant an updated list of UMTS/LTE patents as well as a draft licensing agreement in which she confirmed her earlier licensing offer. The proposed royalty amounted to $ 0.75 per product containing UMTS and/or LTE functionality. For products already sold, a royalty of $ 1 would need to be paid. At a next meeting on 3 September 2015, it became clear that Claimant did not wish to obtain the license offered. On behalf of Claimant, it was made clear during the meeting that Defendant would have to take legal action if she wished to obtain a license fee. In October 2015, Defendant started proceedings before the Rechtbank Den Haag for infringement of her European Patents EP 1 440 525, EP 1 685 659 and EP 1 623 511.
    By letter of 12 January 2016, Claimant made a written counter offer of 0.071% of her net revenue from products incorporating the UMTS and/or LTE standards. For a net sale price per product of € 100, the offered royalty would amount to 7 eurocent per product.
  2. Court’s reasoning
    Claimant asked the court to declare that Defendant’s licensing offer of 28 July 2015 is not FRAND and to declare that a royalty fee of € 0.007 for every product sold by Claimant incorporating the UMTS standard and a royalty fee of € 0.020 for every product sold by Claimant incorporating the UMTS and LTE standards is FRAND. In addition, Claimant asked the court to rule that its own licensing offer of 12 January 2016 is higher than what a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory royalty fee would require.
    1. Market power and notice of infringement
      The court left open whether the SEPs conferred market power to Defendant since it did, in any case, find no abuse of such potential market power. The court argued that it is generally accepted and to be inferred from the system laid down in the Huawei/ZTE judgment that a FRAND license has a certain bandwidth. After all, the Huawei/ZTE judgment contemplates that the SEP holder makes a FRAND offer first and afterwards, if the SEP user does not agree with the offer, makes a counter offer which also has to be FRAND. During this negotiation process, the characteristics of the SEP user as well as its specific objections can be taken account in the license at the discretion of the parties. As such, the court noted that the fact that Defendant’s initial offer would turn out to be unreasonable for Claimant because she finds itself in the low budget segment of the market and her margins are small does not imply that the offer made by Defendant on 28 July 2015 is not FRAND.
      The court also made clear that until the Huawei/ZTE judgment the initiative to obtain a license was incumbent on the SEP user and not on the SEP holder in line with the common interpretation of the judgment of the Rechtbank Den Haag in Philips/SK Kassetten and the Orange Book ruling of the Bundesgerichtshof. In the view of the court the, on this crucial point, contrary Huawei/ZTE judgment that was delivered on 15 July 2015 constituted a new moment for negotiation between the parties. The court noted that, in line with the Huawei/ZTE judgment, Defendant took initiative with its licensing offer of 28 July 2015. Since Claimant made clear in the meeting on 3 September 2015 that Defendant would have to take legal action if she wished to obtain more than a few thousand euros in licensing fees, it seems unfitting that Archos reproaches Philips to have not been open to negotiation, or at least that position is insufficiently substantiated (par. 4.3).
    2. The SEP owner’s licensing offer
      Claimant put forward a number of arguments for its claim that Defendant’s offer of 28 July 2015 is not FRAND. All of these arguments were rejected by the court on the ground that Claimant had not sufficiently substantiated them. The main arguments raised are as follows.
      Claimant argued that Defendant’s rights regarding devices incorporating Qualcomm baseband chips had been exhausted due to the cross-license that Defendant had already concluded with Qualcomm for these chips. Since a number of Claimant’s products rely on Qualcomm baseband chips, the compensation that Defendant had already received from Qualcomm should, in the view of Claimant, at least have been taken into account in the license offer. The court noted that Claimant had not sufficiently contested that the Qualcomm license did not cover production and sales of mobile phones – as Defendant had made clear before the court – and that Claimant could have raised this point during the negotiations (par. 4.4).
      The court continued by stating that the fact that Defendant’s licensing offer covered both UMTS and LTE SEPS could not affect the FRAND-ness of the offer in the case at hand considering that Claimant’s products do not merely require a license under the LTE SEPs but also under the UMTS SEPs (par. 4.5).
      While the parties agreed that the Defendant’s share of the absolute number of SEPs in the UMTS-SEP portfolio is an important factor for assessing the FRAND-character of Defendant’s offer, they each reached different absolute numbers. The court concluded that the calculations in the consultancy reports on which Claimant relied do not lead to accurate results and are rather speculative in nature. As such, the Claimant downplayed the value of Defendant’s SEPs (par. 4.6-4.7).
      With regard to Claimant’s argument that Defendant’s proposed royalty rate would amount to impermissible royalty stacking, the court argued that this was insufficiently substantiated by Claimant (par. 4.8).
      Claimant also argued that the royalty rate should not be based on the total price of a phone but merely on the part in which the technology at issue is incorporated (the Smallest Saleable Patent-Practising Unit, SSPPU). In this context, the court noted that Defendant rightly pointed out that the requested royalty was set at a fixed amount as a result of which there is no relationship with the market value of the phone. Furthermore, since the SSPPU concept is at the very least subject to debate, the court noted that this issue could have been considered in the negotiations. That the royalty rate suggested by Defendant, which was not based on the SSPPU price, would not be FRAND for that mere reason could not be established by the court (par. 4.10).
      The court also dismissed Claimant’s reference to patent hold-up on the ground that a situation of hold-up can only occur in the case of a non-FRAND license which had not been established in the case at issue (par. 4.13).
      In the end, the court dismissed Claimant’s request to make a declaratory statement that Defendant’s offer of 28 July 2015 was not FRAND.
    3. The standard implementer’s reaction
      Considering that Claimant’s counter offer of 12 January 2016 is more than a factor 10 lower than the Defendant’s offer and is based on an inaccurate (at least insufficiently substantiated) share of Defendant’s SEPs in the relevant UMTS standard, the court refused to declare the counter offer to be FRAND, let alone to declare that this counter offer is higher than a FRAND royalty rate as requested by Claimant (par. 4.17-4.18).
  3. Other important issues
    AA defence that Defendant invoked was that Claimant had no interest (anymore) in the requested declaratory statements because its respective FRAND commitments were exhausted due to the unwilling attitude of Claimant. However, as Claimant’s requests for the declaratory statements were found not to be sufficiently substantiated, there was no need for the court to discuss this issue anymore (par. 4.18).

Updated 20 10月 2020

Sisvel v Wiko

LG Mannheim
4 9月 2019 - Case No. 7 O 115/16

A. 内容

原告Sisvelは、公平、合理的かつ非差別的(FRAND)な条件にて規格実施者に利用を認めるとの約束に基づき、UMTS及びLTE無線通信の規格に必須である(と見込まれる)と宣言された特許を保有している(標準必須特許又はSEP)。Sisvelは、自らのSEPを含め、複数のSEP保有者の特許で構成されるパテントプールを管理している(パテントプール)。

被告は、Wikoグループのフランスに所在する親会社及びドイツに所在する子会社(Wiko)である。Wikoは、LTE規格を実施する携帯電話を特にドイツにおいて販売している。

2015年6月、Sisvelは、パテントプールの存在及びライセンス取得が必要である旨をWikoに通知した。両当事者は、ライセンス契約の協議に入った。Sisvelは、パテントプールに含まれるSEPの情報について、その複数の特許の規格必須性を示したクレームチャートを添えてWikoに提出した。2016年6月1日、Sisvelは、当該パテントプールを対象とするライセンスについてWikoに申出を行ったが、合意には至らなかった。

2016年6月22日、Sisvelは、1つの特許がLTE規格に抵触していることに基づき、Wikoを相手方として、ドイツのマンハイム地方裁判所(本裁判所)に訴訟を提起した(権利侵害訴訟)。Sisvelは、実体的事項に関するWikoの損害賠償責任を確認する宣言的判決とともに、情報及び計算書の提出を求めた。 2016年6月23日、Sisvelは、Wikoのドイツ子会社に対して自己のSEPのみを対象とする双務的ライセンスをオファーしたが、このオファーは、承諾されなかった。さらにWikoは、SEPの無効確認を訴えて、ドイツ連邦特許裁判所に訴訟を提起した(無効確認訴訟)。

2016年10月4日、Sisvelは、侵害訴訟での訴えを変更し、差止命令による救済手段、並びに侵害性を有する製品の市場からの排除及びその後の破棄を追加的に求めた。

2016年11月11日、WikoはSisvelにカウンターオファーを申し出た。その後、Wikoは、当該カウンターオファーに従い、保証金及び情報をSisvelに提供した。

訴訟手続中に、Sisvelは、プールライセンスに関し、ロイヤルティ料率を含めた新たな申出をWikoに行った。Wikoはこれについても拒絶した。2017年12月22日、Sisvelは、並行して行われていた特許の無効確認訴訟においてドイツ連邦特許裁判所によるSEPの有効性にかかわる判断が下るまで、権利侵害訴訟手続の停止を命じるよう本裁判所に申し立てた。Wikoは、Sisvelの申立てに同意した。2018年1月30日、権利侵害訴訟手続の停止が本裁判所により命じられた。

2018年6月26日、権利侵害訴訟手続の停止中に、Sisvelは、自らが策定した、新たな内容のライセンスプログラムに基づき、あらためてWikoにライセンスオファーを申し出た(2018年オファー)。

2018年オファーと同時に、Sisvelは、―とりわけー選定した20件の特許に関するクレームチャート及び新規ライセンスプログラムと既存の2つのプログラム双方の既存のライセンシーのリストをWikoに提供した。当該リストには、各契約の締結日と合意されたライセンス料が記載されていた。しかし、ライセンシーの名は黒塗りされていた。

Wikoは3か月超にわたり2018年オファーに対応しなかった。2018年10月15日、WikoはSisvelに回答したが、2018年オファーの内容に対しては意見を述べず、2016年11月11日付のカウンターオファーを引用するにとどまった。さらにWikoは、Sisvelが2018年オファーの際に提出したリストの中で既存のライセンシーの名を開示しなかったことを批判した。

この主張に応じ、Sisvelは、2018年10月22日、Wikoに秘密保持契約(NDA)の草案を送付した。Sisvelは、WikoがNDAに署名する時点で既存のライセンシーの名を開示するつもりであった。しかしながら、Wikoは、Sisvelから提案されたNDAに署名することを拒否した。

2018年10月、ドイツ連邦特許裁判所は、係争中のSEPを部分的に認めた。爾後、本裁判所は、権利侵害訴訟手続に取り掛かり、特にFRAND関連問題について協議した。

2019年7月の口頭審理終了後、WikoはSisvelに新たなカウンターオファーを申し出、追加情報をSisvelに提供した。しかしWikoは、2016年11月11日付の初回のカウンターオファー後には、保証金額を増額しなかった。

本判決において [421] 、本裁判所は、Wikoに差止命令を下すと共に、侵害性を有する製品を市場から排除し、滅失させるよう命じた。さらに本裁判所は、実体的事項に関するWikoの損害賠償責任を確認し、損害額の算定に必要な情報をSisvelに提供するようWikoに命じた。


B. 判決理由

本裁判所は、Wikoの製品が係争中の特許を侵害していると認めた [422] 。係争中の特許の必須性は、両当事者間で争われなかった [423]

さらに本裁判所は、EU機能条約(TFEU)第102条により、Sisvelが差止命令による救済手段及び権利侵害訴訟において侵害性を有するとされる製品のリコール及び破棄を求める請求権の行使を妨げられるものではないと判示した。Wikoは現訴訟の申立てにより、SisvelがTFEU第102条に反して市場での支配的な地位を濫用していたと異議を申し立てた。

本裁判所の見解によれば、SisvelはHuawei対ZTE事件 [424] においてEU司法裁判所(CJEU)が定めた行動義務(Huaweiフレームワーク又は義務)を履行していたため、本件は支配的な地位の濫用にあたらない。これに対しWikoは、Huaweiフレームワークを遵守していなかった。

Huaweiフレームワーク

これまでの判例法から外れて、本裁判所は、権利侵害訴訟手続の過程で両当事者がHuawei義務を是正することが可能であるとの見解を示した [425] 。しかしながら、これには、CJEUにより要請される通り、両当事者間で圧力のない協議ができるようになることが必要である。このため、両当事者は、並行する無効確認訴訟において連邦特許裁判所の決定がなされるまで、審理停止の申立て [426] 又は同意を得た上での手続停止等の利用可能な手続文書を使用して、訴訟手続の一時停止を求めなければならない [427]

上記を背景に、本裁判所は、権利侵害訴訟手続開始後Huaweiフレームワークに基づき情報開示義務の是正を求めるSEP保有者に対し、審理停止を申し立てるよう求めた [427] 。当該申立てがなされた場合には、「誠実意思を有する実施者は訴訟手続停止に同意するであろう」と本裁判所は期待している [427]

本裁判所は、係争中の権利侵害訴訟手続の過程でHuawei義務の欠点を是正する機会を両当事者に与えることは、英国控訴院(Unwired Planet対Huawei) [428] とハーグ控訴裁判所(Philips対Asus) [429] の双方で採用された「セーフハーバー」方式に準じていると述べた。上記裁判所はいずれも、Huaweiフレームワークについて厳密に実施すべき強制的な正式手続とみなしておらず、したがって、CJEUにより定められた協議の枠組みから逸脱したとしても、必ずしも、特許保有者による差止命令の請求を排除する濫用的な行動にはあたらない [430] 。さらに、これに該当するかどうかは、ケースバイケースで評価する必要がある [431]

権利侵害通知

その上で本裁判所は、Sisvelが係争中のSEPの侵害について権利侵害訴訟手続開始前にWikoに通知するHuawei義務を履行していたと認めた。

SEP保有者の各通知の内容に関し、本裁判所は基本的に、従前の決定と同じ要件を適用した。本裁判所は、当該通知において (1) 係争中の特許についてその特許番号を含めて記載し、(2) 当該特許が規格に必須として関連標準化機関に宣言されていることを通知し、(3) どの規格について当該特許が必須であるのかを示し、かつ、(4) 実施者の製品又はサービスのうち当該規格を実施する技術的機能を説明しなければならないと認めた [432] 。適切とする詳細の水準については、ケースバイケースで判断する [432] 。本裁判所は、原則として、特許保有者が、SEPライセンス許諾の交渉において慣習的に用いられるクレームチャートを実施者に提供することにより、その通知義務を履行したことになる旨を確認した [432] 。本裁判所はさらに、企業グループの親会社に通知が送付された場合、通常、Huaweiフレームワークにおいて十分であることを再確認した [432]

SEP保有者の申出

本裁判所は、SisvelがまたWikoに対して書面による明確なFRAND条件でのライセンスの申出を行うHuawei義務を履行していたことも認めた。各評価に関し、本裁判所は、権利侵害訴訟手続停止中にSisvelからWikoに対してなされた最後の申出である2018年オファーのみを検討した [433]

まず、本裁判所は、どの具体的なライセンス料や追加的な契約条件がFRANDの「客観的側面に該当する」のかについて、侵害を管轄する裁判所がこれを判断する義務を負うものではないとする自らの立場を重ねて強調した [434] 。カールスルーエ高等地方裁判所(superior Higher District Court of Karlsruhe)が以前に示した見解に反し、本裁判所は、CJEUが差止命令及び製品リコールに関する訴訟手続についてFRAND条件の「正確な数量的判断(precise mathematical determination)」を「負わせる」つもりはなかったとの考えを支持した [435] 。さらに、FRANDへの該当が見込まれる条件には「幅」があるため、差止命令の要求がTFEU第102条に抵触するのは、特段の交渉状況及び市況に鑑みて、SEP保有者の申出が「搾取的な濫用」にあたるような場合に限られる [434] 。すなわち、本裁判所の認識は、英国控訴院のUnwired Planet対Huaweiと共通であった [428]

上記にかかわらず、本裁判所は、権利侵害を管轄する裁判所がSEP保有者のライセンスの申出がFRANDに適合するか否かにつき、単なる「表面的」な評価ではなく、それ以上の評価を行うべきであることを明確にした。権利侵害を管轄する裁判所は、具体的な申出の全体的な内容について、両当事者の交渉上の立場における典型的な当初の違いにかかわらず、誠実に行為する実施者に対し当該申出に応じることを要求するものであるか否かを検討しなければならない [436] 。原則として、このような義務は、SEP保有者が自らの申出がFRAND条件での申出であると判断する理由を立証する方法でロイヤルティの算定を説明する場合に生じる [437] 。プールライセンシングプログラム又は標準ライセンシングプログラムが存在する場合は、通常、各プログラムが市場で受け入れられていることを立証すれば十分である。プールごとに十分な数のライセンスが許諾されている場合、特許保有者は、当該プールに包含される特許に言及した適切な数量のクレームチャートを提示して、当該プールの構成を概説すれば良い [438]

この状況において、本裁判所は、特許保有者の申出がFRANDに適合するか否かに関し実施者が申立てをする場合、原則として、個別の契約条項の違法性(の主張)を根拠として申立を行うことができない旨を指摘した。さらに、申出がFRANDに適合しているか否かについては、包括的な契約の概要に基づき評価しなければならない [439] 。例外が適用されるのは、特定の条項が「容認できない効果(unacceptable effect)」を有する場合に限られる [439] 。本件において、本裁判所は、2018年オファーのいずれの条項にもこのような効果がないと判断した [439] 。 とりわけ、本裁判所は、ライセンシー(ここではWiko)に申し出がなされたライセンスの対象たる特許の消尽に関する立証責任を定めた条項が許容されると判断した [440] 。同様の事件におけるデュッセルドルフ地方裁判所の見解とは対照的に、本裁判所は、ライセンシーがサプライヤーを関与させることによりライセンス網を追跡しやすい立場にあることから、関連の事実を確証するようライセンシーに要請することが適切であると論じた [440]

また、本裁判所は、提示されたライセンスの期間を5年に制限する条項が反トラストの観点から「容認できない効果(unacceptable effect)」を有するとは判断しなかった。本裁判所は、その5年の期間について、急速な技術の発展を特徴とする無線通信業界において実勢的な慣行に準じたものであると判示した [441]

さらに本裁判所は、ライセンシーによる報告義務の違反や30日を超える支払遅延が生じた場合のライセンス契約の例外的な終了を求める権利を定めた条項について、上記の「容認できない効果(unacceptable effect)」がないことを指摘した [441]

本裁判所は、2018年オファーにおいて、契約期間中、対象特許の数に変更が生じた場合に合意済みロイヤルティ料率の調整について定めた条項が含まれていなかったことに異議を唱えなかった。本裁判所の見解によれば、FRAND条件でのライセンスに当該条項を含めることは求められていない [441] 。しかしながら、プールを構成する特許の多数がライセンス期間締結後間もなく満了する場合には、例外が認められるべきである [441] 。一般的に、ライセンスの申出において、契約目的の履行不能性を理由にライセンスの調整を要請する両当事者の制定法上の権利(ドイツ民事法典第313条1項)が制限又は排除されていない場合には特に、「調整」条項がなくとも問題にならない [441]

非差別性/秘密保持

FRANDライセンスの申出の非差別的要素に関して、本裁判所は、TFEU第102条においては、係争中の権利侵害訴訟手続において、被告に対する申出が同様の状況に置かれた競業者に比べて被告を差別するものでないことを証明する特許保有者の義務(二次的な)が定められているとの見解を示した [438]

上記にかかわらず、本裁判所は、いかなる事例においても上記の義務が法的に「全面的な透明性」を伴うわけではないことを明確にした [438] 。SEP保有者の反トラスト義務により、法的保護に値する被告の秘密保持上の権利が常に重視されるものではない。さらに言えば、個々の事例の特別な状況により、秘密性を保護しなければならない可能性がある [438]

本裁判所は、SEP保有者と同様の状況に置かれた第三者たるライセンシーとの間の既存のライセンス契約(類似契約)に定められた情報を特段に参照した上で、当該契約を開示する特許保有者の義務については、侵害を管轄する裁判所により、訴訟手続における両当事者の訴答を考慮した上で、ケースバイケースで判断されるべきであるとの見解を示した [438]

本裁判所によれば、特許保有者は、保護されるべき秘密保持上の権利の存在を確立しなければならない。類似契約に秘密保持条項が適用されるというだけでは、本来的には、特許保有者の開示義務の範囲を制限する根拠とはならない [442] 。これに対し被告は、特許保有者のライセンスの申出がFRANDに該当するか否かを評価するに際し、要請した情報が必要であった理由を説明しなければならない [442] 。被告は、SEP保有者の差別的と見られる行動を示し、具体的な事実を確証しなければならない [443]

この点を考慮し、本裁判所は、いかなる場合においてもSEP保有者が権利侵害訴訟手続において既存の類似契約書すべてを提出する義務を負うとのデュッセルドルフ裁判所の見解に異議を申し立てた [444] 。とりわけ、特許保有者が実施者との間で標準的なライセンス契約のみを締結している場合、当該契約の条件が公開されているのであれば、本裁判所には、訴訟手続において(膨大な)同一の契約書を提出する義務を特許保有者に負わせる理由がない。すなわち、それまでに締結した(標準的な)ライセンス契約の件数を開示すれば十分である [444]

したがって、本裁判所は、2018年オファーに際しSisvelからWikoに提出された既存ライセンシーのリストについて、ライセンシーの名が黒塗りされていたとしても、当該オファーのFRAND該否の確証に十分であったと認めた。本裁判所の見解において、Wikoは、2018年オファーのFRAND該否を評価するために既存ライセンシーの身元情報が必要であった理由を説明していなかった [445] 。さらに本裁判所は、Wikoが既存ライセンシーの身元開示を目的として訴訟手続が停止されている間、Sisvelから提示されたNDAの締結を拒絶していた事実も考慮した [446] 。2018年オファーのFRAND該否に異議がなかったため、本裁判所は、WikoによるNDAの締結の拒絶がHuaweiフレームワークを準拠する意思のないこととみなされるかどうかについて判断を下さなかった。しかしながら、本裁判所は、実施者が適切なNDAの締結を拒絶した場合は原則としてこれをSEP保有者の申出の評価に関連して検討すべきとの、この点に関しデュッセルドルフ裁判所が示した見解に同意した [446]

さらに、本裁判所は、ドイツ民事訴訟手続法(Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO)第142条に従い管轄裁判所により発せられた文書提出命令を通じ、権利侵害訴訟手続において類似契約の使用を促す可能性についても検討した [443] 。このオプションは、特に、類似契約に定められた秘密保持条項により、裁判所命令が発せられた場合に限り契約の開示が認められる個別の事例において侵害を管轄する裁判所により検討される。本裁判所によれば、当該秘密保持条項は、それ自体では反トラスト法に反するものでないことから、特許保有者が訴訟手続において保護に値する秘密保持上の利益を確証できない場合を除き、尊重されるべきである [443] 。特許保有者が、秘密保持条項の拘束を受け、審理に際し類似契約書を提出する意思がある場合には、侵害を管轄する裁判所は、各案件の具体的な状況に基づき、ZPO第142条に従い文書提出命令を発する [443] 。特許保有者が当該命令に従わない場合、当該裁判所は、Huaweiフレームワークにおける両当事者の行為を全体的に評価する上で、その行動を不誠実さの顕れであると判断する場合がある [443] 。ZPO第142条に従い発せられた裁判所命令に基づき類似契約書の閲覧が認められた後、実施者が訴訟手続停止に同意しない場合も、同様に適用される [443]

実施者のカウンターオファー

本裁判所は、WikoがSisvelに対し、正当な過程でFRAND条件の対案(カウンターオファー)を行うHuawei義務を履行していなかったと認めた。各評価に関し、本裁判所は、2018年オファーに対するWikoの対応に注目した [447]

本裁判所は、申出がFRANDに該当するとみなしているか否かにかかわらず(通常はあてはまる)、実施者が具体的な事実に基づき、SEP保有者のライセンスオファーに対応する義務を負っていると明言した [443] 。さらに、実施者は、各事例の事実、特定分野での業界慣行及び誠実な原則を検討の上、可能な限り早急に対応しなければならない [427]

Wikoが3か月を超える期間、2018年オファーに一切対応しなかったことに鑑み、本裁判所は、Wikoが上記の義務に違反すると判示した [423] 。本裁判所の見解では、Wikoは時間の引き延ばし戦術をとったとされる [423] 。本裁判所は、フランスの休校期間や、(Wikoの陳述によれば)ライセンス関連業務を担当した従業員がわずか2名であったという事実が、Wikoによる対応の遅延の十分な根拠になるとは認めなかった [447] 。国際的な業務に携わる会社として、Wikoは、今後、各問題に対処できるよう十分な人材を確保すべきである [447]


C. その他の重要事項

差止命令並びに侵害性を有する製品の市場からの排除及び破棄を求めたSisvelの請求とは別に、本裁判所は、実体的事項に関するWikoの損害賠償責任を認め、宣言的判決を下した [448]

本裁判所は、Wikoが係争中の特許を著しく侵害したと判断した。とりわけ、Wikoは、少なくとも過失的行為をなした [448] 。Wikoは、極めて複雑な標準化技術(特に、規格に組み込まれる膨大な数の特許)が極めて複雑であるため、知的財産権に関する状況を評価することが困難になった(よって、過失を除外すべき)と主張した。しかしながら本裁判所は、基盤となる技術がより一層複雑になったために、実施者側に対するデューディリジェンス要件がさらに拡大したことを明言した [449]

  • [421] Sisvel対Wiko、マンハイム地方裁判所2019年9月4日、事件番号7 O 115/16。
  • [422] 同判決、17~31頁。
  • [423] 同判決、46頁。
  • [424] Huawei対ZTE、EU司法裁判所2015年7月16日判決、事件番号C-170/13。
  • [425] Sisvel対Wiko、マンハイム地方裁判所2019年9月4日、事件番号7 O 115/16、42頁。
  • [426] 同判決、43頁及び51頁以下。
  • [427] 同判決、42頁。
  • [428] Unwired Planet対Huawei、英国控訴院2018年10月23日判決、[2018] EWCA Civ 2344、第282節。
  • [429] Philips対Asus、ハーグ控訴裁判所2019年5月7日、事件番号200.221 .250/01。
  • [430] Sisvel対Wiko、マンハイム地方裁判所2019年9月4日、事件番号7 O 115/16、44頁。
  • [431] 同判決、44頁。
  • [432] 同判決、37頁。
  • [433] 同判決、47頁及び53頁。
  • [434] 同判決、38頁。
  • [435] 同判決、37頁。以下。
  • [436] Sisvel対Wiko、マンハイム地方裁判所2019年9月4日、事件番号7 O 115/16、39頁。
  • [437] 同判決、39頁。
  • [438] 同判決、40頁。
  • [439] 同判決、53頁。
  • [440] 同判決、54頁。
  • [441] 同判決、55頁。
  • [442] 同判決、40頁及び49頁。
  • [443] 同判決、41頁。
  • [444] 同判決、49頁。
  • [445] 同判決、50頁。
  • [446] 同判決、51頁。
  • [447] 同判決、47頁。
  • [448] 同判決、35頁。
  • [449] 同判決、35頁以下。

Updated 2 8月 2019

Philips v Wiko, Court of Appeal of The Hague

オランダ裁判所の決定
2 7月 2019 - Case No. C/09/511922/HA ZA 16-623

A. Facts

By letter dated 13 October 2013, the Claimant, Koninklijke Philips N.V. (“Philips”), informed the Defendant, Wiko SAS (“Wiko”), that it holds patents declared essential to the UMTS and LTE mobile telecommunication standards (Standard Essential Patents or “SEPs”) towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”). The letter included a list of some of Wiko’s products and invited Wiko to discuss a FRAND licensing agreement [450] . Wiko did not react to the letter [451] .

On 28 July 2015, Philips sent Wiko claim charts and a licensing agreement [452] . The communication remained unanswered by Wiko [451] .

On 19 October 2015, Philips started the present proceedings against Wiko [453] . On 25 August 2016, Wiko made a counteroffer [454] . Since 2016, it has also provided information about worldwide units sold and blocked an amount of EUR 895.000 into an escrow account [451] .

After the present proceedings were filed, Philips brought a further action against Wiko before the District Court of Mannheim (Mannheim Court), Germany (German proceedings). On 2 March 2018, the Mannheim Court honoured Wiko’s FRAND defence and dismissed Philips’ action.

In an interlocutory decision dated 16 April 2019, the Court of Appeal of The Hague (Court) held that the patent in suit EP1 623 511 (EP 511) is valid and that Wiko is infringing this patent [455] . Wiko claimed that, as this patent is a SEP and Philips has not complied with its contractual duties, Philips is abusing its dominant position by initiating infringement proceedings against Wiko [451] .

With the present judgment, the Court granted Philips’ request for injunctive relief [456] , destruction [457] and the recall of products [458] , but partly invalidated EP 511, insofar it goes beyond the claims of the second auxiliary request [459] .

B. Court’s reasoning

German Proceedings and Lis Pendens

Since the Court of Manheim in Germany had honoured its FRAND defence, Wiko argued that Articles 29 and 30 of Brussels Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements (Brussels Regulation) are applicable and that the Court is not competent for the present case [460] .

The Court rejected this argument, underlying that each national proceedings are based on a national counterpart of a European patent. For each national counterpart, the concerned national jurisdiction is exclusively competent [461] .

The fact the same FRAND defence has been raised in the German proceedings does not prevent the Court from moving on with its proceedings. The application of Articles 29 and 30 of the Brussels Regulation on cases with same object requires that the filed claims, not the raised defences, are identical [460] .

The Court concluded that recognition of the Mannheim decision would not affect the pending proceedings, as the patents at stake were not the same [462] .

Patent essentiality and infringement

Philips had declared EP 511 as essential to HSUPA (part of UMTS standard) towards ETSI on 26 November 2009 [463] . The fact that EP 511 is essential to HSUPA was not challenged by Wiko [464] .

Moreover, the interlocutory decision of the Court dated 16 April 2019 confirmed that claims 1, 9 and 12 of EP 511 are implemented in the UMTS standard [451] .

FRAND negotiations and application of the Huawei steps

The Court considers that the Huawei decision [465] does not set up strict rules, but rather guidelines for FRAND negotiations in good faith between the parties [466] .

Regarding the first step of the Huawei decision, that is the SEP-holder’s obligation to notify the implementer of the patents at stake and the infringement [467] , the Court underlines that this approach is different than what had been previously decided in a Dutch case prior to the Huawei decision, Philips v. SK Kassetten [468] .

Moving on to the next step, the Court found that Wiko had not fulfilled its duty as it did not react to Philips’ notification [469] . The Court, therefore, held that Philips was not obliged to make a licensing offer to Wiko, before starting proceedings against Wiko [451] .

FRAND offer

Nevertheless, Philips had made an offer to Wiko on 28 July 2015 [470] . This offer was for a worldwide licence under Philips’ UMTS and LTE SEPs [471] .

Philips’ expert explained that the offered rate amounting to USD 1,0 per product (non-compliant rate) and USD 0,75 per product (compliant rate) was justified in view of all UMTS and LTE SEPs [451] .

However, Wiko argued that Philips’ offer is not FRAND for the following reasons: Philips did not specify that its offer was FRAND compliant and did not explain how the offer was FRAND [472] .

Contrary to German courts, the Court held that the Huawei steps do not imply a substantiation duty [473] , but solely the duty to specify the amount of the rate and the way it is calculated [474] . It bases this reasoning on the fact that the Huawei decision has to be read in light of a previous German decision, the Orange Book Standard decision, where the German Supreme Court decided it was up to the implementer to make a first FRAND offer [451] . The Court interprets the Huawei decision as requiring the SEP-holder, as it is in a better position to do so, to make a first FRAND offer after the implementer has demonstrated itself to be a “willing licensee” [451] . But it does not require the SEP-holder to substantiate its FRAND offer and give insights on why he believes the offer is FRAND. The Court also considers there is no duty for the SEP-holder to justify its rate in view of what other licensees are paying [475] .

Wiko also challenged specific terms of the license, i.e. the suggested duration (until expiry of the last patent), the coupling of UMTS and LTE SEPs, as well as the requested fixed licence fees [476] . The Court held, however, that Wiko did not provide any evidence to support its position that Philips’ offer is not FRAND [451] . Additionally, the Court attached importance to the fact that Philips had expressed its willingness to discuss the offer and specific circumstances with Wiko [477] . Philips had even asked Wiko to make a counteroffer, which the latter did not [478] .

The Court further pointed out that the fact that there are different terms and conditions with other parties does not necessarily imply that the offer made to Wiko is discriminatory [479] . It stressed that “non-discriminatory” does not mean that every licensee must be offered the same structure and rate; the “non-discriminatory” nature of an offer depends on the facts and circumstances of the specific case [451] .

Wiko’s counteroffer

Wiko GmbH, an entity legally independent from other Wiko entities, had made a counteroffer to Philips [480] . However, the Court did not consider this counteroffer as a counteroffer made by the Defendant of the present proceedings to Philips [451] .

Besides that, the Defendant had also made a counteroffer to Philips after the start of the present proceedings [481] . This offer was based on the following estimates: the total number of UMTS and LTE SEPs was 12.000, out of which Wiko estimated that Philips holds 97 families, and the aggregated royalty rate for all SEPs amounted to 12% [482] . Wiko derived a rate of 0.001% per SEP family and made the following counteroffer to Philips [451] :

- 0.042% for the compliant rate (EUR 0.027)

- 0.066% for the non-compliant rate (EUR 0.043)

- 0.0315% for past sales (EUR 0.020).

Subsequently, Wiko made a further offer to Philips of 0.084 (which, in Philips‘ eyes, referred to a percentage) [451] .

The Court held that Wiko’s counteroffers were not FRAND. It found that the counteroffer included too many patents into the total SEPs pool, because it included base station and infrastructure patents, while Philips portfolio was focused on cellphone patents [483] . Consequently, the Court concluded that Philips held a higher percent of SEPs than estimated by Wiko [451] . It also highlighted that Wiko did not provide any explanation with respect to a proposed discount of the initially estimated rate of 0.097% and the aggregated royalty rate [483] . The Court also noticed that, while Wiko stated Philips’ rate should account for the technical and economic value of Philips’ SEPs, this analysis was missing from Wiko’s counteroffer [484] . It added that Wiko’s counteroffer did not account for the value of Philips’ SEPs in view of other SEPs for the same standard [485] .

Abuse of a dominant position

The Court held that the Huawei case requires that the facts and circumstances of a case have to be assessed to determine if there is an abuse of a dominant position [466] . Furthermore, the Court also referred to the decision of the UK High Court of Justice in Unwired Planet v. Huawei to note that the fact that the circumstances of a case diverge from the Huawei scheme does not automatically lead to the conclusion of an abuse of a dominant position, if the SEP-holder, nonetheless, files an action against an implementer [451] .

The Court expressly pointed out that if starting proceedings is considered as an abuse of a dominant position, then implementers have no incentives to comply with the Huawei steps and can just delay the negotiations [486] .

With respect to the asserted claims for injunction and recall of products, the Court found that the facts and circumstances of this case were different from the German proceedings, where the Mannheim Court viewed Wiko as a “willing licensee” [487] .

Wiko did not demonstrate itself to be a “willing licensee”, as it did not react to Philips’ notification, and did not comply with the required Huawei steps. Therefore, the Court rejected Wiko’s FRAND defence and granted Philips’ request for an injunction and recall of products.

  • [450] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 2.1
  • [451] Ibidem
  • [452] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 2.2
  • [453] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 2.3
  • [454] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 2.4
  • [455] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 3.1
  • [456] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 5.1
  • [457] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 5.4
  • [458] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 5.3
  • [459] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 5.8
  • [460] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.1
  • [461] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.2
  • [462] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.3
  • [463] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6
  • [464] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.5
  • [465] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [466] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.14
  • [467] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.10
  • [468] Case reference: Court of The Hague, Philips v. SK Kassetten, 17 March 2019, referred to in Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.10.
  • [469] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.15
  • [470] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.16
  • [471] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.27
  • [472] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.17
  • [473] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.18 and 4.19
  • [474] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.18
  • [475] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.19
  • [476] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.31
  • [477] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraphs 4.26, 4.31, 4.32, 4.36
  • [478] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.36
  • [479] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.34
  • [480] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.20
  • [481] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 2.4
  • [482] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.38
  • [483] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.40
  • [484] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.39
  • [485] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.41
  • [486] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.21
  • [487] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 2 July 2019, paragraph 4.22

Updated 9 11月 2020

Nokia対Daimler、マンハイム地方裁判所

LG Mannheim
18 8月 2020 - Case No. 2 O 34/19

A. 内容

原告は、フィンランドに本社を置くNokiaグループに属している(「Nokia」)。Nokiaは、大手通信事業者であり、欧州電気通信標準化機構(「ETSI」)が開発した各種無線通信規格の実施に不可欠(と見込まれる)と宣言されている、重要な特許ポートフォリオ(標準必須特許又はSEP)を保有している。

被告Daimlerは、世界的に有名なドイツの車メーカーである。Daimlerは、ETSIが開発した規格を実装する接続機能を備えた車をドイツで製造し、販売している。

Nokiaは、本件にかかわる特許が4G/LTE規格にとって不可欠であるとETSIに向けて宣言した。ETSIは、規格の実施に不可欠であるか、不可欠となる可能性のある特許の特許権者に対し、ユーザーが公平、合理的、かつ非差別的(FRAND)な条件にてこれを利用できるよう確約することを要求している。

2016年6月21日、Nokiaは、ETSIに不可欠(と見込まれる)と宣言した特許及び特許出願を網羅したリストを提出して自社のSEPポートフォリオをDaimlerに知らせた。これに対しDaimlerは、自社製品が実際にNokiaの特許を侵害しているとの条件でライセンスを取得できると回答した。

2016年11月9日、Nokiaは、Daimlerに1回目のライセンスの申し出を行った。2016年12月7日、Nokiaは、自社の特許ポートフォリオに関する詳細情報をDaimlerに提供した。2016年12月14日、Daimlerは、Daimlerの車に組み込まれている、いわゆる「テレマティクス制御ユニット」(TCU)を製造するサプライヤーへライセンスを付与する方が効率的と思われる旨回答した。2017年1月から2019年2月まで、Daimlerは、Nokiaとの交渉の場に再度就くことはなく、NokiaがDaimlerのサプライヤーと行った協議にも参加しなかった。

2019年2月27日、Nokiaは、Daimlerに対し二度目となるライセンスの申し出を行い、これに際し、自社特許と対象たる規格関連部分との対応関係を図示したクレームチャートを添付した。2019年3月19日、Daimlerは、Nokiaのポートフォリオに関するロイヤルティについて、基本的に、Daimlerが製造した車の台数ではなく、そのサプライヤーからDaimlerに提供されたコンポーネント数を基準として計算すべきであるとして、再度この申込みを拒絶した。

爾後Nokiaは、Daimlerに対し、ドイツのミュンヘン、デュッセルドルフ及びマンハイのム地方裁判所に複数の権利侵害訴訟を申し立てた。

2019年5月9日、権利侵害訴訟開始後間もなく、Daimlerは、Nokiaにカウンターオファーを行った。Nokiaのポートフォリオにかかわるそのロイヤルティの算定根拠は、Daimlerがサプライヤーに支払ったTCUの平均販売価格であった。Nokiaはこのカウンターオファーを拒絶した。

2020年6月10日、Daimlerは、Nokiaに2度目のカウンターオファーを行った。Nokiaは、(ドイツ民法典第315条に従い)ライセンス料を一方的に決定することができたが、Daimlerは、その決定されたライセンス料について裁判で争う権利を有していた。その2度目のカウンターオファーも拒絶された。

2020年6月18日、ドイツ連邦カルテル庁(「カルテル庁」)がマンハイム地方裁判所(「本裁判所」)での本件訴訟に介入し、FRAND宣言の性質に関する問題を本裁判所から欧州司法裁判所(CJEU)に照会するよう勧告した。本裁判所は、カルテル庁の勧告に従わなかった。

現行の判決で [488] 、本裁判所は、Daimlerに差止命令を下すとともに、本案に関するDaimlerの損害賠償責任を認めた。さらに本裁判所は、Nokiaへの損害賠償金の算定に必要な会計帳簿及び情報を提出するようDaimlerに命じた。

 

B. 判決理由

本裁判所は、係争中の特許をDaimlerが侵害したと認定した [489] 。これにより、Nokiaには差止命令等による救済手段が与えられた [490]

Daimler及び当該訴訟に参加したそのサプライヤーは、Nokiaが権利侵害訴訟の申立てにより市場支配的地位を濫用しており、これがEU機能条約第102条に違反していることから、差止命令が却下されるべきとして、いわゆる「FRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁」を主張した。とりわけ、Huawei v ZTE [491] (「Huawei裁定」又は「Huaweiフレームワーク」)事件でCJEUが定めた行動要件をNokiaが遵守していないと論じられた。

本裁判所は、Daimler及びそのサプライヤーのFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁を理由がないとして棄却した [492]

 

Huaweiフレームワーク

本裁判所は、SEP保有者が特許に起因して生じる独占権の行使を本来的に妨げられないことを名言した [493] 。実際のところ、特許が規格に必須であっても、その特許権者に技術利用を許容する義務を負わせることにならない。但し、市場支配的地位を獲得した結果、そのような利用を認めていたか、その利用を認める義務を課されていた場合は、この限りでない [493]

特許権者がHuaweiフレームワークに基づく義務を履行しているのであれば、特許権の行使による市場支配的地位の濫用が生じることはない [494] 。但し上記の義務は、権利者の許諾なしに保護対象技術を既に利用している実施者がFRAND条件でのライセンス取得の意思を有していることを前提とする [495] 。本裁判所は、特許権者から規格利用者に対しライセンスを「押しつける」よう要請することはできないのであるから、ライセンス契約締結を要請する法的請求権については尚更有していないと説示した [495] 。その上、支配的地位に付される「特段の責任」により、SEP保有者は、原則としてライセンス取得の意思を有するライセンシーに契約締結を促すよう「十分な努力」を払う義務を負う [496]

 

権利侵害通知

本裁判所によれば、上記の「努力」には、その実施者に特許侵害について通知するだけでなく、権利侵害訴訟申立て前におけるライセンス取得の可能性および必要性を通知する義務が含まれる [497] 。具体的な事例を参照した結果、本裁判所は、Nokiaが当該義務を履行したと認めた [498]

内容について言えば、上記の権利侵害通知には、被侵害特許の明示並びに侵害性を有する使用法及び訴えの対象たる実施形態を記載しなければならない [497] 。権利侵害について技術的・法的観点から詳細に分析する必要はない。実施者の立場としては、結局は専門家又は弁護士の助言に依拠してその権利侵害の主張を評価するしかない [497] 。通例、クレームチャートが提示されれば十分である(但し、必須ではない) [497] 。さらに本裁判所は、特許権者がその特許を侵害している最終製品メーカーのサプライヤーそれぞれに対し、別個に権利侵害を通知する義務を負わないことを指摘した [499]

本裁判所の見地から、2016年6月21日、2016年11月9日及び2016年12月7日付のNokiaのEメールは、上記要件を満たしている [500] 。実際のところNokiaは、-少なくとも当初は-付託される係争中の特許に該当する標準規格書の具体的部分を示していなかったことは、害にはならない。これは、権利侵害の最終的な評価を行うに際し権利侵害通知が求められていなかったためである [501]

さらに本裁判所は、Nokiaが権利侵害通知において、関連規格によって接続機能を生み出す具体的なコンポーネント(Daimlerの車に組み込まれたTCU等)を特定する必要はないと判断した [502] 。Daimlerは当該コンポーネントを購入した上で自社製品に使用したのだから、情報不足は何ら生じるはずがなかった [502]

 

誠実意思

さらに本裁判所は、DaimlerがNokiaとのFRANDライセンス契約締結の意思を十分に明示ていないことから、差止命令を回避するためにFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁に依拠できないと認定した [503]

本裁判所の見地から、実施者は、「どのような条件が実際にFRANDにあたるのかにかかわらず」SEP保有者とのライセンス契約を締結する意思について、「明確に」かつ「疑義の生じないよう」宣言した上で、爾後「目的志向」の意図にてライセンス供与の協議に従事しなければならなかった(Sisvel v Haier(連邦司法裁判所, 2020年5月5日, Case No. KZR 36/17)、及びUnwired Planet v Huawei(英国及びウェールズ高等法院、2017年4月5日, Case No. [2017] EWHC 711(Pat)の判決) [504] 。ライセンス供与の協議における実施者の「目的志向」は、決定的な重要性を有する。実施者は概して、ライセンス供与の協議が開始される前の時点で特許取得済の標準化技術を既に使用していることから、その特許の有効期間満了までライセンス契約締結を遅延させることに利得を有するが、これはHuawei裁定の趣旨に反する [505] 。よって、権利侵害の通知に対して、ライセンス契約締結を検討する意思を示したり、ライセンス取得の是非及びその条件についての協議に入る意思を示したりするだけでは不十分である [504]

本裁判所はさらに、一定条件下での誠実意思の宣言が許容されないと指摘した [504] 。さらに特許権者へのカウンターオファー内容変更協議の拒絶も、実施側の誠実意思欠如を示すものとみなされうる [504]

上記に基づき、本裁判所は、Daimlerが当初、製品がNokiaの特許を実際に侵害すればライセンス契約を締結すると示したことでは、DaimlerがFRANDライセンス契約を締結する意思を適切に示さなかったとの見解を示した [506] 。本裁判所は、Daimlerのカウンターオファーは契約締結にかかわる意思を十分に示したものになりえず、特に2度目のカウンターオファーについては、Nokiaが片務的に設定できたはずのロイヤルティ料率に異議を唱える権利をDaimlerに求めただけで、ライセンス料の決定に関する両当事者間の紛争を爾後の訴訟に持ち越しただけに過ぎないと付け加えた [507]

本裁判所はさらに、DaimlerがNokiaとの協議に関与しなかったにもかかわらず、自らのサプライヤーにNokiaから直接ライセンスを付与するよう強く主張したことから、Daimlerが「誠実意思を有する」ライセンシーとして行為していなかったと判示した [508] 。さらに、Daimlerの誠実意思の欠落は、NokiaのSEPポートフォリオに対するライセンス料の算定基準として、Daimlerがサプライヤーから購入したTCUの平均価格を適用するよう主張したことからも確認された [509]

 

FRAND料金の算定

本裁判所は、NokiaのSEPポートフォリオに対するロイヤルティ料率の算定に、TCUを「参考値」として使用することは適正でなかったと認定した [510]

一般に、FRAND条件は単一ではなく、FRANDのライセンス供与条件及び料金には幅が設定されるのが通例である [511] 。また、何がFRANDとみなされるかは、業界及び時期によって異なる場合がある [511]

しかしながら、本裁判所は、原則として「バリューチェーンの最終段階で商品として通用する最終製品にかかる技術の経済上の利益」を特許権者に「配分」しなければならないと指摘した [512] 。どの理由は、保護された発明を使用する最終製品で「経済上の利益」を獲得する「機会が創出する」、ためである [512] 。裁判所は、最終製品における特許技術の価値を斟酌して、SEP保有者がバリューチェーンの別の段階でなされるイノベーションから利益を得ているとの考えを認めなかった [513] 。裁判所は、これが生じないと確認するために入手可能な証拠文書が複数存在することを示した [513]

したがって、本裁判所は、いわゆる「最小販売可能特許実施単位(SSPPU)」、すなわち、製品に組み入れられる最小技術単位をFRANDロイヤルティ料率の算定根拠とする考えを否定した [513] 。特許消尽の影響により、SEP保有者は、バリューチェーン最終段階で創出される価値に関与することを妨げられる [513] 。これとは別に、この選択肢は、バリューチェーンの複数の段階において同一特許のライセンスが付与される「二重取り」の特定と回避をより複雑にするおそれがある [513] 。 それでもなお本裁判所は、上記の原則について、必ずしも専ら最終製品製造会社とライセンス契約締結を意味するものでないと明言した [514] 。本裁判所は、販売可能な最終製品の特許技術の価値がサプライチェーンの別の段階で計算に組み込まれる可能性が大いにあるとみなした [514]

この背景に照らし、本裁判所は、TCUの販売価格では、本事件の最終製品にあたるDaimler製造車に対するNokiaのSEPの価値が十分に反映されていないと認定した [515] 。TCUの販売価格が相応するのはDaimlerのそれぞれのコストのみである [516] 。むしろDaimlerは、接続機能により、顧客に追加サービスを提示してこれによる収入を得て、コストを節減し、研究開発費を最適化した [517] 。接続機能はこの価値創出の機会を保証するものである [518] 。さらに、本裁判所は、Daimlerの複数の主要競合会社が(専ら車製造会社にライセンスを付与する)Avanciプラットフォームのライセンシングモデルを承諾したことにより、最終製品向けの保護された技術の価値に焦点があてられることは、自動車業界にとっても合理的と認定した [519]

 

非差別性

さらに本裁判所は、NokiaのDaimlerに対する特許請求の申立ては差別的なものではなく、よってサプライヤーがライセンスを取得するべきとのDaimlerの主張が正当化されるものでないことを認めた [520]

裁判所は、特許権利者が基本的に、サプライヤーンの中で権利を主張する段階を自由に選択できることを説示した [521] 。競争関連法においてこの可能性は本来的に制限されていないため、市場支配的地位を有する特許権者も同様である [521] 。その上、支配的地位を有する特許権利者は、すべての見込ライセンシーに「標準料率」を申出する義務を負うものでない [521] 。TFEU第102条に定められた非差別性に関わる義務は、上流市場又は下流市場での競争の歪みを回避するためであるが、正当な根拠が十分に存在する場合にライセンシーの様々な取扱いを排除するものではない [522]

本件において、本裁判所は、ロイヤルティベースとして最終製品を使用すべきであるとのNokiaの請求が競争に影響を及ぼさないと判断した [523] 。特に、自動車業界では車メーカーに販売されるコンポーネントのライセンスをサプライヤーが取得することが一般的であるとの事実は、Nokiaに慣行の変更を求めるものでない。これは特に、AvanciプラットフォームからDaimlerの競合会社へのライセンス供与は、通信業界において実勢的なその慣行が自動車業界でも既に適用されていることを証しているためである [524] 。さらに本裁判所は、最終製品メーカーにSEPを主張することにより生産、販売及び技術発展の制限がもたらされ、これにより消費者が不利益を被るとはみなさなかった [525] 。この点に関し、本裁判所は、ETSI IPRポリシーに拠ればFRANDライセンスに含められるべきであり、かつ、コンポーネントメーカーに製品の製造、販売及び開発を認めるいわゆる「下請製造権」に言及した [526]

 

SEP保有者の申出/情報提供義務

さらに、本裁判所は、Nokiaがライセンスの申出に関し十分な情報を提供することを拒絶した旨をDaimlerが主張しても、Daimlerのライセンス取得する意思のないことを正当化できないと判示した [527]

本裁判所は、SEP保有者がライセンス要請のFRAND適合性を具体化する義務を負う可能性を指摘した [528] 。特許権利者は、第三者との間で非標準的な条件に基づき既に契約を締結している場合、一般的には、別の契約条件の申出を受けているかどうか実施者が評価できるようにするため、-少なくとも-重要な契約条項の内容を開示し、提示する義務を負う [528] 。各々の義務の範囲および詳細なレベルは、ケースバイケースで判断される [528]

上記に鑑みて、本裁判所は、車両の接続機能の価値に関する調査や他の主要車メーカーとの署名済みライセンス締結等を共有することにより、NokiaがDaimlerに十分な情報を提供していたとの見解を示した [529] 。この状況において、本裁判所は、NokiaがDaimlerに対し、スマートフォンメーカーとのライセンス契約を開示する義務を負っていなかったと示した。本裁判所は、SEP保有者の情報開示義務が、従前に署名されているあらゆるライセンス契約の全文に及んで適用されるとの意見や、SEP保有者がすべての既存契約を開示する義務を負うとの意見を拒絶した [530] 。さらに本裁判所は、通信業界でのライセンス契約は自動車業界でのライセンスのFRAND適合性評価とは無関係であると判示した [530]

 

サプライヤーによるFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁

上記とは別に、本裁判所は、訴訟に参加したサプライヤーが提起したFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁がDaimlerに利益をもたらさないことを強調した [531]

本裁判所は、訴えられている最終製品メーカーがそのサプライヤーにより提起されるFRAND抗弁に、原則として依拠できるかどうかについて結論を出さなかった。本裁判所によれば、これについてはいかなる場合であれ、サプライヤーが(製造するコンポーネントでなく)最終製品に対する対象特許の価値を根拠として特許権利者からライセンスを取得する意思を有している必要がある [532] 。本訴訟はこのような状況でなかった [533]

本裁判所は、サプライヤーがSEP保有者に支払ったロイヤルティをその顧客に転嫁することが難しいことを無視したわけではない [534] 。しかしながら、第三者との契約上の取決め(ここでは、サプライヤーと最終製品メーカーとの契約)は、裁判所の見地から、最終製品にかかわる特許技術により創出される価値への配分を認めないライセンス契約にSEP保有者に指示するものであってはならない [534]

 

C. その他の問題点

最終的に本裁判所は、-カルテル庁の勧告に反し-、訴訟手続を停止し、かつ、SEP保有者のFRAND宣言により、バリューチェーンに含まれるあらゆる者に双務的なライセンスが付与される直接的な請求(license-to-allの考え方)または標準化技術へのアクセスへの請求(access-to-allの考え方)が確立されるのかをめぐる問題をCJEUに照会する必要はないと判断した。

本裁判所は、Daimlerもそのサプライヤーも、Daimlerが製造した車に関する特許技術の価値に基づきFRAND条件でNokiaからライセンスを取得する意思を有していなかったため、これについて結論を出さなかった [535] 。さらに本裁判所は、係争中の特許の有効期限が今後数年で満了するとの事実に基づき、訴訟手続の停止命令に反対すると述べた [536]

  • [488] Nokia v Daimler(マンハイム地方裁判所, 2020年8月18日判決, 事件番号 2 O 34/19(www.juris.deから引用))
  • [489] 同判決、第49節乃至第136節。
  • [490] 同判決、第138節。
  • [491] Huawei v ZTE(欧州司法裁判所, 2016年7月16日判決、事件番号 C-170/13)
  • [492] Nokia v Daimler(マンハイム地方裁判所、2020年8月18日判決、事件番号 2 O 34/19, 第144節)
  • [493] 同判決、第146節。
  • [494] 同判決、第147節。
  • [495] 同判決、第148節。
  • [496] 同判決、第149節。
  • [497] 同判決、第152節。
  • [498] 同判決、第151乃至第156節。
  • [499] 同判決、第248節。
  • [500] 同判決、第153節以降。
  • [501] 同判決、第154節。
  • [502] 同判決、第155節。
  • [503] 同判決、第157乃至第231節。
  • [504] 同判決、第158節。
  • [505] 同判決、第159節。
  • [506] 同判決、第161節。
  • [507] 同判決、第197乃至第199節。
  • [508] 同判決、第157節、第160節及び第162節乃至第164節。
  • [509] 同判決、第160及び第165節乃至第168節。
  • [510] 同判決、第169節。
  • [511] 同判決、第170節。
  • [512] 同判決、第171節。
  • [513] 同判決、第172節。
  • [514] 同判決、第173節。
  • [515] 同判決、第174節以降。
  • [516] 同判決、第174節。
  • [517] 同判決、第177節。
  • [518] 同判決、第180節。
  • [519] 同判決、第187節以降。
  • [520] 同判決、第201節乃至第212節。
  • [521] 同判決、第202節。
  • [522] 同判決、第203節。
  • [523] 同判決、第205節。
  • [524] 同判決、第210節。
  • [525] 同判決、第213節。
  • [526] 同判決、第215節。
  • [527] 同判決、第216節以降。
  • [528] 同判決、第217節。
  • [529] 同判決、第218節。
  • [530] 同判決、第230節。
  • [531] 同判決、第232節以降。
  • [532] 同判決、第234及び第236節以降。
  • [533] 同判決、第240節以降。
  • [534] 同判決、第239節。
  • [535] 同判決、第253及び第291節。
  • [536] 同判決、第291節。

Updated 15 5月 2018

Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, [2018] EWHC 808 (Pat)

英国裁判所の決定
16 4月 2018 - Case No. HP-2017-000048

A. Facts

The claimant, Conversant, is a licensing firm incorporated in Luxembourg. The defendants are two major Chinese telecoms equipment and handset manufacturers, Huawei and ZTE, and their English affiliates. After years of negotiations that failed to result in licenses for claimant’s portfolio of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) reading on ETSI wireless telecoms standards (and comprising inter alia Chinese and UK patents),Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE[2018] EWHC 808 (Pat) para 5. the claimant filed an action for infringement of four of its UK SEPs before the High Court of Justice (Court), and requested the Court to define Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms for its global SEP portfolio. [529] The defendants in separate proceedings initiated in China disputed the validity, essentiality and infringement of claimant’s Chinese patents. Since the defendants failed to unequivocally commit to conclude licenses on FRAND terms decided by the Court, the plaintiff amended its pleading to include injunctive relief, unless and until the defendants comply with the Court’s FRAND determination. [530]

The judgment at hand involves the defendants’ challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction to decide upon the terms of a global portfolio license. According to the defendants, a UK court has no jurisdiction to decide on the validity and infringement of foreign (in the present case: Chinese) patents. [531] Furthermore, the defendants claim that the jurisdiction most closely connected to the case is China which is the centre of the defendants’ manufacturing activities as well as the jurisdiction where the bulk of their sales takes place. [532]

B. Court’s Reasoning

The court dismissed the defendants’ challenge of jurisdiction. Following the reasoning of Birss J in Unwired Planet,Unwired Planet v. Huawei[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) paras 565-67 Carr J held that, although issues of validity of patents granted in foreign jurisdictions are not justiciable in the UK, nevertheless the issue of validity should be distinguished from the issue of the determination of a global portfolio license on FRAND terms. According to Carr J, the defendants are free to challenge the validity, essentiality, and infringement of claimant’s Chinese patents in separate proceedings before Chinese courts; the pending issues of validity, essentiality and infringement do not preclude, however, the Court from determining FRAND terms for a global license and providing a mechanism of adjusting the royalty rate according to the validity and infringement decisions of courts in other jurisdictions.Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE(n. 1) paras 17 et seq. Furthermore, the defendants’ justiciability defense, were it to be accepted, would make it impossible for patent holders with a global portfolio of SEPs to obtain relief in the form of court-determined FRAND terms for a global license, since they would need to commence litigation on a country-by-country basis. [535] Forcing the patent holder to seek separate licenses for every individual country where it held SEPs could be characterized as a ‘hold-out chater’, in the eyes of the Court. [535]

Moreover, the Court seized jurisdiction over the case on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim concerns four patents granted in the UK; the issue of relief for patent infringement, and in particular whether such relief will take the form of setting FRAND terms for a global license, is to be decided in the context of a ‘FRAND trial’, after a decision on infringement is reached. [536] Were the defendants’ argument to be accepted, the Court would, in effect, be barred from deciding on the infringement and the proper relief for patents granted in the UK. [532] Besides that, the Court also held that the defendants’ failed to establish that the Chinese courts would be the appropriate forum for the dispute. [537] In this respect, given that royalty rates for telecommunication SEPs are usually lower in China than in other countries, the Court particularly pointed out that no holder of a global SEP portfolio would voluntarily prefer to submit to determination of a FRAND license for the entirety of portfolio in a country, where the rates applied would be lower than the rest of the world. [538]

  • [528] Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE[2018] EWHC 808 (Pat) para 5.
  • [529] ibid, para 7.
  • [530] ibid, para 8.
  • [531] ibid, paras 9, 12 and 13.
  • [532] ibid.
  • [533] Unwired Planet v. Huawei[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) paras 565-67
  • [534] Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE(n. 1) paras 17 et seq.
  • [535] ibid, para 28.
  • [536] ibid, para 69.
  • [537] ibid, paras 72 et seq.
  • [538] ibid, para 63.

Updated 30 10月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal

英国裁判所の決定
23 10月 2018 - Case No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344

A. Facts

The Claimant, Unwired Planet International Limited, holds a significant portfolio of patents which are essential for the implementation of the 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE wireless telecommunications standards (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs). The Defendants, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Huawei Technologies (UK) Co. Ltd., manufacture and sell mobile devices complying with the above standards worldwide.

Starting in September 2013, the Claimant contacted the Defendants several times, requesting the latter to engage in discussions for a licence regarding its SEP portfolio. [555] In March 2014, the Claimant sued the Defendants as well as Samsung and Google for infringement of five of its UK SEPs before the UK High Court of Justice (High Court). [556] The Claimant also initiated parallel infringement proceedings against the Defendants in Germany. [557]

The High Court conducted three technical trials first, focusing on the validity and essentiality of four of the SEPs in suit. [558] By April 2016, these trials were completed; the High Court held that two of the SEPs in suit were both valid and essential, whereas two other patents were found to be invalid. [558] The parties agreed to postpone further technical trials indefinitely. [558]

In July 2016, Samsung took a licence from the Claimant covering, among other, the SEPs in suit. [559] The Claimant also settled the infringement proceedings with Google. [560]

In late 2016, the trial concerned with questions regarding to the licensing of the SEPs in suit commenced between the Claimant and the Defendants. Over the course of these proceedings the parties made licensing offers to the each other. However, they failed to reach an agreement. The Defendants indicated they were willing to take a licence under Claimant’s UK patent portfolio, whereas the Claimant contended that it was entitled to insist upon a worldwide licence. [561]

In April 2017, the High Court granted an UK injunction against the Defendant, until such time as it entered into a worldwide licensing agreement with the Claimant on the specific rates, which the court determined to be Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) [562] in accordance with the undertaking given by the Claimant towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). [563] Pending appeal, the High Court stayed the injunction. [564]

Shortly after the High Court delivered its decision, the Defendants began proceedings against the Claimant in China, which are still pending. [565]

With the present judgment, the UK Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendants’ appeal against the decision of the High Court. [566]


B. Court’s reasoning

The Defendants appealed the decision of the High Court on the following three grounds:

1. The High Court’s finding that only a worldwide licence was FRAND is erroneous; the imposition of such a licence on terms set by this court based on a national finding of infringement of UK patents is wrong in principle. [567]

2. The offer imposed to the Defendants by the High Court is discriminatory in violation of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking, since the rates offered are higher than the rates reflected in the licence granted by the Claimant to Samsung. [568]

3. The Claimant is not entitled to injunctive relief; by bringing the infringement proceedings against the Defendants, without meeting the requirements established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in the matter Huawei v ZTE [569] (Huawei judgment) before, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). [570]

Notably, the High Court’s determination of the rates which apply to the worldwide licence that the court requested the Defendants to take was not challenged by any of the parties to the proceedings. [571]


1. Worldwide licences

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Defendants’ notion that imposing a worldwide licence on an implementer is wrong, because it amounts to an (indirect) interference with foreign court proceedings relating to patents subsisting in foreign territories, which would have been subject to materially different approaches to the assessment of FRAND royalty rates and could, therefore, lead to different results (particularly the ongoing litigation between the parties in China and Germany). [572]

The Court of Appeal explained that in imposing a worldwide licence the High Court did neither adjudicate on issues of infringement or validity concerning any foreign SEPs, nor was it deciding what the appropriate relief for infringement of any foreign SEPs might be (particularly since it made clear that a FRAND licence should not prevent a licensee from challenging the validity or essentiality of any foreign SEPs and should make provision for sales in non-patent countries which do not require a licence) [573] . [574]

Moreover, the High Court simply determined the terms of the licence that the Claimant was required to offer to the Defendants pursuant to its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI. [575] Such an undertaking has international effect. [576] It applies to all SEPs of the patent holder irrespective of the territory in which they subsist. [577] This is necessary for two reasons: first, to protect implementers whose equipment may be sold and used in a number of different jurisdictions. [577] Second, to enable SEP holders to prevent implementers from “free-riding” on their innovations and secure an appropriate reward for carrying out their research and development activities and for engaging with the standardisation process. [578]

Accordingly, the High Court had not erred in finding that a worldwide licence was FRAND. On the contrary, there may be circumstances in which only a worldwide licence or at least a multi-territorial licence would be FRAND. [579] German Courts (in Pioneer Acer [580] and St. Lawrence v Vodafone [581] ) as well as the European Commission in its Communication dated 29 November 2017 [582] had also adopted a similar approach. [583]

Having said that, the Court of Appeal recognized that it may be “wholly impractical” for a SEP holder to seek to negotiate a licence for its patents on a country-by-country basis, just as it may be “prohibitively expensive” to seek to enforce its SEPs by litigating in each country in which they subsist. [578] In addition, if in the FRAND context the implementer could only be required to take country-by-country licences, there would be no prospect of any effective injunctive relief being granted to the SEP holder against it: the implementer could avoid an injunction, if it agreed to pay the royalties in respect of its activities in any particular country, once those activities had been found to infringe. [584] In this way, the implementer would have an incentive to hold out country-by-country, until it was compelled to pay. [584]

In its discussion of this topic, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the view taken by the High Court that in every given set of circumstances only one true set of FRAND terms exists. Nevertheless, the court did not consider that the opposite assumption of the High Court had a material effect to the its decision. [585]

In the eyes of the Court of Appeal, it is “unreal” to suggest that two parties, acting fairly and reasonably, will necessarily arrive at precisely the same set of licence terms as two other parties, also acting fairly and reasonably and faced with the same set of circumstances. [586] The reality is that a number of sets of terms may all be fair and reasonable in a given set of circumstances. [586] Whether there is only one true set of FRAND terms or not, is, therefore, more of a “theoretical problem” than a real one. [587] If the parties cannot reach an agreement, then the court (or arbitral tribunal) which will have to determine the licensing terms will normally declare one set of terms as FRAND. The SEP holder would then have to offer that specific set of terms to the implementer. On the other hand, in case that the court finds that two different sets of terms are FRAND, then the SEP holder will satisfy its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI, if it offers either one of them to the implementer. [587]

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal dismissed Defendants’ claim that imposing a worldwide licence is contrary to public policy and disproportionate. [588] In particular, the Defendants argued that this approach encourages over-declaration of patents [589] and is not compatible with the spirit of the Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, [590] which requires relief for patent infringement to be proportionate. [591]

Although the Court of Appeal recognised the existence of the practice of over-declaration and acknowledged that it is a problem, it held that this phenomenon cannot justify “condemning” SEP holders with large portfolios to “impossibly expensive” litigation in every territory in respect of which they seek to recover royalties. [592] The court also found that there was nothing disproportionate about the approach taken by the High Court, since the Defendants had the option to avoid an injunction by taking a licence on the terms which the court had determined. [593]


2. Non-discrimination

The Court of Appeal rejected the Defendants’ argument [594] that the non-discrimination component of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking towards ETSI obliges the Claimant to offer to the Defendants the same rates as those contained in the licence granted to Samsung. [595]

The Court of Appeal made clear that the obligation of the SEP holder not to discriminate is, in principle, engaged in the present case, since the Claimant’s transaction with the Defendants is equivalent to the licence it granted to Samsung. [596] In the court’s eyes, when deciding whether two transactions are equivalent one needs to focus first on the transactions themselves. Insofar, differences in the circumstances in which the transactions were entered into, particularly economic circumstances, such as the parties’ financial position [597] or market conditions (e.g. cost of raw materials), cannot make two otherwise identical transactions non-equivalent (releasing, therefore, the patent holder from the obligation not to discriminate). Changes in such circumstances could only amount to an objective justification for a difference in treatment. [598]

Considering the specific content of the SEP holder’s respective obligation, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court’s finding that the non-discrimination element of a SEP holder’s FRAND undertaking does not imply a so-called “hard-edged” component (imposing on the patent holder an obligation to offer the same rate to similarly situated implementers). [599] It argued that the “hard-edged” approach is “excessively strict” and fails to achieve a balance between a fair return to the SEP owner and universal access to the technology. [600] It could have the effect of compelling the SEP holder to accept a level of compensation for the use of its invention which does not reflect the value of the licensed technology and, therefore, harm the technological development of standards. [601]

Furthermore, the “hard-edged” discrimination approach should be rejected also because its effects would result in the insertion of the “most favoured licensee” clause in the FRAND undertaking. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the industry would most likely have regarded such a clause as inconsistent with the overall objective of the FRAND undertaking. [602]

Conversely, the Court of Appeal followed the notion described by the High Court as the “general” non-discrimination approach: [603] the FRAND undertaking prevents the SEP holder from securing rates higher than a “benchmark” rate which mirrors a fair valuation of its patent(s), but it does not prevent the patent holder from granting licences at lower rates. [603] For determining the benchmark rate, prior licences granted by the SEP holder to third parties will likely form the “best comparables”. [604]

The Court of Appeal argued that the “general” approach is in line with the objectives of the FRAND undertaking, since it ensures that the SEP holder is not able to “hold-up” implementation of the standard by demanding more than its patent(s) is worth. [605] However, the FRAND undertaking does not aim at leveling down the royalty owed to the SEP holder to a point where it no longer represents a fair return for its patent(s), or to removing its discretion to agree royalty rates lower than the benchmark rate, if it chooses to do so. [605]

In this context, the Court of Appeal made clear that it does not consider differential pricing as per se objectionable, since it can in some circumstances be beneficial to consumer welfare. [606] The court sees no value in mandating equal pricing for its own sake. On the contrary, once the hold-up effect is dealt with by ensuring that licences are available at the benchmark rate, there is no reason for preventing the SEP holder from charging less than the licence is worth. [606] Should discrimination appear below the benchmark rate, it should be addressed through the application of competition law; as long as granting licences at rates lower than the benchmark rate causes no competitive harm, there is no reason to assume that the FRAND undertaking constrains the ability of the SEP holder to do so. [607]


3. Abuse of dominant Position / Huawei v ZTE

The Court of Appeal further rejected Defendants’ argument that, by bringing the infringement proceedings prior to fulfilling the obligations arising from the Huawei judgment, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 TFEU. [608]

To begin with, the Court of Appeal confirmed the finding of the High Court that the Claimant held a dominant market position and dismissed the respective challenge by the latter. [609] It did not find any flaw in the High Court’s view that the SEP holder has a 100% market share with respect to each SEP (since it is “common ground” that the relevant market for the purpose of assessing dominance in the case of each SEP is the market for the licensing of that SEP [610] ) and that the constrains imposed upon the SEP holder’s market power by the limitations attached to the FRAND undertaking [611] and the risk of hold-out that is immanent to the structure of the respective market, [612] can either alone or together rebut the assumption that it most likely holds market power. [613]

Notwithstanding the above, the Court of Appeal held that the Claimant had not abused its market power in the present case. [614]

The court agreed with the finding of the High Court that the Huawei judgment did not lay down “mandatory conditions”, in a sense that that non-compliance will per se render the initiation of infringement proceedings a breach of Article 102 TFEU. [615] The language used in the Huawei judgment implies that the CJEU intended to create a “safe harbor”: if the SEP holder complies with the respective framework, the commencement of an action will not, in and of itself, amount to an abuse. [616] If the SEP holder steps outside this framework, the question whether its behaviour has been abusive must be assessed in light of all of the circumstances. [617]

In the court’s eyes, the only mandatory condition that must be satisfied by the SEP holder before proceedings are commenced, is giving notice to the implementer about the infringing use of its patents. [618] This follows from the clear language used by the CJEU with respect to this obligation. [619] The precise content of such notice will depend upon all the circumstances of the particular case. [619] In general, if an alleged infringer is familiar with the technical details of the products it is dealing and the SEP it may be infringing, but has no intention of taking a licence on FRAND terms, it will not be justified to deny the SEP holder an injunction, simply because it had not made a formal notification prior to the commencement of proceedings. [620]

On the merits, the court accepted the High Court’s assessment that the Claimant had not behaved abusively and particularly the finding, that the Defendants, who were in contact with the Claimant prior to the proceedings, had sufficient notice that the Claimant held SEPs which ought to be licensed, if found infringed and essential. [621]

Considering further that the respective conduct requirements were not established at the point in time, in which the infringement action was filed (since the present proceedings were initiated before the CJEU delivered the Huawei judgment), the Court of Appeal noted that it would very likely not be fair to accuse the Claimant of abusive behavior. [622] Insofar the court agreed with the respective approach developed by German courts in co-called “transitional” cases (Pioneer v Acer, [623] St. Lawrence v Vodafone [623] and Sisvel v Haier [624] ) [625] .

  • [555] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, Case-No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, para. 233.
  • [556] Ibid, para. 6 et seqq.
  • [557] Ibid, para. 233.
  • [558] Ibid, para. 7.
  • [559] Ibid, paras. 8 and 137 et seqq.
  • [560] Ibid, para. 8.
  • [561] Ibid, para. 9 et seqq.; para. 31 et seqq.
  • [562] Ibid, para 17.
  • [563] Ibid, para 130.
  • [564] Ibid, para 18.
  • [565] Ibid, para 112.
  • [566] Ibid, para 291.
  • [567] Ibid, paras. 19 and 45 et seqq.
  • [568] Ibid, paras. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [569] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [570] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [571] Ibid, para. 17.
  • [572] Ibid, paras. 74 and 77 et seq.
  • [573] Ibid, para. 82.
  • [574] Ibid, para. 80.
  • [575] Ibid, para. 79 et seq.
  • [576] Ibid, para. 26.
  • [577] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [578] Ibid, para. 54 et seq., para. 59.
  • [579] Ibid, para. 56.
  • [580] Pioneer v Acer, District Court of Mannheim, judgement dated 8 January 2016, Case No. 7 O 96/14.
  • [581] St. Lawrence v Vodafone, District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 31 March 2016, Case No. 4a O 73/14.
  • [582] Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, “Setting out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents”, 29 November 2017, COM(2017) 712 final.
  • [583] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 74.
  • [584] Ibid, para. 111.
  • [585] Ibid, para. 128.
  • [586] Ibid, para. 121.
  • [587] Ibid, para. 125.
  • [588] Ibid, para. 75.
  • [589] Ibid, para. 92
  • [590] Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Official Journal of the EU L 195, 02/06/2004, p. 16)
  • [591] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 94.
  • [592] Ibid, para. 96.
  • [593] Ibid, para. 98.
  • [594] Ibid, para. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [595] Ibid, paras. 207 and 210.
  • [596] Ibid, para. 176.
  • [597] Ibid, para. 173.
  • [598] Ibid, para. 169 et seq.
  • [599] Ibid, paras. 194 et seqq.
  • [600] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [601] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [602] Ibid, para. 199.
  • [603] Ibid, para. 195.
  • [604] Ibid, para. 202.
  • [605] Ibid, para. 196.
  • [606] Ibid, para. 197.
  • [607] Ibid, para. 200.
  • [608] Ibid, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [609] Ibid, para. 212.
  • [610] Ibid, para. 216.
  • [611] Ibid, para. 219.
  • [612] Ibid, para. 220.
  • [613] Ibid, para. 229.
  • [614] Ibid, para. 284.
  • [615] Ibid, para. 269.
  • [616] Ibid, para. 270.
  • [617] Ibid, para. 269 and 282.
  • [618] Ibid, para. 253 and 281.
  • [619] Ibid, para. 271.
  • [620] Ibid, para. 273.
  • [621] Ibid, para. 284
  • [622] Ibid, para. 275
  • [623] See above
  • [624] Sisvel v Haier, Higher District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 30 March 2017, Case No. 15 U 66-15.
  • [625] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 279.

Updated 30 10月 2018

­Vodafone v Intellectual Ventures, High Court of Ireland

アイルランド裁判所の決定
10 3月 2017 - Case No. 2016 5102P, [2017] IEHC 160

A. Facts

The Claimant, Vodafone GmbH, is a German company offering communication services in Germany, including DSL internet connections based on the standards ADSL2+ and VDSL2 [691] .

The first Defendant, Intellectual Ventures II LLC (IV LLC), is a US company that holds patents declared as essential to the above standards (Standard Essential Patents or SEPs), including German designations of several European patents [692] . The second Defendant, Intellectual Ventures International Licensing (IV Licensing), is an Irish company engaged in patent licensing [692] . IV LLC granted IV Licensing a sub-licence which allows the latter to grant non-exclusive licences in respect to IV LLC’s portfolio [693] .

In January 2016, IV LLC brought infringement actions against the Claimant before the District Court (Landgericht) of Düsseldorf in Germany (Düsseldorf Court) based on the German designation of two of its SEP relating to the ADSL2+ and VDSL2 standards (German proceedings) [694] . In the German proceedings, IV LLC sought for a declaration that the Claimant is liable for damages arising from the infringement of the SEPs in suit as well as the provision of information and the rendering of accounts [694] .

During the course of the German proceedings, IV Licensing made an offer for a licensing agreement to the Claimant comprising the German designations of sixteen European Patents, including the two patents already asserted before the Düsseldorf Court [695] . The Claimant made a counter-offer which was, however, rejected [696] .

Subsequently, the Claimant filed an action for a declaratory judgement against the Defendants before the Dublin High Court (High Court) in Ireland (Irish proceedings). The Claimant requested the High Court inter alia to declare (1) that IV Licensing’s offer was not Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) and, therefore, amounted to an abuse of dominant position contrary to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and (2) that Claimant’s counter-offer was FRAND [697] . In case that the High Court held that neither IV Licensing’s offer nor Claimant’s counter-offer were FRAND, the Claimant also sought for a declaration as to which terms and conditions would be FRAND [697] .

The Defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court. They requested the High Court – among other motions – to decline jurisdiction in favour of the Düsseldorf Court, or, in the alternative to stay its proceedings [698] .

With the present judgment the High Court refused to decline jurisdiction over the dispute brought before it [699] . The Court ordered, however, a stay in the proceedings, until the Düsseldorf Court delivered its final judgment in the German proceedings [699] .

B. Court’s reasoning

The High Court held that neither Article 24 nor Article 29 of the Recast Brussels Regulation [700] require the court to decline jurisdiction in favour of the Düsseldorf Court, even though the German proceedings were initiated prior to the Irish proceedings.

Pursuant to Article 24 of the Regulation, the Courts of each EU Member State have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the validity of any European Patent granted for that Member State. Both pending proceedings concern German designations of IV LLC’s European patens. However, this fact did not hinder the High Court to assume jurisdiction over the present case: In the High Court’s eyes, no issue as to the validity the patents which ought to be licensed has been placed in issue in the Irish proceedings; moreover, no part of Claimant’s cause of action concerning the (alleged) abuse of dominance depends in any way on the validity of the SEPs in suit [701] .

Furthermore, the High Court found that Article 29 of the Regulation does not apply to the present case, either. The High Court took the view that the Irish proceedings and the German proceedings do not involve the “same cause of action”, as Article 29 of the Regulation requires [702] . Although there are overlapping issues in both proceedings (for instance, Article 102 TFEU is mentioned in parties’ pleadings in both trials), this fact does not suffice to establish a “same cause of action” in terms of Article 29 of the Regulation [702] . In particular, Article 102 TFEU, to the extent that it features in the German proceedings is not concerned with an (alleged) abuse of dominant position by way of the offer made to the Claimant by IV Licensing [702] . Besides that, the High Court also pointed out, that – at least regarding to IV Licensing – it is not presented with proceedings “between the same parties” (since IV Licensing in not party to the German proceedings) which is, however, a further prerequisite for the application of Article 29 of the Regulation [703] .

Notwithstanding the above, the High Court held that some form of relief under Article 30 of the Regulation ought to be granted to the Defendants [704] . Under this provision, a court is allowed (meaning that the power given to the court is discretionary) to either stay its proceedings (Article 30 para. 1) or decline jurisdiction (Article 30 para. 2), in case that a “related action” is already pending before another court [705] . The objective of Article 30 of the Regulation is “to improve co-ordination of the exercise of judicial functions” within the EU and to avoid “irreconcilable judgments” [706] . In the matter at hand, the High Court found that these ob­jectives are served by an order to stay the proceedings according to Article 30 para. 1 of the Regulation [699] .

Looking at the present case, the High Court explained that a risk of “irreconcilable judgments” exists, since at the heart of both the Irish and the German proceedings lies the question whether the parties have complied with their conduct obligations under the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in the matter Huawei v ZTE [707] (Huawei requirements), especially with the obligation to exchange licensing offers on FRAND terms [708] .

In the Irish Proceedings, the claims made by the Claimant expressly address this question. In the German Proceedings, the same question will be of “direct relevance” for the nature and scope of the claim for damages and the accessory claim for the rendering of accounts asserted by IV LLC [709] . Although compliance with the Huawei requirements is – in contrast to claims for injunctive relief – no direct prerequisite for the enforcement of SEP holder’s damage claims (including the auxiliary claims for information and the rendering of accounts) [710] , it has an impact on the scope of such claims: according to the case law of the Düsseldorf Courts, if the patent holder does not meet the Huawei requirements or both the patent holder and the potential licensee comply with the Huawei requirements, the patent holder’s damage claim is limited to the FRAND licence fees and the claim for the rendering of accounts is limited to the information needed in order to calculate the respective damages (using the so-called “licence analogy” method) [711] . Accordingly, the Düsseldorf Court would not be able to decide on the merits of the claims raised by IV LLC before it, without first determining whether the parties fulfilled the Huawei requirements [712] .

In addition, the High Court pointed out that setting the FRAND terms and conditions for the patent portfolio offered to the Claimant, as the latter requested in the Irish proceedings, could also lead to “irreconcilable judgments”, particularly if the Düsseldorf Court would be asked by IV LLC at a later point in time to fix the damages for the two SEPs asserted in the German proceedings (since these SEPs were also part of the portfolio offered) [713] . Insofar, the High Court was not convinced by the Claimant’s argument, that fixing of rates for a patent portfolio usually involves different considerations to the fixing of a rate for individual patents [713] . On the contrary, the High Court recognized that within the “longstanding industry practice” of portfolio licensing, the fixing of rates for a portfolio of patents does, in general, involve the same methodology as the fixing of rates for individual patents. Consequently, rates set by the High Court in the Irish proceedings might conflict with any rates determined by the Düsseldorf Court with respect to the damage claims made in the German proceedings [713] .

  • [691] Vodafone v Intellectual Ventures, High Court of Ireland, 10 March 2017, para. 1.
  • [692] Ibid, para. 2.
  • [693] Ibid, para. 3.
  • [694] Ibid, para. 37.
  • [695] Ibid, paras. 10-12 and 93.
  • [696] Ibid, paras. 13-16.
  • [697] Ibid, para. 5.
  • [698] Ibid, para. 7.
  • [699] Ibid, para. 180.
  • [700] Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12th December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ L 351/1 of 20th December 2012.
  • [701] Vodafone v Intellectual Ventures, High Court of Ireland, 10 March 2017, para. 122.
  • [702] Ibid, para. 146.
  • [703] Ibid, para. 148.
  • [704] Ibid, para. 166.
  • [705] Ibid, para. 119.
  • [706] Ibid, para. 165.
  • [707] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [708] Vodafone v Intellectual Ventures, High Court of Ireland, 10 March 2017, para. 52.
  • [709] Ibid, paras. 52 and 60.
  • [710] Ibid, paras. 55 et seqq.
  • [711] Ibid, para. 61 et seq.
  • [712] Ibid, para. 62.
  • [713] Ibid, para. 93.

Updated 6 10月 2020

Unwired Planet対Huawei Conversant対Huawei 及び ZTE、英国最高裁判所

英国裁判所の決定
26 8月 2020 - Case No. [2020] UKSC 37

A. 内容

英国最高裁判所(最高裁判所)による本判決は、欧州電気通信標準化機構(European Telecommunications Standards Institute: ETSI)が開発した無線通信標準の実施において必須な(と見込まれる)ものとして宣言済みの特許(標準必須特許又はSEP)の侵害に関する2つの別々の事件から提起された上告について判断を下している。ETSIの知的財産権ポリシー(ETSIのIPRポリシー)は、特許権者に対して自らの保有するSEPを公平、合理的、かつ非差別的(Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory:FRAND)な条件で標準の実施者にとってアクセス可能にするとの誓約を推奨している。

Unwired Planet対Huawei

第一の事件は、幾つかの無線通信標準に対応したSEPのポートフォリオを保有する会社であるUnwired Planet International Limited(Unwired Planet)と特に標準準拠のモバイルフォンを製造販売する中国の製造販売会社であるHuaweiグループ中の2社(Huawei)の間の紛争に関わるものである。

2014年3月、Unwired Planetは自社の5つの英国SEPの侵害に関しHuawei、Samsung、及び第三の会社をイングランド・ウェールズ高等法院(高等法院)において提訴した。この訴訟の過程において、Unwired PlanetはHuaweiに対しライセンシングの申し出をいくつか行ったが、ライセンス契約の合意には至らなかった。その一方で、Unwired PlanetとSamsungとの間ではライセンス契約が交わされた。

2017年4月5日、高等法院はHuaweiに対し、同法院がFRANDと決定した特定の条件による ワールドワイド・ライセンス契約をUnwired Planetとの間で交わすまでの差止命令を出した [572] 。Huaweiはこの判決について控訴した。高等法院は控訴が係属中の間、差止命令の強制を停止した。

2018年10月23日、英国控訴院(控訴院)は高等法院の判決を不服とするHuaweiの控訴を棄却した  [573] その後、Huaweiは英国最高裁判所(最高裁判所又は最高裁)に上告を提起した。

Conversant対Huawei and ZTE

第二の事件は、ライセンシング会社であるConversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (Conversant)とHuawei及びZTEグループの2社 (ZTE)の間の紛争に関わるものである。ZTEは中国に拠点を置きネットワーク機器、モバイルフォン、及び消費者向け電子機器を製造し世界的に販売する企業グループである。 2017年にConversantはHuawei及びZTEに対する侵害訴訟を高等法院において提起した。Conversantは、数ある請求の中でもとりわけ、自社の4つの英国特許に対する侵害について差止による救済を求め、また自社のSEPポートフォリオについてグローバルFRANDライセンスの条件を決定することも高等法院に求めた。Huawei及びZTEは同事件について審理し判決を下す高等法院の管轄権について争い、Conversantの中国特許の有効性に異議を唱える訴訟を中国で提起した。

2018年4月16日、高等法院は、グローバルポートフォリオ・ライセンスの条件を決定する権限を含めて当該紛争についての管轄権を同法院が有すると確認した [574]  。HuaweiとZTEは高等法院のこの判決について控訴した。

2019年1月30日、控訴院は控訴を棄却し、英国特許の侵害を根拠としてグローバルライセンスのFRAND条件を決定するための管轄権を英国の裁判所が有すると確認した [575] 。HuaweiとZTEは最高裁判所に上告した。

最高裁判所は、両事件についての控訴を全員一致で棄却し、本判決を下した Unwired Planet対Huawei、Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国最高裁判所、2019年1月30日判決、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38。 。 

B. 判決理由

最高裁判所は、両上告において以下の5つの争点が提起されたと特定し、それらについて判断を下した。

1. 管轄権 最高裁判所は、多国籍SEPポートフォリオについてグローバルFRANDライセンス条件を決定する管轄権を英国の裁判所が有し、従って、標準実施者がかかるライセンス契約の締結を拒否した場合には、英国SEPを根拠とする差止命令を発出する管轄権を有すると確認した  [577]

最高裁は、ETSIのIPRポリシーの下でSEP保有者は国内裁判所に差止命令を求めることを禁じられていないとした [578] 。 最高裁は、国内裁判所が差止命令を出すことで侵害を止める可能性は、むしろ、実施者がFRANDライセンスの交渉を行うことを確実に奨励するのであり 「IPRポリシーが取ろうとするバランスに必要な構成要素である」とした [578]  。

また、最高裁は、英国特許を根拠とする差止命令の裁定の他に、英国の裁判所は、グローバルFRANDライセンスの条件も定めることができるとした。最高裁判所の見解によれば、ETSIのIPRポリシーが定めた「契約上の取り決め」は、英国の裁判所に該当する権限を行使する管轄権も与えている  [579]

最高裁によれば、ETSIのIPRポリシーは「通信業界における商慣習の反映」を試みており 「国際的に効力を有することを意図する」ものである [580] 。通信業界においては、(ポートフォリオ中の)「正確にいくつの特許が有効か又は侵害されているかを知らずに」特許のポートフォリオについてグローバルライセンス契約を結ぶことは一般的である [581] 。特許権者は、特定の特許について必須である(と見込まれる)との宣言を行う時点では、開発中の標準におけるその特許の有効性や侵害の有無について知りえない [581]  。その一方で、実施者は、標準を実施する際にどの特許の有効で侵害しているかについて知ってはいない  [581]

この「不可避の不確実性(unavoidable uncertainty)」は、特許権者が宣言した全てのSEPをワールドワイドに網羅したポートフォリオライセンスの締結によって対処され、その対価は「ポートフォリオ中の多くの特許が未検証であるという性質を反映しなければならない 」 [581]  。かかるライセンスを締結することで、実施者は標準への「アクセス」と、その標準に準拠するために必要とされる全技術の使用を許可されているとの「確実性」を「買う」のである [581]

最高裁判所は、商慣習によれば、FRANDライセンスには「未検証 (untested)」の特許が含まれるため、グローバルライセンスの条件の決定はそれに含まれる全特許についての有効性の評価を意味しないとの見解をとった。従って、ワールドワイドポートフォリオ・ライセンスの条件を定める際、英国の裁判所は外国特許に関する有効性及び侵害の有無について判断しておらず、かかる問題は、まさに各特許が認可された国の国内裁判所の専属的管轄権に服するものである [582]  。それ故、実施者が「これらの特許又はいずれかの特許について該当する外国裁判所において異議を申し立てる権利を留保し、結果として、当該ライセンス上でロイヤルティ料率変更のメカニズムを定めるよう求めることは一般に「公平かつ合理的(fair and reasonable)」であると判断された。 [583]

これに関連して、最高裁判所は、前述のアプローチが英国の法理に特有のものではなく、他の管轄区域、特にアメリカ、ドイツ、中国、及び日本で下された判決とも整合性があることを強調した  [584]

2. 適切な法廷地(フォーラム・コンビニエンス)

最高裁判所が扱った第二の争点も英国の裁判所の管轄権に関するものである。原告は、 Conversant対Huaweiの事件において、英国の裁判所は管轄権を辞退して中国の裁判所に渡すか少なくともConversantの中国特許の有効性に対する異議申し立てについて中国の裁判所が判決を下すまで訴訟を一時停止するべきであったと主張した。

最高裁判所は、英国の裁判所には管轄権を辞退し中国の裁判所に渡す義務はないと判断した [585] 。最高裁は、中国の裁判所については(英国の裁判所と異なり)当該紛争の全当事者の合意がないことから、現時点では中国の裁判所にグローバルFRANDポートフォリオライセンスの条件を定める管轄権はなく、本事件には所謂「フォーラム・コンビニエンス(forum conveniens)」の法理が適用されないとした [585]  。更に、最高裁は、現状況下でConversantが中国の裁判所への管轄権付与を承諾するとは合理的に考えにくいと判断した [585]  。 最高裁判所は、本紛争に関わる英国の裁判所には、有効性に関する中国での訴訟の結果を待って英国での訴訟を一時停止する義務もないとの見解を示した [586] 。最高裁は、英国で提起された訴訟がConversantのグローバルSEPポートフォリオについてのFRAND ライセンス条件の決定に関するものであるのに対し、中国での訴訟はConversantの中国特許の有効性のみに関連しているためであるとした  [586]

3. 非差別性

最高裁判所が審理した第三の争点は、FRANDの非差別性要件の解釈に関するものである。この訴訟においては、トライアル開始後にSamsungと合意した条件よりも不利なライセンス条件をHuaweiに対して申し出たことによりUnwired PlanetがFRANDの非差別性の部分に違反していたか否かという問題が生じていた。

最高裁判所は、高等法院及び控訴院の判断を支持し、(Unwired Planetは)違反してはいなかったとした。最高裁は、全ての同様の状況にあるライセンシーに対して同一又は同様の条件を申し出ることを特許権者に義務づけるような、所謂「厳格な(hard-edged)」非差別性の要件をFRANDは暗示してはいないと説明した [587] ] 。

ETSIの IPR ポリシー(第6条第1項)によれば、特許権者はFRAND条件のライセンスを提供することにコミットしなければならないとされている。最高裁判所は、この義務は「単一の一体化された義務(single, unitary obligation)」であり、ライセンス条件の公平性、合理性、及び非差別性に関する別々の3つの義務ではないとの見解を示した  [588]  。よって、条件は「全ての市場参加者に公平なロイヤルティ価格として一般的に提供されるべきものであり」、特定のライセンシーの「個別の特性による調整なしに」SEPポートフォリオの「適正市価(true value)」を反映するべきであるとされた [589]   。

最高裁判所は、更に、ETSIのIPRポリシーに基づくFRAND誓約は、所謂「最も有利なライセンス(most favourable license)」の条項を暗示するものではなく、全ての同様の状況にあるライセンシーに対して最も有利な条件と同等の条件でライセンス許諾を行うことを特許権者に義務づけてはいないと明確に示した [590]  。最高裁は、ETSIによるIPRポリシー制定の経緯について詳しく検討した上で、 以前ETSIが前述のような条項をFRAND誓約に含める提案を明確に却下していたとの所見を述べた [591]  。 最高裁は、更に、価格差別化がそれに関わる私的又は公的な利益にとって有害であるとの「一般的推定(general presumption)」は存在しないとした [592]  。最高裁は、むしろ、特定のライセンシーに対するベンチマーク料率よりも低いロイヤルティのオファーをSEP保有者が選択することが商取引上の意味合いから合理的な状況も存在するとした [593]  。 このことは、例えば、所謂「先行者利益(first mover advantage)」にも当てはまる。最高裁は、一番初めのライセンシーとの間で低いロイヤルティ料率を合意することは、SEPから最初の収益を生むだけでなく、締結されたライセンスが当該ポートフォリオを市場において「有効化(validate)」し将来的なライセンシングに資する可能性もあるため、「経済的合理性(economically rational)」と「商取引上の重要性(commercially important)」を有し得ると認めた [593]  。このことは、Unwired PlanetがSamsung とライセンス契約を締結した当時のように、特許権者が自らの商業的な生き残りを確実にするのため低いロイヤルティ料率でのライセンス許諾を強いられる所謂「投売り(fire sales)」の状況にも当てはまるとされた [594]  。

4. 市場における支配的地位の濫用/Huaweiフレームワーク

最高裁判所が審理した第四の争点は、Huaweiに対する侵害訴訟を提起したことにより Unwired Planetが市場における支配的地位を濫用し「EUの機能に関する条約(the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU:TFEU)」 第102条への違反を犯しており、従って差止による救済へのアクセスを認められるべきでないのかという問題である。Huaweiは、この問題について、欧州連合司法裁判所(the Court of Justice of the European Union:CJEU)がHuawei対ZTE事件で確立した要件(Huawei判決又はHuaweiスキーム) にUnwired Planetが従っていなかったため差止命令の請求は却下されるべきであると主張していた [595]  。

最高裁判所は、この主張は当てはまらないと判断した [596] 。Huawei判決は、特許権者が標準の実施者に対して問題となっているSEPの使用が侵害を犯しているとの通知を差止による救済を求める訴訟の提起前に行う義務を定めており、違反した場合には、TFEU第102条における濫用行為に該当するとの見解を最高裁は示した [597] 。しかし、この義務の「性質(nature)」については、個別の事件の状況によって決まるとした  [597]  。最高裁は、Unwired Planetが本侵害訴訟の提起に先立ちHuaweiに妥当な通知を行っていたと判断した  [598]

Huawei判決が定めたその他の義務を考察して、最高裁判所は、Huaweiスキームは「強制的(mandatory)」なものではなく、正確に従えば第102条に違反するリスクを冒さずに [特許権者]が差止命令を求めることができる「ルートマップ(route map)」を示したものであるとの高等法院及び控訴院が以前に示した見解を支持した [599] 。最高裁は、それ以外にも、各当事者にFRAND条件でライセンスを締結する意思があるか否かという極めて重要な問題の評価を助けるいくつかの基準をHuawei判決が定めているとした[1076]。 最高裁判所は、その上でUnwired PlanetにはFRANDライセンスをHuaweiに許諾する意思があったのであり、濫用行為を行ってはいなかったと判断した  [598]  。

5. 損害賠償か差止命令かの問題

最高裁が審理した五番目で最後の争点は、SEPの侵害に対する適切な救済についての問題である。最高裁判所における上告審において、(原告は)Unwired PlanetのSEPに対する侵害への適切かつ相応な(appropriate and proportionate) 救済措置は差止命令ではなく損害賠償の裁定であるとの主張を初めて行った。 最高裁判所は、本事件において損害賠償の裁定を差止命令の代替とする根拠は存在しないと判断した [600] 。最高裁は、Unwired PlanetとConversantのいずれも、裁判所が既にFRANDとして確認していたはずの条件でライセンス許諾を申し出た場合にのみ差止命令を求める権利を得たのであるから「差止命令の威嚇(threat of an injunction)」をHuawei又はZTEに「法外な料金(exorbitant fees)」を課すための方法として用いることはできなかったとした [601]

更に、最高裁は、(損害賠償訴訟の場合)SEP保有者は実施者に対して特許毎かつ国毎に訴訟を提起することを余儀なくされ実際的ではない(impractical)と考えられるため、損害賠償の裁定が「差止命令の裁定を差し控えることにより失われるものに対する適切な代替手段となり得る可能性は低い」との見解を示した [602]  。更に、最高裁判所は、(損害賠償が適切な救済とされれば)標準の実施者が「特許毎かつ国毎にロイヤルティの支払いを強制されるまで侵害を続けることへの誘因」を得るのであり、自発的にライセンス契約を締結することは侵害者にとって「経済的に意味がなくなる」ため、FRANDライセンシングがより困難なものになるだろうと指摘した [603]  。

それに対し、差止命令であれば「より効果的な救済となり得る」と最高裁は判断した。差止命令は、侵害を全体的に禁止することにより、「侵害者が市場に留まろうとするなら」 SEP保有者の申し出たFRAND条件を受け入れる以外には侵害者に「ほとんど選択肢を与えない」ためである[1081]。このような理由により、最高裁判所は、差止命令が「正義を成すために必要(necessary in order to do justice)」であると強調した [604]

  • [572] Unwired Planet対Huawei、イングランド・ウェールズ高等法院、2017年4月5日判決、事件番号 [2017] EWHC 711(Pat)。
  • [573] Unwired Planet対Huawei、英国控訴院、2018年10月23日判決、事件番号 [2018] EWCA Civ 2344。
  • [574] Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、イングランド・ウェールズ高等法院、2018年4月16日判決、事件番号 [2018] EWHC 808 (Pat)。
  • [575] Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国控訴院、2019年1月30日判決、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [576]  Unwired Planet対Huawei、Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国最高裁判所、2019年1月30日判決、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [577] 同判決、第49節以下。
  • [578] 同判決、第61節。
  • [579] 同判決、第58節。
  • [580] 同判決、第62節。
  • [581] 同判決、第60節。
  • [582] 同判決、第63節。
  • [583] 同判決、第64節。
  • [584] 同判決、第68節ないし第84節。
  • [585] 同判決、第97節。
  • [586] 同判決、第99節以下。
  • [587] 同判決、第112節以下。
  • [588] 同判決、第113節。
  • [589] 同判決、第114節。
  • [590] 同判決、第116節。
  • [591] 同判決、第116節以下
  • [592] 同判決、第123節。
  • [593] 同判決、第125節。
  • [594] 同判決、第126節。
  • [595] Huawei対ZTE、欧州連合司法裁判所、2015年7月16日判決、事件番号 C-170/13。
  • [596] Unwired Planet対Huawei、Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国最高裁判所、2019年1月30日、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38、第149節以下。
  • [597] 同判決、第150節。
  • [598] 同判決、第158節。
  • [599] 同判決、第157節及び第158節。
  • [600] 同判決、第163節。
  • [601] 同判決、第164節。
  • [602] 同判決、第166節。
  • [603] 同判決、第167節。
  • [604] 同判決、第169節。