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Updated 17 1月 2018

Sisvel v Haier

OLG Düsseldorf
30 3月 2017 - Case No. I-15 U 66/15

A. Facts

The claimant is the owner of European patent EP B1, allegedly covering data transmission technology under the GPRS standard. The defendants produce and market devices using the GPRS standard. On 10 April 2013, the claimant made a commitment towards ETSI by declaring to grant a license on FRAND terms regarding, inter alia, patent EP B1. In various letters and meetings between 2012 and 2015, the claimant informed the parent companies of the defendants about its patent portfolio and made an offer, but no licensing agreement was entered into. These interactions took place before the CJEU handed down its Huawei v. ZTE ruling in July 2015. On 3 November 2015, the District Court granted an injunction order. [1] The District Court also held that the defendants were liable for compensation in principle and ordered them to render full and detailed account of its sales. Further, the District Court ordered a recall and removal of all infringing products from the relevant distribution channels.

The defendants lodged an appeal with the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf. They argued, inter alia, that the District Court had not taken into account the procedural requirements set out by the CJEU in the decision Huawei v. ZTE [2] and that the claimant had not made a license offer on FRAND conditions. [3] The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf partially granted the appeal. It held that the defendants were under an obligation to render accounts and that they owed compensation in principle. [4] However, it held that the defendants were under no obligation to recall and remove the products from the relevant distribution channels because the claimant was in breach of its obligations under EU competition law (‘kartellrechtlicher Zwangslizenzeinwand’). [5] The Higher Regional Court did not have to decide about the injunction order because the parties had agreed to settle the matter in this regard (the patent had expired in September 2016). [6]

B. Court’s reasoning

1. Market Power

The Higher Regional Court held that the claimant was a dominant undertaking within the meaning of Art 102 TFEU. [7] In the eyes of the court, proprietorship of an SEP does not automatically constitute a dominant market position because not all SEPs necessarily influence competition in the downstream product market. [8] Rather, it needs to be ascertained whether or not market dominance exists in respect of each SEP individually. A dominant market position exists, for example, if it would not be possible to successfully market a competitive product without using the respective SEP, or if compatibility and interoperability under the standard could not be guaranteed. In contrast, a dominant position does not exist if the technology covered by the SEP is only of little importance for consumers in the relevant market. [8] On this basis, the Higher Regional Court had no doubts that the claimant was in a dominant market position [9] because the patent in question was related to data transfer, an essential function of the GPRS standard. [10]

2. Notice of Infringement

The Higher Regional Court held that the claimant had given proper notice of infringement under the CJEU requirements. According to the court, the procedure set out by the CJEU in the Huawei v. ZTE ruling applied to transitional cases (i.e. proceedings that had commenced before the CJEU decision, but where the decisions were handed down after). [11] The District Court had wrongfully assumed that the Huawei v. ZTE principles did not apply to the case at hand. CJEU decisions pursuant to Art 267 TFEU apply ab initio (‘ex tunc’) and thus to transitional cases. [12] The Higher Regional Court argued that the Huawei v. ZTE case itself had been of a transitional nature and that the CJEU had been aware of the diverging principles created by the German Federal Court of Justice in the Orange Book Standard decision in 2009. [12] Nevertheless, the CJEU had not distinguished between transitional and ‘new’ cases. As a consequence, the claimant was under an obligation to notify the defendants of the infringement. The written correspondence between the parties from 2012 and 2013 met this requirement [13]

The Higher Regional Court also held that it was sufficient to notify the defendants’ parent companies. [14] The claimant can reasonably expect that the parent company will pass on the respective information to all subsidiaries that are active on the relevant product markets. Requiring the claimant to give additional notices to the subsidiaries would be an unjustified formality (‘bloße Förmelei’). [14]

3. The Defendant’s Willingness to Enter into a License Agreement

As a consequence, the defendants were under an obligation to declare their willingness to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms. [15] Several months had passed between the notice of infringement and the defendants’ declaration of willingness. However, the defendants had made it clear in an email from December 2013 that they were willing to enter into a license agreement. In the eyes of the Higher Regional Court, this was sufficient because there was ample time between this declaration and the commencement of proceedings in 2014.

In the further course of the negotiations, the rejection of certain license terms by the defendant was not necessarily an indicator for general unwillingness. [16] The defendant’s willingness needs to be seen in the overall context of the case. Unwillingness would be demonstrated only if the defendant definitively and finally rejects the claimant’s offers (the ‘last word’). [16] The Higher Regional Court held that the statements made by the defendants in the course of the negotiations did not justify such a conclusion. [16]

4. The SEP Owner’s Licensing Offer and the Standard Implementer’s Reaction

The Higher Regional Court held that the District Court had been incorrect to leave open the question as to whether the claimant’s offer had been FRAND. [17] The Higher Regional Court took the view that the CJEU had established an intricate system of consecutive actions that the parties must take. A claimant needs to make an offer on FRAND terms only if the defendant declared its willingness to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms. Similarly, a defendant is under an obligation to make a counter-offer on FRAND terms only if the claimant made an offer on FRAND terms. [18] According to the Higher Regional Court, this view flows from the wording of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling that relates the content of offer and counter-offer (‘such an offer’; ‘responded to that offer’). [18] An SEP owner who has given a commitment to an SSO to offer FRAND licenses can be expected to make a FRAND offer that can reasonably be accepted by the defendant. In addition, a defendant needs to be able to assess whether the conditions of the claimant’s offer are FRAND. Requiring a defendant to make a FRAND counter-offer no matter what the claimant had offered earlier would be a contradiction of this basic proposition of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling. [18] Thus, it was necessary to have a decision in respect of the conditions of the claimant’s licensing offer.

The Higher Regional Court held that the claimant’s licensing offer did not meet FRAND requirements [19] because it discriminated against the defendants. [20] The court reiterated that infringement courts cannot limit their assessment to a summary review of whether the conditions were not evidently non-FRAND. Rather, infringement courts need to make a full assessment of the license conditions. [21]

The court held that dominant undertakings are under no obligation to treat all business partners in exactly the same way. [22] SEP owners have discretion regarding the license fees that they charge. [23] Different treatment of licensees is accepted if it can be justified as a result of normal market behavior. [24] Further, license conditions can be abusive only if they are significantly different between licensees. [24] These principles also apply to SEP owners who have given a FRAND declaration because this commitment refers to Art 102 lit. c) TFEU. [25] The burden of proof for such substantially unequal treatment lies with the defendant, [26] whilst the onus is on the claimant to prove that this unequal treatment is justified. [26] However, as the defendant will typically not have the necessary information, the claimant is under an obligation to provide information as to which competitors have been granted licenses and on what terms. [26] On this basis the Higher Regional Court concluded that the claimant had treated the defendants significantly differently from their competitors [27] without having a proper justification. [28] In particular, the claimant could not prove that discounts given to a competitor were common in the industry, [29] or that these discounts were a result of the particularities of the case. [30]

  • [1] LG Düsseldorf, 3 November 2015, File No. 4a O 93/14
  • [2] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 32.
  • [3] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 34.
  • [4] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 75.
  • [5] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 74 and 175.
  • [6] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 47.
  • [7] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 177 et seqq.
  • [8] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 182.
  • [9] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 185.
  • [10] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 186.
  • [11] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 202.
  • [12] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 203.
  • [13] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 215.
  • [14] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 213.
  • [15] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 220.
  • [16] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 240.
  • [17] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 244.
  • [18] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 245.
  • [19] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 242.
  • [20] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 251.
  • [21] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 249.
  • [22] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 254.
  • [23] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 255 and 257.
  • [24] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 256.
  • [25] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 257.
  • [26] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 258.
  • [27] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 263.
  • [28] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 268.
  • [29] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 270 et seqq.
  • [30] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 275 et seqq. and paras 290 et seqq.

Updated 17 8月 2018

Apple v Qualcomm, [2018] EWHC 1188 (Pat)

22 5月 2018 - Case No. HP-2017-000015

A. Facts

The Claimants are the US-based parent company of the Apple group, Apple Inc., and five European subsidiaries. The Apple group manufactures and sells, among other products, mobile telecommunication and media devices [31] .

The two Defendants are the US-based parent company of the Qualcomm group, Qualcomm Incorporated (Qualcomm USA), and its subsidiary, Qualcomm (UK) Limited (Qualcomm UK) [32] . Qualcomm USA supplies manufacturers of Claimants’ devices with chipsets for mobile phones [33] . The company holds a great number of patents declared essential (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs) to mobile telecommuni¬cation standards developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [32] . Qualcomm USA made undertakings towards ETSI pursuant to Article 6.1 of the ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy (IPR Policy) that it “and its Affiliates” would make its SEPs accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions (FRAND undertakings). Qualcomm UK, on the other hand, neither holds SEPs relating to ETSI standards, nor made a FRAND undertaking vis-à-vis ETSI pursuant to Article 6.1. ETSI [34] . The company is, nevertheless, a member of ETSI.

The Claimants brought an action against both Defendants before the High Court of Justice (Court). Against Qualcomm USA the Claimants asserted claims for declaration of invalidity, for revocation and for declaration of non-essentiality with respect to certain SEPs [35] , a claim for declaration that rights derived from SEPs held by Qualcomm USA are exhausted [36] , a claim for damages allegedly suffered by an abuse of dominant position by Qualcomm USA in the relevant markets [37] , as well as claims arising from an alleged breach of the ETSI IPR Policy and the FRAND undertakings [38] .

Against Qualcomm UK the Claimants raised one single claim: They argued that Qualcomm UK as a member of ETSI was in breach of an obligation to license or procure licences on FRAND terms for SEPs held by the Qualcomm group [39] .

In its present decision, the Court did not rule on the merits of the claims asserted against Qualcomm USA. The Court focused on procedural questions regarding to the service of these claims, expressing doubts that some of the claims raised (particularly the claim for damages resulting from an alleged abuse of market power) could be validly served on Qualcomm USA outside the UK jurisdiction [40] .

Regarding to the claim asserted against Qualcomm UK, the Court found that no real prospect of success on the merits exist [41] . Accordingly, the Court signaled that it will grant Qualcomm UK a summary judg-ment against that claim, as the latter requested [42] .

B. Court’s reasoning

The Claimants based the claim against Qualcomm UK on the notion that the ETSI IPR policy obliges all ETSI members to license or procure a licence for SEPs on FRAND terms [39] . In addition, the Claimants argued that the ETSI IPR Policy imposes on Qualcomm UK as a member of ETSI an obligation to see to it that Qualcomm USA, or other companies belonging to the Qualcomm group, performed their FRAND undertakings [43] . Further, the Claimants pleaded that the FRAND undertakings made by Qualcomm USA towards ETSI on behalf of itself and its “Affiliates” also covered Qualcomm UK; thus, a breach of these undertakings was enforceable and actionable against the latter as well [44] .

Ruling on the obligations of ETSI members, the Court made clear that the ETSI IPR Policy does not require ETSI members which do not own SEPs to make a FRAND undertaking, not least because such an undertaking could not be fulfilled [45] . Moreover, in the eyes of the Court, the ETSI IPR Policy does not establish such an obligation even for entities which hold SEPs [45] . This can be derived from the provisions contained in the ETSI IPR Policy regulating the steps to be taken, in case that the patent holder chooses to refrain from making a FRAND undertaking (Article 8 ETSI IPR Policy) [45] .

Furthermore, the Court rejected the notion that the ETSI IPR Policy imposes on Qualcomm UK as a member of ETSI an obligation to make sure that Qualcomm USA performed its FRAND undertakings [43] . According to the Court, there is nothing in the wording of the ETSI IPR Policy or in the nature of the ETSI scheme which could establish such an obligation of ETSI members [43] . The Court did not see any need to impose an unexpressed obligation of that kind on ETSI members, either [43] .

Finally, the Court ruled that the FRAND undertakings of Qualcomm USA did not affect Qualcomm UK [46] . In the Court’s view, the reference to “Affiliates” in connection with undertakings pursuant to Article 6.1 ETSI IPR Policy covers only subsidiaries which themselves own SEPs subject to the respective undertaking [47] . Again, a company which does not own SEPs cannot be required to grant licences for patents that it does not hold [48] .

  • [31] Applev Qualcomm, UK High Court of Justice, judgement dated 22ndMay 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000015, [2018] EWHC 1188 (Pat), para. 1 et seq.
  • [32] Ibid, para. 3.
  • [33] Ibid, para. 63.
  • [34] Ibid, para. 35 et seq.
  • [35] Ibid, para. 13 et seq.
  • [36] Ibid, para. 15.
  • [37] Ibid, para. 16.
  • [38] Ibid, paras. 13 et seq.
  • [39] Ibid, paras. 11 and 38.
  • [40] Ibid, paras. 92 and 115 et. seq.
  • [41] Ibid, para. 57.
  • [42] Ibid, paras. 8 and 57.
  • [43] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [44] Ibid, para. 38.
  • [45] Ibid, para. 47.
  • [46] Ibid, para. 49 et seq.
  • [47] Ibid, para. 50 et seq.
  • [48] Ibid, para. 50.

Updated 10 4月 2019

Huawei 対 ZTE

16 7月 2015 - Case No. C-170/13

A. 内容

原告Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.は、欧州電気通信標準化機構(ETSI)が開発したLTEE無線通信規格(標準必須特許又はSEP)のプラクティスに関して必須のものとして宣言済みの特許を保有している [49] 。2009年3月、原告は、当該特許を実施者が公平、合理的かつ非差別的(Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory:FRAND)条件で利用できるようにすることをETSIに誓約した [50]

被告ZTE Corp.及びZTE Deutschland GmbHは、LTE規格にかかわる複数のSEPを保有しており [51] 、とりわけ、ドイツにおいては、LTE準拠製品の上市も行っている [52]

2010年11月から2011年3月の間、両当事者は、原告のSEPポートフォリオのライセンス許諾に関し協議していた [52] 。原告が合理的なロイヤルティとみなした金額を示したのに対し、被告は、クロスライセンス契約の締結を求めた [53] 。しかしながら、ライセンス契約の申出は決着しなかった [53]

2011年4月、原告は、被告を相手取り、差止命令、それまでの使用にかかわる計算書の提出、製品のリコール及び特許侵害にかかわる損害賠償を求めて、デュッセルドルフ地方裁判所(地方裁判所)に訴訟を提起した [54] [6]。

地方裁判所は、訴訟手続を停止し、EU機能条約(TFEU)第267条に基づく先決裁定を得るため欧州司法裁判所(CJEU)に付託した。簡潔に言えば、地方裁判所は、SEP保有者がSEP実施者に対する禁止的差止命令を求めて訴訟を提起することが支配的地位の濫用でありTFEU第102条に反するとの問題に関し、ドイツ連邦裁判所と欧州委員会が相反する立場を取っていると見られる点に着目した [55] 。オレンジブック判決において、ドイツ連邦裁判所は、SEPにかかわる権利侵害訴訟において、被告は、ライセンス契約締結にかかわる無条件かつ公正な申出を特許保有者に提示しており、過去の使用行為にかかわる計算書を提出しており、かつ、それにより生じるロイヤルティにつき保証金を支払っている限り、TFEU第102条に基づき防御する(それにより差止命令を回避する)権利を有すると判示した [56] 。これに対し、欧州委員会は、複数のEU加盟国においてサムスンがAppleを相手取り権利行使に関連して提起した訴訟において、特許保有者のFRAND誓約に従いFRAND条件でのライセンス契約について協議する意思を被告が実証している限り、SEPに関し差止命令による救済手段を求める訴訟が原則としてTFEU第102条違反になるとの見解を示した [57]


  • まず実施者に対し、「当該特許を指し示し、何が侵害にあたるのかを明示することにより」特許侵害を通知している。
  • 次に、申立てを受けた侵害者がFRAND条件でライセンス契約を締結する意思をあらわした場合、「当該条件でのライセンス申出について、とりわけ、そのロイヤルティ及び計算方法を明示した上で、当該侵害者に書面で明確に提示している」 [58]

これに対しSEP実施者は、特許保有者が禁止的差止命令又は製品リコールを求めた訴訟について、SEP保有者の申出に遅滞なく回答した場合に限り、当該訴訟の不適切性を訴えることができる [59] 。実施者は、当該申出を拒絶した場合、次の行為をしなければならない。

  • 「FRAND条件に対応する明示的なカウンターオファーを、速やかに、かつ、書面にて」特許保有者に送付し [60] 、かつ、
  • カウンターオファーが拒絶された場合、「銀行保証又は必要な預り金等を差し出す等して」、特許の実施に必要な担保を差し出す [61]

CJEUは、過去の使用行為に関しSEP保有者によりなされる損害賠償請求又は計算書提出の請求に上記の枠組みを適用しないことを明確にした。このような請求にかかわる行為は、標準的な準拠製品の上市又は市販継続が可能かどうかを左右するものでないため、TFEU第102条の侵害にあたらない [62]

B. 判決理由

CJEUは、SEP保有者の基本的な知的財産権(IPR)を司法により有効に保護することと、自由で歪みのない競争における公益との均衡を保つ必要性を強調した [63]

両当事者は、原告の市場における支配的地位の有無については争っていなかったため、裁判所の分析ではTFEU第102条に定める「濫用」の有無に焦点が当てられた [64] 。CJEUによれば、IPRの行使が支配的地位を保有する引受行為であるとしても、「元来」濫用になりえない [65] 。さらには、IPRの行使行為が支配的地位の濫用を構成するのは、「例外的な状況」に限られる [66]

SEPが関係する事例については、他のIPR関連事例と区別する。第一に、特許がSEPにあたる場合、その特許保有者は、「競合会社の製品の上市又は市販継続を妨げ、これにより、問題の製品の製造を留保できる」ことになる [67] 。これに加え、FRAND誓約により、特許保有者は、当該規格を実装する第三者に対しFRAND条件でSEPを利用できるとの「正当な期待」をもたらしている[19]。「正当な期待」がもたらされたことにより、権利侵害を訴えられた特許実施者は、SEP保有者がFRAND条件でのライセンス許諾を拒絶していた場合、原則として、TFEU第102条に依拠して防御することができる [68]

SEP保有者が法的手続を頼ってIPRの保護を求める権利を剥奪されることはないが、CJEUは、FRANDの引受けが、差止命令による救済手段を求めるに際し特定要件を遵守する義務をSEP保有者に負わせる根拠となると判示した [69] 。特に、TFEU第102条違反を回避するには、SEP保有者は、次の条件を満たさなければならない。すなわち、(a) 禁止的差止命令を求める訴訟を提起する前に、「当該特許を指し示し、何が侵害にあたるのかを明示することにより」侵害について実施者に通知しなければならず [70] 、かつ、(b) 実施者が当該ライセンス契約を締結する意思を表明している場合、FRAND条件でのライセンス申出について、「そのロイヤルティ及び計算方法」を明示した上で、当該実施者に書面で明確に提示しなければならない [71] 。この状況において、CJEUは、SEP保有者がそのような申出をするよう期待されうると認めた。これは、原則として、一般向けの規格ライセンス契約は存在せず、また、SEP保有者が第三者と締結した既存契約の条件は公開されていないことから、被疑侵害者に比べ非差別的な条件に従った申出であるかどうか確認する方が有効であるためである [72]

その一方で、(被疑)侵害者は、SEP保有者の申出に対し、注意を払った上で「業界で認められた商慣習に従い、誠実に」対応しなければならない[11]。応じるかどうかは、とりわけ「引き延ばし戦略」が黙示されない「客観的要素」に基づき確証しなければならない。 侵害者は、条件案において特許保有者のFRAND誓約がなされていないとしてSEP保有者のライセンス申出を拒絶することとした場合は、SEP保有者にFRAND条件に基づき書面による明示的なカウンターオファーをSEP保有者に送付しなければならない[12]。当該カウンターオファーが拒絶された場合において、(被疑)侵害者がライセンスを取得せずに当該SEPを既に使用しているときは、当該(被疑)侵害者は、業界で認められた商慣習に従い、銀行保証又は必要な預り金等を差し出す等して、適切な担保を差し出す義務を負う [61] 。担保の算定においては、とりわけ、「過去のSEP使用件数」を含めなければならず、被疑侵害者は、当該使用行為にかかわる計算書を提出できるよう用意しなければならない [61] 。(被疑)侵害者によるカウンターオファーにもかかわらず合意に至らなかった時点で、CJEUは、両当事者が「共通合意」により、「独立の第三者の遅滞なき決定により」ロイヤルティを決定するよう要請するオプションを有することを指し示した [73]

最後に、CJEUは、(被疑)侵害者がライセンス契約の協議と並行してSEP保有者の特許の有効性若しくは必須性又はこれを実際に使用することにつき異議を申し立てるか、将来これを行う権利を留保することができることを明確にした [74]


  • [49] Huawei対ZTE、欧州司法裁判所2015年7月6日判決、第22節。
  • [50] 同判決、第22節。
  • [51] 同判決、第40節。
  • [52] 同判決、第24節。
  • [53] 同判決、第25節。
  • [54] 同判決、第27節。
  • [55] 同判決、第29節以下。
  • [56] 同判決、第30節以下。
  • [57] 同判決、第34節以下。
  • [58] 同判決、第77節。
  • [59] 同判決、第65節。
  • [60] 同判決、第66節。
  • [61] 同判決、第67節。
  • [62] 同判決、第72節以下。
  • [63] 同判決、第42節。
  • [64] 同判決、第43節。
  • [65] 同判決、第46節。
  • [66] 同判決、第47節。
  • [67] 同判決、第53節。
  • [68] 同判決、第53節以下。
  • [69] 同判決、第58節以下。
  • [70] 同判決、第61節。
  • [71] 同判決、第63節。
  • [72] 同判決、第64節。
  • [73] 同判決、第68節。
  • [74] 同判決、第69節。

Updated 9 11月 2020


LG Munich
10 9月 2020 - Case No. 7 O 8818/19

A. 内容




In 2017年、シャープは、Avanciライセンシングプラットフォームに参加した。Avanciは、標準ライセンス契約及び固定料率に基づき、接続規格に関するSEPのライセンスを自動車メーカーにオファーした。Avanciは、2016年9月以降、ライセンス契約締結に関し、既にダイムラーと接触していたが、契約締結には至らなかった。

On 20 May 2019年5月20日、最初の接触後、シャープは、対象規格の関連部分にかかわる自社のSEP(係争中の特許を含む)を図示したクレームチャートをダイムラーに送付した。






その後、シャープは、ダイムラーを相手取り、ミュンヘン地方裁判所(裁判所)に権利侵害訴訟を提起した。ダイムラーの複数のサプライヤーがダイムラーを援護するため当該訴訟に参加した。 2019年12月17日、訴訟が提起された後、ダイムラーは、係争中の権利侵害訴訟の停止に同意するようシャープに要請した後、カウンターオファーを行った。2019年12月31日、シャープは、ダイムラーのこのカウンターオファーを拒絶した。


この判決 [75] をもって、裁判所は、ダイムラーに差止命令を下すとともに、ダイムラーの損害賠償責任を判示した。さらに裁判所は、侵害製品のリコール及び破棄、計算書の提出、並びにシャープに対する損害賠償金の算定に必要な情報の提供をするようダイムラーに命じた。

B. 判決理由

裁判所は、係争中の特許が4G/LTE規格の実施に必須 [76] であり、侵害されていた [77] と認めた。これにより、シャープは、差止命令の救済手段を求める権利がある [78] 。 ダイムラーは、いわゆる「FRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁」を展開し、シャープが権利侵害訴訟の提起によって市場支配的地位を濫用し、これがEU機能条約(TFEU)第102条に反していることから、差止命令の申立ては却下されるべきと主張した。特に、Huawei対ZTE事件 [79] でEU司法裁判所(CJEU)が示した行動要件(Huwaei決定又はフレームワーク)をシャープが遵守していなかった点について主張した。 裁判所は、ダイムラーによるFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁を却下し、ダイムラーが自社サプライヤー由来のFRAND抗弁に依拠することはできないと認定した [80]


裁判所によれば、特許保有者が支配的地位に付帯する「特段の責任」を果たすための「十分な努力」を怠った上、原則として「ライセンスを取得する意向である」実施者との契約締結を推進した場合、SEPの行使による市場支配的地位の濫用が生じうる [81] 。ただし、この場合、権利保有者の許諾を得ることなく保護対象の技術を既に使用している実施者がFRAND条件でライセンスを取得する意向でなければならない [82] 。裁判所は、SEP保有者が規格実施者にライセンス取得の「強要」を求めることはできないと説明した [82]

上記を踏まえ、裁判所は、シャープが本件訴訟を提起したことはTFEU第102条に定められる濫用にあたらないと認めた [83] 。裁判所は、シャープが市場支配的地位を有していたか否かについては確証せず、本件においては有していたと想定するに留めた [83] 。それにもかかわらず、(想定された)支配的地位の濫用が認められなかったのは、ダイムラーがシャープのSEPポートフォリオにかかわるライセンスの取得することについて十分に明確な意欲を表明しなかったためである [84]


裁判所は、「実際にいかなるFRAND条件であろうと」、実施者がSEP保有者とのライセンス契約を締結し、爾後、「目標志向」の方法でライセンス協議に従事する誠実意思を有する場合、これを「明確に」かつ「疑義のないよう」宣言しなければならないと説明した(引用判例、連邦司法裁判所、2020年5月5日判決、Sisvel対Haier、事件番号KZR 36/17、及び英国高等法院、2017年4月5日判決、事件番号[2017] EWHC 711(Pat) – Unwired Planet対Huawei) [82]

つまり、実施者は、ライセンス協議を遅延させてはならない [85] 。裁判所の見地からすると、特許で保護された標準化技術を協議前に既に利用している実施者はその特許が満了するまでライセンス契約の締結を遅延させる単独の利益又は優勢な利益を有しているため、遅延させてはならない点が特に重要である [85]

その上で、裁判所は、ダイムラーが「誠実意思を有する」実施者としてふるまっていなかったと認定した [84]

シャープへのカウンターオファー前のダイムラーの行動を見た上で、裁判所は、「明確な」誠実意思の宣言が欠落していたと判示した [86] 。2019年6月7日のシャープに対する最初の回答で、ダイムラーは、シャープの特許が使用されている場合でも、ライセンス協議に関する一般的な意思を超える確約をするとの表明を一切しなかった [87] 。さらに言えば、2019年7月23日付のダイムラーの書簡では、ダイムラーは、シャープに対して自社のサプライヤー(特定しないで)に差し向け、シャープがサプライヤーにライセンスを許諾する義務を負っていると主張しており、適切な誠実意思が宣言されていなかった [88] 。2019年9月18日の陳述書でも、ダイムラーは、自社のサプライヤーに委ねるとし、かつ、ライセンスオファーに必要な情報をシャープに提供することを拒絶していた [89] 。裁判所は、シャープから要請される情報を提供する法的義務はないが、ダイムラーがその提供を拒絶したことで、「目標志向」で協議に従事しなかっただけでなく、当該協議を遅延させることがねらいであったことが明らかになった点に着目した [90] 。これは、ダイムラーの回答がシャープの要請の都度およそ6週間後に行われていた事実からも確認されている。裁判所は、ダイムラーが回答に時間を要した理由を確認しなかった [90]

さらに、裁判所は、ダイムラーの「誠実意思を有しない」実施者としての行為は、Avanciプラットフォームとの協議でのダイムラーの全体的な態度からも明らかであると事実認定した [91] 。裁判所は、FRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁を申し立てる実施者の「誠実意思」を評価するにあたっては、時機的に、権利侵害通知受領後直接に発生した事実のみならず、全体的な行為を考慮に入れなければならないと判示した [92] 。誠実意思評価の基準は、特許保有者が先に実施者に接近したか、実施者が主導してライセンスを求めたかの「やや行き当たりばったりの」事実に依拠するものであってはならない [93] 。Huawei判決において示された義務(そのひとつが、ライセンス取得の「誠実意思」を表明することにより権利侵害通知に反応すること)は、原則としてCJEUの命令において「措置」として従うべきものであるが、両当事者の行動上例外が認められ、かつ、Huaweiフレームワークの純粋な「形式的」見解が適切でないと思われる場合には、ケースバイケースで例外を認めなければならない [94] 。裁判所によれば、ダイムラーが2016年9月以後Avanciと接触しており、いずれの時間的段階においてもライセンス取得の意向を表明していないことから、本件はその例外に該当した [95]

さらに裁判所は、2019年12月17日付のダイムラーによるカウンターオファーについて、権利侵害訴訟提起後になされたものに過ぎず、意向表明の欠如を是正することにならないと認定した [96] 。裁判所の見解によれば、本件において係属中の訴訟手続の停止についてシャープに同意が求め後カウンターオファーがなされた事実は、ダイムラーが専ら遅延を生じさせようとして行ったことを示しており、よって、当該カウンターオファーはその時点までにダイムラーが示していた「明らかな意向の欠如」を補うに値するものでなかった [97] 。この点に関し、裁判所は、審理が進むにつれ厳格さが増す要件が求められるが、係属中の訴訟手続中、(カウンターオファー等により)不備を是正する機会が原則として与えられていると述べた [98] 。 さらに裁判所は、ダイムラーのカウンターオファーが内容の点で、「実際にいかなるFRAND条件であろうと」ライセンスを取得する意向を表明するものでなかったと強調した [99] 。ロイヤルティ計算に異なる複数の「基準」を用いることで、ダイムラーは、シャープからオファーされたか、Avanciが競業者をとりまとめたオファーののごく一部のみについてカウンターオファーを行い、カウンターオファーの拒絶が「論理上必要」となるように仕向けていた [100]

この流れにおいて、裁判所は、意向の評価にはダイムラーの態度のみが関係すると明言した [101] 。さらに、ダイムラーは、差止命令を回避するために、訴訟に参加していたサプライヤーがシャープからライセンスを取得する意向を有していたとする「主張」には依拠することができなかった [102] 。よって、裁判所は、ダイムラーのサプライヤーが実際に「誠実意思を有するライセンシー」として行為していたかどうか調査しなかった [102]


上記に加え、裁判所は、シャープがエンドデバイスメーカーであるダイムラーのみにライセンス取得を求めることにより、濫用的又は非差別的に行動していたのではなかったと説示した [103] 。 裁判所の見解では、シャープはダイムラーのサプライヤーにライセンスを許諾する義務を負っていなかった [104] 。(ドイツの)自動車業界においては自動車メーカーにコンポーネントを販売するサプライヤーが当該コンポーネントに関するライセンスを取得するのが一般的であるとはいえ、シャープがその慣行を尊重し、受け入れる義務を負うものではない [105] 。反対に、ダイムラーは、自社製品での無線通信技術の利用度が増す限り、その分野で一般的な、エンドデバイスメーカーへもライセンスを許諾するという慣行を受け入れなければならない [105]

上記にかかわらず、シャープは、コンポーネントメーカーにライセンスを許諾する法的義務を一切負っていない。シャープが負っているのは、自社のSEPがカバーする規格への「アクセス権」を付与する義務である [106] 。特許保有者がETSIに確約することにより、SEPのライセンスを第三者に許諾する義務が生じる [107] 41。しかしながら裁判所は、これにより、バリューチェーンのあらゆるレベルでライセンスを許諾する義務が必ずしも生じるわけではないことを強調した [108] 。そのような義務は、競争法又は特許法若しくはETSIのFRAND規約に対する契約法のいずれからも生じない [108] 。 特に、EU競争法では、バリューチェーンのあらゆるレベルでSEPのライセンスを許諾する義務を定めていない [109] 。裁判所によれば、特許保有者は原則として、バリューチェーンのどのレベルをライセンス許諾の対象とするか、自由裁量により選択することができる [110] 。Huawei判決において、CJEUは、FRAND引受けにより、特許保有者からライセンスを許諾される第三者の側に「正当な期待」が生じると指摘した。しかしながら裁判所は、これにより、エンドデバイスメーカーの全サプライヤーにライセンスを許諾する義務が生じるものではないと判示した。市場へのアクセスに必要とされるのは、必ずしもライセンスではなく、「法的に使用できること」である。これは例えばバリューチェーンの最終レベルで付与されるライセンス等を通じて与えられ、サプライヤーはこれに基づき「have-made-rights製造委託権」下で製造することができる [110]

また裁判所は、特許法においても、バリューチェーンの中でSEPライセンスが付与されるべきレベルは定められていないと説明した同判決、paras. 173節以下。。とりわけ、SEPポートフォリオに含まれる特許のすべてが常にコンポーネントメーカーのレベルで消尽するわけではないという事実が、(この場合に見込まれるライセンス料のより効率的な「管理」に加え)エンドデバイスレベルでのライセンス許諾の正当性を示している [112]

最後に、裁判所は、ETSIのFRAND規定は、契約法によって利害関係者たるすべての第三者にライセンスを許諾する義務が特許保有者に課すものではない旨を指摘した [113] 。適用されるフランス法に基づき、ETSI IPRポリシー第6.1条は、ライセンスを求める当事者との間でFRAND契約について協議する義務のみが課されると理解される [114] 。ただし、「装置」に言及した場合、本規定は、すべてのコンポーネントが必ずしも規格全体を実装するわけではないことから、エンドデバイスメーカーにのみ対応することとなる [115] 。裁判所の見地において、以前別の事例において欧州委員会が示した見解に拠っても、別の結論が導き出されることはない同判決、第180~183節。裁判所は、とりわけ、欧州委員会の決定(事件番号AT.39985 – Motorola)、水平的協力協定へのTFEU第101条の適用に関するガイドラインの通達(2011/C 11/01)、及びデジタル単一市場へのICT標準化優先性の通達(COM(2016) 176確定版)に言及した。


さらに裁判所は、サプライヤーによりなされたFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁をダイムラーが利用することはできないと認めた [117] 。被告がそのような抗弁に依拠できるのは、特許保有者がサプライヤーにライセンスを許諾する義務を負っている場合に限られる。ただし、被告自らが、関連するバリューチェーンでの特許消尽を十分に考慮しSEP保有者との間でライセンス契約を締結する立場にある場合、上記の定めは適用されない [117]

裁判所は、本件がこれにあたるとみなした。ダイムラーのサプライヤーは、シャープに対しライセンスの許諾を請求する権利を有しておらず、標準化技術に対し「法的に保護されたアクセス権」を請求する権利を有していた。これをダイムラーに有利になるよう考慮することはできない [118]

C. その他の問題

さらに、裁判所は、比例性の原則(proportionality considerations)に基づくシャープの差止命令請求を制限する根拠はないと裁定した [119] 。ダイムラーは、自社製造の自動車が多数のコンポーネントを組み込んだ「複雑」な製品であり、シャープのSEPに関係するテレマティクス制御ユニットは当該自動車にとって重要性が低いとして、係争中の特許に基づき差止命令が下されるべきでないと論じた。

裁判所は、比例性がドイツ法において、原告から異議が申し立てられる都度検討される、憲法と同等の順位を有する一般原則であり、差止命令による救済手段に関しても考慮される旨を明言した [120] 。連邦裁判所の判例によれば、差止命令は、例外的に、信義則に反する特許保有者の正当化できない排他権で、実施者が不都合を被るおそれがあると即時に執行されない場合があり、 [121] 。 裁判所の見地から、差止命令による救済を求める権利の制限が問題になるのは「ごくわずかな例外的な事例」であることから、その制限に際しては、厳格な条件を定め、特に「法秩序」のみならず「法的な確実性及び予測可能性」を保護しなければならない [122] 。関係事実すべてをケースバイケースで評価する必要がある一方で、実体的及び手続上の包括的なフレームワーク(最初の差止命令の執行を求める場合の供託金差出しの必要性を含む)についても検討する必要がある [122]

裁判所は、差止命令により通常もたらされる結果を超える不都合のみが考慮の対象となりうることを説明した [122] 。権利侵害者には、可能な限り早急にライセンス契約を締結するよう努力し、かつ、遅くとも権利侵害通知受領後、見込まれる差止命令に対する予防措置を講じることが求められる [122]

この背景を鑑み、裁判所は、本件において、対象となるのがダイムラーの自動車に含まれる単一のコンポーネントのみであったとしても、複雑な特許ポートフォリオ(シャープのポートフォリオか、Avanciのポートフォリオかを問わない)に基づくライセンス許諾を巡り紛争が展開されると述べた [123] 。「コネクテッドカー」を参照する技術革新の重大部分は技術的・経済的双方の観点においてモバイル通信技術と密接に関連していることから、シャープの特許により実装された機能がダイムラーの車両にとってさほど重要でないとの反論は、裁判所を説得する材料とならなかった [124] 。最後に裁判所は、ダイムラーがシャープ又はAvanciのいずれともライセンス契約を締結すべく真摯な努力を尽くさなかったとして批判した [125]

  • [75] シャープ対ダイムラー、ミュンヘン地方裁判所、2020年9月10日判決、事件番号7O8818/19(から引用)
  • [76] 同判決、第68節以下。
  • [77] 同判決、第 25節以下。
  • [78] 同判決、第90節。
  • [79] Huawei対ZTE、EU司法裁判所、2015年7月16日判決、事件番号C-170/13
  • [80] シャープ対ダイムラー、ミュンヘン地方裁判所、2020年9月10日判決、事件番号7O8818/19第121節。
  • [81] 同判決、第124節。
  • [82] 同判決、第125節。
  • [83] 同判決、第128節。
  • [84] 同判決、第130節以下。
  • [85] 同判決、第126節。
  • [86] 同判決、第132節以下。
  • [87] 同判決、第134節以下。
  • [88] 同判決、第136節以下。
  • [89] 同判決、第138節以下。
  • [90] 同判決、第140節。
  • [91] 同判決、第141節。
  • [92] 同判決、第142節以下。
  • [93] 同判決、第143節以下。
  • [94] 同判決、第144節。
  • [95] 同判決、第146~149節。
  • [96] 同判決、第150節。
  • [97] 同判決、第151及び153節。
  • [98] 同判決、第152節。
  • [99] 同判決、第154節。
  • [100] 同判決、第154節以下。
  • [101] 同判決、第158節及び159節。
  • [102] 同判決、第158節。
  • [103] 同判決、第161節以下。
  • [104] 同判決、第162節。
  • [105] 同判決、第164節。
  • [106] 同判決、第165節。
  • [107] 同判決、第168節。
  • [108] 同判決、第169節。
  • [109] 同判決、第170節以下。
  • [110] 同判決、第171節。
  • [111] 同判決、paras. 173節以下。
  • [112] 同判決、第174節。
  • [113] 同判決、第175節以下。
  • [114] 同判決、第177節以下。
  • [115] 同判決、第178節。
  • [116] 同判決、第180~183節。裁判所は、とりわけ、欧州委員会の決定(事件番号AT.39985 – Motorola)、水平的協力協定へのTFEU第101条の適用に関するガイドラインの通達(2011/C 11/01)、及びデジタル単一市場へのICT標準化優先性の通達(COM(2016) 176確定版)に言及した。
  • [117] 同判決、第167節。
  • [118] 同判決、第185節。
  • [119] 同判決、第92~102節。
  • [120] 同判決、第93節。
  • [121] 同判決、第94節。
  • [122] 同判決、第95節。
  • [123] 同判決、第97節以下。
  • [124] 同判決、第100節以下。
  • [125] 同判決、第99節。

Updated 24 7月 2020

Sisvel 対 Haier、ドイツ連邦最高裁判所(Bundesgerichtshof)

Federal Court of Justice - BGH
5 5月 2020 - Case No. KZR 36/17

A. 事実


被告は、中国に本社を置くHaier groupのドイツ及びフランスの子会社である(Haier)。Haierグループは、とりわけ、GPRS規格に適合した電子機器の製造及びマーケティングを行なっている。

2012年12月20日、Sisvelは、Haier groupの親会社(Haier China)に対し、SisvelのSEPの使用侵害について通知した。Sisvelは、そのポートフォリオに包含されたおよそ450件の特許の一覧を提示すると共に、自社のSEPについてライセンスの申出を行う旨をHaierに知らせた。


2013年8月及び11月に、Sisvelは、Haier Chinaに対し、自社のライセンスプログラムに関する情報を記した追加の書簡を送付した。Haier Chinaは、2013年12月のみ、Sisvelに対して回答し、Sisvelと「正式な交渉(formal negotiation)」を行うことを望んでいる旨を明示すると共に、これまでのやりとりでSisvelが提示した割引の可能性に関する情報の提供を求めた。


2015年11月3日に、本地方裁判所は、Haierに対して差止命令を出した [126] 。本地方裁判所はまた、侵害製品のリコール及び破棄を命じた。さらに本地方裁判所は、実体的事項に関するHaierの損害賠償責任を認めると共に、Haierに対して、Sisvelに対する侵害製品の販売にかかわる完全かつ詳細な会計書類の提示を命じた。

Haierは、この決定を上訴すると共に、本地方裁判所により下された差止命令の執行の停止を命じるよう、デュッセルドルフ高等裁判所(Higher District Court of Duesseldorf)(本上訴裁判所)に要請した。2016年1月、本控訴裁判所は、それぞれの命令を言い渡した [127]

上訴手続きにおいて、Haierは、とりわけ、Sisvelが侵害訴訟を提起した後の、Huawei対ZTE事件の2015年7月に下された判決(Huawei判決)において欧州司法裁判所(CJEU)がSEP保有者に課した行動要件について、本地方裁判所が、これを適切に考慮しなかった旨を主張した [128] 。 本控訴裁判所での手続き中、2016年1月16日に、Haierはさらに、ドイツの裁判所が係争特許の有効性及び侵害性を最終的に認めた場合のみ、SisvelからFRANDライセンスを受けるつもりであることを宣言した。2016年3月23日に、Haierは、Sisvelに別の書簡を送り、状況が何も変わっていないことを示した。さらに、Haierは、Sisvelの全ての特許に関するクレームチャート及びロイヤルティの算定についての追加の情報を要請した。2016年12月、Sisvelは、Haierに対して新たなライセンスの申出を行ったが、この申出はまた拒絶された。

2017年3月30日付の判決により、本控訴裁判所は、Haierの上訴を部分的に認めた [129] 。本控訴裁判所は、実体的事項に関するHaierの損害賠償責任及び会計書類の提示義務を確認した。しかしながら、本上訴裁判所は、Haierが侵害製品のリコール及び破棄についていかなる義務も負うものではないと判断した。Sisvelが、特にHaierに対してFRANDライセンスの申出を行わなかったことにより、Huawei判決に基づく自らの義務を遵守しなかったからである。本上訴裁判所は、両当事者が本件については和解することに合意したため、差止命令による救済の請求について決定を下す必要はなかった。係争特許が2016年9月に満了となるからである。Sisvelは、本控訴裁判所の決定に対して不服申し立てを行った。

2017年10月、係争特許の特定のクレームの範囲を狭め、別途その有効性を確認した [130] 。2020年3月に、ドイツ連邦最高裁判所(FCJ又は本裁判所)は、第二審として本決定を概ね容認した [131]

2020年5月5日付のこの判決により  [132] (引用元、FCJは、本控訴裁判所の判決を破棄した。第一審における本地方裁判所の裁定は、Sisvelの損害賠償請求及び情報及び会計書類の提示請求に関して維持された。Sisvelによる侵害製品のリコール及び破棄についての請求は、Haierが所有している製品又は係争特許が2016年9月に満了となるまでに製造され、もしくは引き渡された製品に制限された。Sisvelによる差止命令による救済の請求は、これが係争特許が失効した後に本控訴裁判所における従前の手続き中に撤回されたため、本裁判所の裁定の対象とはならなかった。

B. 判決理由 本裁判所は、係争特許がGPRS規格に必須であり、侵害を受けているとの判決を下した [133]

さらに、本裁判所は、Haierに対する侵害訴訟を開始することにより、SisvelがEU機能条約(TFEU)第102条を違反して支配的市場地位を濫用していなかったと判決を下した [134]



本裁判所は、SisvelがTFEU第102条の意味の範囲内で支配的市場地位にあるとの判決を下した  [135]

FCJは、支配的市場地位が、特許により付与される独占的な権利のみによって生じるものではないと説明した [136] 。従って、いくつかの要因を考慮する必要がある [137] 。1つ目の重要な要因は関連市場である。特許が、標準化団体によって策定された基準(又はデファクトスタンダード(事実上の標準))に適合する上で技術的に必須であって、かつ、下流市場で付された製品について、当該基準に代わる技術的な手段が利用できない場合、支配性の評価に適すのは、当該特許のライセンスが提供される(個々の)市場である [138]  。

これに基づき、本裁判所は、Sisvelが支配的市場地位にあると判示した:係争特許は、GPRS規格の実施に必須であること、また、GPRS規格に適合したいかなる携帯電話も、従前の規格の世代も今後の規格の世代も同一の機能を備えることが認められていないため、(下流)市場において競業するものではないこと [139]

この状況において、FCJは、規格実施者が、商品及びサービスの市場の買主と比較して、交渉において有利な立場を得る場合が多いという事実により、SEP保有者の市場支配が制限されるというSisvelの意見を認めなかった [140] 。本裁判所は、商品やサービスの買主とは異なり、規格実施者が、特許保有者との合意を締結していなくとも、規格に準拠した製品を製造するために必要な保護された技術にアクセスできるという有利な立場にいると判断した  [141] 。しかしながら、本裁判所によると、この事実は、市場支配を除外するには十分ではない。ライセンスの交渉において個々の実施者に対するSEP保有者の交渉力の度合いは関係ない [142] 。 支配的市場地位は、独占的権利を行使して市場から実施者を排除する法的能力から生じる、特許保有者の優越した構造的な市場支配力によりもたらされる [143]

同様に、本裁判所は、SEPの行使に関するHuawei判決により課せられた制限が、市場支配(的地位)を損なうものではないことを指摘した [144] 。 本裁判所は、対等な立場で交渉を行うための手段をSEP保有者が最大限に利用できないため、これらの制限がSEP保有者の交渉上の立場を著しく弱めていると指摘した [144] 。 それにも関わらず、実施者が、特許が満了となるまで交渉を遅延することにより「ホールドアウト」行為を行うような場合でさえ、これは、特許保有者の支配的地位を問題として取り上げるには十分ではない  [144]

それでもやはり、本裁判所は、係争特許が満了したので、Sisvelの支配的市場地位が終結したことを指摘した  [145]

侵害製品を(下流)市場参入から排除する法的権利がこれ以上付与されなくなる場合、SEP保有者はもはや支配力を有しない  [145]


両当事者の行為を検討し、本裁判所は、本控訴裁判所とは異なり、Sisvelがその市場支配的地位を濫用していないと判断した  [146]  。

本裁判所は、SEP保有者が、本質的には自らの特許から生じる独占的な権利を行使することを妨げられていないことを明言した  [147] 。特許が標準必須特許であるという事実は、その特許保有者が、支配的な市場地位を有することにより、その技術の使用を許可しているか、許可するよう義務付けられていない限り、かかる使用を容認しなければならないということを意味するものではない。 [147] 。しかしながら、FCJによると、SEPの使用を許可しなければならないという義務は、実施者がFRAND条件にてライセンスを取得するつもりのない場合には存在しない。特許保有者は、とりわけライセンス契約の締結を要請する法的権利を有しないため、支配的な市場地位を有するとしても、標準必須特許の使用者に対してライセンスを「課す」義務はない。 [148]  。


  1. 特許保有者がその支配的な市場地位を濫用したり、非差別性に関わる義務を違反することなく、かかる特許保有者によって拒絶され得ない条件にて、実施者が無条件のライセンスの申出を行なった場合(本裁判所が2009年5月6日付の「オレンジブックスタンダート事件」判決(事件番号 KZR 39/06)における従前の裁定を反芻した限りにおいて) [149]  。
  2. 実施者が、基本的に、ライセンスを取得するつもりであるが、SEP保有者がその支配的市場地位に付される「固有の責任」に従ってライセンス契約の締結を円滑に進める「十分な努力」を尽くしていない場合 [150]


結果的に、本裁判所は、SEP保有者が、侵害請求訴訟を提起する前に係争特許の侵害使用について実施者に対して通知義務を負うという見解を示した [151] 。実施者が未だ侵害を認識していない場合に限り当該義務が発生するとFCJが示唆したと思われる  [152]  。

本裁判所は、基本的には、技術実施者が、製品の製造や販売を担う前に第三者の権利が侵害されていないことを確認しなければならない旨を説示した [153]  。しかしながら、この責務は、とりわけ情報通信技術(ICT)分野においてはかなり困難なことである。ICT分野の製品は、多数の特許権の影響を受ける可能性がある  [153]  。特許保有者は、通常はすでに侵害について調査しているが、実施者がFRAND条件にてライセンスを取得する必要があるか否かを検討し、それにより差止命令を回避できるよう、裁判手続きの開始前に実施者に対して特許の使用についての情報を提供しなければならない。 [154]  。

本裁判所によると、それぞれの侵害通知は、通常、グループ会社の親会社宛に送付されることで十分とする  [155] [309] 。内容について言えば、通知には、侵害対象となった特許を明記すると共に、特定の侵害使用及び非難の対象たる実施形態について説明しなければならない [156]  。侵害の技術的かつ法的分析についての詳細は必要ない。従って、実施者は、最終的には専門家や弁護士の助言に従い、侵害の申立について専ら評価しなければならない [156]  。概して、実際にはクレームチャートを提示することで十分な場合多い(強制ではない)  [156]  。

さらに、侵害された特許及び影響を受けた規格に関する情報を提供した特許保有者は、実施者が受け取った情報が侵害を評価するには十分ではないと直ちに示すことを予測していることを、FCJは付言した [157] 。これは、多くの特許及び規格が関わる場合にも当てはまる [157]

上記の事項を考慮し、本裁判所は、Sisvelが所定の適切な侵害通知をHaierに交付したと判断した。2012年12月20日付の書簡及びその後のやりとりは、該当する要件を満たすものであった  [158]  。


その一方、Haierの行為を勘案し、本裁判所は、HaierがSisvelからFRAND条件によるライセンスを取得する意思のあるライセンシーとして行為しなかったと判断した [159] 。この点において、FCJは、逆の結論に至った本控訴裁判所によるそれぞれの評価に異議を示した。

本裁判所は、Haierがほぼ1年にわたって(2012年12月から2013年12月まで)、対応することをとどまっていたため、Sisvelからの通知に対するHaier Chinaの当初の回答が遅かったことに注視した [160] 。侵害通知に回答するのに数ヶ月を要する実施者というのは、通常は、ライセンスを取得することに関心のないこと示す  [160]  。Sisvelが、2012年12月のHaierに対する最初の通知の送付後になって、Sisvelが係争特許を対象としてETSIに対してFRAND確約を行なったという事実は、適時性を評価する上でいかなる意味もなさない。2012年12月20日付の書簡において、Sisvelはすでに、Haierに対してFRANDライセンスを申し出るつもりであることを宣言している [160] 。侵害訴訟手続きの開始前に行われた遅延された回答が(2013年12月からのHaierの回答と同様に)、それでもやはり、当事者らによるHuawei判決(本上訴裁判所が行なった通り)の遵守を評価する際に考慮されるか否かについての疑義は、FCJによって判断されなかった  [161]  。本件では、この疑義は関連性がない。というのは、内容の点から言えば、Haierによるいかなる回答にも、ライセンスを取得する意思が十分に示されていないからである  [162]  。

本裁判所の見地から、実施者は、「どのような条件が実際にFRANDにあたるのかにかかわらず」SEP保有者とのライセンス契約を締結する意思について、「明確に」かつ「疑義の生じないよう」宣言しなければならない(Unwired Planet 対 Huawei(英国及びウェールズ高等法院、2017年4月5日付、事件番号[2017] EWHC 711(Pat)の判決を引用)  [163]  。実施者は、その後、「目的志向」の態度にてライセンス供与の協議に参加する義務がある [317] 。むしろ、権利侵害の通知に対して、ライセンス契約締結を検討する意思を示したり、ライセンス取得の是非及びその条件についての協議に入る意思を示したりするだけでは不十分である  [163]  。

これに基づき、本裁判所は、Haierの2014年12月の回答が、「正式な交渉」を行うという見込みのみが示されているだけであって、誠実意思を宣言するには不十分であると判断した。この宣言は、上記の「明確なもの」でも「疑義の生じないもの」でもなかった  [164]

同様に、2016年1月16日付のHaierの書簡には、Haierがドイツの裁判所による係争特許の有効性及び侵害についての従前の確認を条件としてライセンス契約を締結したため、誠実意思についての十分な宣言が記載されていなかった [165]  。実施者は、原則として、ライセンス契約の締結後にはライセンス対象特許の有効性に異議を申し立てる権利を留保することができるが、本裁判所は、それぞれの条件下での誠実意思の宣言を行うことはできないと判断した [165]  。

さらに、FCJは、Haierが2016年3月23日付の書面により自らの誠実意思を十分に明示してはいなかったと判断した。Haierが上記の許容できない条件を撤回しなかったという事実とは別に、本裁判所は、侵害通知の受領後およそ3年間に渡って、全てのSisvelの特許に関するクレームチャートの作成を要請することは、Haierが係争特許が満了となるまで交渉を遅延させることにしか関心がないことを示すものであるとの見解を示した  [166]  。

Haierが誠実意思を適切に宣言しなかったため、本裁判所は、侵害手続きが開始された後に、実施者がこの義務を履行することが可能であるか否かについて回答しなかった  [167]  。


  • [126] Sisvel 対 Haier、デュッセルドルフ地方裁判所、2015年11月3日付判決、事件番号No. 4a O 93/14。
  • [127] Sisvel 対 Haier、 デュッセルドルフ高等裁判所、2016年1月13日付判決、事件番号No. I-15 U 66/15。
  • [128] Huawei対ZTE、欧州司法裁判所、2015年7月16日付判決、事件番号No. C-170/13。
  • [129] Sisvel v Haier、デュッセルドルフ高等裁判所、2017年3月30日付判決、事件番号No. I-15 U 66/15。
  • [130] 連邦特許裁判所、2017年10月6日付判決、事件番号No. 6 Ni 10/15 (EP)。
  • [131] 連邦裁判所、2020年3月10日付判決、事件番号No. X ZR 44/18。
  • [132] Sisvel 対Haier、連邦裁判所、2020年5月5日付判決、事件番号KZR 36/17。
  • [133] 同判決、第9節以下、及び第59節。
  • [134] 同判決、第52節。
  • [135] 同判決、第54節。
  • [136] 同判決、第56節。
  • [137] 同判決、第 57節以下。
  • [138] 同判決、第58節。
  • [139] 同判決、第59節以下。
  • [140] 同判決、第61節。
  • [141] 同判決、第63節。
  • [142] 同判決、第62節。
  • [143] 同判決、第61節以下。FCJによると、それぞれの法的障害により、会社が市場に参入することが不合理なものとなっている事実により、事前にライセンスを得ていなくとも、市場参入の障壁はすでに構築されている。第63項を参照。
  • [144] 同判決、第64節。
  • [145] 同判決、第65節。
  • [146] 同判決、第67節以下。
  • [147] 同判決、第69節。
  • [148] 同判決、第70節。
  • [149] 同判決、第71節。
  • [150] 同判決、第72節。
  • [151] 同判決、第73節以下。
  • [152] 同判決、第73節以下。 本裁判所によると、特許保有者は、規格の使用者に対し、当該使用者が規格を実施することによりその特許の内容が許可なく使用されることになるという「事実を認識していない」場合には、特許の侵害について通知しなければならない。
  • [153] 同判決、第74節。
  • [154] 同判決、第74節及び第85節。
  • [155] 同判決、第89節。
  • [156] 同判決、第85節。
  • [157] 同判決、第87節。
  • [158] 同判決、第86 節以下。
  • [159] 同判決、第91節以下。
  • [160] 同判決、第92節。
  • [161] 同判決、第93節以下。
  • [162] 同判決、第94節。
  • [163] 同判決、第83節。
  • [164] 同判決、第95節。
  • [165] 同判決、第96節。
  • [166] 同判決、第98節。
  • [167] 同判決、第97節。

Updated 16 6月 2021

Conversant v Daimler, District Court (Landgericht) of Munich I

LG Munich
30 10月 2020 - Case No. 21 O 11384/19

A. Facts

The claimant, Conversant, holds patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of several wireless telecommunications standards (standard essential patents, or SEPs). Conversant has made a commitment towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to make patents essential to a standard accessible to users on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.

The defendant, Daimler, is a global car company with headquarters in Germany. Daimler manufactures and sells vehicles with connectivity features complying with the LTE standard developed by ETSI.

In October 2018, Conversant joined the Avanci licensing platform, which offers a patent licensing program tailored to connected cars. On 18 December 2018, Conversant made an offer for a bilateral worldwide licence to Daimler and provided information about its SEP portfolio including claim charts concerning several individual patents to the latter.

On 27 February 2019, following a respective reminder sent by Conversant, Daimler replied that it was willing to sign a FRAND licence, highlighted, however, that in the automotive sector it is common that intellectual property rights (IPRs) are licensed to suppliers. Daimler also requested information about existing licensees to Conversant's portfolio as well as an explanation which patents read on which components and why the terms offered were FRAND. Subsequently, Daimler started negotiations for a pool licence with Avanci.

On 5 July 2019, Conversant sent an e-mail to Daimler suggesting a meeting in person on 15 July 2019, since it had been informed by Avanci that the negotiations with Daimler had not been successful. Conversant also pointed out that the car makers participating in the Avanci-programme are licensed under its SEP portfolio and explained the royalty calculation underlying its own bilateral offer -inter alia- by reference to court cases (especially Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK High Court of Justice, judgment dated 5 April 2017). Conversant also intended to provide a full list of patents included in its portfolio to Daimler, the respective document was, however, not attached by mistake to the e-mail sent to Daimler.

On 29 July 2019, Daimler responded and referred to the ongoing negotiations with Avanci. It repeated the view that licensing at supplier level was more efficient and countered that a meeting in person should take place at a later point in time, since Conversant had not shared all necessary information yet.

On 13 August 2019, Conversant filed an infringement action against Daimler before the District Court of Munich I (Court), which did not include a claim for injunctive relief. On 24 August 2019, Conversant informed Daimler about the case filed in Munich and noted that it assumed that Daimler had no actual interest in obtaining a FRAND licence. Conversant also highlighted that for the calculation of royalties the value generated at end-device level should be taken into account.

On 18 September 2019, Daimler reiterated its willingness to obtain a licence and pointed out for the first time that Conversant's e-mail dated 5 July 2019 had not contained the full list of portfolio patents referred to by Conversant. This list was shared with Daimler on 20 September 2019. At the same time, Conversant suggested a meeting in person in the beginning of October 2019. On 8 October 2019, Daimler responded that a meeting could take place only in the end of October, since information needed was still missing.

On 4 December 2019, the parties met in person in Daimler's headquarters. On 15 January 2020, Conversant sent the presentation held in this meeting to Daimler and pointed out that it was willing to establish a licensing programme for Daimler's tier-1 suppliers and that it was prepared to have a meeting with Daimler and all supplier to that end. Conversant had also offered to take recourse to a neutral third party, e.g. in arbitration proceedings, for the determination of the licensing value. On 24 January 2020, Daimler explained that it had already discussed with its suppliers and was willing to organise a meeting.

On 29 January 2020, Conversant additionally raised claims for injunctive relief and the recall and destruction of infringing products against Daimler in the pending proceedings in Munich.

In February and March 2020, the parties discussed about a meeting with Daimler's tier-1 suppliers. Daimler did, however, not organise a meeting with the participation of all suppliers.

On 8 April 2020, Daimler made a counteroffer to Conversant. The counteroffer was based on the value of the Telematic Control Unit (TCU), which is the component enabling LTE-connectivity in cars.

On 30 June 2020, Conversant made a further offer to Daimler that was not accepted. On 10 August 2020, Daimler provided information to Conversant about past vehicle sales and placed security for past uses.

With the present judgment [168] , the Court found in favour of Conversant and – among other things – granted an injunction against Daimler.

B. Court's reasoning

The Court found that the patent in suit is essential to the LTE standard and infringed [169] . Consequently, the claims asserted by Conversant were given. The claims for injunctive relief as well as the recall and destruction of infringing products were also to be granted. By initiating infringement proceedings against Daimler, Conversant neither abused a dominant market position in terms of Article 102 TFEU (competition law defence, cf. item 1), nor violated its contractual obligations under ETSI's IPR Policy (contract law defence, cf. item 2.) [170] .

1. Competition law defence
Dominant market position

The Court held that Conversant had a dominant market position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU [171] .

The exclusivity rights arising from a patent do not establish a dominant market position by themselves. [172] A market dominant position is established, when the patent is technically essential for complying with a standard developed by a standardisation body (or a de facto standard) and technical alternatives are not available for products brought on a (downstream) market [173] . In the Court's eyes, this applied to the patent in suit. [174]

Exceptional circumstances that could exclude Conversant's market dominant position here were not present. According to the Court, the sole fact that Conversant had made a FRAND commitment towards ETSI establishing an obligation to grant FRAND licences did not per se exclude market dominance; decisive is, moreover, whether the SEP holder actually meets this obligation. [175] Furthermore, the additional option to get a license from the patent in suit from Avanci did not limit Conversant's market dominant position. [176]

No abuse of market dominance

The Court found, however, that Conversant had not abused its dominance by filing an action for injunctive relief as well as the recall and destruction of infringing products against Daimler.

In cases, in which the implementer already uses protected standardised technology, the assessment of the SEP holder's behaviour requires a comprehensive analysis, in which the constitutionally guaranteed strong protection of IPRs, on the one hand, and the interest of users to access the standard, on the other hand, must be balanced against one another. [177] In this context, not only private interests, but also the public interest must be taken into account. [178] The Court highlighted that the public interest is not to be seen as just the 'sole sum of private interests in using standardised technology', but equally includes the substantial interest of the public to protect the integrity of IPRs and secure effective enforcement. [179]

Considering the 'particular nature' of SEPs especially in the telecommunications field, the Court held -in line with the Huawei v ZTE judgment (Huawei judgment) of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) [180] - that it is justified to impose certain conduct obligations on SEP holders. Reason for this is, basically, that -unlike 'regular' patents- SEPs are established in the market through their inclusion in the standard, without further action by the patent holder. [181] Consequently, the need to secure a competitive advantage for the inventor of a patented technology in the market by granting exclusivity rights for a certain period of time is less compelling in relation to SEPs compared to non-standard-essential patents. [182]

Having said that, the Court made, however, clear that the conduct duties imposed on the SEP holder by the Huawei judgement exist only towards an implementer, who 'seriously and not only in words' wants to sign a licence. [183] Accordingly, a defence based on an alleged abuse of market dominance can be successful, only when the implementer that wants to use, or already uses the patent without authorisation is willing to obtain a FRAND licence and refrain from delaying tactics throughout the licensing negotiations with the SEP holder. [184] The Court noted that the key notion underlying the Huawei judgment that parties are best situated to determine FRAND in fair, balanced and swift negotiations relies on a constructive involvement of both parties which is driven by the actual 'sincere motivation' to reach an agreement. [185]

Notification of infringement

Looking at the parties' behaviour, the Court held that Conversant fulfilled the duty to notify Daimler about the infringement of its SEPs by sending the letter dated 18 December 2018, which contained sufficient information about its portfolio, including claim charts covering several patents. [186] Whether Conversant had sufficiently explained the royalty calculation underlying the licensing offer that was also attached to this letter, was not relevant, since, at this stage, Conversant had not even been obliged to make an offer to Daimler. [187]


On the other hand, the Court found that Daimler had not been willing to take a licence from Conversant: On the contrary, the Court identified a 'particularly clear case of missing willingness'. [188]

In terms of content, the implementer must 'clearly' and 'unambiguously' declare willingness to conclude a licence agreement with the SEP holder on 'whatever terms are in fact FRAND' and, subsequently, engage in negotiations in a 'target-oriented' and 'constructive' manner. [189] By contrast, it is not sufficient, in response to the (first) notification of infringement, to just demonstrate willingness to consider signing a licensing agreement or to enter into negotiations about whether and under which conditions taking a licence comes into question. [189]

The Court explained that the assessment of willingness requires a comprehensive analysis of all facts until the end of the oral hearings in the infringement proceedings. [190] Establishing whether willingness is given cannot be a question answered by a 'formalistic snapshot' of the implementer's conduct; what is more, the implementer cannot remain inactive until -in its view- the SEP holder has met its obligations first. [190]

In addition, the Court highlighted that timing in negotiations is a factor, which must be considered in the assessment of willingness as well. [191] Otherwise, implementers would lack motivation to seriously engage in negotiations in a timely manner. [192] Rigid deadlines cannot be set, a case-by-case assessment is needed. [193] An implementer, who has been notified about the infringement, is, however, obliged to legitimize the -unlawful- use of the patent(s) as soon as possible by signing a FRAND-licence with the SEP holder. [193]

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that whether and at which time the implementer made a counteroffer to the SEP holder can also be an 'important indicator' of (un-)willingness. [194] A counteroffer made after the initiation of infringement proceedings will, as a rule, not be acceptable. [195] According to the Court, implementers should not be allowed to engage in negotiations only 'for appearance's shake' and then pull the 'emergency brake' against a potential conviction in infringement proceedings by making a counteroffer. [192] Exceptionally, a counteroffer made during trial could be considered in the assessment of willingness in cases, in which the implementer was willing from the start of the negotiations and always engaged constructively in the discussions with the patent holder. [196]

In line with the above, the Court pointed out that, in general terms, delaying tactics initially applied by an implementer cannot be 'undone' at a later point in time without more ado. [197] Nevertheless, the belated declaration of willingness does not 'automatically' prevent an implementer from raising a 'FRAND-defence' in infringement proceeding: Whether this will be the case or not, shall be decided on a case-by-case basis on grounds of the overall circumstances of the negotiation history. [198]

Against this backdrop and under consideration of Daimler's overall behaviour, the Court reached the conclusion that -although acting in a FRAND-compliant manner would have actually been possible and reasonable [199] - Daimler had chosen to apply delaying tactics [200] .

The Court found that by directing Conversant to its suppliers, Daimler had not expressed willingness to take a licence on 'whatever terms are in fact FRAND', but rather made clear that it was not prepared to take a licence from Conversant itself. [201] Indemnification clauses regarding third-party IPRs potentially agreed between Daimler and its suppliers played insofar no role, as Daimler infringed Conversant's patents independently and must, therefore, be held accountable for that. [201]

A further indication of Daimler's unwillingness was the fact that it took Daimler more than two months to inform Conversant that it had not received a list of portfolio patents that was unintentionally not attached to the e-mail sent by Conversant on 5 July 2020. [202] The Court equally criticized the fact that Daimler had at no point in time posed questions to Conversant on the claim charts provided by the later, but raised concerns against the quality of the patents only in the pending infringement trial. [203]

The Court saw an additional 'substantial' indication of unwillingness in Daimler's response dated 27 July 2020, in which the latter had expressly limited its willingness to sign a licence to products, which were either not licenced yet or purchased by suppliers unwilling to take a licence from Conversant themselves. [204] The Court particularly objected Daimler's choice to define the 'unwillingness' of its suppliers as a condition for signing an own licence with Conversant. [205]

The fact that Daimler had not responded to the proposal to use alternative dispute resolution methods and particularly arbitration for the determination of FRAND-royalties, which Conversant had made at the parties' meeting on 4 December 2019, was also considered as a sign of unwillingness on the side of Daimler. [206]

An additional 'clear' indication of unwillingness and delaying tactics was -according to the Court- the fact that, following the discussion of 4 December 2019, Daimler did not organise a meeting with all tier-1 suppliers, in order to discuss a potential direct licensing option with Conversant, despite having implied that this option had already been discussed with its suppliers. [207]


Subsequently, the Court noted that Daimler's counteroffer dated 8 April 2020 could not remedy the missing willingness which Daimler had displayed until then. [208] Moreover, it rather served as an 'alibi'. [199]

In the eyes of the Court, the counteroffer was belated, since it was made more than 1 year and 4 months after Conversant's offer. [208] What is more, Daimler made the counteroffer during the pendency of the infringement proceedings, which was not acceptable, given that until that point it had been clearly unwilling to take a licence. [209] The Court also explained that Daimler could not excuse the delay by claiming that Conversant had not provided necessary information, since the counteroffer was based on generally known and available data without an underlying detailed analysis; accordingly, it could have been made earlier, that is shortly after receipt of Conversant's initial offer. [210]

Besides that, the Court found that Daimler's counteroffer was, in terms of content, 'evidently not FRAND'. [211] Based on a summary analysis, the licensing fees offered by Daimler were considered to be evidently too low. [212]

The Court noted that FRAND is a range and that there are several methods for calculating FRAND royalties. [212] The Court relied on the so-called 'top-down'-approach (which both Conversant and Daimler had used). [213] Looking at Daimler's 'top-down'-calculation, the Court held that taking the number of all patents declared as standard-essential towards ETSI as the basis for determining Conversant's share of LTE-related SEPs was not in line with FRAND-principles. [214] Considering that not all declared patents are actually standard-essential (a phenomenon described as 'over-declaration'), the use of the total number of declared patents benefits Daimler: Conversant's share of SEPs would per se be higher, if the (lower) number of actually standard-essential LTE patents would be used as basis for the calculation. [214]

In addition, the Court pointed out that the average purchase price of the TCU is no adequate royalty base under FRAND principles. [215] The value of a SEP is reflected by a royalty, which is adequately in proportion to the value of the service provided. [216] According to the Court, in the present case, economic value is created by the offering of LTE-enabled functionalities in Daimler's cars and the use of such functionalities by Daimler's customers. [216] As a consequence, relevant is the value, which Daimler's customers attach to the LTE-based features in a car. [216] The purchase price of TCUs paid by Daimler to its suppliers does not mirror this value. [216]

FRAND defence raised by suppliers / licensing level

The Court further explained that Daimler could not invoke the (alleged) willingness of its suppliers to take a licence from Conversant for establishing a FRAND defence. [217]

If an implementer, along with its own declaration of willingness, expresses the wish that licensing takes place at supplier level, it is obliged to comprehensively disclose in writing, which standard-compliant components are integrated in its products and which suppliers provide such components. [218] If this information and disclosure duty is not met, as it was the case here, a request for licensing at supplier level contradicts the implementer's declaration that it is willing to sign an own licence with the SEP holder, and is, therefore, a sign of bad faith (Sec. 242 German Civil Code). [219] In this context, the Court made clear that the implementer is obliged to still pursue bilateral negotiations with the SEP holder in a timely and target-oriented manner, even if -after having provided the aforementioned information to the latter- it is in parallel actively engaged towards facilitating the establishment of a licensing regime at supplier level. [220] In the bilateral negotiations with the SEP holder, the implementer could, however, insist that a clause excluding double payments for components already licensed to suppliers is included in the agreement. [220]

In line with the above, the Court confirmed that by seeking to license Daimler, Conversant did not act in an abusive or discriminatory way. [221]

In the view of the Court, the fundamental question whether the so-called 'license-to-all' or 'access-to-all' approach should be followed with respect to SEP licensing in a supply chain, did not need to be answered here. [222] In legal disputes between a SEP holder and an end-device manufacturer it is sufficient from a competition law angle that the objectives pursued by the SEP holder in the proceedings do not exclude suppliers from the market; this is true, when suppliers are granted access to the standardised technology through 'have-made' rights established by the licence signed by the end-device manufacturer, as Conversant had offered. [222] Whether suppliers have individual claims for being granted a licence is a distinct question, that could be potentially raised in separate proceedings between the SEP holder and the supplier. [223]

The Court added that the SEP holder is free to decide against which infringer within a supply chain court proceedings will be initiated. [224] The respective right of choice is derived from the constitutionally guaranteed protection of property as well as the very nature of patents as exclusionary rights. [225]

According to the Court, the common practice in the automotive field that components are sold to car manufacturers free of third-party rights does not render Conversant's pursuit to license Daimler abusive in antitrust terms. [226] Respective agreements between end-device manufacturers and suppliers have only bilateral (contractual) effects and cannot impair the legal position of third parties. [226] In particular, they cannot limit the SEP holder's right to choose the level of the value chain for the assertion of its patents. [227] The Court noted that the need to abandon existing practices in the automotive sector is of no importance from an antitrust angle, given that the integration of additional technologies serves Daimler's economic interest to access new markets and customer groups. [227]

In this context, the Court also explained that the SEP holder is not obliged to perform duties under the Huawei judgment towards suppliers, as far as infringement proceedings are initiated only towards the end-device manufacturer. [228] Accordingly, a supplier joining such proceedings cannot invoke that the SEP holder abused its market dominance e.g. by omitting a separate notification of infringement addressed to the supplier. [229] The Court denied such comprehensive notification duty of SEP holders, since in multi-level supply chains it is neither feasible nor reasonable to identify all suppliers involved. [230]

In the Court's view, the question whether the SEP holder has abused its market dominance by denying a direct licence to a supplier is subject to general competition law principles. [231] In the present case, the Court did not see sufficient grounds for such abuse. [231] It was not convinced that -absent an own bilateral licence- suppliers are left without rights or face legal uncertainty. [232] The fact that an individual bilateral licence would give suppliers broader freedom to operate than 'have-made' rights might serve their commercial interests, is, however, not of relevance with respect to proceedings between SEP holders and end-device manufacturers, as long as adequate access to the standard is provided to suppliers through 'have-made' rights. [233] Insofar, the Court noted that co-operation within a supply chain on basis of 'have-made' rights is wide-spread and common in practice and also supported by EU law (Commission notice of 18 December 1978 concerning its assessment of certain subcontracting agreements in relation to Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty, OJ C 1, 3 January 1979). [233]

Finally, the Court dismissed the argument, that Conversant had allegedly colluded with other members of the Avanci platform to specifically discriminate implementers by excluding access to the relevant standards. [234] The Court saw no indication that this was the case here, but rather highlighted the pro-competitive effects which patent pools are generally recognised to have, not least by EU law (para. 245 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 101 TFEU to technology transfer agreements; 2014/C 89/03). [234]

2. Contract law defence

The Court further found that Daimler could not defend itself against the claim for injunctive relief by invoking a contractual claim against Conversant for being granted a FRAND licence, since such claim did not exist. [235] Daimler had argued that Conversant's FRAND commitment towards ETSI prevented the latter from asserting claims for injunctive relief before court.

The Court found that the ETSI FRAND undertaking does not establish duties or rights different than those established by European competition law (especially Art. 102 TFEU), which Conversant had met in the present case. [236] In legal terms, the ETSI FRAND undertaking is a contract for the benefit of a third party under French law ('stipulation pour l'autrui'), containing a binding promise of the SEP holder to grant a FRAND licence at a later point in time. [237] The content and the extent of the corresponding obligation to negotiate a licence is, however, to be interpreted in line with the Huawei judgment, which has defined a standard of conduct based on Art. 102 TFEU. [237] The fact that the ETSI FRAND commitment materialises the requirement to provide access to the standard stipulated by Art. 101 TFEU speaks also in favour of applying a uniform standard of conduct. [237] In the eyes of the Court, French law cannot establish further going conduct duties, since it must be interpreted within the spirit of EU law. [237]

C. Other important issues

Finally, the Court took the view that there are no grounds for a limitation of Conversant's claim for injunctive relief due to proportionality considerations. [238] Under German law, proportionality is a general principle of constitutional rank to be considered also with respect to injunctive relief, if a respective objection is raised by the defendant in trial. [238] The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) has also recognised that an injunction might not be immediately enforceable in exceptional cases, in which the implementer would suffer hardships not justified by the patent holder's exclusionary right in violation of the principle of good faith ('Wärmetauscher'ruling dated 10 May 2016, Case No. X ZR 114/13). [238] In the eyes of the Court, Daimler had, however, not pleaded any relevant facts in the present proceedings. [238]

  • [168] Conversant v Daimler, District Court of Munich I, 30 October 2020, Case-No. 21 O 11384/19 (cited by juris).
  • [169] Ibid, paras.122-265.
  • [170] Ibid, para. 285.
  • [171] Ibid, para.286.
  • [172] Ibid, para.288.
  • [173] Ibid, paras.287 et seqq.
  • [174] Ibid, paras.291 et seqq.
  • [175] Ibid, para.295.
  • [176] Ibid, para.296.
  • [177]  Ibid, para. 299.
  • [178] Ibid, para. 300.
  • [179] Ibid, para.300.
  • [180] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [181] Conversant v Daimler, District Court of Munich I, 30 October 2020, Case-No. 21 O 11384/19, para.301.
  • [182] Ibid, para.301.
  • [183] Ibid, para.307.
  • [184] Ibid, para.308.
  • [185] Ibid, paras.302 and 308.
  • [186] Ibid, paras. 323 et seqq.
  • [187] Ibid, para.324. The Court expressed, nevertheless, doubts that the sole reference to the calculation method used by the UK High Court in Unwired Planet v Huawei would prove sufficient for the explanation of the rates offered by Conversant to Daimler.
  • [188] Ibid, para. 309.
  • [189] Ibid, para. 310.
  • [190] Ibid, para. 316.
  • [191]  Ibid, para. 311.
  • [192] Ibid, para. 312.
  • [193] Ibid, para. 320.
  • [194] Ibid, para. 311.
  • [195] Ibid, paras. 312 and 316.
  • [196] Ibid, para. 315.
  • [197] Ibid, paras.317 et seqq.
  • [198] Ibid, para. 321.
  • [199] Ibid, para.357.
  • [200] Ibid, paras.322 and 358.
  • [201] Ibid, para.328.
  • [202] Ibid, paras.331 and 336.
  • [203] Ibid, para.332.
  • [204] Ibid, paras.334 and 336.
  • [205] Ibid, para.335.
  • [206] Ibid, para.337.
  • [207] Ibid, para.338.
  • [208] Ibid, para.339.
  • [209] Ibid, para.340.
  • [210] Ibid, paras.355 et seq.
  • [211] Ibid, paras.341 and 354.
  • [212] Ibid, para.341.
  • [213] Ibid, paras.341 and 348.
  • [214] Ibid, para.352.
  • [215] Ibid, para.353.
  • [216] Ibid, para.353
  • [217] Ibid, para.360.
  • [218] Ibid, para.362.
  • [219] Ibid, paras.362 and 364.
  • [220] Ibid, para.363.
  • [221] Ibid, para.365.
  • [222] Ibid, para.366.
  • [223] Ibid, para.367.
  • [224] Ibid, paras.368 and 382.
  • [225] Ibid, para.368.
  • [226] Ibid, para.370.
  • [227] Ibid, para.372.
  • [228] Ibid, paras.373 and 376-378.
  • [229] Ibid, para.373.
  • [230] Ibid, paras.373 and382.
  • [231] Ibid, paras.373 and 379.
  • [232] Ibid, para.374.
  • [233] Ibid, para.375.
  • [234] Ibid, para.380.
  • [235] Ibid, para.384.
  • [236] Ibid, paras.384 et seqq.
  • [237] Ibid, para.385.
  • [238] Ibid, para.269.

Updated 6 5月 2021

Sisvel v Haier

Federal Court of Justice - BGH
24 11月 2020 - Case No. KZR 35/17

A. Facts

The claimant, Sisvel, holds patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of several wireless telecommunications standards (standard essential patents, or SEPs). Sisvel has made a commitment towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to make SEPs accessible to users on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.

The defendants are two European subsidiaries of the Haier group (Haier), which has its headquarters in China. The Haier group produces and markets -among other things- mobile phones and tablets complying with various standards, including the GPRS and UMTS standards developed by ETSI.

On 20 December 2012, Sisvel informed the parent company of the Haier group (Haier China) that it offers licences for its SEPs and shared a list of approx. 235 patents included in its portfolio. In August and November 2013, Sisvel sent further letters with information about its licensing program to Haier China.

Haier China replied to Sisvel only in December 2013. It expressed 'hope' to have 'a formal negotiation' with Sisvel and asked for information regarding potential discounts mentioned in previous communi­cations.

In August 2014, Sisvel made an offer for a global portfolio licence to Haier, which was rejected.

Shortly after that, Sisvel filed infringement actions against Haier before the District Court of Duesseldorf (District Court). One of the actions was based on a SEP reading on the UMTS standard (patent in suit). The other action involved a patent reading on the GPRS standard. Haier filed nullity actions against both patents asserted before the German Federal Patent Court.

During the infringement proceedings, Haier made certain counteroffers to Sisvel. These offers had a limited scope, since they covered only the patents (patent families) asserted against Haier in court.

On 3 November 2015, the District Court decided in favour of Sisvel in both cases [239] . It granted injunctions against Haier and ordered the recall and destruction of infringing products. The District Court further recognised Haier's liability for damages on the merits and ordered Haier to render full and detailed account of the sales of infringing products to Sisvel. Haier appealed both decisions.

In the subsequent proceedings before the Higher District Court of Duesseldorf (Appeal Court), Haier argued –among other things– that the District Court had not adequately taken into account the conduct requirements imposed on SEP holders by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the Huawei v ZTE ruling [240] (Huawei judgment) rendered after Sisvel had filed the infringement actions.

On 16 January 2016, during the course of the proceedings before the Appeal Court, Haier declared that it was willing to take a FRAND licence from Sisvel, however, only in case that the German courts would finally confirm the validity and infringement of the patent in suit. Haier also requested claim charts with respect to all patents included in Sisvel's portfolio.

In December 2016, Sisvel made a further licensing offer to Haier, which was also rejected.

On 20 January 2017, that is a few weeks prior to the end of the oral arguments in the appeal proceedings, Haier made a further counteroffer to Sisvel. The licence offered would cover only the two subsidiaries of the Haier group sued in Germany. An agreement was not reached.

By two judgments dated 30 March 2017, the Appeal Court partially granted Haier's appeals in both parallel proceedings [241] . The claims for injunctive relief as well as the recall and destruction of infringing products were dismissed on the grounds that Sisvel had not complied with its obligations under the Huawei judgment, especially by failing to make a FRAND licensing offer to Haier.

Sisvel appealed the decisions of the Appeal Court.

In April 2020, the Federal Court of Justice (FCJ or Court) finally dismissed the invalidity action filed by Haier against the patent in suitFederal Court of Justice, judgment dated 28 April 2020, Case No. X ZR 35/18..

On 5 May 2020, FCJ rendered a judgment in the parallel proceedings pending between the parties concerning the patent reading on the GPRS standard [243] . The Court decided in favour of Sisvel and reversed the judgment of the Appeal Court. With the present judgmentSisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17 (cited by )., the Court reversed the decision of the Appeal Court also in the case involving the patent in suit.

B. Court's reasoning

The Court found that the patent in suit was essential to the UMTS standard and infringedIbid, paras. 10-43..

Contrary to the view previously taken by the Appeal Court, FCJ found that by initiating infringement proceedings against Haier, Sisvel had not abused a dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) [246] .

Dominant market position

The Court held that Sisvel had a dominant market position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEUIbid, paras. 48 et seqq..

FCJ explained that a dominant market position is given, when a patent is technically essential for comply­ing with a standard developed by a standardisation body (or a de facto standard) and technical alterna­tives to the standard are not available for products brought on a downstream marketIbid, para. 49.. Even when alternative (technical) options exist, market domi­nance can arise as long as products not using the teaching of the patent cannot compete in a (downstream) market.Ibid, para. 49. According to the FCJ, this applied with respect to the patent in suit.

Abuse of market dominance

The Court found, however, that Sisvel had not abused its dominant market position by filing infringement actions against HaierIbid, para. 52.. An abuse of market dominance can occur, when the SEP holder

  • refuses to grant a FRAND licence to an implementer willing to take such licence and brings a court action against the latter, asserting claims for injunctive relief (and/or the recall and destruction of infringing products), or
  • has not made 'sufficient efforts' in line with the 'particular responsibility' attached to its dominant position to facilitate the signing of a licence agreement with an implementer, who is, basically, willing to take a licenceIbid, para. 53..

In the eyes of the Court, in both above scenarios, the filing of an action against a 'willing' implementer amounts to an abuse, only because the latter has a claim to be contractually allowed by the SEP holder to use the teachings of the patent under FRAND conditionsIbid, para. 54.. On the other hand, an abuse is regularly not per se established by an offer made by the patent holder at the beginning of negotiations, even when the terms offered would unreasonably impede or discriminate the implementer, if contractually agreed.Ibid, para. 54. An abuse would be given, if the SEP holder insisted on such conditions also at the end of licensing negotiations with the imple­menter.Ibid, para. 54.

Notification of infringement

The Court explained that the 'particular responsibility' of a market dominant patent holder materializes in an obligation to notify the implementer about the infringement of the patent in suit prior to filing an action, in case that the implementer is (potentially) not aware that by complying with the standard said patent is usedIbid, para. 55..

In the present case, the Court found that by the letter dated 20 December 2012 and the following correspondence Sisvel had given proper notification of infringement to HaierIbid, para. 84..


On the other hand, the Court found that Haier did not act as a licensee willing to obtain a FRAND licence from SisvelIbid, paras. 86 et seqq.. In this respect, FCJ disagreed with the Appeal Court, which had taken the opposite view.

In the Court's eyes, the implementer must 'clearly' and 'unambiguously' declare willingness to conclude a licence agreement with the SEP holder on FRAND terms and, subsequently, engage in negotiations in a 'target-oriented' manner [255] . By contrast, it is not sufficient, in response to a notification of infringement, to just demonstrate willingness to consider signing a licensing agreement or to enter into negotiations about whether and under which conditions taking a licence comes into question [255] .

The Court reasoned that the willingness of the implementer to legitimise the unauthorized use of the patent for the future by creating a respective contractual base is a prerequisite for placing the burden on the SEP holder to negotiate a FRAND licence with the implementer. [256] What is more, willingness (on both sides) is essential, because an adequate solution balancing the opposing interests of the parties results, as a rule, from an interest-based negotiation. [257] The fact that a party fails to contribute in negotiations towards a FRAND agreement will regularly be considered to its detriment. [258] An implementer, who has not shown interest in a FRAND-licence over a longer period after receipt of an infringement notification will have to undertake 'additional efforts' to make sure, that despite the delay caused a licence can be signed as soon as possible. [259]

The Court highlighted particularly that implementers should not engage in 'patent hold-out' by exploiting the 'structural disadvantage', which SEP holders face due to the limitation of their right to assert patents in court. [260] Otherwise, competition could be distorted, because the infringer would gain unfair advantages over implementers that have taken a licence in a timely manner. [260]

FCJ took the view that the above interpretation of the requirements related to the implementers' obligation to demonstrate willingness to obtain a FRAND-licence is in line with the Huawei judgment; a new referral of the respective questions to the CJEU, as requested by Haier, was not needed.Ibid, para. 63. The Huawei judgment created a 'safe harbour' against antitrust liability in the sense that compliance with the obligations established will regularly suffice to exclude an abuse of market dominance.Ibid, para. 65. Under special circumstances, however, stricter or less strict conduct duties of the parties could be justified.Ibid, para. 65.

The Court observed that the Huawei judgment supports the notion that the implementer should remain willing to obtain a licence throughout the course of negotiations.Ibid, para. 65. The 'continuous' willingness is an 'indispensable condition' for successful negotiations or, in case negotiations fail, for a finding of abuse of market dominance on the side of the SEP holder.Ibid, para. 68. The refusal of SEP holder to grant a FRAND licence would, indeed, have no relevance in antitrust terms, when the implementer is not objectively willing and able to obtain such licence. [264]

Accordingly, FCJ explained that willingness shall (still) be in place, also when the SEP holder makes a licensing offer.Ibid, para. 69. In this regard, the Court disagreed with the District Court of Duesseldorf, which had expressed the opposite view in the recent referral of certain FRAND-related questions to the CJEU in the matter Nokia v Daimler.Ibid, para. 69. See Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Duesseldorf, order dated 26 November 2020, Case No. 4c O 17/19. According to FCJ, the offer of the SEP holder is just the 'starting point' of negotiations; since FRAND is a range, it is the goal of negotiations to reach a fair and reasonable result considering the interests of both sides.Ibid, paras. 70 and 71. The implementer has, therefore, a duty to examine the FRAND-conformity of the terms of the SEP holder's offer.Ibid, para. 71. If the offer is 'obviously' not FRAND, it will be sufficient that the implementer explains the reasons why this is the case.Ibid, para. 71.

In this context, the Court made clear that the implementer's duty to examine SEP-holder's licensing offer exists, irrespective of whether the offer is, in terms of content, FRAND-compliant in every respect.Ibid, para. 72. If one would require from the SEP holder to make a 'perfect' FRAND offer right away, licensing negotiations would be obsolete.Ibid, para. 73. It is also not possible to assess the FRAND-conformity of the offer in the abstract, without reference to the aspects which each side considers relevant.Ibid, para. 74. The Court reiterated that an non-FRAND licensing offer does not per se amount to an abuse of market dominance.Ibid, para. 76.

Having said that, FCJ noted that for the assessment of the willingness of the implementer its entire conduct (including its reaction to the SEP holder's licensing offer) must be taken into account.Ibid, para. 77. Consequently, willingness can change in the course of time: a court action filed by the SEP holder could become abusive at a later point in time, if the implementer adequately raises a request for a FRAND-licence.Ibid, paras. 79 et seqq. However, the longer the implementer waits with asserting such request, the higher the threshold for considering it as a willing licensee will be. [275] The Court again noted that the above inter­pretation is in line with the Huawei judgment, so that no additional referral to the CJEU is needed, as Haier had requested.Ibid, para. 77.

Against this background, the Court observed that the first response of Haier China to Sisvel's notification almost one year after receipt of the infringement notification was belated [276] . An implementer taking several months to respond to a notification of infringement, typically, sends a signal that there is no interest in taking a licence [276] . Besides that, FCJ found that Haier's response in December 2013, in which only the 'hope' to have a 'formal negotiation' was expressed, was not a sufficient declaration of willing­ness, in terms of content [277] . Since it had reacted belatedly to the notification of infringement, Haier should have undertaken 'additional efforts' to demonstrate willingness, which had been, however, not the case. [278]

Similarly, Haier's letter dated 16 January 2016 did not contain a sufficient declaration of willingness, since Haier had made the signing of a licence subject to the prior confirmation of the validity and infringement of the patent in suit by German courts [279] . Although the implementer is, in principle, allowed to preserve the right to contest the validity of a licensed patent after conclusion of an agreement, the Court held that a declaration of willingness cannot be placed under a respective conditionIbid, para. 95.. Besides that, requesting the production of claim charts for all patents of Sisvel's portfolio almost three years after the receipt of the notification of infringement was, according to the Court, an indication that Haier was only interested in delaying the negotiations until the expiration of the patent in suit [281] .

Furthermore, FCJ found that Haier's willingness to enter into a FRAND licence could also not be extracted from the counteroffers made during the infringement proceedings.Ibid, paras. 102 et seqq. The fact that these counteroffers were, in terms of scope, limited only to the patents asserted by Sisvel in court indicated that Haier had not seriously addressed Sisvel's request for a worldwide portfolio licence. [283] Given that it had more than sufficient time to examine Sisvel's portfolio, one could expect from Haier to provide substantive grounds for such 'selective licensing'. [283]

What is more, the Court held that the counteroffer dated 20 January 2017, which Haier had made shortly before the end of the appeal proceedings, was no sufficient demonstration of willingness either.Ibid, paras. 108 et seqq. The Court focused particularly on the fact that the licence would cover only the two affiliates of the Haier group sued in Germany.Ibid, para. 116. According to FCJ, Haier had no 'legitimate interest' on such 'selective licensing'; on the contrary, a limited licence would offer no sufficient protection against infringement by other companies of the Haier group and force Sisvel to a cost-intensive assertion of its SEPs 'patent to patent and country-by-country'.Ibid, para. 118.

In addition, the Court also criticised the proposed royalty regime.Ibid, paras. 124 et seqq. Haier based the royalty calculation only on a small portion (four patent families) of the SEPs that should be included in the licence, which, in its eyes, were 'probably' essential.Ibid, para. 124. The Court reasoned that the scope of the licence must be clarified in negotiations, whereas in the ICT-sector, due to the large number of relevant patents, it is common to rely on estimations regarding both essentiality and validity, which, on the one hand, allow to take 'necessary remaining uncertainties' adequately into account and, on the other hand, help to avoid disproportionate high transaction costs.Ibid, para. 125.

Apart from that, the fact that the counteroffer was made only in the 'last minute' of the appeal proceedings allowed the conclusion that Haier was not actually aiming at signing a FRAND licence, but was rather motivated by tactical considerations with respect to the pending proceedings.Ibid, para. 126.

SEP holder's licensing offer

Having found that Haier had not sufficiently demonstrated willingness to obtain a FRAND licence, the Court did not examine the FRAND-conformity of Sisvel's licensing offers to Haier in the present case [291] . According to FCJ, this question is not relevant, when the implementer has not adequately expressed willingness to sign a FRAND licence.Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17, para. 107.

The Court highlighted that -apart from the obligation to notify the implementer about the infringement- duties of the SEP holder (including the duty to make a FRAND licensing offer) arise only if the implementer has demonstrated willingness to obtain a licence on FRAND terms.Ibid, para. 56. The FRAND-undertaking of the patent holder towards the relevant standardisation body does not change the fact that the user of a patent is, in principle, obliged to seek a licence from the right holder.Ibid, para. 56.

C. Other important issues

Patent ambush

The Court dismissed Haier's defence based on the 'patent ambush' argument.Ibid, paras. 127 et seqq. Haier argued that the patent in suit was unenforceable, because the initial patent holder, from whom Sisvel had acquired said patent, had failed to disclose the patent towards ETSI in due course during the development of the UMTS standard.

The Court did not examine whether a 'patent ambush' in the above sense indeed occurred in the present case.Ibid, para. 130. FCJ took the view that an implementer can assert 'patent ambush' only against the patent holder that actually participated in the standard development process; on the contrary, such defence cannot be raised against its successor (here: Sisvel).Ibid, para. 130.

Notwithstanding the above, the Court noted that a 'patent ambush' requires that the decision-making process within the relevant standardisation body was distorted by the withheld information.Ibid, para. 131. Insofar, the implementer must establish at least some indication that the standard would have taken a different form, if the information considering the relevant patent application had been disclosed in time.Ibid, paras. 131 et seq. Haier had, however, failed to do so.Ibid, paras. 131 et seq.


Finally, the Court found that Sisvel's damage claims were given on the merits. Negligence establishing Haier's liability for damages was given: The implementer is, in principle, obliged to make sure that no third party rights are infringed, before starting manufacturing or selling products, which Haier had not done. [298]

What is more, Sisvel's claim for damages was not limited to the amount of a FRAND licensing rate ('licensing analogy'). [299] The SEP holder is entitled to full damages, unless the implementer can assert an own counterclaim, requesting to be placed in the position, in which it would have been, in case that the SEP holder had fulfilled the obligations arising from its dominant market position. [298] An implementer is, however, entitled to such (counter)claim, only when it adequately expressed its willingness to enter into a licence, which had not been the case here.77

  • [239] Sisvel v Haier, District Court of Duesseldorf, judgment dated 3 November 2015, Case No. 4a O 144/14 (UMTS-related patent) and Case No. 4a O 93/14 (GPRS-related patent).
  • [240] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [241] Sisvel v Haier, Higher District Court of Duesseldorf, judgment dated 30 March 2017, Case No. I-15 U 65/15 (UMTS-related patent) and Case No. I-15 U 66/15 (GPRS-related patent).
  • [242] Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 28 April 2020, Case No. X ZR 35/18.
  • [243] Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 5 May 2020, Case No. KZR 36/17.
  • [244] Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17 (cited by ).
  • [245] Ibid, paras. 10-43.
  • [246] Ibid, para. 44.
  • [247] Ibid, paras. 48 et seqq.
  • [248] Ibid, para. 49.
  • [249] Ibid, para. 52.
  • [250] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [251] Ibid, para. 54.
  • [252] Ibid, para. 55.
  • [253] Ibid, para. 84.
  • [254] Ibid, paras. 86 et seqq.
  • [255] Ibid, para. 57.
  • [256] Ibid, para. 58.
  • [257] Ibid, para. 59.
  • [258] Ibid, para. 60.
  • [259] Ibid, para. 62.
  • [260] Ibid, para. 61.
  • [261] Ibid, para. 63.
  • [262] Ibid, para. 65.
  • [263] Ibid, para. 68.
  • [264] Ibid, paras. 66 and 68.
  • [265] Ibid, para. 69.
  • [266] Ibid, para. 69. See Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Duesseldorf, order dated 26 November 2020, Case No. 4c O 17/19.
  • [267] Ibid, paras. 70 and 71.
  • [268] Ibid, para. 71.
  • [269] Ibid, para. 72.
  • [270] Ibid, para. 73.
  • [271] Ibid, para. 74.
  • [272] Ibid, para. 76.
  • [273] Ibid, para. 77.
  • [274] Ibid, paras. 79 et seqq.
  • [275] Ibid, para. 83.
  • [276] Ibid, para. 87.
  • [277] Ibid, paras. 88 et seqq.
  • [278] Ibid, para. 89.
  • [279] Ibid, paras. 93 et seqq.
  • [280] Ibid, para. 95.
  • [281] Ibid, paras. 96-99.
  • [282] Ibid, paras. 102 et seqq.
  • [283] Ibid, para. 102.
  • [284] Ibid, paras. 108 et seqq.
  • [285] Ibid, para. 116.
  • [286] Ibid, para. 118.
  • [287] Ibid, paras. 124 et seqq.
  • [288] Ibid, para. 124.
  • [289] Ibid, para. 125.
  • [290] Ibid, para. 126.
  • [291] The Court had, however, undertaken such analysis in its earlier decision between the same parties dated May 2020. See Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 5 May 2020, Case No. KZR 36/17, especially paras. 76-81 and 101 et seqq.
  • [292] Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17, para. 107.
  • [293] Ibid, para. 56.
  • [294] Ibid, paras. 127 et seqq.
  • [295] Ibid, para. 130.
  • [296] Ibid, para. 131.
  • [297] Ibid, paras. 131 et seq.
  • [298] Ibid, para. 135.
  • [299] Ibid, paras. 134 et seqq.

Updated 17 1月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat)

7 6月 2017 - Case No. HP-2014-000005

A. Facts and Main Judgment

The claimant is a company that grants licenses for patented technologies in the telecommunications industry. The patents at issue relate to telecommunication network coding and procedures. In 2014, the claimant made a declaration under the ETSI IPR Policy that it was willing to grant licenses on FRAND terms. There were five technical trials relating to the validity, infringement and essentiality of these patents and one non-technical trial relating to competition law issues, FRAND issues, injunctive relief and damages for past infringements.Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), available at In its decision on 5 April 2017 (the ‘main judgment’), the Patents Court (Birrs J) held that two patents were valid and that they had been infringed, and that the claimant was in a dominant position, but had not abused this position. The court stated that a final decision about an injunction to restrain patent infringements should be made separately. A few weeks after the main judgment, a license representing the FRAND terms between the two parties was prepared (the ‘settled license’), but had not yet been entered into. [301] Further, the defendant offered to give an undertaking to the court to enter into the license settled by the Patents Court or any other court. [302]

In its subsequent decision on 7 June 2017 (the case at hand), the parties argued whether the court should grant an injunction order given the existence of the settled license. Other minor issues of the case related to damages, declaratory relief, costs and permission to appeal. [303] The court granted an injunction for infringements of patents EP (UK) 2 229 744 and EP (UK) 1 230 818 (the ‘final order’). [304] The injunction order would be discharged if the defendant entered into a FRAND license and it would be stayed pending appeal. The court also declared that the settled license represented the FRAND terms in the given circumstances between the parties and that the defendant had to pay GBP 2.9 million of the claimant’s costs. Permission to appeal was granted to the defendant in respect of three issues and to the claimant in respect of one issue. [304]

B. Court’s Reasoning

1. Injunction

The main issue considered by the court was the interplay between the injunction, the settled license and the undertaking offered by the defendant. Patent EP (UK) 2 229 744 will expire in 2028. The settled license’s expiry date is 31 December 2020, [305] which would put the defendant in a difficult position if it attempts to renegotiate the license while the injunction is still in place. The defendant would even risk being in contempt of court if it continued to sell equipment if there was an argument that the license had come to an end for other reasons (e.g. repudiatory breach of contract). [306] However, the court took the view that it cannot be said that the defendant must be free to sell products if the license has ceased to exist. [305] Similarly, it cannot be said with certainty that the claimant must have an injunction at that date.

Thus, the court considered what the correct form of injunction in respect of a FRAND undertaking should be when a court has settled a license but the defendant has not entered into it (‘FRAND injunction’). [307] The court held that the FRAND injunction should contain a proviso that it will cease to have effect as soon as the defendant enters into the FRAND license. The injunction should also be subject to an express liberty to either party to return to court in the future if the FRAND license ceases to exist or expires while the patent is still valid. [307]

The court also held that despite the court’s discretion as to whether an injunction is granted, an injunction is normally effective, proportionate and dissuasive in IP cases. [308] Although the practical effect of a defendant’s undertaking and an injunction are similar, rights holders usually insist on an injunction. [309] One reason is that it involves a public vindication of the claimant’s rights. [309] As the claimant has been forced to come to court, an offer of undertaking after judgment is usually considered too late. [309] In this case, the defendant had maintained throughout the negotiations and the trial that it was under no obligation to accept a worldwide license. [310] Thus, according to the court, the right thing to do was to grant a FRAND injunction which will be stayed on terms pending appeal.

2. Other Issues

The court held that the issue of damages is closely related to the main issue. [311] If the defendant entered into the settled license, all payments would be covered by the license. If the defendant did not enter into the settled license, an order for damages is required. As a consequence, the court order should be in the same form as the FRAND injunction (stayed pending appeal and ceasing to have effect if the parties enter into the settled license). [311]

The parties also disagreed about the wording of the court declaration regarding the FRAND terms of the settled license. [312] The court dismissed the defendant’s suggestion as too complicated and the claimant’s suggestion as incomprehensive. Instead, the court declaration would be ‘the license annexed to the judgment represents the FRAND terms applicable between the parties in the relevant circumstances’. [313] Further, the court rejected the defendant’s petition to make a declaration that the claimant had not abused its dominant market position. [314] It took the view that the main judgment made a clear finding on this issue in summary paragraph 807(17).

Further, the parties disagreed about the extent of the defendant’s obligation to bear the claimant’s costs. The claimant argued that it should be regarded as the successful party so that the defendant had to pay its costs (GBP 6.4million). [315] The defendant argued the claimant had been clearly wrong regarding the applicable FRAND rate [316] and the appropriate thing would be to make no cost order. The court rejected the idea that there was no overall winner (as argued by the defendant) because the claimant was successful on the issues of the nature of the license and the existence and abuse of market dominance. [317] The ensuing question was whether any deductions were appropriate. [318] The court held that neither party had offered terms that were essentially FRAND. [319] However, the rates offered by the claimant were significantly further away from the end result than the rates offered by the defendant. [319] Thus, the defendant’s costs in relation to the FRAND rate issue were not recoverable by the claimant.

The fifth and final issue was in respect of permission to appeal. The court granted the defendant permission on three grounds: first, the necessity of granting a global license (including the court’s view that there is only one applicable license fee); [320] second, the hard-edged non-discrimination point; [321] and third, the issue of injunctive relief and abuse of market dominance under the CJEU ruling Huawei v. ZTE. [322] Conversely, the claimant was granted permission to appeal on the blended global benchmark issue (using a blended global rate as a benchmark, leading to the question whether another discount for the Chinese market should given). [323]

  • [300] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), available at
  • [301] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 2.
  • [302] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 8.
  • [303] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 1.
  • [304] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 70.
  • [305] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 22.
  • [306] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 19.
  • [307] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 20.
  • [308] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 25.
  • [309] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 26.
  • [310] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 29.
  • [311] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 33.
  • [312] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 34.
  • [313] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 36.
  • [314] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 38.
  • [315] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), paras 39-40.
  • [316] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 41.
  • [317] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 44.
  • [318] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 45.
  • [319] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 56.
  • [320] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 170 et seqq.
  • [321] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 177 and 481 et seqq.
  • [322] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 627 et seqq.
  • [323] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 537 et seqq.

Updated 3 12月 2018

IP Bridge v HTC

LG Mannheim
28 9月 2018 - Case No. 7 O 165/16

A. Facts

The Claimant, IP Bridge, is a non-practising entity holding a European patent (German part) which was declared essential to the wireless telecommunications standard LTE (Standard Essential Patent or SEP) developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [324] . The previous holder of the SEP in question had made an undertaking towards ETSI according to Article 6.1 of ETSI IPR Policy to make the patent accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions [325] .

The Defendant is a German subsidiary of HTC, a company which manufactures and sells electronic devices worldwide, including mobile phones complying with the LTE standard [326] . The Defendant filed an action for invalidity against the Claimant’s SEP in Germany [326] .

In December 2014, the Claimant contacted the Defendant’s parent company (parent company) suggesting that the parties entered into negotiations regarding a licence for Claimant’s patent portfolio which also included the aforementioned SEP [326] . Subsequently, several licensing offers and counter-offers were made by the Claimant and the parent company respectively [326] . On 29 February 2016, the Claimant sent a letter to the parent company explaining how the LTE standard made use of the technology covered by its SEP inter alia under reference to an attached claims chart [327] . In response, the parent company confirmed that it is willing to obtain a licence, among others, by letter dated 7 September 2016 [328] . However, no licensing agreement was concluded.

On 27 September 2016, the Claimant brought an infringement action against the Defendant before the District Court of Mannheim (Court) requesting for a declaratory judgment confirming Defendant’s liability for damages arising from the use of its SEP as well as for information and rendering of accounts [329] .

On 16 February 2018, during the course of the pending proceedings against the Defendant, the Claimant made a further licensing offer to the parent company [330] . On 11 April 2018, after the parent company had signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement, the Claimant presented existing licensing agreements with third parties concerning its relevant patent portfolio (comparable agreements) to the parent company and requested the latter to respond to its last licensing offer of 16 February 2018 within one week (that is until 18 April 2018) [330] . This deadline was extended for almost three weeks until 7 May 2018 [330] .

On 15 May 2018, the Claimant extended its claims in the ongoing proceedings; in addition to its already pending claims, it sought for injunctive relief and also requested the recall and the destruction of products infringing its SEP (claims for injunction) [330] .

With the present judgment the Court ruled that the Defendant is liable for damages arising from the infringement of the SEP in suit [331] . The Court also ordered the Defendant to render accounts and to provide relevant information to the Claimant [331] . On the other hand, the Court dismissed the claim for injunctive relief and the recall and destruction of infringing products as being unenforceable for the time being [332] .

B. Court’s reasoning

The Court held that the products sold by the Defendant in Germany infringe Claimant’s SEP [333] . Thus, the Defendant is obliged to compensate the damages suffered by the Claimant and the previous holder of the patent in suit [331] . Since the Claimant has no knowledge of the details required for the quantification of the damages suffered, the Defendant is obliged to provide information on relevant uses (starting from the publication of the patent grant) and render accounts for such uses (starting from one month after the publication of the patent grant) [331] .

In the Court’s view, the Defendant cannot raise a defence based on a so-called “patent ambush” against these claims [334] . A “patent ambush” requires that the patent holder deliberately – in terms of a willful fraudulent misconduct – misled the participants in the standardisation process and intentionally prevented the adoption of an alternative technology into the standard [335] . Insofar, it needs to be established (by the defendant) that the disclosure of the patent during the standardisation process would have led to an alternative structure of the standard, which would have avoided making use of the teaching of the patent in suit; the mere theoretical possibility of an alternative technical solution does not suffice for supporting the allegation of a “patent ambush” [335] . The Court held that the Defendant failed to establish such fact [334] . Accordingly, the Court left the question regarding the legal consequences of a “patent ambush” open (obligation to licence royalty-free or just an obligation to offer FRAND licences?) [334] .

Furthermore, the Court stressed out that the FRAND undertaking given by the previous holder of the SEP in suit has no impact on both the scope and the enforceability of the above claims [336] .

In the Court’s eyes, the Claimant is bound to the FRAND undertaking made by the previous holder of the SEP in suit towards ETSI [337] . The wording of Article 6.1. ETSI IPR Policy establishes a respective assumption [337] . In any case, the assignee of a SEP abuses its market power, if it is aware of the FRAND-undertaking of its predecessor, but, nevertheless, refuses to fulfil the obligations arising from it [327] . The assignee of an SEP cannot draw benefits from the inclusion of its patent into a standard, without being bound to the FRAND commitment of its predecessor, since the latter enabled the inclusion of the SEP in the standard in the first place [327] . Indeed, antitrust law and particularly Article 101 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) obliges standard development organisations to make the inclusion of patented technology into a standard subject to a FRAND commitment of the patent holder, in order to secure that essential technology will be accessible to users [338] .

Having said that, the Court made clear that SEP holder’s claims for information and rendering of accounts are not limited by the FRAND undertaking [336] . Even if one would assume that such undertaking limits the SEP holder’s claims for damages to the amount of the FRAND royalty (which the Court left undecided), the patent holder would, nevertheless, be entitled, in principle, to information regarding the use of its SEP [336] .

In addition, the Court explained that a FRAND undertaking has also no influence on the enforceability of the claims for damages (on the merits), information and rendering of accounts asserted by the Claimant [336] . In particular, these claims are not subject to the conduct requirements set forth by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the matter Huawei v ZTEHuawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-130/13. (Huawei requirements or framework) with respect to dominant undertakings in terms of Article 102 TFEU [340] .

The opposite is, on the other hand, the case with respect to the claims for injunction asserted by the Claimant. These claims are not enforceable for the time being, since the Claimant failed to fully comply with the Huawei requirements [341] .

Regarding to the SEP in suit, the Court ruled that the Claimant has a dominant market position in terms of Article 102 TFEU: The patent is essential to the LTE standard, which, in turn, cannot be substituted by an alternative standard (from the users’ point of view) [342] .

Looking at the negotiations between the parties involved, the Court did not see any flaws in the parties’ conduct with respect to the first two steps of the framework; the Claimant had effectively notified the Defendant about the infringing use of its SEP and the Defendant (in fact, its parent company) had effectively declared its willingness to obtain a licence covering also the SEP in suit [327] . In this context, the Court pointed out that the SEP holder’s obligation to notify the user of the infringing use of its SEP is also met, when the respective notification is addressed to the parent company of the (alleged) infringer (as is was the case here, especially with the Claimant’s letter to the parent company dated 29 February 2016) [327] .

However, the Court held that the Claimant failed to fulfil its consequent obligation under the Huawei framework, namely to make a FRAND licensing offer to the Defendant (respectively its parent company) [343] .

The Court considered only two offers made by the Claimant to the Defendant’s parent company prior to the extension of its claims in the pending proceedings on 15 May 2018 (since the other offers made were either indisputably not FRAND or were not produced by the Claimant in trial) [328] .

An offer made in February 2016 was found not to be FRAND in terms of content, since it contained a clause, according to which the licensee was obliged to pay the full amount of the royalties agreed, even if only one patent of the licensed portfolio was valid and used by the Defendant [328] .

The Court reached the same conclusion also with respect to the further offer made by the Claimant on 11 April 2018 (that is short before the Claimant extended its claims in the proceedings, adding the claims for injunction) [344] . The Court held that this offer did not comply with the Huawei requirements, since the Defendant was not given sufficient time to assess the offer and eventually make a counter-offer to the Claimant, before the latter asserted the claims for injunction against him in the proceedings [328] .

In the Court’s eyes, a licensing offer complying with the Huawei requirements is only given, when the SEP holder provides the SEP user with all information required from assessing the FRAND conformity of the offer [345] . Only then, the SEP user’s consequent obligation under the Huawei framework to make a FRAND counter-offer to the SEP holder is triggered [345] . In particular, the SEP holder must make the requested royalty amount transparent with reference to a standard licensing programme implemented in the market or to rates actually paid by third parties to a patent pool, covering also patents relevant to the standard [345] . For the assessment of the non-discriminatory character of the offer, information on comparable agreements is needed [345] .

Based on the above considerations, the Court held that the period of 22 workdays between the presentation of the comparable agreements to the parent company (11 April 2018) and the assertion of the injunction claims in the proceedings by the Defendant (15 May 2018) was too short for a competent assessment of the Claimant’s licensing offer [346] . The fact that the Defendant (and/or its parent company) would have had sufficient time to react to the Claimant’s offer until the end of the oral hearings in mid-July 2018 was considered irrelevant by the Court in this respect [346] . The Huawei framework aims at preventing the situation, in which the SEP user agrees to unfavourable licensing conditions under the pressure of pending infringement proceedings (defined by the Court as “patent hold-up”) [346] . In case that the SEP holder has not fulfilled the Huawei requirements prior to the initiation of proceedings (as it was the case here), it has to make sure that the parties can again negotiated without the pressure of an ongoing trial, for instance by asking the court to stay its proceedings pursuant to Article 251 of the German Court of Civil Procedure [347] . Otherwise, the initiation of the infringement proceedings shall be considered as abusive in terms of antitrust law [347] . In the present case, the Claimant chose to not ask for a stay in the proceedings, ignoring the Court’s respective indication [347] .

C. Other issues

The Court explained that the registration in the patent register allows the registered patent holder to assert the patent rights in court [348] . On the other hand, it does not define the ownership of the patent in material legal terms [349] . Nevertheless, the patent registration establishes an assumption of ownership which must be rebutted by the defendant in infringement proceedings based on concrete indications [350] .

Besides that, the Court pointed out that a stay in the infringement proceedings (pursuant to Article 148 of the German Code of Civil Procedure) until the end of parallel invalidation proceedings concerning the patent(s) in suit can be considered only under special circumstances [351] . As a rule, it must be expected with a sufficient degree of probability that the patent(s) in suit will be invalidated [351] . The Defendant failed convince the Court that this was the case with the SEP in suit [351] .

  • [324] District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 28 September 2018, Case-No. 7 O 165/16, page 2 and 23.
  • [325] Ibid, page 23 et seq.
  • [326] Ibid, page 5.
  • [327] Ibid, page 25.
  • [328] Ibid, page 26.
  • [329] Ibid, pages 5 et seq.
  • [330] Ibid, page 6.
  • [331] Ibid, page 19.
  • [332] Ibid,page 23.
  • [333] Ibid, pages 16 et seqq.
  • [334] Ibid, page 20.
  • [335] Ibid, page 21.
  • [336] Ibid, page 22.
  • [337] Ibid, page 24.
  • [338] Ibid, pages 24 et seq.
  • [339] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-130/13.
  • [340] District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 28 September 2018, Case-No. 7 O 165/16, pages 22.
  • [341] Ibid,pages 23 and 25.
  • [342] Ibid, page 23.
  • [343] Ibid, pages 23 and 25 et seq.
  • [344] Ibid, pages 26 et seqq.
  • [345] Ibid, page 27.
  • [346] Ibid, page 28.
  • [347] Ibid, page 29.
  • [348] Ibid, page 10.
  • [349] Ibid, pages 10 et seq.
  • [350] Ibid, page 11.
  • [351] Ibid, page 30.

Updated 6 6月 2019

Koninklijke Philips N.V.対Asustek Computers INC.、ハーグ控訴裁判所

7 5月 2019 - Case No. 200.221.250/01

A. 事実

本件は、消費者向け電子機器製造業者であり欧州電気通信標準化機構(European Telecommunications Standards Institute: ETSI)が開発した様々な標準の実施において潜在的に必須であるとして宣言済みの特許(標準必須特許又はSEP)のポートフォリオの保有者であるPhilipsと、ラップトップ、タブレット、及びスマートフォン等の無線機器の製造業者であるAsusとの間の紛争に関するものである。

Philipsは、公平、合理的、かつ非差別的(Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory: FRAND)な条件で標準の使用者がPhilipsのSEPにアクセスできるようにするとの誓約をETSIに対して行っていた。特に、Philipsは1998年に自社のSEPへのアクセスをFRAND条件でオファーするとの一般的(包括的)な誓約をETSIに対して行っていた。


2015年、交渉は決裂し、Philipsは欧州の様々な法域(即ち、イングランド、フランス、及びドイツ)において、とりわけ欧州特許1 623 511 (EP 511)に基づき侵害訴訟を提起した。Philipsは、EP 511特許が3G-UMTS及び4G-LTE標準に(潜在的に)必須であるとの宣言を行っていた。イングランド・ウェールズ高等法院は、EP 511 特許の有効性を支持する予備的評決(preliminary verdict)を下した。

Philipsは、オランダでは、とりわけ差止命令を求めてAsusに対する訴訟をハーグ地方裁判所(地方裁判所)において提起していた。地方裁判所は、EP 511特許に基づくPhilipsの差止請求を棄却した [352] 。Philipsは、ハーグ控訴裁判所(控訴裁判所)に控訴した。

本判決では、控訴裁判所がEP 511の有効性及び必須性を支持し、TFEU第102条に基づきFRAND違反を主張するAsusの抗弁(FRAND defense)を退け、Asusに対して係争中の特許を侵害している製品についての差止命令を出した [353]

B. 判決理由

控訴裁判所はEP 511特許の新規性及び進歩性を認め当該特許の有効性に対するAsusの異議を棄却した [354] 。更に、控訴裁判所は、当該特許が必須であり侵害されていると認めた [355]

控訴裁判所は、Asusの主張、即ち、Philipsが差止による救済を求めて侵害訴訟を提起する上でETSI に対する契約上のFRAND義務に違反しており、欧州司法裁判所(Court of Justice of the EU: CJEU) がHuawei対ZTE事件において定めた要件(Huawei要件)を遵守しなかったことによりTFEU第102 条 に違反したとの主張を審理した [356] 。特に、Asusは、(a) ETSI のIPR Policyに従った適切かつ適時なEP 511の開示をPhilipsが行なわず、また(b)提示した条件がFRANDである根拠を明確に示さなかったことでPhilipsがHuawei要件に反していたと主張した。

控訴裁判所は、前者について、EP 511の付与から2年後に当該特許が(潜在的に)必須であるとPhilipsが宣言したことは、SEPの「適時の開示(timely disclosure)」を求めるETSI IPR Policy第4.1条に基づく契約上の義務への違反に当たらないとした。

控訴裁判所は、ETSIの開示義務の根底にある一般的な目的について、ETSI標準に利用可能な最高の技術を組み入れることであって、Asusが主張したようにETSI 標準への参加者が最低のコストで(必須の)技術ソリューションを選択できるようにすることではないとした [357]  。また、宣言を行う義務の目的は、むしろ、使用者にとって事後的に実施できないSEPが現れないようにリスクを減らすことであるとした [358]

その上で控訴裁判所は、Philipsが行った一般的かつ包括的な宣言はETSIのIPR Policyに基づく義務を果たすために十分であったとした。この点について、控訴裁判所は、Philipsが特定のSEPの宣言を遅く行ったことは(必須でない特許を含めた)超過宣言(over-declaration)を招くとのAsusの主張を退け、逆に控訴裁判所は、早期開示ではETSI 標準に必須でない特許が含まれてしまう可能性の方が高いとした [359]  。更に、控訴裁判所は、欧州委員会の水平的協調行為に関するガイドライン(Horizontal Guidelines )によれば包括的宣言はEU競争法の目的上許容されるSEP宣言の形式の1つであり、Philipsの包括的宣言はTFEU第101条違反に当たらないと指摘した  [360]

FRAND違反を主張するAsusの抗弁(FRAND defense)の第一の根拠を退けた上で、控訴裁判所は、両当事者が交渉上Huawei要件に従っていたか否かについて評価した。控訴裁判所は、前置きとして、Huawei 事件におけるCJEUの判決は、Huawei要件に従わない特許保有者が自動的にTFEU第102条違反を犯したものとされる厳格な要件のセットを定めてはいないと述べた [361]  。このため、控訴裁判所は、本事件の特定の状況と両当事者の行為を評価する必要があるとした。

その次に控訴裁判所は、Huawei要件の第一ステップである侵害者への適切な通知の義務をPhilipsが遵守したか否かを審理した。控訴裁判所は、侵害を受けているとされる特許のリストとそれらが必須である標準をPhilipsが提出したこと及びFRAND条件でライセンスをオファーする意思をPhilipsが宣言したことによりAsusへの通知義務をPhilipsが明確に果たしていたと事件記録が示しているとの見解をとった。 [362]  また、その後の技術的議論において、Philipsは自社のポートフォリオとライセンスプログラムについての更なる詳細(クレームチャート及び標準ライセンスでのロイヤルティ料率を含む)を提供していた [363] 。これに対して、AsusはFRAND条件でのライセンスを受ける意思を表示しなかった。控訴裁判所は、交渉が常にPhilipsの側から始められ、AsusはPhilipsのポートフォリオを評価できる技術専門家を交渉に参加させていなかったと事実認定した [364] 。控訴裁判所は、交渉においてAsusが提起した技術的問題が交渉を遅らせることだけを目的としており「ホールドアウト(hold-out)」と言われる行為に当たるとした  [365]

この時点で既に、控訴裁判所はAsusがHuawei要件に基づく義務に違反しており、Philipsは差止命令を求める権利を有していると判断していたが、更に踏み込んでHuaweiフレームワークの第二ステップ以降の遵守についても検討した。控訴裁判所は、 Philipsが自社の標準ライセンス契約を提示したことは、具体的であり提示した料率の計算法も説明している点でCJEU要件を完全に満たしているとした [366] 。更に、控訴裁判所は、ドイツにおいて訴訟が提起された後にAsusが出したカウンターオファー自体は、PhilipsがHuawei要件を遵守しており従って差止命令を求める権利を有するとの結論を変えるものではないとした [367] 。最後に、控訴裁判所はPhilipsが交わしている比較可能なライセンス契約がFRAND適格であるかを評価するためにそれらへのアクセスを求めたAsusの弁護士による要求を却下した。控訴裁判所は、ETSIのIPR Policy、TFEU第102条、及びHuawei フレームワークの何れも当該要求の根拠とはならないとした [368]

  • [352] Koninklijke Philips N.V.対Asustek Computers INC、ハーグ地方裁判所、2017年、事件番号C 09 512839 /HA ZA 16-712。
  • [353] Koninklijke Philips N.V.対Asustek Computers INC、ハーグ控訴裁判所、2019年5月7日判決、事件番号200.221.250/01。
  • [354] 同判決、第4.63節、第4.68節、第4.75節、第4.80節、第4.82節、第4.93節、第4.100節、及び第4.117節。
  • [355] 同判決、第4.118節 以下。
  • [356] Huawei対ZTE、欧州司法裁判所、2015年7月16日判決、事件番号C-170/13。
  • [357] Koninklijke Philips N.V.対Asustek Computers INC、ハーグ控訴裁判所、2019年5月7日判決、事件番号200.221.250/01、第4.153節以下。
  • [358] 同判決、第4.155節及び第4.157節。
  • [359] 同判決、第4.159節。
  • [360] 同判決、第4.164節。
  • [361] 同判決、第4.171節。
  • [362] 同判決、第4.172節。
  • [363] 同判決。
  • [364] 同判決、第4.172節ないし第4.179節。
  • [365] 同判決、第4.179節。
  • [366] 同判決、第4.183節。
  • [367] 同判決、第4.185節。
  • [368] 同判決、第4.202節以下。

Updated 1 11月 2017

Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) 2

4 5月 2017 - Case No. HP-2014-000005

  1. Facts
    The claimant is a company that grants licenses for patented technologies in the telecommunications industry. The patents at issue (EP (UK) 2 229 744, EP (UK) 2 119 287, EP (UK) 2 485 514, EP (UK) 1 230 818, EP (UK) 1 105 991, EP (UK) 0 989 712) relate to telecommunication network coding and procedures [369] . Most were part of a large patent portfolio that the claimant had acquired from a major telecommunications company in 2013. [370] In 2014, the claimant made a declaration under the ETSI IPR Policy that it was willing to grant licenses on FRAND terms. There were five technical trials relating to the validity, infringement and essentiality of these patents. This summary focuses on the non-technical trial addressed competition law issues, FRAND issues, injunctive relief and damages for past infringements. [371]
    In April 2014 the claimant made an open offer to the defendant, a major international smartphone manufacturer, to grant a license in respect of the claimant’s entire global patent portfolio (containing SEPs and non-SEPs). The defendant refused the offer, contending that there was no patent infringement, that the patents were not essential, and that they were invalid. The defendant also argued that the offer was not FRAND and thus did not constitute an abuse of a dominant market position under Art. 102 TFEU. In July 2014 the claimant made a further offer, limited to the claimant’s SEPs. Again, the defendant refused, arguing that the license conditions were not FRAND. [372] In June 2015 both parties made further offers. These offers were the result of directions from the court. The claimant offered a worldwide portfolio license while the defendant wanted to limit the territorial scope to the United Kingdom. [373] Between August and October 2016 the parties exchanged further offers without reaching an agreement. [374]
    The Patents Court (Birrs J) held that the claimant was in a dominant position, but did not abuse this position. [375] The defendant was not prepared to take a license on FRAND conditions and the claimant was not in breach of competition law. Thus, the court held that a final injunction to restrain patent infringements should be granted. An injunction for infringements of patents EP (UK) 2 229 744 and EP (UK) 1 230 818 was granted on 7 June 2017. [376]
  2. Court’s reasoning
    1. Market power
      The court defined the relevant market for assessing dominance as a distinct market for licensing each SEP individually. [377] European case law indicated that owning an SEP could be a rebuttable presumption for the existence of a dominant position. [378] The claimant’s pleaded position was a non-admission of dominance rather than a denial coupled with a positive case to the contrary. It was the view of the court that this was insufficient to rebut the presumption. In particular, the claimant’s argument of countervailing buyer power was unconvincing because it had not been supported by a proper economic analysis. [379]
    2. SEP Proprietor’s Licensing Offer
      1. FRAND Declaration as Conceptual Basis
        The court pointed out that that the FRAND undertaking also applied in the case that the SEP proprietor was not in a dominant position. It held that the FRAND undertaking operated as a practical constraint on a SEP owner’s market power. [380] The ETSI declaration made by the SEP proprietor is also the starting point for determining the FRAND rate. The underlying issue, which is discussed at length by the court, [381] is if such a declaration forms a contract and whether that contract can benefit third parties. The court acknowledged that the legal effect of this declaration, in particular its enforceability, is a controversial issue under French law. [382] However, the court reasoned that the FRAND declaration is an important aspect of technology standardisation. Holders of SEPs are not compelled to give a FRAND declaration. If they do, the undertaking would be enforceable and irrevocable due to public interest. [382]
        The court applied a procedural approach to FRAND. It emphasised that FRAND describes not only a set of license terms, but also the process by which a set of terms are agreed. [383] It applies to both the SEP-holder and the implementer/defendant. In particular, this approach allows for starting offers that leave room for negotiation. On the other hand, making extreme offers and taking an uncompromising approach which prejudices fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory negotiation is not a FRAND approach. [384] This approach also means that the SEP proprietor is under an obligation to make a FRAND offer and to enter into FRAND license agreements. [385]
      2. ‘True FRAND Rate’
        The court considered that there is only a single set of terms for a given set of circumstances that would meet FRAND conditions (‘true FRAND rate’). [386] This eliminates the so-called Vringo-problem, [387] i.e. if FRAND were a range there would be two different but equally FRAND offers. Thus, if the court would grant or not an injunction, it would be unfair for the alleged infringer or SEP holder respectively. [388]
        The court was of the opinion that the true FRAND rate approach does not cause problems under competition law. Theoretically, if only one set of terms is truly FRAND, and if FRAND also represents the line between abusive and non-abusive conduct under Art. 102 TFEU, then every agreed SEP-licence could be at serious risk of being abusive. [389] However, the court took the view that FRAND-compliance and compliance with Art. 102 TFEU are not the same thing (the court pointed out that the CJEU in the Huawei ruling appears to equate an obligation to make a FRAND offer with compliance with Art 102 TFEU). [390] Since Art. 102 TFEU condemns excessive pricing, [391] a royalty rate can be somewhat higher than the true FRAND rate and still not be contrary to competition law. Conversely, for a breach of competition law, it will be necessary but not sufficient that the rate is not the true FRAND rate. [391]
      3. Discrimination
        The court held that the correct approach is to start from a global rate as a benchmark and to then adjust this rate as appropriate. [392] It distinguished between two concepts of discrimination. First, the ‘general’ concept of non-discrimination describes an overall assessment of FRAND which can be used to derive the benchmark mentioned above. [393] It is based on the intrinsic value of the patent portfolio, but it does not depend on the licensee. The court held that this benchmark should be applied to all licensees seeking the same kind of license. [394]
        Second, the ‘hard-edged’ non-discrimination obligation, which takes into account the nature of the potential licensee, [393] is a distinct concept that could be used to adjust license terms. However, the court held that the FRAND declaration does not introduce such a hard-edged non-discrimination concept. [395] If, contrary to the view taken by the court, the FRAND undertaking did include hard-edged non-discrimination, a licensee could only have the right to a lower rate granted to another licensee (i.e. a specific non-discrimination obligation resulting from the FRAND declaration) if the difference would otherwise distort competition between the two licensees. [394]
      4. Territorial Scope of License
        The court held that the defendant’s offer that was limited to UK licenses was not FRAND. In the court’s opinion country by country licensing is inefficient for goods such as mobile telecommunications devices that are distributed across borders. [396] It would also be inefficient to negotiate many different licenses and then to keep track of so many different royalty calculations and payments. No rational business would do this, if it could be avoided. [396] This was illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of licenses introduced in the trial were worldwide licenses. [397] Further, it is common ground that the industry assesses patent families rather than individual patents within the family. Assessing portfolios on a family basis inevitably involved tying a patent in one jurisdiction with a patent in another. [398] Thus, according to the court, a worldwide license would not be contrary to competition law. As willing and reasonable parties would agree on a worldwide licence, the insistence by the defendant on a license which was limited to the UK was not FRAND. [399]
  3. Court’s reasoning
    1. Comparable agreements and reasonable aggregate royalty rate
      The court held that for determining the royalty rate, the evidence of the parties would be relevant, including evidence of how negotiations actually work in the industry. [400] Other freely-negotiated license agreements might be used as comparables. [401] This may be compared with a top down approach [402] can also be used in which the rate is set by determining the patentee’s share of relevant SEPs and applying that to the total aggregate royalty for a standard, but this may be more useful as a cross-check. [403] Royalty rates determined by other courts might be useful as persuasive precedents. However, in the eyes of the court, a license rate determined at a binding arbitration does not carry much weight as to what parties are usually paying. [400] License agreements must meet certain criteria to be comparable. [404] First, the licensor is the claimant. Second, the license agreement is recent. However, it is not necessary that the licensee is the defendant or a comparable company because different market participants have different bargaining powers, which is reflected in the negotiations and the resulting royalty rates. [404] Finally the court confirmed that a royalty based on the handset price was appropriate and implied a reasonable aggregate royalty rate of 8.8%of the handset price. The court found that the 8.8% was reasonable, in part, because the aggregate implied by either party’s case was higher (10.4% and 13.3%). [405]
    2. Principles derived from Huawei v. ZTE
      The court also provided a compiled overview of its interpretation of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling. [406] In the eyes of the court, the ‘willingness to conclude a licence on FRAND terms’ refers to a willingness in general. The fact that concrete proposals are also required does not mean it is relevant to ask whether the proposals are actually FRAND or not. If the patentee complies with the procedure as set out by the CJEU, then bringing a claim for injunction is not abusive under Art 102. But even if sufficient notice is given, bringing a claim can constitute an abuse because complying with the procedure does not mean that a patentee can behave with impunity. In other words, there might be other aspects that make the claim abusive. Conversely, bringing such a claim without prior notice will necessarily be abusive. Significantly, the court held, the legal circumstances of this case differ from the circumstances assumed by the CJEU in a crucial respect. A FRAND undertaking can be effectively enforced irrespective of Art 102. The defendant does not need Art 102 TFEU to have a defence to the injunction claim.
  • [369] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 2
  • [370] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 54 et seqq.
  • [371] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 3
  • [372] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 5
  • [373] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 7-8
  • [374] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 11-14
  • [375] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 807
  • [376] Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC 1304 (Pat)
  • [377] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 631
  • [378] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 634
  • [379] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 636-646
  • [380] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 656
  • [381] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 108-145
  • [382] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 146
  • [383] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 162
  • [384] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 163
  • [385] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 159
  • [386] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 164
  • [387] See Vringo v ZTE [2013] EWHC 1591 (Pat) and [2015] EWHC 214 (Pat)
  • [388] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 158
  • [389] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 152
  • [390] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 154
  • [391] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 153
  • [392] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 176
  • [393] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 177
  • [394] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 503
  • [395] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 501
  • [396] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 544
  • [397] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 534
  • [398] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 546
  • [399] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 572
  • [400] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 171
  • [401] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 170
  • [402] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 178
  • [403] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 806 (10)
  • [404] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 175
  • [405] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 476
  • [406] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), 744

Updated 9 11月 2020


LG Mannheim
18 8月 2020 - Case No. 2 O 34/19

A. 内容











現行の判決で [407] 、本裁判所は、Daimlerに差止命令を下すとともに、本案に関するDaimlerの損害賠償責任を認めた。さらに本裁判所は、Nokiaへの損害賠償金の算定に必要な会計帳簿及び情報を提出するようDaimlerに命じた。


B. 判決理由

本裁判所は、係争中の特許をDaimlerが侵害したと認定した [408] 。これにより、Nokiaには差止命令等による救済手段が与えられた [409]

Daimler及び当該訴訟に参加したそのサプライヤーは、Nokiaが権利侵害訴訟の申立てにより市場支配的地位を濫用しており、これがEU機能条約第102条に違反していることから、差止命令が却下されるべきとして、いわゆる「FRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁」を主張した。とりわけ、Huawei v ZTE [410] (「Huawei裁定」又は「Huaweiフレームワーク」)事件でCJEUが定めた行動要件をNokiaが遵守していないと論じられた。

本裁判所は、Daimler及びそのサプライヤーのFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁を理由がないとして棄却した [411]



本裁判所は、SEP保有者が特許に起因して生じる独占権の行使を本来的に妨げられないことを名言した [412] 。実際のところ、特許が規格に必須であっても、その特許権者に技術利用を許容する義務を負わせることにならない。但し、市場支配的地位を獲得した結果、そのような利用を認めていたか、その利用を認める義務を課されていた場合は、この限りでない [412]

特許権者がHuaweiフレームワークに基づく義務を履行しているのであれば、特許権の行使による市場支配的地位の濫用が生じることはない [413] 。但し上記の義務は、権利者の許諾なしに保護対象技術を既に利用している実施者がFRAND条件でのライセンス取得の意思を有していることを前提とする [414] 。本裁判所は、特許権者から規格利用者に対しライセンスを「押しつける」よう要請することはできないのであるから、ライセンス契約締結を要請する法的請求権については尚更有していないと説示した [414] 。その上、支配的地位に付される「特段の責任」により、SEP保有者は、原則としてライセンス取得の意思を有するライセンシーに契約締結を促すよう「十分な努力」を払う義務を負う [415]



本裁判所によれば、上記の「努力」には、その実施者に特許侵害について通知するだけでなく、権利侵害訴訟申立て前におけるライセンス取得の可能性および必要性を通知する義務が含まれる [416] 。具体的な事例を参照した結果、本裁判所は、Nokiaが当該義務を履行したと認めた [417]

内容について言えば、上記の権利侵害通知には、被侵害特許の明示並びに侵害性を有する使用法及び訴えの対象たる実施形態を記載しなければならない [416] 。権利侵害について技術的・法的観点から詳細に分析する必要はない。実施者の立場としては、結局は専門家又は弁護士の助言に依拠してその権利侵害の主張を評価するしかない [416] 。通例、クレームチャートが提示されれば十分である(但し、必須ではない) [416] 。さらに本裁判所は、特許権者がその特許を侵害している最終製品メーカーのサプライヤーそれぞれに対し、別個に権利侵害を通知する義務を負わないことを指摘した [418]

本裁判所の見地から、2016年6月21日、2016年11月9日及び2016年12月7日付のNokiaのEメールは、上記要件を満たしている [419] 。実際のところNokiaは、-少なくとも当初は-付託される係争中の特許に該当する標準規格書の具体的部分を示していなかったことは、害にはならない。これは、権利侵害の最終的な評価を行うに際し権利侵害通知が求められていなかったためである [420]

さらに本裁判所は、Nokiaが権利侵害通知において、関連規格によって接続機能を生み出す具体的なコンポーネント(Daimlerの車に組み込まれたTCU等)を特定する必要はないと判断した [421] 。Daimlerは当該コンポーネントを購入した上で自社製品に使用したのだから、情報不足は何ら生じるはずがなかった [421]



さらに本裁判所は、DaimlerがNokiaとのFRANDライセンス契約締結の意思を十分に明示ていないことから、差止命令を回避するためにFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁に依拠できないと認定した [422]

本裁判所の見地から、実施者は、「どのような条件が実際にFRANDにあたるのかにかかわらず」SEP保有者とのライセンス契約を締結する意思について、「明確に」かつ「疑義の生じないよう」宣言した上で、爾後「目的志向」の意図にてライセンス供与の協議に従事しなければならなかった(Sisvel v Haier(連邦司法裁判所, 2020年5月5日, Case No. KZR 36/17)、及びUnwired Planet v Huawei(英国及びウェールズ高等法院、2017年4月5日, Case No. [2017] EWHC 711(Pat)の判決) [423] 。ライセンス供与の協議における実施者の「目的志向」は、決定的な重要性を有する。実施者は概して、ライセンス供与の協議が開始される前の時点で特許取得済の標準化技術を既に使用していることから、その特許の有効期間満了までライセンス契約締結を遅延させることに利得を有するが、これはHuawei裁定の趣旨に反する [424] 。よって、権利侵害の通知に対して、ライセンス契約締結を検討する意思を示したり、ライセンス取得の是非及びその条件についての協議に入る意思を示したりするだけでは不十分である [423]

本裁判所はさらに、一定条件下での誠実意思の宣言が許容されないと指摘した [423] 。さらに特許権者へのカウンターオファー内容変更協議の拒絶も、実施側の誠実意思欠如を示すものとみなされうる [423]

上記に基づき、本裁判所は、Daimlerが当初、製品がNokiaの特許を実際に侵害すればライセンス契約を締結すると示したことでは、DaimlerがFRANDライセンス契約を締結する意思を適切に示さなかったとの見解を示した [425] 。本裁判所は、Daimlerのカウンターオファーは契約締結にかかわる意思を十分に示したものになりえず、特に2度目のカウンターオファーについては、Nokiaが片務的に設定できたはずのロイヤルティ料率に異議を唱える権利をDaimlerに求めただけで、ライセンス料の決定に関する両当事者間の紛争を爾後の訴訟に持ち越しただけに過ぎないと付け加えた [426]

本裁判所はさらに、DaimlerがNokiaとの協議に関与しなかったにもかかわらず、自らのサプライヤーにNokiaから直接ライセンスを付与するよう強く主張したことから、Daimlerが「誠実意思を有する」ライセンシーとして行為していなかったと判示した [427] 。さらに、Daimlerの誠実意思の欠落は、NokiaのSEPポートフォリオに対するライセンス料の算定基準として、Daimlerがサプライヤーから購入したTCUの平均価格を適用するよう主張したことからも確認された [428]



本裁判所は、NokiaのSEPポートフォリオに対するロイヤルティ料率の算定に、TCUを「参考値」として使用することは適正でなかったと認定した [429]

一般に、FRAND条件は単一ではなく、FRANDのライセンス供与条件及び料金には幅が設定されるのが通例である [430] 。また、何がFRANDとみなされるかは、業界及び時期によって異なる場合がある [430]

しかしながら、本裁判所は、原則として「バリューチェーンの最終段階で商品として通用する最終製品にかかる技術の経済上の利益」を特許権者に「配分」しなければならないと指摘した [431] 。どの理由は、保護された発明を使用する最終製品で「経済上の利益」を獲得する「機会が創出する」、ためである [431] 。裁判所は、最終製品における特許技術の価値を斟酌して、SEP保有者がバリューチェーンの別の段階でなされるイノベーションから利益を得ているとの考えを認めなかった [432] 。裁判所は、これが生じないと確認するために入手可能な証拠文書が複数存在することを示した [432]

したがって、本裁判所は、いわゆる「最小販売可能特許実施単位(SSPPU)」、すなわち、製品に組み入れられる最小技術単位をFRANDロイヤルティ料率の算定根拠とする考えを否定した [432] 。特許消尽の影響により、SEP保有者は、バリューチェーン最終段階で創出される価値に関与することを妨げられる [432] 。これとは別に、この選択肢は、バリューチェーンの複数の段階において同一特許のライセンスが付与される「二重取り」の特定と回避をより複雑にするおそれがある [432] 。 それでもなお本裁判所は、上記の原則について、必ずしも専ら最終製品製造会社とライセンス契約締結を意味するものでないと明言した [433] 。本裁判所は、販売可能な最終製品の特許技術の価値がサプライチェーンの別の段階で計算に組み込まれる可能性が大いにあるとみなした [433]

この背景に照らし、本裁判所は、TCUの販売価格では、本事件の最終製品にあたるDaimler製造車に対するNokiaのSEPの価値が十分に反映されていないと認定した [434] 。TCUの販売価格が相応するのはDaimlerのそれぞれのコストのみである [435] 。むしろDaimlerは、接続機能により、顧客に追加サービスを提示してこれによる収入を得て、コストを節減し、研究開発費を最適化した [436] 。接続機能はこの価値創出の機会を保証するものである [437] 。さらに、本裁判所は、Daimlerの複数の主要競合会社が(専ら車製造会社にライセンスを付与する)Avanciプラットフォームのライセンシングモデルを承諾したことにより、最終製品向けの保護された技術の価値に焦点があてられることは、自動車業界にとっても合理的と認定した [438]



さらに本裁判所は、NokiaのDaimlerに対する特許請求の申立ては差別的なものではなく、よってサプライヤーがライセンスを取得するべきとのDaimlerの主張が正当化されるものでないことを認めた [439]

裁判所は、特許権利者が基本的に、サプライヤーンの中で権利を主張する段階を自由に選択できることを説示した [440] 。競争関連法においてこの可能性は本来的に制限されていないため、市場支配的地位を有する特許権者も同様である [440] 。その上、支配的地位を有する特許権利者は、すべての見込ライセンシーに「標準料率」を申出する義務を負うものでない [440] 。TFEU第102条に定められた非差別性に関わる義務は、上流市場又は下流市場での競争の歪みを回避するためであるが、正当な根拠が十分に存在する場合にライセンシーの様々な取扱いを排除するものではない [441]

本件において、本裁判所は、ロイヤルティベースとして最終製品を使用すべきであるとのNokiaの請求が競争に影響を及ぼさないと判断した [442] 。特に、自動車業界では車メーカーに販売されるコンポーネントのライセンスをサプライヤーが取得することが一般的であるとの事実は、Nokiaに慣行の変更を求めるものでない。これは特に、AvanciプラットフォームからDaimlerの競合会社へのライセンス供与は、通信業界において実勢的なその慣行が自動車業界でも既に適用されていることを証しているためである [443] 。さらに本裁判所は、最終製品メーカーにSEPを主張することにより生産、販売及び技術発展の制限がもたらされ、これにより消費者が不利益を被るとはみなさなかった [444] 。この点に関し、本裁判所は、ETSI IPRポリシーに拠ればFRANDライセンスに含められるべきであり、かつ、コンポーネントメーカーに製品の製造、販売及び開発を認めるいわゆる「下請製造権」に言及した [445]



さらに、本裁判所は、Nokiaがライセンスの申出に関し十分な情報を提供することを拒絶した旨をDaimlerが主張しても、Daimlerのライセンス取得する意思のないことを正当化できないと判示した [446]

本裁判所は、SEP保有者がライセンス要請のFRAND適合性を具体化する義務を負う可能性を指摘した [447] 。特許権利者は、第三者との間で非標準的な条件に基づき既に契約を締結している場合、一般的には、別の契約条件の申出を受けているかどうか実施者が評価できるようにするため、-少なくとも-重要な契約条項の内容を開示し、提示する義務を負う [447] 。各々の義務の範囲および詳細なレベルは、ケースバイケースで判断される [447]

上記に鑑みて、本裁判所は、車両の接続機能の価値に関する調査や他の主要車メーカーとの署名済みライセンス締結等を共有することにより、NokiaがDaimlerに十分な情報を提供していたとの見解を示した [448] 。この状況において、本裁判所は、NokiaがDaimlerに対し、スマートフォンメーカーとのライセンス契約を開示する義務を負っていなかったと示した。本裁判所は、SEP保有者の情報開示義務が、従前に署名されているあらゆるライセンス契約の全文に及んで適用されるとの意見や、SEP保有者がすべての既存契約を開示する義務を負うとの意見を拒絶した [449] 。さらに本裁判所は、通信業界でのライセンス契約は自動車業界でのライセンスのFRAND適合性評価とは無関係であると判示した [449]



上記とは別に、本裁判所は、訴訟に参加したサプライヤーが提起したFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁がDaimlerに利益をもたらさないことを強調した [450]

本裁判所は、訴えられている最終製品メーカーがそのサプライヤーにより提起されるFRAND抗弁に、原則として依拠できるかどうかについて結論を出さなかった。本裁判所によれば、これについてはいかなる場合であれ、サプライヤーが(製造するコンポーネントでなく)最終製品に対する対象特許の価値を根拠として特許権利者からライセンスを取得する意思を有している必要がある [451] 。本訴訟はこのような状況でなかった [452]

本裁判所は、サプライヤーがSEP保有者に支払ったロイヤルティをその顧客に転嫁することが難しいことを無視したわけではない [453] 。しかしながら、第三者との契約上の取決め(ここでは、サプライヤーと最終製品メーカーとの契約)は、裁判所の見地から、最終製品にかかわる特許技術により創出される価値への配分を認めないライセンス契約にSEP保有者に指示するものであってはならない [453]


C. その他の問題点


本裁判所は、Daimlerもそのサプライヤーも、Daimlerが製造した車に関する特許技術の価値に基づきFRAND条件でNokiaからライセンスを取得する意思を有していなかったため、これについて結論を出さなかった [454] 。さらに本裁判所は、係争中の特許の有効期限が今後数年で満了するとの事実に基づき、訴訟手続の停止命令に反対すると述べた [455]

  • [407] Nokia v Daimler(マンハイム地方裁判所, 2020年8月18日判決, 事件番号 2 O 34/19(www.juris.deから引用))
  • [408] 同判決、第49節乃至第136節。
  • [409] 同判決、第138節。
  • [410] Huawei v ZTE(欧州司法裁判所, 2016年7月16日判決、事件番号 C-170/13)
  • [411] Nokia v Daimler(マンハイム地方裁判所、2020年8月18日判決、事件番号 2 O 34/19, 第144節)
  • [412] 同判決、第146節。
  • [413] 同判決、第147節。
  • [414] 同判決、第148節。
  • [415] 同判決、第149節。
  • [416] 同判決、第152節。
  • [417] 同判決、第151乃至第156節。
  • [418] 同判決、第248節。
  • [419] 同判決、第153節以降。
  • [420] 同判決、第154節。
  • [421] 同判決、第155節。
  • [422] 同判決、第157乃至第231節。
  • [423] 同判決、第158節。
  • [424] 同判決、第159節。
  • [425] 同判決、第161節。
  • [426] 同判決、第197乃至第199節。
  • [427] 同判決、第157節、第160節及び第162節乃至第164節。
  • [428] 同判決、第160及び第165節乃至第168節。
  • [429] 同判決、第169節。
  • [430] 同判決、第170節。
  • [431] 同判決、第171節。
  • [432] 同判決、第172節。
  • [433] 同判決、第173節。
  • [434] 同判決、第174節以降。
  • [435] 同判決、第174節。
  • [436] 同判決、第177節。
  • [437] 同判決、第180節。
  • [438] 同判決、第187節以降。
  • [439] 同判決、第201節乃至第212節。
  • [440] 同判決、第202節。
  • [441] 同判決、第203節。
  • [442] 同判決、第205節。
  • [443] 同判決、第210節。
  • [444] 同判決、第213節。
  • [445] 同判決、第215節。
  • [446] 同判決、第216節以降。
  • [447] 同判決、第217節。
  • [448] 同判決、第218節。
  • [449] 同判決、第230節。
  • [450] 同判決、第232節以降。
  • [451] 同判決、第234及び第236節以降。
  • [452] 同判決、第240節以降。
  • [453] 同判決、第239節。
  • [454] 同判決、第253及び第291節。
  • [455] 同判決、第291節。

Updated 30 10月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal

23 10月 2018 - Case No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344

A. Facts

The Claimant, Unwired Planet International Limited, holds a significant portfolio of patents which are essential for the implementation of the 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE wireless telecommunications standards (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs). The Defendants, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Huawei Technologies (UK) Co. Ltd., manufacture and sell mobile devices complying with the above standards worldwide.

Starting in September 2013, the Claimant contacted the Defendants several times, requesting the latter to engage in discussions for a licence regarding its SEP portfolio. [456] In March 2014, the Claimant sued the Defendants as well as Samsung and Google for infringement of five of its UK SEPs before the UK High Court of Justice (High Court). [457] The Claimant also initiated parallel infringement proceedings against the Defendants in Germany. [458]

The High Court conducted three technical trials first, focusing on the validity and essentiality of four of the SEPs in suit. [459] By April 2016, these trials were completed; the High Court held that two of the SEPs in suit were both valid and essential, whereas two other patents were found to be invalid. [459] The parties agreed to postpone further technical trials indefinitely. [459]

In July 2016, Samsung took a licence from the Claimant covering, among other, the SEPs in suit. [460] The Claimant also settled the infringement proceedings with Google. [461]

In late 2016, the trial concerned with questions regarding to the licensing of the SEPs in suit commenced between the Claimant and the Defendants. Over the course of these proceedings the parties made licensing offers to the each other. However, they failed to reach an agreement. The Defendants indicated they were willing to take a licence under Claimant’s UK patent portfolio, whereas the Claimant contended that it was entitled to insist upon a worldwide licence. [462]

In April 2017, the High Court granted an UK injunction against the Defendant, until such time as it entered into a worldwide licensing agreement with the Claimant on the specific rates, which the court determined to be Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) [463] in accordance with the undertaking given by the Claimant towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). [464] Pending appeal, the High Court stayed the injunction. [465]

Shortly after the High Court delivered its decision, the Defendants began proceedings against the Claimant in China, which are still pending. [466]

With the present judgment, the UK Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendants’ appeal against the decision of the High Court. [467]

B. Court’s reasoning

The Defendants appealed the decision of the High Court on the following three grounds:

1. The High Court’s finding that only a worldwide licence was FRAND is erroneous; the imposition of such a licence on terms set by this court based on a national finding of infringement of UK patents is wrong in principle. [468]

2. The offer imposed to the Defendants by the High Court is discriminatory in violation of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking, since the rates offered are higher than the rates reflected in the licence granted by the Claimant to Samsung. [469]

3. The Claimant is not entitled to injunctive relief; by bringing the infringement proceedings against the Defendants, without meeting the requirements established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in the matter Huawei v ZTE [470] (Huawei judgment) before, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). [471]

Notably, the High Court’s determination of the rates which apply to the worldwide licence that the court requested the Defendants to take was not challenged by any of the parties to the proceedings. [472]

1. Worldwide licences

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Defendants’ notion that imposing a worldwide licence on an implementer is wrong, because it amounts to an (indirect) interference with foreign court proceedings relating to patents subsisting in foreign territories, which would have been subject to materially different approaches to the assessment of FRAND royalty rates and could, therefore, lead to different results (particularly the ongoing litigation between the parties in China and Germany). [473]

The Court of Appeal explained that in imposing a worldwide licence the High Court did neither adjudicate on issues of infringement or validity concerning any foreign SEPs, nor was it deciding what the appropriate relief for infringement of any foreign SEPs might be (particularly since it made clear that a FRAND licence should not prevent a licensee from challenging the validity or essentiality of any foreign SEPs and should make provision for sales in non-patent countries which do not require a licence) [474] . [475]

Moreover, the High Court simply determined the terms of the licence that the Claimant was required to offer to the Defendants pursuant to its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI. [476] Such an undertaking has international effect. [477] It applies to all SEPs of the patent holder irrespective of the territory in which they subsist. [478] This is necessary for two reasons: first, to protect implementers whose equipment may be sold and used in a number of different jurisdictions. [478] Second, to enable SEP holders to prevent implementers from “free-riding” on their innovations and secure an appropriate reward for carrying out their research and development activities and for engaging with the standardisation process. [479]

Accordingly, the High Court had not erred in finding that a worldwide licence was FRAND. On the contrary, there may be circumstances in which only a worldwide licence or at least a multi-territorial licence would be FRAND. [480] German Courts (in Pioneer Acer [481] and St. Lawrence v Vodafone [482] ) as well as the European Commission in its Communication dated 29 November 2017 [483] had also adopted a similar approach. [484]

Having said that, the Court of Appeal recognized that it may be “wholly impractical” for a SEP holder to seek to negotiate a licence for its patents on a country-by-country basis, just as it may be “prohibitively expensive” to seek to enforce its SEPs by litigating in each country in which they subsist. [479] In addition, if in the FRAND context the implementer could only be required to take country-by-country licences, there would be no prospect of any effective injunctive relief being granted to the SEP holder against it: the implementer could avoid an injunction, if it agreed to pay the royalties in respect of its activities in any particular country, once those activities had been found to infringe. [485] In this way, the implementer would have an incentive to hold out country-by-country, until it was compelled to pay. [485]

In its discussion of this topic, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the view taken by the High Court that in every given set of circumstances only one true set of FRAND terms exists. Nevertheless, the court did not consider that the opposite assumption of the High Court had a material effect to the its decision. [486]

In the eyes of the Court of Appeal, it is “unreal” to suggest that two parties, acting fairly and reasonably, will necessarily arrive at precisely the same set of licence terms as two other parties, also acting fairly and reasonably and faced with the same set of circumstances. [487] The reality is that a number of sets of terms may all be fair and reasonable in a given set of circumstances. [487] Whether there is only one true set of FRAND terms or not, is, therefore, more of a “theoretical problem” than a real one. [488] If the parties cannot reach an agreement, then the court (or arbitral tribunal) which will have to determine the licensing terms will normally declare one set of terms as FRAND. The SEP holder would then have to offer that specific set of terms to the implementer. On the other hand, in case that the court finds that two different sets of terms are FRAND, then the SEP holder will satisfy its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI, if it offers either one of them to the implementer. [488]

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal dismissed Defendants’ claim that imposing a worldwide licence is contrary to public policy and disproportionate. [489] In particular, the Defendants argued that this approach encourages over-declaration of patents [490] and is not compatible with the spirit of the Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, [491] which requires relief for patent infringement to be proportionate. [492]

Although the Court of Appeal recognised the existence of the practice of over-declaration and acknowledged that it is a problem, it held that this phenomenon cannot justify “condemning” SEP holders with large portfolios to “impossibly expensive” litigation in every territory in respect of which they seek to recover royalties. [493] The court also found that there was nothing disproportionate about the approach taken by the High Court, since the Defendants had the option to avoid an injunction by taking a licence on the terms which the court had determined. [494]

2. Non-discrimination

The Court of Appeal rejected the Defendants’ argument [495] that the non-discrimination component of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking towards ETSI obliges the Claimant to offer to the Defendants the same rates as those contained in the licence granted to Samsung. [496]

The Court of Appeal made clear that the obligation of the SEP holder not to discriminate is, in principle, engaged in the present case, since the Claimant’s transaction with the Defendants is equivalent to the licence it granted to Samsung. [497] In the court’s eyes, when deciding whether two transactions are equivalent one needs to focus first on the transactions themselves. Insofar, differences in the circumstances in which the transactions were entered into, particularly economic circumstances, such as the parties’ financial position [498] or market conditions (e.g. cost of raw materials), cannot make two otherwise identical transactions non-equivalent (releasing, therefore, the patent holder from the obligation not to discriminate). Changes in such circumstances could only amount to an objective justification for a difference in treatment. [499]

Considering the specific content of the SEP holder’s respective obligation, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court’s finding that the non-discrimination element of a SEP holder’s FRAND undertaking does not imply a so-called “hard-edged” component (imposing on the patent holder an obligation to offer the same rate to similarly situated implementers). [500] It argued that the “hard-edged” approach is “excessively strict” and fails to achieve a balance between a fair return to the SEP owner and universal access to the technology. [501] It could have the effect of compelling the SEP holder to accept a level of compensation for the use of its invention which does not reflect the value of the licensed technology and, therefore, harm the technological development of standards. [502]

Furthermore, the “hard-edged” discrimination approach should be rejected also because its effects would result in the insertion of the “most favoured licensee” clause in the FRAND undertaking. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the industry would most likely have regarded such a clause as inconsistent with the overall objective of the FRAND undertaking. [503]

Conversely, the Court of Appeal followed the notion described by the High Court as the “general” non-discrimination approach: [504] the FRAND undertaking prevents the SEP holder from securing rates higher than a “benchmark” rate which mirrors a fair valuation of its patent(s), but it does not prevent the patent holder from granting licences at lower rates. [504] For determining the benchmark rate, prior licences granted by the SEP holder to third parties will likely form the “best comparables”. [505]

The Court of Appeal argued that the “general” approach is in line with the objectives of the FRAND undertaking, since it ensures that the SEP holder is not able to “hold-up” implementation of the standard by demanding more than its patent(s) is worth. [506] However, the FRAND undertaking does not aim at leveling down the royalty owed to the SEP holder to a point where it no longer represents a fair return for its patent(s), or to removing its discretion to agree royalty rates lower than the benchmark rate, if it chooses to do so. [506]

In this context, the Court of Appeal made clear that it does not consider differential pricing as per se objectionable, since it can in some circumstances be beneficial to consumer welfare. [507] The court sees no value in mandating equal pricing for its own sake. On the contrary, once the hold-up effect is dealt with by ensuring that licences are available at the benchmark rate, there is no reason for preventing the SEP holder from charging less than the licence is worth. [507] Should discrimination appear below the benchmark rate, it should be addressed through the application of competition law; as long as granting licences at rates lower than the benchmark rate causes no competitive harm, there is no reason to assume that the FRAND undertaking constrains the ability of the SEP holder to do so. [508]

3. Abuse of dominant Position / Huawei v ZTE

The Court of Appeal further rejected Defendants’ argument that, by bringing the infringement proceedings prior to fulfilling the obligations arising from the Huawei judgment, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 TFEU. [509]

To begin with, the Court of Appeal confirmed the finding of the High Court that the Claimant held a dominant market position and dismissed the respective challenge by the latter. [510] It did not find any flaw in the High Court’s view that the SEP holder has a 100% market share with respect to each SEP (since it is “common ground” that the relevant market for the purpose of assessing dominance in the case of each SEP is the market for the licensing of that SEP [511] ) and that the constrains imposed upon the SEP holder’s market power by the limitations attached to the FRAND undertaking [512] and the risk of hold-out that is immanent to the structure of the respective market, [513] can either alone or together rebut the assumption that it most likely holds market power. [514]

Notwithstanding the above, the Court of Appeal held that the Claimant had not abused its market power in the present case. [515]

The court agreed with the finding of the High Court that the Huawei judgment did not lay down “mandatory conditions”, in a sense that that non-compliance will per se render the initiation of infringement proceedings a breach of Article 102 TFEU. [516] The language used in the Huawei judgment implies that the CJEU intended to create a “safe harbor”: if the SEP holder complies with the respective framework, the commencement of an action will not, in and of itself, amount to an abuse. [517] If the SEP holder steps outside this framework, the question whether its behaviour has been abusive must be assessed in light of all of the circumstances. [518]

In the court’s eyes, the only mandatory condition that must be satisfied by the SEP holder before proceedings are commenced, is giving notice to the implementer about the infringing use of its patents. [519] This follows from the clear language used by the CJEU with respect to this obligation. [520] The precise content of such notice will depend upon all the circumstances of the particular case. [520] In general, if an alleged infringer is familiar with the technical details of the products it is dealing and the SEP it may be infringing, but has no intention of taking a licence on FRAND terms, it will not be justified to deny the SEP holder an injunction, simply because it had not made a formal notification prior to the commencement of proceedings. [521]

On the merits, the court accepted the High Court’s assessment that the Claimant had not behaved abusively and particularly the finding, that the Defendants, who were in contact with the Claimant prior to the proceedings, had sufficient notice that the Claimant held SEPs which ought to be licensed, if found infringed and essential. [522]

Considering further that the respective conduct requirements were not established at the point in time, in which the infringement action was filed (since the present proceedings were initiated before the CJEU delivered the Huawei judgment), the Court of Appeal noted that it would very likely not be fair to accuse the Claimant of abusive behavior. [523] Insofar the court agreed with the respective approach developed by German courts in co-called “transitional” cases (Pioneer v Acer, [524] St. Lawrence v Vodafone [524] and Sisvel v Haier [525] ) [526] .

  • [456] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, Case-No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, para. 233.
  • [457] Ibid, para. 6 et seqq.
  • [458] Ibid, para. 233.
  • [459] Ibid, para. 7.
  • [460] Ibid, paras. 8 and 137 et seqq.
  • [461] Ibid, para. 8.
  • [462] Ibid, para. 9 et seqq.; para. 31 et seqq.
  • [463] Ibid, para 17.
  • [464] Ibid, para 130.
  • [465] Ibid, para 18.
  • [466] Ibid, para 112.
  • [467] Ibid, para 291.
  • [468] Ibid, paras. 19 and 45 et seqq.
  • [469] Ibid, paras. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [470] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [471] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [472] Ibid, para. 17.
  • [473] Ibid, paras. 74 and 77 et seq.
  • [474] Ibid, para. 82.
  • [475] Ibid, para. 80.
  • [476] Ibid, para. 79 et seq.
  • [477] Ibid, para. 26.
  • [478] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [479] Ibid, para. 54 et seq., para. 59.
  • [480] Ibid, para. 56.
  • [481] Pioneer v Acer, District Court of Mannheim, judgement dated 8 January 2016, Case No. 7 O 96/14.
  • [482] St. Lawrence v Vodafone, District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 31 March 2016, Case No. 4a O 73/14.
  • [483] Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, “Setting out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents”, 29 November 2017, COM(2017) 712 final.
  • [484] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 74.
  • [485] Ibid, para. 111.
  • [486] Ibid, para. 128.
  • [487] Ibid, para. 121.
  • [488] Ibid, para. 125.
  • [489] Ibid, para. 75.
  • [490] Ibid, para. 92
  • [491] Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Official Journal of the EU L 195, 02/06/2004, p. 16)
  • [492] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 94.
  • [493] Ibid, para. 96.
  • [494] Ibid, para. 98.
  • [495] Ibid, para. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [496] Ibid, paras. 207 and 210.
  • [497] Ibid, para. 176.
  • [498] Ibid, para. 173.
  • [499] Ibid, para. 169 et seq.
  • [500] Ibid, paras. 194 et seqq.
  • [501] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [502] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [503] Ibid, para. 199.
  • [504] Ibid, para. 195.
  • [505] Ibid, para. 202.
  • [506] Ibid, para. 196.
  • [507] Ibid, para. 197.
  • [508] Ibid, para. 200.
  • [509] Ibid, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [510] Ibid, para. 212.
  • [511] Ibid, para. 216.
  • [512] Ibid, para. 219.
  • [513] Ibid, para. 220.
  • [514] Ibid, para. 229.
  • [515] Ibid, para. 284.
  • [516] Ibid, para. 269.
  • [517] Ibid, para. 270.
  • [518] Ibid, para. 269 and 282.
  • [519] Ibid, para. 253 and 281.
  • [520] Ibid, para. 271.
  • [521] Ibid, para. 273.
  • [522] Ibid, para. 284
  • [523] Ibid, para. 275
  • [524] See above
  • [525] Sisvel v Haier, Higher District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 30 March 2017, Case No. 15 U 66-15.
  • [526] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 279.

Updated 6 10月 2020

Unwired Planet対Huawei Conversant対Huawei 及び ZTE、英国最高裁判所

26 8月 2020 - Case No. [2020] UKSC 37

A. 内容

英国最高裁判所(最高裁判所)による本判決は、欧州電気通信標準化機構(European Telecommunications Standards Institute: ETSI)が開発した無線通信標準の実施において必須な(と見込まれる)ものとして宣言済みの特許(標準必須特許又はSEP)の侵害に関する2つの別々の事件から提起された上告について判断を下している。ETSIの知的財産権ポリシー(ETSIのIPRポリシー)は、特許権者に対して自らの保有するSEPを公平、合理的、かつ非差別的(Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory:FRAND)な条件で標準の実施者にとってアクセス可能にするとの誓約を推奨している。

Unwired Planet対Huawei

第一の事件は、幾つかの無線通信標準に対応したSEPのポートフォリオを保有する会社であるUnwired Planet International Limited(Unwired Planet)と特に標準準拠のモバイルフォンを製造販売する中国の製造販売会社であるHuaweiグループ中の2社(Huawei)の間の紛争に関わるものである。

2014年3月、Unwired Planetは自社の5つの英国SEPの侵害に関しHuawei、Samsung、及び第三の会社をイングランド・ウェールズ高等法院(高等法院)において提訴した。この訴訟の過程において、Unwired PlanetはHuaweiに対しライセンシングの申し出をいくつか行ったが、ライセンス契約の合意には至らなかった。その一方で、Unwired PlanetとSamsungとの間ではライセンス契約が交わされた。

2017年4月5日、高等法院はHuaweiに対し、同法院がFRANDと決定した特定の条件による ワールドワイド・ライセンス契約をUnwired Planetとの間で交わすまでの差止命令を出した [527] 。Huaweiはこの判決について控訴した。高等法院は控訴が係属中の間、差止命令の強制を停止した。

2018年10月23日、英国控訴院(控訴院)は高等法院の判決を不服とするHuaweiの控訴を棄却した  [528] その後、Huaweiは英国最高裁判所(最高裁判所又は最高裁)に上告を提起した。

Conversant対Huawei and ZTE

第二の事件は、ライセンシング会社であるConversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (Conversant)とHuawei及びZTEグループの2社 (ZTE)の間の紛争に関わるものである。ZTEは中国に拠点を置きネットワーク機器、モバイルフォン、及び消費者向け電子機器を製造し世界的に販売する企業グループである。 2017年にConversantはHuawei及びZTEに対する侵害訴訟を高等法院において提起した。Conversantは、数ある請求の中でもとりわけ、自社の4つの英国特許に対する侵害について差止による救済を求め、また自社のSEPポートフォリオについてグローバルFRANDライセンスの条件を決定することも高等法院に求めた。Huawei及びZTEは同事件について審理し判決を下す高等法院の管轄権について争い、Conversantの中国特許の有効性に異議を唱える訴訟を中国で提起した。

2018年4月16日、高等法院は、グローバルポートフォリオ・ライセンスの条件を決定する権限を含めて当該紛争についての管轄権を同法院が有すると確認した [529]  。HuaweiとZTEは高等法院のこの判決について控訴した。

2019年1月30日、控訴院は控訴を棄却し、英国特許の侵害を根拠としてグローバルライセンスのFRAND条件を決定するための管轄権を英国の裁判所が有すると確認した [530] 。HuaweiとZTEは最高裁判所に上告した。

最高裁判所は、両事件についての控訴を全員一致で棄却し、本判決を下した Unwired Planet対Huawei、Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国最高裁判所、2019年1月30日判決、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38。 。 

B. 判決理由


1. 管轄権 最高裁判所は、多国籍SEPポートフォリオについてグローバルFRANDライセンス条件を決定する管轄権を英国の裁判所が有し、従って、標準実施者がかかるライセンス契約の締結を拒否した場合には、英国SEPを根拠とする差止命令を発出する管轄権を有すると確認した  [532]

最高裁は、ETSIのIPRポリシーの下でSEP保有者は国内裁判所に差止命令を求めることを禁じられていないとした [533] 。 最高裁は、国内裁判所が差止命令を出すことで侵害を止める可能性は、むしろ、実施者がFRANDライセンスの交渉を行うことを確実に奨励するのであり 「IPRポリシーが取ろうとするバランスに必要な構成要素である」とした [533]  。

また、最高裁は、英国特許を根拠とする差止命令の裁定の他に、英国の裁判所は、グローバルFRANDライセンスの条件も定めることができるとした。最高裁判所の見解によれば、ETSIのIPRポリシーが定めた「契約上の取り決め」は、英国の裁判所に該当する権限を行使する管轄権も与えている  [534]

最高裁によれば、ETSIのIPRポリシーは「通信業界における商慣習の反映」を試みており 「国際的に効力を有することを意図する」ものである [535] 。通信業界においては、(ポートフォリオ中の)「正確にいくつの特許が有効か又は侵害されているかを知らずに」特許のポートフォリオについてグローバルライセンス契約を結ぶことは一般的である [536] 。特許権者は、特定の特許について必須である(と見込まれる)との宣言を行う時点では、開発中の標準におけるその特許の有効性や侵害の有無について知りえない [536]  。その一方で、実施者は、標準を実施する際にどの特許の有効で侵害しているかについて知ってはいない  [536]

この「不可避の不確実性(unavoidable uncertainty)」は、特許権者が宣言した全てのSEPをワールドワイドに網羅したポートフォリオライセンスの締結によって対処され、その対価は「ポートフォリオ中の多くの特許が未検証であるという性質を反映しなければならない 」 [536]  。かかるライセンスを締結することで、実施者は標準への「アクセス」と、その標準に準拠するために必要とされる全技術の使用を許可されているとの「確実性」を「買う」のである [536]

最高裁判所は、商慣習によれば、FRANDライセンスには「未検証 (untested)」の特許が含まれるため、グローバルライセンスの条件の決定はそれに含まれる全特許についての有効性の評価を意味しないとの見解をとった。従って、ワールドワイドポートフォリオ・ライセンスの条件を定める際、英国の裁判所は外国特許に関する有効性及び侵害の有無について判断しておらず、かかる問題は、まさに各特許が認可された国の国内裁判所の専属的管轄権に服するものである [537]  。それ故、実施者が「これらの特許又はいずれかの特許について該当する外国裁判所において異議を申し立てる権利を留保し、結果として、当該ライセンス上でロイヤルティ料率変更のメカニズムを定めるよう求めることは一般に「公平かつ合理的(fair and reasonable)」であると判断された。 [538]

これに関連して、最高裁判所は、前述のアプローチが英国の法理に特有のものではなく、他の管轄区域、特にアメリカ、ドイツ、中国、及び日本で下された判決とも整合性があることを強調した  [539]

2. 適切な法廷地(フォーラム・コンビニエンス)

最高裁判所が扱った第二の争点も英国の裁判所の管轄権に関するものである。原告は、 Conversant対Huaweiの事件において、英国の裁判所は管轄権を辞退して中国の裁判所に渡すか少なくともConversantの中国特許の有効性に対する異議申し立てについて中国の裁判所が判決を下すまで訴訟を一時停止するべきであったと主張した。

最高裁判所は、英国の裁判所には管轄権を辞退し中国の裁判所に渡す義務はないと判断した [540] 。最高裁は、中国の裁判所については(英国の裁判所と異なり)当該紛争の全当事者の合意がないことから、現時点では中国の裁判所にグローバルFRANDポートフォリオライセンスの条件を定める管轄権はなく、本事件には所謂「フォーラム・コンビニエンス(forum conveniens)」の法理が適用されないとした [540]  。更に、最高裁は、現状況下でConversantが中国の裁判所への管轄権付与を承諾するとは合理的に考えにくいと判断した [540]  。 最高裁判所は、本紛争に関わる英国の裁判所には、有効性に関する中国での訴訟の結果を待って英国での訴訟を一時停止する義務もないとの見解を示した [541] 。最高裁は、英国で提起された訴訟がConversantのグローバルSEPポートフォリオについてのFRAND ライセンス条件の決定に関するものであるのに対し、中国での訴訟はConversantの中国特許の有効性のみに関連しているためであるとした  [541]

3. 非差別性

最高裁判所が審理した第三の争点は、FRANDの非差別性要件の解釈に関するものである。この訴訟においては、トライアル開始後にSamsungと合意した条件よりも不利なライセンス条件をHuaweiに対して申し出たことによりUnwired PlanetがFRANDの非差別性の部分に違反していたか否かという問題が生じていた。

最高裁判所は、高等法院及び控訴院の判断を支持し、(Unwired Planetは)違反してはいなかったとした。最高裁は、全ての同様の状況にあるライセンシーに対して同一又は同様の条件を申し出ることを特許権者に義務づけるような、所謂「厳格な(hard-edged)」非差別性の要件をFRANDは暗示してはいないと説明した [542] ] 。

ETSIの IPR ポリシー(第6条第1項)によれば、特許権者はFRAND条件のライセンスを提供することにコミットしなければならないとされている。最高裁判所は、この義務は「単一の一体化された義務(single, unitary obligation)」であり、ライセンス条件の公平性、合理性、及び非差別性に関する別々の3つの義務ではないとの見解を示した  [543]  。よって、条件は「全ての市場参加者に公平なロイヤルティ価格として一般的に提供されるべきものであり」、特定のライセンシーの「個別の特性による調整なしに」SEPポートフォリオの「適正市価(true value)」を反映するべきであるとされた [544]   。

最高裁判所は、更に、ETSIのIPRポリシーに基づくFRAND誓約は、所謂「最も有利なライセンス(most favourable license)」の条項を暗示するものではなく、全ての同様の状況にあるライセンシーに対して最も有利な条件と同等の条件でライセンス許諾を行うことを特許権者に義務づけてはいないと明確に示した [545]  。最高裁は、ETSIによるIPRポリシー制定の経緯について詳しく検討した上で、 以前ETSIが前述のような条項をFRAND誓約に含める提案を明確に却下していたとの所見を述べた [546]  。 最高裁は、更に、価格差別化がそれに関わる私的又は公的な利益にとって有害であるとの「一般的推定(general presumption)」は存在しないとした [547]  。最高裁は、むしろ、特定のライセンシーに対するベンチマーク料率よりも低いロイヤルティのオファーをSEP保有者が選択することが商取引上の意味合いから合理的な状況も存在するとした [548]  。 このことは、例えば、所謂「先行者利益(first mover advantage)」にも当てはまる。最高裁は、一番初めのライセンシーとの間で低いロイヤルティ料率を合意することは、SEPから最初の収益を生むだけでなく、締結されたライセンスが当該ポートフォリオを市場において「有効化(validate)」し将来的なライセンシングに資する可能性もあるため、「経済的合理性(economically rational)」と「商取引上の重要性(commercially important)」を有し得ると認めた [548]  。このことは、Unwired PlanetがSamsung とライセンス契約を締結した当時のように、特許権者が自らの商業的な生き残りを確実にするのため低いロイヤルティ料率でのライセンス許諾を強いられる所謂「投売り(fire sales)」の状況にも当てはまるとされた [549]  。

4. 市場における支配的地位の濫用/Huaweiフレームワーク

最高裁判所が審理した第四の争点は、Huaweiに対する侵害訴訟を提起したことにより Unwired Planetが市場における支配的地位を濫用し「EUの機能に関する条約(the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU:TFEU)」 第102条への違反を犯しており、従って差止による救済へのアクセスを認められるべきでないのかという問題である。Huaweiは、この問題について、欧州連合司法裁判所(the Court of Justice of the European Union:CJEU)がHuawei対ZTE事件で確立した要件(Huawei判決又はHuaweiスキーム) にUnwired Planetが従っていなかったため差止命令の請求は却下されるべきであると主張していた [550]  。

最高裁判所は、この主張は当てはまらないと判断した [551] 。Huawei判決は、特許権者が標準の実施者に対して問題となっているSEPの使用が侵害を犯しているとの通知を差止による救済を求める訴訟の提起前に行う義務を定めており、違反した場合には、TFEU第102条における濫用行為に該当するとの見解を最高裁は示した [552] 。しかし、この義務の「性質(nature)」については、個別の事件の状況によって決まるとした  [552]  。最高裁は、Unwired Planetが本侵害訴訟の提起に先立ちHuaweiに妥当な通知を行っていたと判断した  [553]

Huawei判決が定めたその他の義務を考察して、最高裁判所は、Huaweiスキームは「強制的(mandatory)」なものではなく、正確に従えば第102条に違反するリスクを冒さずに [特許権者]が差止命令を求めることができる「ルートマップ(route map)」を示したものであるとの高等法院及び控訴院が以前に示した見解を支持した [554] 。最高裁は、それ以外にも、各当事者にFRAND条件でライセンスを締結する意思があるか否かという極めて重要な問題の評価を助けるいくつかの基準をHuawei判決が定めているとした[1076]。 最高裁判所は、その上でUnwired PlanetにはFRANDライセンスをHuaweiに許諾する意思があったのであり、濫用行為を行ってはいなかったと判断した  [553]  。

5. 損害賠償か差止命令かの問題

最高裁が審理した五番目で最後の争点は、SEPの侵害に対する適切な救済についての問題である。最高裁判所における上告審において、(原告は)Unwired PlanetのSEPに対する侵害への適切かつ相応な(appropriate and proportionate) 救済措置は差止命令ではなく損害賠償の裁定であるとの主張を初めて行った。 最高裁判所は、本事件において損害賠償の裁定を差止命令の代替とする根拠は存在しないと判断した [555] 。最高裁は、Unwired PlanetとConversantのいずれも、裁判所が既にFRANDとして確認していたはずの条件でライセンス許諾を申し出た場合にのみ差止命令を求める権利を得たのであるから「差止命令の威嚇(threat of an injunction)」をHuawei又はZTEに「法外な料金(exorbitant fees)」を課すための方法として用いることはできなかったとした [556]

更に、最高裁は、(損害賠償訴訟の場合)SEP保有者は実施者に対して特許毎かつ国毎に訴訟を提起することを余儀なくされ実際的ではない(impractical)と考えられるため、損害賠償の裁定が「差止命令の裁定を差し控えることにより失われるものに対する適切な代替手段となり得る可能性は低い」との見解を示した [557]  。更に、最高裁判所は、(損害賠償が適切な救済とされれば)標準の実施者が「特許毎かつ国毎にロイヤルティの支払いを強制されるまで侵害を続けることへの誘因」を得るのであり、自発的にライセンス契約を締結することは侵害者にとって「経済的に意味がなくなる」ため、FRANDライセンシングがより困難なものになるだろうと指摘した [558]  。

それに対し、差止命令であれば「より効果的な救済となり得る」と最高裁は判断した。差止命令は、侵害を全体的に禁止することにより、「侵害者が市場に留まろうとするなら」 SEP保有者の申し出たFRAND条件を受け入れる以外には侵害者に「ほとんど選択肢を与えない」ためである[1081]。このような理由により、最高裁判所は、差止命令が「正義を成すために必要(necessary in order to do justice)」であると強調した [559]

  • [527] Unwired Planet対Huawei、イングランド・ウェールズ高等法院、2017年4月5日判決、事件番号 [2017] EWHC 711(Pat)。
  • [528] Unwired Planet対Huawei、英国控訴院、2018年10月23日判決、事件番号 [2018] EWCA Civ 2344。
  • [529] Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、イングランド・ウェールズ高等法院、2018年4月16日判決、事件番号 [2018] EWHC 808 (Pat)。
  • [530] Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国控訴院、2019年1月30日判決、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [531]  Unwired Planet対Huawei、Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国最高裁判所、2019年1月30日判決、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [532] 同判決、第49節以下。
  • [533] 同判決、第61節。
  • [534] 同判決、第58節。
  • [535] 同判決、第62節。
  • [536] 同判決、第60節。
  • [537] 同判決、第63節。
  • [538] 同判決、第64節。
  • [539] 同判決、第68節ないし第84節。
  • [540] 同判決、第97節。
  • [541] 同判決、第99節以下。
  • [542] 同判決、第112節以下。
  • [543] 同判決、第113節。
  • [544] 同判決、第114節。
  • [545] 同判決、第116節。
  • [546] 同判決、第116節以下
  • [547] 同判決、第123節。
  • [548] 同判決、第125節。
  • [549] 同判決、第126節。
  • [550] Huawei対ZTE、欧州連合司法裁判所、2015年7月16日判決、事件番号 C-170/13。
  • [551] Unwired Planet対Huawei、Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国最高裁判所、2019年1月30日、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38、第149節以下。
  • [552] 同判決、第150節。
  • [553] 同判決、第158節。
  • [554] 同判決、第157節及び第158節。
  • [555] 同判決、第163節。
  • [556] 同判決、第164節。
  • [557] 同判決、第166節。
  • [558] 同判決、第167節。
  • [559] 同判決、第169節。