Huawei対ZTE事件CJEU判決後の判例法
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Updated 22 8月 2018

TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications and Ors., EWHC

英国裁判所の決定
13 6月 2018 - Case No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 1515 (Ch)

A. Facts

The Claimant acquired patents which were declared as essential to the DSL standard under the so-called "ITU Recommen¬dations" (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs) from a company called Aware Inc [1] . The ITU Recommendations require from the SEP holder to make its patents accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions [2] . The Defendants manufacture and sell various types of equipment complying with the DSL standard [2] .

The Claimant asserted claims against the Defendants before the UK High Court of Justice (Court) based on two SEPs it holds [3] . The proceedings involve, on the one hand, technical issues concerning the validity, essentiality and infringement of the SEPs in question and, on the other hand, the licensing of these SEPs on FRAND terms [4] .

Prior to service of the statements of case, the Court ordered the Claimant to disclose licence agreements concluded with third parties covering the SEPs in suit (comparable agreements) [5] . The Claimant entered into licences with two companies (in the following referred to as "counterparty A" and "counterparty B") [6] and also possesses copies of licences previously granted by Aware Inc. to other SEP users [7] . Counterparty A and Aware Inc. argued that their licence agreements can only be disclosed on an "external eyes only" basis (that is only towards i.e. external counsels and independent experts), since they contain confidential information, such as party names, pricing terms and other commercial information [8] . Counterparty B did not object to the disclosure of its licence agreement to the Defendant (provided that this would take place on a confidential basis), but argued that any other confidential information provided to the Claimant in the course of negotiations for the licence can only be disclosed to "external eyes only" [9] .

The Claimant suggested that the parties to the proceedings enter into a co-called "Confidentiality Club Agreement". The agreement proposed by the Claimant differentiated between "Confidential Infor-mation" and "Highly Confidential Information" [10] . Whether information is designated as "Confidential" or "Highly Confidential" would be determined by the disclosing party [10] . Information designated as "Highly Confidential" would be subject to an "external eyes only" limitation [10] . This limitation would apply to both comparable licences granted by the Claimant and licences granted by Aware Inc. [11] . The Defendants did not agree with the Claimant’s proposal. Instead, they requested that two named individuals from the Defendant’s group should be given access to the comparable licences [10] .

The Court did not approve the establishment of an "external eyes only" mechanism as suggested by the Claimant [12] and ordered disclosure of the comparable licences. Nevertheless, the Court temporarily stayed that order to give the third parties affected (counterparties A and B and Aware Inc.) the opportunity to set it aside or vary it, before disclosure of the comparable licences is made [13] .


B. Court’s reasoning

In the Court’s eyes, it is "common practice" in patent cases for parties to reach Confidentiality Club Agreements [10] ; such agreements are "often essential", when disclosure of confidential information is required in court proceedings [14] . In cases involving intellectual property rights, a mechanism for disclosure limiting access to confidential documents to specific representatives of one of the parties is considered "commonplace" [14] . Furthermore, documents can be redacted to exclude confidential material which is irrelevant to the dispute [14] .

Looking particularly at "external eyes only" mechanisms, the Court takes the view that such mechanisms can be included in Confidentiality Club Agreements upon agreement of the parties (as it was the case in the matter Unwired Planet v Huawei [15] ) [16] . If no agreement can be reached on such a provision, parties can request the Court to restrict access to specified documents to "external eyes only" [7] .

The Court finds, however, that such a confidentiality regime can be applied only to exceptional cases [17] . An "external eyes only" mechanism enables one party to exclude access to any document that it chooses, placing the burden of seeking access to documents to the opposing party, despite the fact that the latter is prima facie entitled to such access [18] . In the Court’s view, the opposite should rather be the case: The party wishing to limit access to documents to "external eyes only" should be obliged to justify that limitation [19] .

According to the Court, when determining whether "external eyes only" restrictions should be ordered, the role which the affected documents are expected to play in the case must be considered [20] . Where the documents are of limited, if any, relevance to the proceedings and their disclosure could be unnecessarily damaging for the party asserting confidentiality, ordering an "external eyes only" limitation may be justified in specific cases [14] (insofar the Court adopts the notion expressed in the matter IPCom v HTC [21] ). Furthermore, the Court did not rule out that in certain exceptional cases an "external eyes only" mechanism might also be justified with respect to specific documents of "greater relevance", at least at an interim stage of the proceedings [22] .

When it comes to documents key to the case, the Court finds, however, that the "blanket exclusion" of access to such documents enabled through "external eyes only" mechanisms is not in line with the right to a fair hearing stipulated by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the principles of natural justice . Such a regime is further incompatible with the obligation of lawyers to share all relevant information of which they are aware with their clients . If key documents were to be subject to an "external eyes only" restriction, the opposing party would be unable to discuss the respective documents with its legal representative, to attend parts of the trial and to see all of the reasons for the judgment .

Against this background, the Court held that in the present case, approving the establishment of an "ex-ternal eyes only" mechanism as suggested by the Claimant would "merely postpone the resolution of the dispute" . The Court had ordered the disclosure of the comparable licences, because they are, or are likely to be, key documents in the above sense . Since the Court may be asked to decide on a FRAND licence which must be reasonable and non-discriminatory, existing licence agreements entered into by the Claimant (and its pre¬decessor, Aware Inc.) may be highly relevant documents as comparators .

  • [1] TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 13 June 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 1515 (Ch), para. 2.
  • [2] Ibid, para. 3.
  • [3] Ibid, para. 1.
  • [4] Ibid, para. 1. With respect to the relationship between the 'technical trials' (that means the proceedings concerning the validity, essentiality and infringement of the SEPs in suit) and the 'non-technical trial' regarding to FRAND licensing see, TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 21 November 2017, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2017] EWHC 3305 (Pat)
  • [5] TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 13 June 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 1515 (Ch), paras. 25 and 30.
  • [6] Ibid, para. 25.
  • [7] Ibid, para. 25.
  • [8] Ibid, paras. 26 and 28.
  • [9] Ibid, para. 27.
  • [10] Ibid, para. 4.
  • [11] Ibid, para. 22.
  • [12] Ibid, paras. 34 et seqq.
  • [13] Ibid, para. 35.
  • [14] Ibid, para. 23.
  • [15] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK High Court of Justice, 5 April 2017, Case-No. HP-2014-000005, [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).
  • [16] TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 13th June 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 1515 (Ch), para. 23.
  • [17] Ibid, para. 21.
  • [18] Ibid, paras. 21 and 34.
  • [19] Ibid, para. 34.
  • [20] Ibid, para. 15.
  • [21] IPCom GmbH and Co KG v HTC Europe Co. Limited and ors, judgement dated 23 January 2013, Case No. HC11 C02064, [2013] EWHC 52 (Pat).
  • [22] TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 13 June 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 1515 (Ch), para. 23.

Updated 17 1月 2018

Sisvel v Haier

OLG Düsseldorf
30 3月 2017 - Case No. I-15 U 66/15

A. Facts

The claimant is the owner of European patent EP B1, allegedly covering data transmission technology under the GPRS standard. The defendants produce and market devices using the GPRS standard. On 10 April 2013, the claimant made a commitment towards ETSI by declaring to grant a license on FRAND terms regarding, inter alia, patent EP B1. In various letters and meetings between 2012 and 2015, the claimant informed the parent companies of the defendants about its patent portfolio and made an offer, but no licensing agreement was entered into. These interactions took place before the CJEU handed down its Huawei v. ZTE ruling in July 2015. On 3 November 2015, the District Court granted an injunction order. [23] The District Court also held that the defendants were liable for compensation in principle and ordered them to render full and detailed account of its sales. Further, the District Court ordered a recall and removal of all infringing products from the relevant distribution channels.

The defendants lodged an appeal with the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf. They argued, inter alia, that the District Court had not taken into account the procedural requirements set out by the CJEU in the decision Huawei v. ZTE [24] and that the claimant had not made a license offer on FRAND conditions. [25] The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf partially granted the appeal. It held that the defendants were under an obligation to render accounts and that they owed compensation in principle. [26] However, it held that the defendants were under no obligation to recall and remove the products from the relevant distribution channels because the claimant was in breach of its obligations under EU competition law (‘kartellrechtlicher Zwangslizenzeinwand’). [27] The Higher Regional Court did not have to decide about the injunction order because the parties had agreed to settle the matter in this regard (the patent had expired in September 2016). [28]

B. Court’s reasoning

1. Market Power

The Higher Regional Court held that the claimant was a dominant undertaking within the meaning of Art 102 TFEU. [29] In the eyes of the court, proprietorship of an SEP does not automatically constitute a dominant market position because not all SEPs necessarily influence competition in the downstream product market. [30] Rather, it needs to be ascertained whether or not market dominance exists in respect of each SEP individually. A dominant market position exists, for example, if it would not be possible to successfully market a competitive product without using the respective SEP, or if compatibility and interoperability under the standard could not be guaranteed. In contrast, a dominant position does not exist if the technology covered by the SEP is only of little importance for consumers in the relevant market. [30] On this basis, the Higher Regional Court had no doubts that the claimant was in a dominant market position [31] because the patent in question was related to data transfer, an essential function of the GPRS standard. [32]

2. Notice of Infringement

The Higher Regional Court held that the claimant had given proper notice of infringement under the CJEU requirements. According to the court, the procedure set out by the CJEU in the Huawei v. ZTE ruling applied to transitional cases (i.e. proceedings that had commenced before the CJEU decision, but where the decisions were handed down after). [33] The District Court had wrongfully assumed that the Huawei v. ZTE principles did not apply to the case at hand. CJEU decisions pursuant to Art 267 TFEU apply ab initio (‘ex tunc’) and thus to transitional cases. [34] The Higher Regional Court argued that the Huawei v. ZTE case itself had been of a transitional nature and that the CJEU had been aware of the diverging principles created by the German Federal Court of Justice in the Orange Book Standard decision in 2009. [34] Nevertheless, the CJEU had not distinguished between transitional and ‘new’ cases. As a consequence, the claimant was under an obligation to notify the defendants of the infringement. The written correspondence between the parties from 2012 and 2013 met this requirement [35]

The Higher Regional Court also held that it was sufficient to notify the defendants’ parent companies. [36] The claimant can reasonably expect that the parent company will pass on the respective information to all subsidiaries that are active on the relevant product markets. Requiring the claimant to give additional notices to the subsidiaries would be an unjustified formality (‘bloße Förmelei’). [36]

3. The Defendant’s Willingness to Enter into a License Agreement

As a consequence, the defendants were under an obligation to declare their willingness to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms. [37] Several months had passed between the notice of infringement and the defendants’ declaration of willingness. However, the defendants had made it clear in an email from December 2013 that they were willing to enter into a license agreement. In the eyes of the Higher Regional Court, this was sufficient because there was ample time between this declaration and the commencement of proceedings in 2014.

In the further course of the negotiations, the rejection of certain license terms by the defendant was not necessarily an indicator for general unwillingness. [38] The defendant’s willingness needs to be seen in the overall context of the case. Unwillingness would be demonstrated only if the defendant definitively and finally rejects the claimant’s offers (the ‘last word’). [38] The Higher Regional Court held that the statements made by the defendants in the course of the negotiations did not justify such a conclusion. [38]

4. The SEP Owner’s Licensing Offer and the Standard Implementer’s Reaction

The Higher Regional Court held that the District Court had been incorrect to leave open the question as to whether the claimant’s offer had been FRAND. [39] The Higher Regional Court took the view that the CJEU had established an intricate system of consecutive actions that the parties must take. A claimant needs to make an offer on FRAND terms only if the defendant declared its willingness to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms. Similarly, a defendant is under an obligation to make a counter-offer on FRAND terms only if the claimant made an offer on FRAND terms. [40] According to the Higher Regional Court, this view flows from the wording of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling that relates the content of offer and counter-offer (‘such an offer’; ‘responded to that offer’). [40] An SEP owner who has given a commitment to an SSO to offer FRAND licenses can be expected to make a FRAND offer that can reasonably be accepted by the defendant. In addition, a defendant needs to be able to assess whether the conditions of the claimant’s offer are FRAND. Requiring a defendant to make a FRAND counter-offer no matter what the claimant had offered earlier would be a contradiction of this basic proposition of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling. [40] Thus, it was necessary to have a decision in respect of the conditions of the claimant’s licensing offer.

The Higher Regional Court held that the claimant’s licensing offer did not meet FRAND requirements [41] because it discriminated against the defendants. [42] The court reiterated that infringement courts cannot limit their assessment to a summary review of whether the conditions were not evidently non-FRAND. Rather, infringement courts need to make a full assessment of the license conditions. [43]

The court held that dominant undertakings are under no obligation to treat all business partners in exactly the same way. [44] SEP owners have discretion regarding the license fees that they charge. [45] Different treatment of licensees is accepted if it can be justified as a result of normal market behavior. [46] Further, license conditions can be abusive only if they are significantly different between licensees. [46] These principles also apply to SEP owners who have given a FRAND declaration because this commitment refers to Art 102 lit. c) TFEU. [47] The burden of proof for such substantially unequal treatment lies with the defendant, [48] whilst the onus is on the claimant to prove that this unequal treatment is justified. [48] However, as the defendant will typically not have the necessary information, the claimant is under an obligation to provide information as to which competitors have been granted licenses and on what terms. [48] On this basis the Higher Regional Court concluded that the claimant had treated the defendants significantly differently from their competitors [49] without having a proper justification. [50] In particular, the claimant could not prove that discounts given to a competitor were common in the industry, [51] or that these discounts were a result of the particularities of the case. [52]

  • [23] LG Düsseldorf, 3 November 2015, File No. 4a O 93/14
  • [24] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 32.
  • [25] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 34.
  • [26] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 75.
  • [27] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 74 and 175.
  • [28] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 47.
  • [29] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 177 et seqq.
  • [30] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 182.
  • [31] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 185.
  • [32] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 186.
  • [33] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 202.
  • [34] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 203.
  • [35] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 215.
  • [36] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 213.
  • [37] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 220.
  • [38] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 240.
  • [39] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 244.
  • [40] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 245.
  • [41] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 242.
  • [42] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 251.
  • [43] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 249.
  • [44] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 254.
  • [45] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 255 and 257.
  • [46] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 256.
  • [47] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 257.
  • [48] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 258.
  • [49] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 263.
  • [50] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 268.
  • [51] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 270 et seqq.
  • [52] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 275 et seqq. and paras 290 et seqq.

Updated 21 11月 2018

Core Wireless v LG, Court of Appeal of Paris

フランス裁判所の決定
9 10月 2018 - Case No. RG 15/17037

A. Facts

The Claimant, Core Wireless Licensing S.à.r.l., holds a portfolio of patents declared essential to the GSM, UMTS and LTE wireless telecommunication standards (Standard Essential Patents or SEPs). The Defendants, LG Electronics France S.A.S. and LG Electronics Inc., manufacture and sell – among others – mobile devices complying with the above standards.

The Claimant acquired its portfolio of SEPs from Nokia by a ‘Purchase and Sale Agreement’ concluded in 2011 [53] . The Claimant, Nokia and Microsoft also concluded a so-called ‘Royalty Participating Agreement’, referring to encumbrances [54] .

The parties failed to reach an agreement on a licence for Claimant’s SEP portfolio. Consequently, the Claimant brought an infringement action against the Defendants before the District Court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) of Paris, based on five French patents of its portfolio. The District Court of Paris dis-missed Claimant’s action [55] .

In the ongoing appeal proceedings before the Court of Appeal (Cour d’ Appel) of Paris (Court), the Defendants requested the Court to order the Claimant to produce the ‘Purchase and Sale Agreement’, the ‘Royalty Participating Agreement’, as well as all licensing agreements concluded by the Claimant with third parties, covering the patents in suit [53] . A few days prior to the oral hearing, the Claimant requested, in turn, that the Defendants produce four license agreements which they had entered with third parties [56] .

With the present decision, the Court dismissed Claimant’s request; it held that it was delayed and that the Claimant failed to explain the relevance of the requested licensing agreements to the present pro-ceedings [54] .

On the other hand, the Court granted the Defendants’ request [54] under the following conditions: First, the relevant documents will be made available (unredacted) only to the parties’ counsels, within a deadline of one month after the Court’s order [57] . The parties’ counsels will then be given the opportunity to argue by written submissions which parts or elements of these documents may affect business secrets [57] . On this basis, the Court will decide whether further measures (as set-forth in paragraphs 2, 3 or 4 of Article L. 153-1 of the French Commercial Code) are required for the protection of potential confidential information, or not [57] .


B. Court’s reasoning

The Court made use of the procedural possibilities for the protection of business secrets in court pro-ceedings recently introduced to the French Commercial Code by Law No. 2018-670 dated 30 July 2018 [58] .

In particular, the Court referred to paragraph 1 of Article L. 153-1 of the French Commercial Code, which reads as follows:

‘Where, in the course of civil or commercial proceedings aimed at obtaining a pre-trial order for investiga¬tive measures before any proceedings on the merits, or in the course of proceedings on the merits, the communication or production of a document is requested, which has been deemed to infringe or alleged by a party to the proceedings or a third party to be capable of infringing a trade secret, the court may take any of the following steps on its own motion or at the request of a party to the proceedings or a third party, if the trade secret cannot be otherwise protected, without prejudice to the rights of defence:

(1°) The court alone will review the document and, if deemed necessary, order an expert valuation and request the opinion, for each of the parties, of a person authorized to assist or represent the party, in order to decide whether to apply the protective measures set out in this Article.’

According to the paragraphs 2-4 of Article L. 153-1 of the French Commercial Code, the Court can order the following protective measures:

  • (2°) Decide to limit the disclosure or production of the document to certain parts thereof, order disclo¬sure or production of a summary of the document only, or restrict access to the document, for each of the parties, to a single individual person and a person authorized to assist or represent that party;
  • (3°) Decide that hearings will be held and the decision will be issued in chambers;
  • (4°) Adapt the grounds of the decision and the mode of publication thereof to the needs of protecting the trade secret.’

  • [53] Court of Appeal (Cour d’ Appel) of Paris, judgment dated 9 October 2018, page 5.
  • [54] Ibid, page 5.
  • [55] District Court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) of Paris, judgment dated 17 April 2015, Case No. 14/14124.
  • [56] Ibid, page 2.
  • [57] Ibid. page 6.
  • [58] Ibid, page 5 et seq.

Updated 26 1月 2017

Saint Lawrence v Vodafone

LG Düsseldorf
31 3月 2016 - Case No. 4a O 73/14

  1. Facts
    Since 28 August 2014 Claimant, a non-practicing entity, is the proprietor of the European patent EP 1 125 276 B1 “J”, originally granted to applicants “Voiceage, and allegedly covering part of the AMR-WB standard. Defendant is a company active in the telecommunications sector and which markets AMR-WB-based devices, inter alia devices produced by the Intervener in this case. After the adoption (“freeze”) of AMR-WB by ETSI on 10 April 2001, Claimant (who was not an ETSI member during the setting of the AMR-WB standard) made, on 29 May 2001, a commitment towards ETSI to grant licenses on FRAND terms inter alia for patent EP J. Claimant and its parent company “O” offer the SEP and all other patents of the same family to third parties by means of a portfolio license. Licensing conditions are accessible on the Internet and various producers in the sector have taken a license under these conditions. Prior to the submission of the patent infringement action on 23 July 2014 and to the advance payments on costs on 29 July 2014, Claimant alerted neither Defendant nor the manufacturer of the contested embodiments, who acted as an intervener in the present proceedings and became aware of the lawsuit in August 2014. By e-mails on 31 July and (as a reminder) on 9 December 2014, the first of which included a copy of the statement of claims and reached the defendant before it was formally served with the statement, Claimant notified the alleged patent violation to Defendant. After Defendant’s reply as of 12 January 2015, Claimant presented a draft licensing agreement to Defendant by letter as of 22 April 2015. On 9 December 2014, the Intervener (HTC) declared willingness to take a license for that patent, inter alia for the patent-in-suit, provided infringement was found in Mannheim’s District Court. It further declared that it would accept royalties determined by a court or arbitration tribunal. Claimant, in turn, offered a licensing agreement by letters as of 12 January 2015 and 25 March 2015 respectively. In the course of meetings taking place since 23 January 2014, [59] Claimant offered a license to the Intervener. On 23 February 2015 and on 2 April 2015 respectively, the Intervener made two licensing offers, including third party determination (arbitration panel or English court) of the amount of royalty, for the whole German patent portfolio of Claimant. An additional offer for a licensing agreement, limited to Germany and implementing a royalty of USD 0.0055 per patent by reference to the “WCDMA Patent Pools”, was made by the Intervener on 6 March 2015 and 24 September 2015 respectively, but it was finally refused by Claimant on 4 October 2015. Moreover, the Intervener provided a bank “guarantee of payment” as of 3 September 2015, being modified by letter as of 10 November 2015, and also rendered account of past and prospective sales in Germany since 2011.
  2. Court’s reasoning
    1. Market power and notice of infringement
      The court leaves open the question of whether the SEP conferred market power to Claimant since it did, in any case, find no abuse of such potential market power. [60] The court declared the Huawei rules applicable to claims for the recall of products. [61] As regards the Huawei requirement to alert the standard user of the infringement, the decision arrived at various findings of interest: Firstly, the judges found that—in “non-transitional” cases where the lawsuit was brought after the Huawei decision—the infringement notification has to take place before the action is filed, or the latest before the advance payment on costs is made. In transitional cases, such as the present case, a delayed infringement notification, taking place after the advance payment on costs as well as the submission of the court action, but before the statement of claims is served, is admissible. [62] Moreover, an infringement notification could possibly be omitted (in particular) if—as in the present case—the patent user already disposes of all necessary information and lacks willingness to license. [63] In non-transitional cases, however, the court doubts whether it is possible to rectify an omitted infringement notification without withdrawing the action. [64] Secondly, the court specified the minimum content of the infringement notification which has to indicate at least the number of the patent, the contested embodiments and the alleged acts of use performed by the standard implementer. The court did not decide whether additional information has to be provided, in particular regarding the interpretation of the patent claims or on which part of the standard the patent reads, but it stated that such additional information is not harmful to the patent proprietor. [65] Lastly, the court detailed on the particular situation of the Intervener, being Defendant’s manufacturer and supplier in the present case: Even though a FRAND defense successfully raised by the Intervener would in general also cover subsequent levels of the distribution chain, the Huawei requirements apply only indirectly to suppliers of contested embodiments which have not been sued themselves. Accordingly, the SEP proprietor is not obliged to notify the patent infringement to third parties, but as soon as a request to grant a license on FRAND terms is submitted the (adapted) Huawei procedure applies. [66] In casu, no separate infringement notice vis-à-vis the Intervener was required since the Intervener was, since August 2014, aware of the action having been brought.
    2. The SEP owner’s licensing offer
      Since the patent user did not express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement in due time, the court found Claimant to comply with the Huawei requirement to submit a licensing offer on FRAND terms even though the offer was made in the course of the ongoing litigation. For transitional cases, as the present one, this holds true even if infringement notification and court action take place at the same time. [67] Besides, the court analyzed under which circumstances licensing conditions can be considered as FRAND according to Huawei. In the opinion of the judges, the more licensing agreements implementing comparable terms the SEP proprietor has already concluded, the stronger is the presumption that these conditions are FRAND, unless factual reasons—which are to be demonstrated by the patent user—justify modified terms. Recognized commercial practice in the relevant sector has to be considered when defining the admissible scope of the licensing agreement. If patent portfolios are usually covered by group or worldwide licenses in the relevant market, a (worldwide) portfolio license will be FRAND unless the circumstances of the specific case, e.g. the SEP proprietor’s market activity being limited to one geographic market, require a modification. [68] Accordingly, Claimant’s (worldwide) licensing offer to Defendant for the whole AMR-WB pool, demanding royalties of USD 0.26 per mobile device that implemented the standard and was produced or marketed in countries in which the SEP was in force, and complying with Claimants existing licensing practice (accessible on the Internet and already implemented in 12 licensing agreements) was declared FRAND. While the court considered that comparable licensing agreements “represent an important indicator of the adequacy of the license terms offered” it clarified that the significance of a patent pool as an indication of FRAND conformity is “limited”. Defendant and the Intervener failed to show that the portfolio comprised (non-used) non-SEPs as well. [69] They further failed to show that the pre-concluded licensing agreements provided no valid basis for comparison as they were concluded under the threat of pending litigation. [70] In order to fulfill the Huawei obligation of specifying the calculation of royalties, the SEP proprietor only has to provide the information necessary to determine the amount of royalties to be paid, e.g. the royalty per unit and the products covered by the license. While the court left undecided whether additional indications, e.g. concerning the FRAND character of the licensing offer, are necessary to comply with Huawei, it found that the SEP proprietor’s duty to inform should not be interpreted too strictly as FRAND does regularly encompass a range of values that will be fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. [71] Claimant’s licensing offer presented to the Intervener was considered as being FRAND for the same reasons. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the contractual clause allowing for judicial review of the royalties offered could be a possible way to avoid abusive practices and to ensure that licensing offers correspond to FRAND terms. [72]
    3. The standard implementer’s reaction
      The court found that the more details the infringement notification contains, the less time remains for the standard user to examine the patent(s) at issue and to express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. In the present case, Defendant did not comply with Huawei because it took more than five months to react and then only asked for proof of the alleged infringement. Given this excessive delay, the court did not decide whether Defendant’s reaction satisfied the Huawei requirements in terms of content. It denied the possibility to remedy a belated reaction by a subsequent declaration of willingness to license. On the contrary, and as a consequence of the patent user’s non-compliance, the SEP proprietor may continue the infringement action without violating Article 102 TFEU, but it still has to grant licenses on FRAND terms. [73] Whether the Intervener satisfied the ECJ criteria was left undecided. [74] The court made some further remarks of interest as to the Huawei requirements concerning the standard implementer: Firstly, it left undecided whether the obligation of the patent user to diligently respond is caused also by a (potentially) non-FRAND licensing offer. [75] Secondly, a standard user who has taken a license is not prevented from challenging validity and essentiality of the SEP afterwards, nor is the SEP proprietor entitled to terminate the license if such a challenge takes place. However, the standard implementer may not delay the (unconditional) conclusion of the licensing agreement until a final court decision on these issues has been rendered. While validity and standard-essentiality is litigated, the licensee remains obliged to pay royalties and it cannot request to insert into the licensing contract a clause entitling it to reclaim paid royalties in case of its success in court. [76] Thirdly, as, in the present case, no specific counter-offers satisfying FRAND terms were submitted and Defendant could not establish that Claimant had waived this requirement the court did not decide on whether a SEP proprietor is obliged to negotiate further although itself and the patent user have submitted FRAND offers. [77] None of the counter-offers of the Intervener were FRAND in terms of content. They were either inadmissibly limited to Germany, contained no precise royalty, were not submitted “promptly” because the standard user had waited until the oral pleadings in the parallel procedure, or they proposed royalties per device which the court considered as too low. [78] While it was therefore held to be irrelevant whether, in the first place, the Intervener duly declared its willingness to license, the court emphasized that the Intervener’s readiness to take a license only after the SEP infringement was determined in court did not satisfy the Huawei standard of conduct. [79] Moreover, the obligation imposed by Huawei to provide appropriate security and to render account was not fulfilled. While Defendant refrained from taking any of these actions, the Intervener waited several months after the counter-offers were refused in order to submit its bank “guarantee of payment”, which was not recognized as “appropriate security” due to its amount and its limitation to acts of use in Germany. [80] Neither was the Intervener’s initial proposal to have the security—if requested by Claimant—determined by an arbitration tribunal or by an English court accepted as an appropriate way to provide security. [81]
  3. Other important issues
    According to the court, the Huawei requirements apply to both non-practicing entities and other market participants. [82] Suing a network operator instead of the undertakings producing devices operating in the network constitutes (at least under the circumstances of this case and absent selective enforcement) no violation of competition law even though this strategy might aim at using the action against the network operator as a “lever” to obtain licensing commitments from the device suppliers. On the other hand, device manufacturers are entitled to a FRAND license as well and can raise the FRAND defense if such a license is not granted. In consequence, the court perceives a fair balance of interests as the SEP proprietor can choose on which level of the chain of production to sue while the undertakings in the chain of production can choose on which level to take a license. [83] Furthermore, no patent ambush-defense based on § 242 BGB could be raised because, firstly, Defendant and the Intervener could not substantiate the alleged patent ambush by “Y” and “C”, being the original SEP proprietors; secondly, they could not show that a different patent declaration conduct would have resulted in a different version of the standard excluding the patent-in-suit; thirdly, the alleged patent ambush would, arguably, have resulted only in a FRAND-licensing obligation and, fourthly, Claimant had declared its willingness to grant a license on FRAND terms anyway. [84]
  • [59] This is the date mentioned by the Court although “23 January 2015” may seem more plausible and the date given by the Court may result from a scrivener’s error.
  • [60] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 184
  • [61] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 187
  • [62] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 195 et seq.
  • [63] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 208-210
  • [64] Case No. 4a O 126/14, para. IV, 3, a, bb, 2, c
  • [65] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 193
  • [66] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 270 et seq.
  • [67] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 222 et seq.
  • [68] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 225 et seq.
  • [69] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 225 et seq. On the relevance of the SIPRO-pool royalty rates, cf. LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 245-248. On the facts indicating that a worldwide license was appropriate LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 249-255.
  • [70] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 234-242. The court argued that it is questionable in principle how much the threat of a claim for injunctive relief can (inadmissibly) affect license agreement negotiations, since the Orange Book case law of the BGH (German Federal Court of Justice), the Motorola decision of the European Commission, and now the CJEU judgment in the Huawei Technologies/ZTE Case could be and can be invoked against inappropriate demands that are in breach of antitrust law.
  • [71] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 256 et seq.
  • [72] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 279 et seq.
  • [73] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 214-220
  • [74] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 214-220; 278
  • [75] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 266
  • [76] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 185 et seq.; 262 et seq.
  • [77] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 264
  • [78] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 291 et seq.
  • [79] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 278
  • [80] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 267 et seq.; 299 et seq.
  • [81] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 304
  • [82] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 189
  • [83] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 309-313
  • [84] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 317 et seq.

Updated 24 7月 2020

Sisvel 対 Haier、ドイツ連邦最高裁判所(Bundesgerichtshof)

Federal Court of Justice - BGH
5 5月 2020 - Case No. KZR 36/17

A. 事実

原告であるSisvelは、各種無線通信規格の実施において必須な(と見込まれる)ものとして宣言された特許(標準必須特許、又はSEP)を保有する。

被告は、中国に本社を置くHaier groupのドイツ及びフランスの子会社である(Haier)。Haierグループは、とりわけ、GPRS規格に適合した電子機器の製造及びマーケティングを行なっている。

2012年12月20日、Sisvelは、Haier groupの親会社(Haier China)に対し、SisvelのSEPの使用侵害について通知した。Sisvelは、そのポートフォリオに包含されたおよそ450件の特許の一覧を提示すると共に、自社のSEPについてライセンスの申出を行う旨をHaierに知らせた。

2013年4月10日、Sisvelは、公平、合理的、かつ非差別的(FRAND)な条件にて規格ユーザにSEPの利用を認めることを欧州電気通信標準化機構(「ETSI」)に確約した。

2013年8月及び11月に、Sisvelは、Haier Chinaに対し、自社のライセンスプログラムに関する情報を記した追加の書簡を送付した。Haier Chinaは、2013年12月のみ、Sisvelに対して回答し、Sisvelと「正式な交渉(formal negotiation)」を行うことを望んでいる旨を明示すると共に、これまでのやりとりでSisvelが提示した割引の可能性に関する情報の提供を求めた。

2014年8月、Sisvelは、Haierに対してライセンスの申出を行ったが、この申出は、2014年9月に拒絶された。その直後、Sisvelは、Haierに対し、GPRS規格に従い、データ送信技術を対象としたSEPに基づき、デュッセルドルフの地方裁判所(本地方裁判所)に権利侵害訴訟を申し立てた(係争特許)。これに対応して、Haierは、2015年3月に、係争特許の無効の訴えを求め、ドイツ連邦特許裁判所に訴訟を提起した。

2015年11月3日に、本地方裁判所は、Haierに対して差止命令を出した [85] 。本地方裁判所はまた、侵害製品のリコール及び破棄を命じた。さらに本地方裁判所は、実体的事項に関するHaierの損害賠償責任を認めると共に、Haierに対して、Sisvelに対する侵害製品の販売にかかわる完全かつ詳細な会計書類の提示を命じた。

Haierは、この決定を上訴すると共に、本地方裁判所により下された差止命令の執行の停止を命じるよう、デュッセルドルフ高等裁判所(Higher District Court of Duesseldorf)(本上訴裁判所)に要請した。2016年1月、本控訴裁判所は、それぞれの命令を言い渡した [86]

上訴手続きにおいて、Haierは、とりわけ、Sisvelが侵害訴訟を提起した後の、Huawei対ZTE事件の2015年7月に下された判決(Huawei判決)において欧州司法裁判所(CJEU)がSEP保有者に課した行動要件について、本地方裁判所が、これを適切に考慮しなかった旨を主張した [87] 。 本控訴裁判所での手続き中、2016年1月16日に、Haierはさらに、ドイツの裁判所が係争特許の有効性及び侵害性を最終的に認めた場合のみ、SisvelからFRANDライセンスを受けるつもりであることを宣言した。2016年3月23日に、Haierは、Sisvelに別の書簡を送り、状況が何も変わっていないことを示した。さらに、Haierは、Sisvelの全ての特許に関するクレームチャート及びロイヤルティの算定についての追加の情報を要請した。2016年12月、Sisvelは、Haierに対して新たなライセンスの申出を行ったが、この申出はまた拒絶された。

2017年3月30日付の判決により、本控訴裁判所は、Haierの上訴を部分的に認めた [88] 。本控訴裁判所は、実体的事項に関するHaierの損害賠償責任及び会計書類の提示義務を確認した。しかしながら、本上訴裁判所は、Haierが侵害製品のリコール及び破棄についていかなる義務も負うものではないと判断した。Sisvelが、特にHaierに対してFRANDライセンスの申出を行わなかったことにより、Huawei判決に基づく自らの義務を遵守しなかったからである。本上訴裁判所は、両当事者が本件については和解することに合意したため、差止命令による救済の請求について決定を下す必要はなかった。係争特許が2016年9月に満了となるからである。Sisvelは、本控訴裁判所の決定に対して不服申し立てを行った。

2017年10月、係争特許の特定のクレームの範囲を狭め、別途その有効性を確認した [89] 。2020年3月に、ドイツ連邦最高裁判所(FCJ又は本裁判所)は、第二審として本決定を概ね容認した [90]

2020年5月5日付のこの判決により  [91] (引用元 https://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=3abd1ba29fc1a5b129c0360985553448&nr=107755&pos=0&anz=1)、FCJは、本控訴裁判所の判決を破棄した。第一審における本地方裁判所の裁定は、Sisvelの損害賠償請求及び情報及び会計書類の提示請求に関して維持された。Sisvelによる侵害製品のリコール及び破棄についての請求は、Haierが所有している製品又は係争特許が2016年9月に満了となるまでに製造され、もしくは引き渡された製品に制限された。Sisvelによる差止命令による救済の請求は、これが係争特許が失効した後に本控訴裁判所における従前の手続き中に撤回されたため、本裁判所の裁定の対象とはならなかった。


B. 判決理由 本裁判所は、係争特許がGPRS規格に必須であり、侵害を受けているとの判決を下した [92]

さらに、本裁判所は、Haierに対する侵害訴訟を開始することにより、SisvelがEU機能条約(TFEU)第102条を違反して支配的市場地位を濫用していなかったと判決を下した [93]

本裁判所の見地からは、Sisvelは、侵害訴訟を提起する前に、自らのSEPの侵害使用についてHaierに通知を交付する、Huawei判決に基づく自らの義務を履行している。一方、Haierは、Sisvelとライセンス契約を締結するという自らの誠実意思を適切に示す、自らのHuawei義務を履行しなかった。この事実は、もはや本件において決め手となるものではないが、本裁判所は、SisvelがそれぞれのHuawei要件に従ってHaierにFRANDライセンスの申出を行ったとの見解を示した。

支配的市場地位

本裁判所は、SisvelがTFEU第102条の意味の範囲内で支配的市場地位にあるとの判決を下した  [94]

FCJは、支配的市場地位が、特許により付与される独占的な権利のみによって生じるものではないと説明した [95] 。従って、いくつかの要因を考慮する必要がある [96] 。1つ目の重要な要因は関連市場である。特許が、標準化団体によって策定された基準(又はデファクトスタンダード(事実上の標準))に適合する上で技術的に必須であって、かつ、下流市場で付された製品について、当該基準に代わる技術的な手段が利用できない場合、支配性の評価に適すのは、当該特許のライセンスが提供される(個々の)市場である [97]  。

これに基づき、本裁判所は、Sisvelが支配的市場地位にあると判示した:係争特許は、GPRS規格の実施に必須であること、また、GPRS規格に適合したいかなる携帯電話も、従前の規格の世代も今後の規格の世代も同一の機能を備えることが認められていないため、(下流)市場において競業するものではないこと [98]

この状況において、FCJは、規格実施者が、商品及びサービスの市場の買主と比較して、交渉において有利な立場を得る場合が多いという事実により、SEP保有者の市場支配が制限されるというSisvelの意見を認めなかった [99] 。本裁判所は、商品やサービスの買主とは異なり、規格実施者が、特許保有者との合意を締結していなくとも、規格に準拠した製品を製造するために必要な保護された技術にアクセスできるという有利な立場にいると判断した  [100] 。しかしながら、本裁判所によると、この事実は、市場支配を除外するには十分ではない。ライセンスの交渉において個々の実施者に対するSEP保有者の交渉力の度合いは関係ない [101] 。 支配的市場地位は、独占的権利を行使して市場から実施者を排除する法的能力から生じる、特許保有者の優越した構造的な市場支配力によりもたらされる [102]

同様に、本裁判所は、SEPの行使に関するHuawei判決により課せられた制限が、市場支配(的地位)を損なうものではないことを指摘した [103] 。 本裁判所は、対等な立場で交渉を行うための手段をSEP保有者が最大限に利用できないため、これらの制限がSEP保有者の交渉上の立場を著しく弱めていると指摘した [103] 。 それにも関わらず、実施者が、特許が満了となるまで交渉を遅延することにより「ホールドアウト」行為を行うような場合でさえ、これは、特許保有者の支配的地位を問題として取り上げるには十分ではない  [103]

それでもやはり、本裁判所は、係争特許が満了したので、Sisvelの支配的市場地位が終結したことを指摘した  [104]

侵害製品を(下流)市場参入から排除する法的権利がこれ以上付与されなくなる場合、SEP保有者はもはや支配力を有しない  [104]

市場支配的地位の濫用

両当事者の行為を検討し、本裁判所は、本控訴裁判所とは異なり、Sisvelがその市場支配的地位を濫用していないと判断した  [105]  。

本裁判所は、SEP保有者が、本質的には自らの特許から生じる独占的な権利を行使することを妨げられていないことを明言した  [106] 。特許が標準必須特許であるという事実は、その特許保有者が、支配的な市場地位を有することにより、その技術の使用を許可しているか、許可するよう義務付けられていない限り、かかる使用を容認しなければならないということを意味するものではない。 [106] 。しかしながら、FCJによると、SEPの使用を許可しなければならないという義務は、実施者がFRAND条件にてライセンスを取得するつもりのない場合には存在しない。特許保有者は、とりわけライセンス契約の締結を要請する法的権利を有しないため、支配的な市場地位を有するとしても、標準必須特許の使用者に対してライセンスを「課す」義務はない。 [107]  。

こうした背景のもと、本裁判所は、SEP保有者による独占的な権利の主張(差止命令による救済並びに/又は侵害製品のリコール及び破棄の請求)が市場独占性の濫用に相当し得るという、2つの事案を特定した。

  1. 特許保有者がその支配的な市場地位を濫用したり、非差別性に関わる義務を違反することなく、かかる特許保有者によって拒絶され得ない条件にて、実施者が無条件のライセンスの申出を行なった場合(本裁判所が2009年5月6日付の「オレンジブックスタンダート事件」判決(事件番号 KZR 39/06)における従前の裁定を反芻した限りにおいて) [108]  。
  2. 実施者が、基本的に、ライセンスを取得するつもりであるが、SEP保有者がその支配的市場地位に付される「固有の責任」に従ってライセンス契約の締結を円滑に進める「十分な努力」を尽くしていない場合 [109]

権利侵害通知

結果的に、本裁判所は、SEP保有者が、侵害請求訴訟を提起する前に係争特許の侵害使用について実施者に対して通知義務を負うという見解を示した [110] 。実施者が未だ侵害を認識していない場合に限り当該義務が発生するとFCJが示唆したと思われる  [111]  。

本裁判所は、基本的には、技術実施者が、製品の製造や販売を担う前に第三者の権利が侵害されていないことを確認しなければならない旨を説示した [112]  。しかしながら、この責務は、とりわけ情報通信技術(ICT)分野においてはかなり困難なことである。ICT分野の製品は、多数の特許権の影響を受ける可能性がある  [112]  。特許保有者は、通常はすでに侵害について調査しているが、実施者がFRAND条件にてライセンスを取得する必要があるか否かを検討し、それにより差止命令を回避できるよう、裁判手続きの開始前に実施者に対して特許の使用についての情報を提供しなければならない。 [113]  。

本裁判所によると、それぞれの侵害通知は、通常、グループ会社の親会社宛に送付されることで十分とする  [114] [309] 。内容について言えば、通知には、侵害対象となった特許を明記すると共に、特定の侵害使用及び非難の対象たる実施形態について説明しなければならない [115]  。侵害の技術的かつ法的分析についての詳細は必要ない。従って、実施者は、最終的には専門家や弁護士の助言に従い、侵害の申立について専ら評価しなければならない [115]  。概して、実際にはクレームチャートを提示することで十分な場合多い(強制ではない)  [115]  。

さらに、侵害された特許及び影響を受けた規格に関する情報を提供した特許保有者は、実施者が受け取った情報が侵害を評価するには十分ではないと直ちに示すことを予測していることを、FCJは付言した [116] 。これは、多くの特許及び規格が関わる場合にも当てはまる [116]

上記の事項を考慮し、本裁判所は、Sisvelが所定の適切な侵害通知をHaierに交付したと判断した。2012年12月20日付の書簡及びその後のやりとりは、該当する要件を満たすものであった  [117]  。

誠実意思

その一方、Haierの行為を勘案し、本裁判所は、HaierがSisvelからFRAND条件によるライセンスを取得する意思のあるライセンシーとして行為しなかったと判断した [118] 。この点において、FCJは、逆の結論に至った本控訴裁判所によるそれぞれの評価に異議を示した。

本裁判所は、Haierがほぼ1年にわたって(2012年12月から2013年12月まで)、対応することをとどまっていたため、Sisvelからの通知に対するHaier Chinaの当初の回答が遅かったことに注視した [119] 。侵害通知に回答するのに数ヶ月を要する実施者というのは、通常は、ライセンスを取得することに関心のないこと示す  [119]  。Sisvelが、2012年12月のHaierに対する最初の通知の送付後になって、Sisvelが係争特許を対象としてETSIに対してFRAND確約を行なったという事実は、適時性を評価する上でいかなる意味もなさない。2012年12月20日付の書簡において、Sisvelはすでに、Haierに対してFRANDライセンスを申し出るつもりであることを宣言している [119] 。侵害訴訟手続きの開始前に行われた遅延された回答が(2013年12月からのHaierの回答と同様に)、それでもやはり、当事者らによるHuawei判決(本上訴裁判所が行なった通り)の遵守を評価する際に考慮されるか否かについての疑義は、FCJによって判断されなかった  [120]  。本件では、この疑義は関連性がない。というのは、内容の点から言えば、Haierによるいかなる回答にも、ライセンスを取得する意思が十分に示されていないからである  [121]  。

本裁判所の見地から、実施者は、「どのような条件が実際にFRANDにあたるのかにかかわらず」SEP保有者とのライセンス契約を締結する意思について、「明確に」かつ「疑義の生じないよう」宣言しなければならない(Unwired Planet 対 Huawei(英国及びウェールズ高等法院、2017年4月5日付、事件番号[2017] EWHC 711(Pat)の判決を引用)  [122]  。実施者は、その後、「目的志向」の態度にてライセンス供与の協議に参加する義務がある [317] 。むしろ、権利侵害の通知に対して、ライセンス契約締結を検討する意思を示したり、ライセンス取得の是非及びその条件についての協議に入る意思を示したりするだけでは不十分である  [122]  。

これに基づき、本裁判所は、Haierの2014年12月の回答が、「正式な交渉」を行うという見込みのみが示されているだけであって、誠実意思を宣言するには不十分であると判断した。この宣言は、上記の「明確なもの」でも「疑義の生じないもの」でもなかった  [123]

同様に、2016年1月16日付のHaierの書簡には、Haierがドイツの裁判所による係争特許の有効性及び侵害についての従前の確認を条件としてライセンス契約を締結したため、誠実意思についての十分な宣言が記載されていなかった [124]  。実施者は、原則として、ライセンス契約の締結後にはライセンス対象特許の有効性に異議を申し立てる権利を留保することができるが、本裁判所は、それぞれの条件下での誠実意思の宣言を行うことはできないと判断した [124]  。

さらに、FCJは、Haierが2016年3月23日付の書面により自らの誠実意思を十分に明示してはいなかったと判断した。Haierが上記の許容できない条件を撤回しなかったという事実とは別に、本裁判所は、侵害通知の受領後およそ3年間に渡って、全てのSisvelの特許に関するクレームチャートの作成を要請することは、Haierが係争特許が満了となるまで交渉を遅延させることにしか関心がないことを示すものであるとの見解を示した  [125]  。

Haierが誠実意思を適切に宣言しなかったため、本裁判所は、侵害手続きが開始された後に、実施者がこの義務を履行することが可能であるか否かについて回答しなかった  [126]  。

 

  • [85] Sisvel 対 Haier、デュッセルドルフ地方裁判所、2015年11月3日付判決、事件番号No. 4a O 93/14。
  • [86] Sisvel 対 Haier、 デュッセルドルフ高等裁判所、2016年1月13日付判決、事件番号No. I-15 U 66/15。
  • [87] Huawei対ZTE、欧州司法裁判所、2015年7月16日付判決、事件番号No. C-170/13。
  • [88] Sisvel v Haier、デュッセルドルフ高等裁判所、2017年3月30日付判決、事件番号No. I-15 U 66/15。
  • [89] 連邦特許裁判所、2017年10月6日付判決、事件番号No. 6 Ni 10/15 (EP)。
  • [90] 連邦裁判所、2020年3月10日付判決、事件番号No. X ZR 44/18。
  • [91] Sisvel 対Haier、連邦裁判所、2020年5月5日付判決、事件番号KZR 36/17。
  • [92] 同判決、第9節以下、及び第59節。
  • [93] 同判決、第52節。
  • [94] 同判決、第54節。
  • [95] 同判決、第56節。
  • [96] 同判決、第 57節以下。
  • [97] 同判決、第58節。
  • [98] 同判決、第59節以下。
  • [99] 同判決、第61節。
  • [100] 同判決、第63節。
  • [101] 同判決、第62節。
  • [102] 同判決、第61節以下。FCJによると、それぞれの法的障害により、会社が市場に参入することが不合理なものとなっている事実により、事前にライセンスを得ていなくとも、市場参入の障壁はすでに構築されている。第63項を参照。
  • [103] 同判決、第64節。
  • [104] 同判決、第65節。
  • [105] 同判決、第67節以下。
  • [106] 同判決、第69節。
  • [107] 同判決、第70節。
  • [108] 同判決、第71節。
  • [109] 同判決、第72節。
  • [110] 同判決、第73節以下。
  • [111] 同判決、第73節以下。 本裁判所によると、特許保有者は、規格の使用者に対し、当該使用者が規格を実施することによりその特許の内容が許可なく使用されることになるという「事実を認識していない」場合には、特許の侵害について通知しなければならない。
  • [112] 同判決、第74節。
  • [113] 同判決、第74節及び第85節。
  • [114] 同判決、第89節。
  • [115] 同判決、第85節。
  • [116] 同判決、第87節。
  • [117] 同判決、第86 節以下。
  • [118] 同判決、第91節以下。
  • [119] 同判決、第92節。
  • [120] 同判決、第93節以下。
  • [121] 同判決、第94節。
  • [122] 同判決、第83節。
  • [123] 同判決、第95節。
  • [124] 同判決、第96節。
  • [125] 同判決、第98節。
  • [126] 同判決、第97節。

Updated 23 1月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat)

英国裁判所の決定
5 4月 2017 - Case No. HP-2014-000005

A. Facts

The claimant is a company that grants licenses for patented technologies in the telecommunications industry. The patents at issue (EP (UK) 2 229 744, EP (UK) 2 119 287, EP (UK) 2 485 514, EP (UK) 1 230 818, EP (UK) 1 105 991, EP (UK) 0 989 712) relate to telecommunication network coding and procedures. [127] Most were part of a large patent portfolio that the claimant had acquired from a major telecommunications company in 2013. [128] In 2014, the claimant made a declaration under the ETSI IPR Policy that it was willing to grant licenses on FRAND terms. There were five technical trials relating to the validity, infringement and essentiality of these patents. This summary focuses on the non-technical trial addressed competition law issues, FRAND issues, injunctive relief and damages for past infringements. [129]

In April 2014 the claimant made an open offer to the defendant, a major international smartphone manufacturer, to grant a license in respect of the claimant’s entire global patent portfolio (containing SEPs and non-SEPs). The defendant refused the offer, contending that there was no patent infringement, that the patents were not essential, and that they were invalid. The defendant also argued that the offer was not FRAND and thus did not constitute an abuse of a dominant market position under Art. 102 TFEU. In July 2014 the claimant made a further offer, limited to the claimant’s SEPs. Again, the defendant refused, arguing that the license conditions were not FRAND. [130] In June 2015 both parties made further offers. These offers were the result of directions from the court. The claimant offered a worldwide portfolio license while the defendant wanted to limit the territorial scope to the United Kingdom. [131] Between August and October 2016 the parties exchanged further offers without reaching an agreement. [132]

The Patents Court (Birrs J) held that the claimant was in a dominant position, but did not abuse this position. [133] The defendant was not prepared to take a license on FRAND conditions and the claimant was not in breach of competition law. Thus, the court held that a final injunction to restrain patent infringements should be granted. An injunction for infringements of patents EP (UK) 2 229 744 and EP (UK) 1 230 818 was granted on 7 June 2017. [134]

B. Court’s Reasoning

1. Market Power

The court defined the relevant market for assessing dominance as a distinct market for licensing each SEP individually. [135] European case law indicated that owning an SEP could be a rebuttable presumption for the existence of a dominant position. [136] The claimant’s pleaded position was a non-admission of dominance rather than a denial coupled with a positive case to the contrary. It was the view of the court that this was insufficient to rebut the presumption. In particular, the claimant’s argument of countervailing buyer power was unconvincing because it had not been supported by a proper economic analysis. [137]

2. SEP Proprietor’s Licensing Offer

a. FRAND Declaration as Conceptual Basis

The court pointed out that that the FRAND undertaking also applied in the case that the SEP proprietor was not in a dominant position. It held that the FRAND undertaking operated as a practical constraint on a SEP owner’s market power. [138] The ETSI declaration made by the SEP proprietor is also the starting point for determining the FRAND rate. The underlying issue, which is discussed at length by the court, [139] is if such a declaration forms a contract and whether that contract can benefit third parties. The court acknowledged that the legal effect of this declaration, in particular its enforceability, is a controversial issue under French law. [140] However, the court reasoned that the FRAND declaration is an important aspect of technology standardisation. Holders of SEPs are not compelled to give a FRAND declaration. If they do, the undertaking would be enforceable and irrevocable due to public interest. [140]

The court applied a procedural approach to FRAND. It emphasised that FRAND describes not only a set of license terms, but also the process by which a set of terms are agreed. [141] It applies to both the SEP-holder and the implementer/defendant. In particular, this approach allows for starting offers that leave room for negotiation. On the other hand, making extreme offers and taking an uncompromising approach which prejudices fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory negotiation is not a FRAND approach. [142] This approach also means that the SEP proprietor is under an obligation to make a FRAND offer and to enter into FRAND license agreements. [143]

b. ‘True FRAND Rate’

The court considered that there is only a single set of terms for a given set of circumstances that would meet FRAND conditions (‘true FRAND rate’). [144] This eliminates the so-called Vringo-problem, [145] i.e. if FRAND were a range there would be two different but equally FRAND offers. Thus, if the court would grant or not an injunction, it would be unfair for the alleged infringer or SEP holder respectively. [146]

The court was of the opinion that the true FRAND rate approach does not cause problems under competition law. Theoretically, if only one set of terms is truly FRAND, and if FRAND also represents the line between abusive and non-abusive conduct under Art. 102 TFEU, then every agreed SEP-licence could be at serious risk of being abusive. [147] However, the court took the view that FRAND-compliance and compliance with Art. 102 TFEU are not the same thing (the court pointed out that the CJEU in the Huawei ruling appears to equate an obligation to make a FRAND offer with compliance with Art 102 TFEU).Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 154./span> Since Art. 102 TFEU condemns excessive pricing, [149] a royalty rate can be somewhat higher than the true FRAND rate and still not be contrary to competition law. Conversely, for a breach of competition law, it will be necessary but not sufficient that the rate is not the true FRAND rate. [149]

c. Discrimination

The court held that the correct approach is to start from a global rate as a benchmark and to then adjust this rate as appropriate. [150] It distinguished between two concepts of discrimination. First, the ‘general’ concept of non-discrimination describes an overall assessment of FRAND which can be used to derive the benchmark mentioned above. [151] It is based on the intrinsic value of the patent portfolio, but it does not depend on the licensee. The court held that this benchmark should be applied to all licensees seeking the same kind of license. [152]

Second, the ‘hard-edged’ non-discrimination obligation, which takes into account the nature of the potential licensee, [151] is a distinct concept that could be used to adjust license terms. However, the court held that the FRAND declaration does not introduce such a hard-edged non-discrimination concept. [153] If, contrary to the view taken by the court, the FRAND undertaking did include hard-edged non-discrimination, a licensee could only have the right to a lower rate granted to another licensee (i.e. a specific non-discrimination obligation resulting from the FRAND declaration) if the difference would otherwise distort competition between the two licensees. [152]

d. Territorial Scope of License

The court held that the defendant’s offer that was limited to UK licenses was not FRAND. In the court’s opinion country by country licensing is inefficient for goods such as mobile telecommunications devices that are distributed across borders. [154] It would also be inefficient to negotiate many different licenses and then to keep track of so many different royalty calculations and payments. No rational business would do this, if it could be avoided. [154] This was illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of licenses introduced in the trial were worldwide licenses. [155] Further, it is common ground that the industry assesses patent families rather than individual patents within the family. Assessing portfolios on a family basis inevitably involved tying a patent in one jurisdiction with a patent in another. [156] Thus, according to the court, a worldwide license would not be contrary to competition law. As willing and reasonable parties would agree on a worldwide licence, the insistence by the defendant on a license which was limited to the UK was not FRAND. [157]

C. Other Important Issues

1. Comparable agreements and reasonable aggregate royalty rate

The court held that for determining the royalty rate, the evidence of the parties would be relevant, including evidence of how negotiations actually work in the industry. [158] Other freely-negotiated license agreements might be used as comparables. [159] This may be compared with a top down approach [160] can also be used in which the rate is set by determining the patentee’s share of relevant SEPs and applying that to the total aggregate royalty for a standard, but this may be more useful as a cross-check. [161] Royalty rates determined by other courts might be useful as persuasive precedents. However, in the eyes of the court, a license rate determined at a binding arbitration does not carry much weight as to what parties are usually paying. [158] License agreements must meet certain criteria to be comparable. [162] First, the licensor is the claimant. Second, the license agreement is recent. However, it is not necessary that the licensee is the defendant or a comparable company because different market participants have different bargaining powers, which is reflected in the negotiations and the resulting royalty rates. [162] Finally the court confirmed that a royalty based on the handset price was appropriate and implied a reasonable aggregate royalty rate of 8.8%of the handset price. The court found that the 8.8% was reasonable, in part, because the aggregate implied by either party’s case was higher (10.4% and 13.3%). [163]

2. Principles derived from Huawei v. ZTE

The court also provided a compiled overview of its interpretation of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling. [164] In the eyes of the court, the ‘willingness to conclude a licence on FRAND terms’ refers to a willingness in general. The fact that concrete proposals are also required does not mean it is relevant to ask whether the proposals are actually FRAND or not. If the patentee complies with the procedure as set out by the CJEU, then bringing a claim for injunction is not abusive under Art 102. But even if sufficient notice is given, bringing a claim can constitute an abuse because complying with the procedure does not mean that a patentee can behave with impunity. In other words, there might be other aspects that make the claim abusive. Conversely, bringing such a claim without prior notice will necessarily be abusive.

Significantly, the court held, the legal circumstances of this case differ from the circumstances assumed by the CJEU in a crucial respect. A FRAND undertaking can be effectively enforced irrespective of Art 102. The defendant does not need Art 102 TFEU to have a defence to the injunction claim.
  • [127] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 2.
  • [128] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 54 et seqq.
  • [129] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 3.
  • [130] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 5.
  • [131] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 7-8.
  • [132] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 11-14.
  • [133] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 807.
  • [134] Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC 1304 (Pat).
  • [135] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 631.
  • [136] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 634.
  • [137] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 636-646.
  • [138] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 656.
  • [139] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 108-145.
  • [140] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 146.
  • [141] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 162.
  • [142] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 163.
  • [143] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 159.
  • [144] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 164.
  • [145] See Vringo v ZTE [2013] EWHC 1591 (Pat) and [2015] EWHC 214 (Pat).
  • [146] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 158.
  • [147] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 152.
  • [148] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 154./span> Since Art. 102 TFEU condemns excessive pricing,Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 153. a royalty rate can be somewhat higher than the true FRAND rate and still not be contrary to competition law. Conversely, for a breach of competition law, it will be necessary but not sufficient that the rate is not the true FRAND rate.Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 153.
  • [149] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 153.
  • [150] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 176.
  • [151] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 177.
  • [152] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 503.
  • [153] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 501.
  • [154] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 544.
  • [155] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 534.
  • [156] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 546.
  • [157] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 572.
  • [158] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 171.
  • [159] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 170
  • [160] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 178
  • [161] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 806 (10)
  • [162] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 175.
  • [163] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 476.
  • [164] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), 744.

Updated 26 1月 2017

Saint Lawrence v Vodafone 2

LG Düsseldorf
31 3月 2016 - Case No. 4a O 126/14

  1. Facts
    Since 28 August 2014 Claimant, a non-practicing entity, is the proprietor of the European patent EP J, originally granted to applicants “Y” and “C”, and allegedly covering part of the AMR-WB standard. Defendant is a company active in the telecommunications sector and which markets AMR-WB-based devices, inter alia devices produced by the Intervener in this case. After the adoption (“freeze”) of AMR-WB by ETSI on 10 April 2001, Claimant (who was not an ETSI member during the setting of the AMR-WB standard) made, on 29 May 2001, a commitment towards ETSI to grant licenses on FRAND terms inter alia for patent EP J. Claimant and its parent company “O” offer the SEP and all other patents of the same family to third parties by means of a portfolio license. Licensing conditions are accessible on the Internet and various producers in the sector have taken a license under these conditions.
    Prior to the submission of the patent infringement action on 23 July 2014 and to the advance payments on costs on 29 July 2014, Claimant alerted neither Defendant nor the manufacturer of the contested embodiments, who acted as an intervener in the present proceedings and became aware of the lawsuit in August 2014. By e-mails on 31 July and (as a reminder) on 9 December 2014, the first of which included a copy of the statement of claims and reached the defendant before it was formally served with the statement, Claimant notified the alleged patent violation to Defendant. After Defendant’s reply as of 12 January 2015, Claimant presented a draft licensing agreement to Defendant by letter as of 22 April 2015.
    On 9 December 2014, the Intervener declared willingness to take a license, inter alia for the patent-in-suit, provided infringement was found in court. It further declared that it would accept royalties determined by a court or arbitration tribunal. Claimant, in turn, offered a licensing agreement by letters as of 12 January 2015 and 25 March 2015 respectively. In the course of meetings taking place since 23 January 2014, [165] Claimant offered a license to the Intervener. On 23 February 2015 and on 2 April 2015 respectively, the Intervener made two licensing offers, including third party determination (arbitration panel or English court) of the amount of royalty, for the whole German patent portfolio of Claimant. An additional offer for a licensing agreement, limited to Germany and implementing a royalty of USD 0.0055 per patent by reference to the “WCDMA Patent Pools”, was made by the Intervener on 6 March 2015 and 24 September 2015 respectively, but it was finally refused by Claimant on 4 October 2015. Moreover, the Intervener provided a bank “guarantee of payment” as of 3 September 2015, being modified by letter as of 10 November 2015, and also rendered account of past and prospective sales in Germany since 2011.
  2. Court’s reasoning
    The considerations of the court are almost exactly the same as those in the case LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14.
    1. Market power and notice of infringement
      The court leaves open the question of whether the SEP conferred market power to Claimant since it did, in any case, find no abuse of such potential market power. [166] The court declared the Huawei rules applicable to claims for the recall of products. [167]
      As regards the Huawei requirement to alert the standard user of the infringement, the decision arrived at various findings of interest: Firstly, the judges found that—in “non-transitional” cases where the lawsuit was brought after the Huawei decision—the infringement notification has to take place before the action is filed, or the latest before the advance payment on costs is made. In transitional cases, such as the present case, a delayed infringement notification, taking place after the advance payment on costs as well as the submission of the court action, but before the statement of claims is served, is admissible. [168] Moreover, an infringement notification could possibly be omitted (in particular) if—as in the present case—the patent user already disposes of all necessary information and lacks willingness to license. [169] In non-transitional cases, however, the court doubts whether it is possible to rectify an omitted infringement notification without withdrawing the action. [170]
      Secondly, the court specified the minimum content of the infringement notification which has to indicate at least the number of the patent, the contested embodiments and the alleged acts of use performed by the standard implementer. The court did not decide whether additional information has to be provided, in particular regarding the interpretation of the patent claims or on which part of the standard the patent reads, but it stated that such additional information is not harmful to the patent proprietor. [171]
      Lastly, the court detailed on the particular situation of the Intervener, being Defendant’s manufacturer and supplier in the present case: Even though a FRAND defense successfully raised by the Intervener would in general also cover subsequent levels of the distribution chain, the Huawei requirements apply only indirectly to suppliers of contested embodiments which have not been sued themselves. Accordingly, the SEP proprietor is not obliged to notify the patent infringement to third parties, but as soon as a request to grant a license on FRAND terms is submitted the (adapted) Huawei procedure applies. [172] In casu, no separate infringement notice vis-à-vis the Intervener was required since the Intervener was, since August 2014, aware of the action having been brought.
    2. The SEP owner’s licensing offer
      Since the patent user did not express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement in due time, the court found Claimant to comply with the Huawei requirement to submit a licensing offer on FRAND terms even though the offer was made in the course of the ongoing litigation. For transitional cases, as the present one, this holds true even if infringement notification and court action take place at the same time. [173]
      Besides, the court analyzed under which circumstances licensing conditions can be considered as FRAND according to Huawei. In the opinion of the judges, the more licensing agreements implementing comparable terms the SEP proprietor has already concluded, the stronger is the presumption that these conditions are FRAND, unless factual reasons—which are to be demonstrated by the patent user—justify modified terms. Recognized commercial practice in the relevant sector has to be considered when defining the admissible scope of the licensing agreement. If patent portfolios are usually covered by group or worldwide licenses in the relevant market, a (worldwide) portfolio license will be FRAND unless the circumstances of the specific case, e.g. the SEP proprietor’s market activity being limited to one geographic market, require a modification. [174] Accordingly, Claimant’s (worldwide) licensing offer to Defendant for the whole AMR-WB pool, demanding royalties of USD 0.26 per mobile device that implemented the standard and was produced or marketed in countries in which the SEP was in force, and complying with Claimants existing licensing practice (accessible on the Internet and already implemented in 12 licensing agreements) was declared FRAND. While the court considered that comparable licensing agreements “represent an important indicator of the adequacy of the license terms offered” it clarified that the significance of a patent pool as an indication of FRAND conformity is “limited”. Defendant and the Intervener failed to show that the portfolio comprised (non-used) non-SEPs as well. [175] They further failed to show that the pre-concluded licensing agreements provided no valid basis for comparison as they were concluded under the threat of pending litigation. [176]
      In order to fulfill the Huawei obligation of specifying the calculation of royalties, the SEP proprietor only has to provide the information necessary to determine the amount of royalties to be paid, e.g. the royalty per unit and the products covered by the license. While the court left undecided whether additional indications, e.g. concerning the FRAND character of the licensing offer, are necessary to comply with Huawei, it found that the SEP proprietor’s duty to inform should not be interpreted too strictly as FRAND does regularly encompass a range of values that will be fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. [177]
      Claimant’s licensing offer presented to the Intervener was considered as being FRAND for the same reasons. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the contractual clause allowing for judicial review of the royalties offered could be a possible way to avoid abusive practices and to ensure that licensing offers correspond to FRAND terms. [178]
    3. The standard implementer’s reaction
      The court found that the more details the infringement notification contains, the less time remains for the standard user to examine the patent(s) at issue and to express its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms. In the present case, Defendant did not comply with Huawei because it took more than five months to react and then only asked for proof of the alleged infringement. Given this excessive delay, the court did not decide whether Defendant’s reaction satisfied the Huawei requirements in terms of content. It denied the possibility to remedy a belated reaction by a subsequent declaration of willingness to license. On the contrary, and as a consequence of the patent user’s non-compliance, the SEP proprietor may continue the infringement action without violating Article 102 TFEU, but it still has to grant licenses on FRAND terms. [179] Whether the Intervener satisfied the ECJ criteria was left undecided. [180]
      The court made some further remarks of interest as to the Huawei requirements concerning the standard implementer: Firstly, it left undecided whether the obligation of the patent user to diligently respond is caused also by a (potentially) non-FRAND licensing offer. [181] Secondly, a standard user who has taken a license is not prevented from challenging validity and essentiality of the SEP afterwards, nor is the SEP proprietor entitled to terminate the license if such a challenge takes place. However, the standard implementer may not delay the (unconditional) conclusion of the licensing agreement until a final court decision on these issues has been rendered. While validity and standard-essentiality is litigated, the licensee remains obliged to pay royalties and it cannot request to insert into the licensing contract a clause entitling it to reclaim paid royalties in case of its success in court. [182] Thirdly, as, in the present case, no specific counter-offers satisfying FRAND terms were submitted and Defendant could not establish that Claimant had waived this requirement the court did not decide on whether a SEP proprietor is obliged to negotiate further although itself and the patent user have submitted FRAND offers. [183]
      None of the counter-offers of the Intervener were FRAND in terms of content. They were either inadmissibly limited to Germany, contained no precise royalty, were not submitted “promptly” because the standard user had waited until the oral pleadings in the parallel procedure, or they proposed royalties per device which the court considered as too low. [184] While it was therefore held to be irrelevant whether, in the first place, the Intervener duly declared its willingness to license, the court emphasized that the Intervener’s readiness to take a license only after the SEP infringement was determined in court did not satisfy the Huawei standard of conduct. [185]
      Moreover, the obligation imposed by Huawei to provide appropriate security and to render account was not fulfilled. While Defendant refrained from taking any of these actions, the Intervener waited several months after the counter-offers were refused in order to submit its bank “guarantee of payment”, which was not recognized as “appropriate security” due to its amount and its limitation to acts of use in Germany. [186] Neither was the Intervener’s initial proposal to have the security—if requested by Claimant—determined by an arbitration tribunal or by an English court accepted as an appropriate way to provide security. [187]
  3. Other important issues
    According to the court, the Huawei requirements apply to both non-practicing entities and other market participants. [188]
    Suing a network operator instead of the undertakings producing devices operating in the network constitutes (at least under the circumstances of this case and absent selective enforcement) no violation of competition law even though this strategy might aim at using the action against the network operator as a “lever” to obtain licensing commitments from the device suppliers. On the other hand, device manufacturers are entitled to a FRAND license as well and can raise the FRAND defense if such a license is not granted. In consequence, the court perceives a fair balance of interests as the SEP proprietor can choose on which level of the chain of production to sue while the undertakings in the chain of production can choose on which level to take a license. [189]
    Furthermore, no patent ambush-defense based on § 242 BGB could be raised because, firstly, Defendant and the Intervener could not substantiate the alleged patent ambush by “Y” and “C”, being the original SEP proprietors; secondly, they could not show that a different patent declaration conduct would have resulted in a different version of the standard excluding the patent-in-suit; thirdly, the alleged patent ambush would, arguably, have resulted only in a FRAND-licensing obligation and, fourthly, Claimant had declared its willingness to grant a license on FRAND terms anyway. [190]
  • [165] This is the date mentioned by the court although “23 January 2015” may seem more plausible and the date given by the court may result from a scrivener’s error.
  • [166] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 184
  • [167] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 187
  • [168] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 195 et seq.
  • [169] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 208-210
  • [170] Case No. 4a O 126/14, para. IV, 3, a, bb, 2, c
  • [171] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 193
  • [172] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 270 et seq.
  • [173] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 222 et seq.
  • [174] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 225 et seq.
  • [175] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 225 et seq. On the relevance of the SIPRO-pool royalty rates, cf. LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 245-248. On the facts indicating that a worldwide license was appropriate LG Düsseldorf, 31 March 2016 – Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 249-255.
  • [176] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 234-242. The court argued that it is questionable in principle how much the threat of a claim for injunctive relief can (inadmissibly) affect license agreement negotiations, since the Orange Book case law of the BGH (German Federal Court of Justice), the Motorola decision of the European Commission, and now the CJEU judgment in the Huawei Technologies/ZTE Case could be and can be invoked against inappropriate demands that are in breach of antitrust law.
  • [177] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 256 et seq.
  • [178] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 279 et seq.
  • [179] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 214-220
  • [180] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 214-220; 278
  • [181] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 266
  • [182] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 185 et seq.; 262 et seq.
  • [183] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 264.
  • [184] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 291 et seq.
  • [185] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 278
  • [186] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 267 et seq.; 299 et seq.
  • [187] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 304
  • [188] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 189
  • [189] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 309-313
  • [190] Case No. 4a O 73/14, para. 317 et seq.

Updated 3 2月 2020

Philips v Wiko

OLG Karlsruhe
30 10月 2019 - Case No. 6 U 183/16

A. Facts

The Claimant, Philips, holds patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of wireless telecommunications standards (Standard Essential Patents or SEPs) developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), including SEPs reading on the UMTS and LTE standards. Philips committed towards ETSI to make its SEPs accessible to standard users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.

The Defendant is the German subsidiary of the Wiko group of companies, which has its headquarters in France (Wiko). Wiko sells mobile phones implementing the LTE standard in Germany.

In October 2014, Philips informed the parent company of the Wiko group about its SEP portfolio, but did not receive a response. In July 2015, Philips shared a draft licensing agreement for its SEP portfolio as well as claim charts referring to several of its SEPs with the parent company of the Wiko group, which again did not react at all. In September 2015, Philips shared further technical details regarding its SEPs.

On 19 October 2015, Philips brought an infringement action against Wiko before the District Court of Mannheim based on one of its SEPs, requesting for injunctive relief, information and rendering of accounts, destruction and recall of infringing products from the market as well as a declaratory judgment confirming Wiko’s liability for damages on the merits.

On the next day, 20 October 2015, Wiko sent a letter to Philips, in which it declared its willingness to enter into negotiations with the latter for a licence covering ‘valuable’ patents. In August 2016, during the course of the pending infringement proceedings, Wiko made a counteroffer to Philips. Philips did not accept this offer. Subsequently, Wiko provided security to Philips for the use of its patents, calculated on basis of its counteroffer.

By judgment dated 25 November 2016 [191] , the District Court of Mannheim granted Philips’ claims almost to the full extent. Wiko appealed the District Court’s judgement. In addition, by way of a counterclaim, Wiko requested disclosure of existing licensing agreements signed by Philips with similarly situated licensees (comparable agreements).

With the present judgment [192] , the Higher District Court of Karlsruhe (Court) overturned the ruling of the District Court in part. In detail, the Court confirmed Philips’ claims for information and the rendering of accounts as well as Wiko’s liability for damages on the merits. The Court, however, rejected Philips’ claims for injunctive relief, destruction and recall of infringing products from the market.

Apart from that, the Court also rejected Wiko’s counterclaim regarding the production of comparable agreements in the proceedings.


B. Court’s reasoning

The Court confirmed that Wiko’s products infringe the patent in suit [193] .

Contrary to the view taken previously by the District Court, the Court found, however, that Article 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) prevents Philips from enforcing the claims for injunctive relief as well as the recall and destruction of infringing products asserted in the infringement proceedings for the time being [194] . In the Court’s eyes, Philips had failed to meet the conduct obligations established by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the matter Huawei v ZTE [195] (Huawei framework or obligations) [196] .

Huawei framework

The Court explained that SEP holder’s failure to meet its Huawei obligations will – as a rule – render an infringement action resulting in an exclusion of the implementer from a downstream market (action for injunctive relief and/or recall and destruction of products) abusive in terms of Article 102 TFEU [197] . This will, however, not be the case, when the implementer himself fails to fulfil its duties under the Huawei framework; if the implementer acts in bad faith as an ‘unwilling’ licensee, then SEP holder’s Huawei obligations are ‘suspended’ [197] . As a result, asserting the rights to injunctive relief and/or the destruction and recall of infringing products in court could then be considered as a justified reaction of the SEP holder to the implementer’s unwillingness to enter into a FRAND licence [197] .

Having said that, the Court expressed the view that the parties can remedy potential flaws in their conduct under the Huawei judgment and/or even fulfil their Huawei obligations for the first time during the course of pending infringement proceedings [198] . The Court noted that in Huawei v ZTE, the CJEU did not require that the parties fulfil all conduct obligations established prior to the initiation of court proceedings [199] . In the Court’s eyes, denying the parties such possibility is not compatible either with the general principle of proportionality known to European law, nor with the German civil procedural law, according to which courts need to consider all facts relevant for their decision-making raised in the proceedings until the end of the oral arguments [200] .

Accordingly, an infringement action that did not give rise to any antitrust concerns at the time it was filed, can be considered as abusive at a later point in time, if the situation significantly changed, e.g. the implementer fulfilled its Huawei obligations in the meantime [201] . Vice versa, an action of an abusive nature can later on be ‘corrected’, if the patent holder performs its duties under the Huawei framework during the course of the pending proceedings [201] .

In the Court’s view, a SEP holder seeking to remedy (or fulfil for the first time) obligations under the Huawei framework after the initiation of infringement proceedings must make sure that pressure-free licensing negotiations between the parties are enabled, as required by the CJEU in Huawei v ZTE [202] . For this, the patent holder must use procedural tools available under German law, particularly a motion for suspension of the trial [202] . The SEP holder can also propose a consensual stay of the proceedings, especially when a parallel nullity action against the patent in suit is pending before the Federal Patent Court [202] . In case such a motion is filed, the Court expects that a ‘willing’ implementer will consent to a suspension of the proceedings [202] .

On the other hand, the Court pointed out that fulfilment of Huawei obligations by the implementer after the beginning of infringement proceedings does not necessarily lead to a dismissal of the claims asserted by the SEP holder [203] . Indeed, if the implementer meets its Huawei duties at a very late point in time in the proceedings (e.g. shortly before the closing of the oral arguments), the Court could eventually neglect this fact in its decision [204] . This way, delays can be avoided. In this context, the Court also made clear that the implementer is not in a position to cause a unilateral suspension of the proceedings; in contrast to the opposite case (that is cases, in which a stay of the proceedings is suggested by the claimant), the SEP holder will usually not be required to agree to a suspension of the proceedings proposed by the implementer, in order to allow pressure-free negotiations to take place [204] . Insofar, the implementer bears the risk that the fulfilment of its obligations under the Huawei framework in the course of a pending infringement trial will have no impact [204] .

Notification of infringement

Looking at the specific conduct of the parties in the present case, the Court found that Philips had fulfilled its obligation to notify Wiko about the infringement of the SEP in suit prior to the commencement of the infringement proceedings.

The Court confirmed that a notification addressed to the parent company within a group of companies will usually be sufficient under the Huawei framework [205] . In terms of content, the Court was satisfied by the fact that Philips’ letter from July 2015 named the patent in suit as well as the relevant part of standard document implementing the technical teachings of this patent [206] . The Court explained that the notification does not have to contain (further) information required for a final assessment of the validity and essentiality of the patent in suit [206] . Accordingly, the SEP holder is not obliged to share claims charts customarily used in SEP licensing negotiations with the implementer along with the notification of infringement [206] .

Willingness to enter into a licence

The Court further found that Wiko had sufficiently met its obligation to express its willingness to negotiate a licence with Philips [207] .

The Court agreed with the assessment of the District Court that Wiko’s initial reaction to Philips’ notification in July 2015 by letter dated 20 October 2015 was belated. According to the Court, the time available to the implementer for expressing its willingness to enter into negotiations for a licence will – as a rule – not exceed two months [208] . This period of time will usually be sufficient: since by declaring its willingness to enter into negotiations the implementer does not waive any rights (especially the right to contest the validity and/or infringement of the patents in question), it shall not be given more time than the time needed for an ‘initial overview’ of the SEP holder’s claims [208] . Delaying tactics potentially applied by the implementer must be prevented [208] . Against this background, Wiko’s letter dated 20 October 2015 was sent to Philips too late.

Nevertheless, the Court found that Wiko had remedied the belated response after the beginning of the infringement proceedings. On the one hand, Wiko’s letter dated 20 October 2015 had reached Philips at a very early stage of the proceedings, namely just some days after the action was filed [209] . In addition, Wiko had confirmed its willingness to enter into negotiations with Philips expressed in said letter during the course of the proceedings, by making a counteroffer, rendering accounts and providing security to Philips [209] .

SEP holder’s offer

On the other hand, the Court held that Philips had failed to comply with its obligation to make a FRAND licensing offer to Wiko. In particular, the Court took the view that Philips did not provide sufficient information to Wiko with respect to its licensing offer dated July 2015 [210] .

The Court argued that the ‘fairness’ element of the FRAND commitment establishes an ‘information duty’ (‘Informationspflicht’) of the SEP holder with respect to the content of its licensing offer to the implementer [211] . This duty exists besides the patent holder’s duty to make a FRAND licensing offer to the implementer [212] .

In terms of scope, the Court found that the information duty is, basically, not limited to the calculation of the offered royalty but also covers (objective) facts showing that the ‘contractual compensation factors’ (‘vertragliche Vergütungsfaktoren’) are not discriminatory [213] . The extent of the information to be shared depends on the circumstances of the specific ‘licensing situation’ [213] .

In case that the patent holder has already granted licences to third parties, the information duty will extend also towards its ‘licensing practice’, including comparable agreements [214] .

If the SEP holder uses exclusively a standard licensing programme, then it will be sufficient to show that said programme has been accepted in the market and that the offer made to the implementer corresponds with the standard licensing agreement used [214] .

On the other hand, if the SEP holder has concluded individual licensing agreements with third licensees, then it would be obliged to disclose – at least – the content of the key contractual terms in a way that would allow the implementer to identify whether (respectively why) the offer it received is subject to dissimilar conditions [214] . The Court made, however, clear that – contrary to the approach adopted by the Duesseldorf courts – the SEP holder is not obliged in any case to disclose the full content of all existing comparable agreements [214] . In the eyes of the Court, the information duty serves only the purpose of facilitating good will licensing negotiations. A full disclosure of comparable agreement is, however, uncommon in practice [214] .

In this context, the Court pointed out that the patent holder will have to adequately substantiate the content of ‘justified confidentiality interests’ that might hinder the disclosure of comparable agreements [214] . Furthermore, the SEP holder would need to facilitate the conclusion of a Non-Disclosure Agreement which would allow sharing further information with the implementer [214] .

Based on the above considerations, the Court found that Philips had not fulfilled its information duty at any time [215] . In particular, the Court criticized that Philips did not adequately explain the reasons for choosing to agree on a lump sum payment (instead of a running royalty) in an existing agreement with a third licensee [216] . The fact that companies of different size were affected did not relieve Philips from its information duty; according to the Court, the mere fact that two competitors in a downstream market are of different size does not per se offer sufficient ground for different treatment [217] .

Since the Court assumed that Philips had failed to meet its information duties, it did not examine whether Philips’ licensing offer to Wiko was FRAND in terms of content [218] . In this respect, the Court seemed to agree, however, with the notion that FRAND is a range providing parties with a degree of flexibility [219] .

Implementer’s claim for disclosure of comparable agreements

Referring to the counterclaim for full disclosure of Philips’ comparable agreements raised by Wiko in the appeal proceedings, the Court clarified that a respective right of Wiko does not exist [220] .

Such a right does not arise either from German civil law (Articles 809 and 810 German Civil Code) [220] or Article 102 TFEU [221] . Furthermore, a right for disclosure of comparable agreement can neither be extracted by the SEP holder’s FRAND commitment to ETSI [222] . The Court saw no indication that French law (which is applicable to the ETSI FRAND undertaking) establishes such a right in favour of standards implementers [223] .

C. Other important issues

The Court pointed out that the claims for damages as well as information and rendering of accounts also asserted by Philips in the present proceedings are not subject to the Huawei framework [224] . Moreover, the Court explained that the non-fulfilment of the Huawei obligations by the patent holder poses no limitations on these rights in terms of content [225] . This is particularly true with respect to SEP holder’s claim to request information about expenses and profits from the implementer5 [226] .

  • [191] Philips v Wiko, District Court (Landgericht) of Mannheim, judgment dated 25 November 2016, Case No. 7 O 44/16.
  • [192] Philips v Wiko, Higher District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 25 November 2016, Case No. 7 O 44/16, cited by http://lrbw.juris.de.
  • [193] Ibid, paras. 37-87.
  • [194] Ibid, para. 88.
  • [195] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C 170/13.
  • [196] Philips v Wiko, Higher District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 25 November 2016, para. 108.
  • [197] Ibid, para. 107.
  • [198] Ibid, paras. 117 et seqq.
  • [199] Ibid, para. 119.
  • [200] Ibid, paras. 120 et seq.
  • [201] Ibid, para. 120.
  • [202] Ibid, para. 125.
  • [203] Ibid, para. 126.
  • [204] Ibid, para. 127.
  • [205] Ibid, para. 111.
  • [206] Ibid, para. 112.
  • [207] Ibid, paras. 115 and 117.
  • [208] Ibid, para. 115.
  • [209] Ibid, para. 129.
  • [210] Ibid, paras. 131 et seqq.
  • [211] Ibid, paras. 132 et seq.
  • [212] Ibid, para. 135.
  • [213] Ibid, para. 133.
  • [214] Ibid, para. 134.
  • [215] Ibid, paras. 136 et seqq.
  • [216] Ibid, para. 136.
  • [217] Ibid, para. 138.
  • [218] Ibid, para. 131.
  • [219] Ibid, para. 106.
  • [220] Ibid, paras. 157 et seqq.
  • [221] Ibid, paras. 162 et seqq.
  • [222] Ibid, paras. 160 et seq.
  • [223] Ibid, para. 161.
  • [224] Ibid, para. 143.
  • [225] Ibid, para. 144.
  • [226] Ibid, paras. 145 et seqq.

Updated 17 1月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat)

英国裁判所の決定
7 6月 2017 - Case No. HP-2014-000005

A. Facts and Main Judgment

The claimant is a company that grants licenses for patented technologies in the telecommunications industry. The patents at issue relate to telecommunication network coding and procedures. In 2014, the claimant made a declaration under the ETSI IPR Policy that it was willing to grant licenses on FRAND terms. There were five technical trials relating to the validity, infringement and essentiality of these patents and one non-technical trial relating to competition law issues, FRAND issues, injunctive relief and damages for past infringements.Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2017/1304.html In its decision on 5 April 2017 (the ‘main judgment’), the Patents Court (Birrs J) held that two patents were valid and that they had been infringed, and that the claimant was in a dominant position, but had not abused this position. The court stated that a final decision about an injunction to restrain patent infringements should be made separately. A few weeks after the main judgment, a license representing the FRAND terms between the two parties was prepared (the ‘settled license’), but had not yet been entered into. [228] Further, the defendant offered to give an undertaking to the court to enter into the license settled by the Patents Court or any other court. [229]

In its subsequent decision on 7 June 2017 (the case at hand), the parties argued whether the court should grant an injunction order given the existence of the settled license. Other minor issues of the case related to damages, declaratory relief, costs and permission to appeal. [230] The court granted an injunction for infringements of patents EP (UK) 2 229 744 and EP (UK) 1 230 818 (the ‘final order’). [231] The injunction order would be discharged if the defendant entered into a FRAND license and it would be stayed pending appeal. The court also declared that the settled license represented the FRAND terms in the given circumstances between the parties and that the defendant had to pay GBP 2.9 million of the claimant’s costs. Permission to appeal was granted to the defendant in respect of three issues and to the claimant in respect of one issue. [231]

B. Court’s Reasoning

1. Injunction

The main issue considered by the court was the interplay between the injunction, the settled license and the undertaking offered by the defendant. Patent EP (UK) 2 229 744 will expire in 2028. The settled license’s expiry date is 31 December 2020, [232] which would put the defendant in a difficult position if it attempts to renegotiate the license while the injunction is still in place. The defendant would even risk being in contempt of court if it continued to sell equipment if there was an argument that the license had come to an end for other reasons (e.g. repudiatory breach of contract). [233] However, the court took the view that it cannot be said that the defendant must be free to sell products if the license has ceased to exist. [232] Similarly, it cannot be said with certainty that the claimant must have an injunction at that date.

Thus, the court considered what the correct form of injunction in respect of a FRAND undertaking should be when a court has settled a license but the defendant has not entered into it (‘FRAND injunction’). [234] The court held that the FRAND injunction should contain a proviso that it will cease to have effect as soon as the defendant enters into the FRAND license. The injunction should also be subject to an express liberty to either party to return to court in the future if the FRAND license ceases to exist or expires while the patent is still valid. [234]

The court also held that despite the court’s discretion as to whether an injunction is granted, an injunction is normally effective, proportionate and dissuasive in IP cases. [235] Although the practical effect of a defendant’s undertaking and an injunction are similar, rights holders usually insist on an injunction. [236] One reason is that it involves a public vindication of the claimant’s rights. [236] As the claimant has been forced to come to court, an offer of undertaking after judgment is usually considered too late. [236] In this case, the defendant had maintained throughout the negotiations and the trial that it was under no obligation to accept a worldwide license. [237] Thus, according to the court, the right thing to do was to grant a FRAND injunction which will be stayed on terms pending appeal.

2. Other Issues

The court held that the issue of damages is closely related to the main issue. [238] If the defendant entered into the settled license, all payments would be covered by the license. If the defendant did not enter into the settled license, an order for damages is required. As a consequence, the court order should be in the same form as the FRAND injunction (stayed pending appeal and ceasing to have effect if the parties enter into the settled license). [238]

The parties also disagreed about the wording of the court declaration regarding the FRAND terms of the settled license. [239] The court dismissed the defendant’s suggestion as too complicated and the claimant’s suggestion as incomprehensive. Instead, the court declaration would be ‘the license annexed to the judgment represents the FRAND terms applicable between the parties in the relevant circumstances’. [240] Further, the court rejected the defendant’s petition to make a declaration that the claimant had not abused its dominant market position. [241] It took the view that the main judgment made a clear finding on this issue in summary paragraph 807(17).

Further, the parties disagreed about the extent of the defendant’s obligation to bear the claimant’s costs. The claimant argued that it should be regarded as the successful party so that the defendant had to pay its costs (GBP 6.4million). [242] The defendant argued the claimant had been clearly wrong regarding the applicable FRAND rate [243] and the appropriate thing would be to make no cost order. The court rejected the idea that there was no overall winner (as argued by the defendant) because the claimant was successful on the issues of the nature of the license and the existence and abuse of market dominance. [244] The ensuing question was whether any deductions were appropriate. [245] The court held that neither party had offered terms that were essentially FRAND. [246] However, the rates offered by the claimant were significantly further away from the end result than the rates offered by the defendant. [246] Thus, the defendant’s costs in relation to the FRAND rate issue were not recoverable by the claimant.

The fifth and final issue was in respect of permission to appeal. The court granted the defendant permission on three grounds: first, the necessity of granting a global license (including the court’s view that there is only one applicable license fee); [247] second, the hard-edged non-discrimination point; [248] and third, the issue of injunctive relief and abuse of market dominance under the CJEU ruling Huawei v. ZTE. [249] Conversely, the claimant was granted permission to appeal on the blended global benchmark issue (using a blended global rate as a benchmark, leading to the question whether another discount for the Chinese market should given). [250]

  • [227] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2017/1304.html
  • [228] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 2.
  • [229] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 8.
  • [230] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 1.
  • [231] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 70.
  • [232] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 22.
  • [233] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 19.
  • [234] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 20.
  • [235] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 25.
  • [236] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 26.
  • [237] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 29.
  • [238] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 33.
  • [239] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 34.
  • [240] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 36.
  • [241] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 38.
  • [242] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), paras 39-40.
  • [243] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 41.
  • [244] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 44.
  • [245] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 45.
  • [246] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 56.
  • [247] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 170 et seqq.
  • [248] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 177 and 481 et seqq.
  • [249] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 627 et seqq.
  • [250] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 537 et seqq.

Updated 3 12月 2018

IP Bridge v HTC

LG Mannheim
28 9月 2018 - Case No. 7 O 165/16

A. Facts

The Claimant, IP Bridge, is a non-practising entity holding a European patent (German part) which was declared essential to the wireless telecommunications standard LTE (Standard Essential Patent or SEP) developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [251] . The previous holder of the SEP in question had made an undertaking towards ETSI according to Article 6.1 of ETSI IPR Policy to make the patent accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions [252] .

The Defendant is a German subsidiary of HTC, a company which manufactures and sells electronic devices worldwide, including mobile phones complying with the LTE standard [253] . The Defendant filed an action for invalidity against the Claimant’s SEP in Germany [253] .

In December 2014, the Claimant contacted the Defendant’s parent company (parent company) suggesting that the parties entered into negotiations regarding a licence for Claimant’s patent portfolio which also included the aforementioned SEP [253] . Subsequently, several licensing offers and counter-offers were made by the Claimant and the parent company respectively [253] . On 29 February 2016, the Claimant sent a letter to the parent company explaining how the LTE standard made use of the technology covered by its SEP inter alia under reference to an attached claims chart [254] . In response, the parent company confirmed that it is willing to obtain a licence, among others, by letter dated 7 September 2016 [255] . However, no licensing agreement was concluded.

On 27 September 2016, the Claimant brought an infringement action against the Defendant before the District Court of Mannheim (Court) requesting for a declaratory judgment confirming Defendant’s liability for damages arising from the use of its SEP as well as for information and rendering of accounts [256] .

On 16 February 2018, during the course of the pending proceedings against the Defendant, the Claimant made a further licensing offer to the parent company [257] . On 11 April 2018, after the parent company had signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement, the Claimant presented existing licensing agreements with third parties concerning its relevant patent portfolio (comparable agreements) to the parent company and requested the latter to respond to its last licensing offer of 16 February 2018 within one week (that is until 18 April 2018) [257] . This deadline was extended for almost three weeks until 7 May 2018 [257] .

On 15 May 2018, the Claimant extended its claims in the ongoing proceedings; in addition to its already pending claims, it sought for injunctive relief and also requested the recall and the destruction of products infringing its SEP (claims for injunction) [257] .

With the present judgment the Court ruled that the Defendant is liable for damages arising from the infringement of the SEP in suit [258] . The Court also ordered the Defendant to render accounts and to provide relevant information to the Claimant [258] . On the other hand, the Court dismissed the claim for injunctive relief and the recall and destruction of infringing products as being unenforceable for the time being [259] .


B. Court’s reasoning

The Court held that the products sold by the Defendant in Germany infringe Claimant’s SEP [260] . Thus, the Defendant is obliged to compensate the damages suffered by the Claimant and the previous holder of the patent in suit [258] . Since the Claimant has no knowledge of the details required for the quantification of the damages suffered, the Defendant is obliged to provide information on relevant uses (starting from the publication of the patent grant) and render accounts for such uses (starting from one month after the publication of the patent grant) [258] .

In the Court’s view, the Defendant cannot raise a defence based on a so-called “patent ambush” against these claims [261] . A “patent ambush” requires that the patent holder deliberately – in terms of a willful fraudulent misconduct – misled the participants in the standardisation process and intentionally prevented the adoption of an alternative technology into the standard [262] . Insofar, it needs to be established (by the defendant) that the disclosure of the patent during the standardisation process would have led to an alternative structure of the standard, which would have avoided making use of the teaching of the patent in suit; the mere theoretical possibility of an alternative technical solution does not suffice for supporting the allegation of a “patent ambush” [262] . The Court held that the Defendant failed to establish such fact [261] . Accordingly, the Court left the question regarding the legal consequences of a “patent ambush” open (obligation to licence royalty-free or just an obligation to offer FRAND licences?) [261] .

Furthermore, the Court stressed out that the FRAND undertaking given by the previous holder of the SEP in suit has no impact on both the scope and the enforceability of the above claims [263] .

In the Court’s eyes, the Claimant is bound to the FRAND undertaking made by the previous holder of the SEP in suit towards ETSI [264] . The wording of Article 6.1. ETSI IPR Policy establishes a respective assumption [264] . In any case, the assignee of a SEP abuses its market power, if it is aware of the FRAND-undertaking of its predecessor, but, nevertheless, refuses to fulfil the obligations arising from it [254] . The assignee of an SEP cannot draw benefits from the inclusion of its patent into a standard, without being bound to the FRAND commitment of its predecessor, since the latter enabled the inclusion of the SEP in the standard in the first place [254] . Indeed, antitrust law and particularly Article 101 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) obliges standard development organisations to make the inclusion of patented technology into a standard subject to a FRAND commitment of the patent holder, in order to secure that essential technology will be accessible to users [265] .

Having said that, the Court made clear that SEP holder’s claims for information and rendering of accounts are not limited by the FRAND undertaking [263] . Even if one would assume that such undertaking limits the SEP holder’s claims for damages to the amount of the FRAND royalty (which the Court left undecided), the patent holder would, nevertheless, be entitled, in principle, to information regarding the use of its SEP [263] .

In addition, the Court explained that a FRAND undertaking has also no influence on the enforceability of the claims for damages (on the merits), information and rendering of accounts asserted by the Claimant [263] . In particular, these claims are not subject to the conduct requirements set forth by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the matter Huawei v ZTEHuawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-130/13. (Huawei requirements or framework) with respect to dominant undertakings in terms of Article 102 TFEU [267] .

The opposite is, on the other hand, the case with respect to the claims for injunction asserted by the Claimant. These claims are not enforceable for the time being, since the Claimant failed to fully comply with the Huawei requirements [268] .

Regarding to the SEP in suit, the Court ruled that the Claimant has a dominant market position in terms of Article 102 TFEU: The patent is essential to the LTE standard, which, in turn, cannot be substituted by an alternative standard (from the users’ point of view) [269] .

Looking at the negotiations between the parties involved, the Court did not see any flaws in the parties’ conduct with respect to the first two steps of the framework; the Claimant had effectively notified the Defendant about the infringing use of its SEP and the Defendant (in fact, its parent company) had effectively declared its willingness to obtain a licence covering also the SEP in suit [254] . In this context, the Court pointed out that the SEP holder’s obligation to notify the user of the infringing use of its SEP is also met, when the respective notification is addressed to the parent company of the (alleged) infringer (as is was the case here, especially with the Claimant’s letter to the parent company dated 29 February 2016) [254] .

However, the Court held that the Claimant failed to fulfil its consequent obligation under the Huawei framework, namely to make a FRAND licensing offer to the Defendant (respectively its parent company) [270] .

The Court considered only two offers made by the Claimant to the Defendant’s parent company prior to the extension of its claims in the pending proceedings on 15 May 2018 (since the other offers made were either indisputably not FRAND or were not produced by the Claimant in trial) [255] .

An offer made in February 2016 was found not to be FRAND in terms of content, since it contained a clause, according to which the licensee was obliged to pay the full amount of the royalties agreed, even if only one patent of the licensed portfolio was valid and used by the Defendant [255] .

The Court reached the same conclusion also with respect to the further offer made by the Claimant on 11 April 2018 (that is short before the Claimant extended its claims in the proceedings, adding the claims for injunction) [271] . The Court held that this offer did not comply with the Huawei requirements, since the Defendant was not given sufficient time to assess the offer and eventually make a counter-offer to the Claimant, before the latter asserted the claims for injunction against him in the proceedings [255] .

In the Court’s eyes, a licensing offer complying with the Huawei requirements is only given, when the SEP holder provides the SEP user with all information required from assessing the FRAND conformity of the offer [272] . Only then, the SEP user’s consequent obligation under the Huawei framework to make a FRAND counter-offer to the SEP holder is triggered [272] . In particular, the SEP holder must make the requested royalty amount transparent with reference to a standard licensing programme implemented in the market or to rates actually paid by third parties to a patent pool, covering also patents relevant to the standard [272] . For the assessment of the non-discriminatory character of the offer, information on comparable agreements is needed [272] .

Based on the above considerations, the Court held that the period of 22 workdays between the presentation of the comparable agreements to the parent company (11 April 2018) and the assertion of the injunction claims in the proceedings by the Defendant (15 May 2018) was too short for a competent assessment of the Claimant’s licensing offer [273] . The fact that the Defendant (and/or its parent company) would have had sufficient time to react to the Claimant’s offer until the end of the oral hearings in mid-July 2018 was considered irrelevant by the Court in this respect [273] . The Huawei framework aims at preventing the situation, in which the SEP user agrees to unfavourable licensing conditions under the pressure of pending infringement proceedings (defined by the Court as “patent hold-up”) [273] . In case that the SEP holder has not fulfilled the Huawei requirements prior to the initiation of proceedings (as it was the case here), it has to make sure that the parties can again negotiated without the pressure of an ongoing trial, for instance by asking the court to stay its proceedings pursuant to Article 251 of the German Court of Civil Procedure [274] . Otherwise, the initiation of the infringement proceedings shall be considered as abusive in terms of antitrust law [274] . In the present case, the Claimant chose to not ask for a stay in the proceedings, ignoring the Court’s respective indication [274] .


C. Other issues

The Court explained that the registration in the patent register allows the registered patent holder to assert the patent rights in court [275] . On the other hand, it does not define the ownership of the patent in material legal terms [276] . Nevertheless, the patent registration establishes an assumption of ownership which must be rebutted by the defendant in infringement proceedings based on concrete indications [277] .

Besides that, the Court pointed out that a stay in the infringement proceedings (pursuant to Article 148 of the German Code of Civil Procedure) until the end of parallel invalidation proceedings concerning the patent(s) in suit can be considered only under special circumstances [278] . As a rule, it must be expected with a sufficient degree of probability that the patent(s) in suit will be invalidated [278] . The Defendant failed convince the Court that this was the case with the SEP in suit [278] .

  • [251] District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 28 September 2018, Case-No. 7 O 165/16, page 2 and 23.
  • [252] Ibid, page 23 et seq.
  • [253] Ibid, page 5.
  • [254] Ibid, page 25.
  • [255] Ibid, page 26.
  • [256] Ibid, pages 5 et seq.
  • [257] Ibid, page 6.
  • [258] Ibid, page 19.
  • [259] Ibid,page 23.
  • [260] Ibid, pages 16 et seqq.
  • [261] Ibid, page 20.
  • [262] Ibid, page 21.
  • [263] Ibid, page 22.
  • [264] Ibid, page 24.
  • [265] Ibid, pages 24 et seq.
  • [266] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-130/13.
  • [267] District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 28 September 2018, Case-No. 7 O 165/16, pages 22.
  • [268] Ibid,pages 23 and 25.
  • [269] Ibid, page 23.
  • [270] Ibid, pages 23 and 25 et seq.
  • [271] Ibid, pages 26 et seqq.
  • [272] Ibid, page 27.
  • [273] Ibid, page 28.
  • [274] Ibid, page 29.
  • [275] Ibid, page 10.
  • [276] Ibid, pages 10 et seq.
  • [277] Ibid, page 11.
  • [278] Ibid, page 30.

Updated 3 12月 2018

District Court, LG Düsseldorf

LG Düsseldorf
11 7月 2018 - Case No. 4c O 81/17

A. Facts

The Claimant holds a patent essential to the data communication standards ADSL2+ and VDSL2 (Standard Essential Patent or SEP) [279] . The previous holder of the patent in question had declared towards the standardization organisation International Telecommunication Union (ITU) its willingness to make the patent accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions [280] .

The Defendant offers communication services in Germany to retail and wholesale clients, including DSL connections using the standards ADSL2+ and VDSL2 [281] .

The Intervener supplies the Defendant with equipment (especially DSL transceivers and DSL Boards), allowing network services based on the above standards [281] .

In January 2016, the Claimant brought an action against the Defendant before the District Court (Landgericht) of Düsseldorf (Court) requesting for a declaratory judgement recognizing Defendant’s liability for damages arising from the infringement of its SEP as well as the provision of information and the rendering of accounts (liability proceedings) [282] . During the course of these proceedings, the Claimant made two offers for a licensing agreement to the Defendant. The Defendant made a counter-offer to the Claimant and provided security for the use of the SEP [283] . The parties failed to reach an agreement.

In June 2016, the Defendant filed an action for a declaratory judgement against the Claimant before the Dublin High Court in Ireland, requesting the High Court to declare that both Claimant’s offers were not FRAND and that Defendant’s counter-offer was FRAND [284] . Taking the ongoing liability proceedings in Germany into account, the Dublin High Court stayed its proceedings [284] .

In September 2017, the Claimant brought a second action against the Defendant before the District Court of Düsseldorf, requesting for injunctive relief (injunction proceedings) [285] . In February 2018, the Claimant made another licensing offer to the Defendant in the pending injunction proceedings [283] .

With the present judgment, the Court dismissed Claimant’s action in the injunction proceedings [286] .


B. Court’s reasoning

Although the Court held that the services offered by the Defendant infringe the SEP in suit [287] , it found that the Claimant cannot enforce its patent rights for the time being [288] , since it failed to fully comply with the obligations stipulated by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the matter Huawei v ZTEHuaweiv ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13. (Huawei obligations or framework) with respect to dominant undertakings in terms of Article 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) [286] .

1. Dominant market position

The Court found that the Claimant holds a dominant market position in terms of Article 102 TFEU [290] .

In the Court’s eyes, the relevant market for assessing dominance with regards to SEPs is, as a rule, the (downstream) market for products or services implementing the standard, to which the SEP refers [291] . Each SEP outlines an own relevant (licensing) market, unless – from the SEP users’ perspective – equivalent alternative technologies for the same technical problem exist [292] . Since the Court held that, in the present case, none of the existing technological alternatives to the standards ADSL2+ and VDSL2 (e.g. HFC networks, LTE, HDSL, SHDSL, ADSL, SDSL, VDSL, fibre optic networks, radio relay technology or internet services via satellite) offers an equivalent solution to users [293] , it defined the relevant market as the market for products and services allowing for internet connections through DSL technology [294] .

Regarding to the subsequent question of whether the Claimant has a dominant position in the above market, the Court first made clear that ownership of a SEP does not per se establish such condition [295] . The fact that a patent is essential to a standard does neither give rise to the (rebuttable) presumption that the SEP holder can distort competition in downstream markets, because products complying with the standard need to use the SEP [295] . Since a high number of patents is usually declared as standard essential, not every SEP can actually (significantly) affect the competitiveness of products or services in downstream markets; the effect of each SEP on a downstream market has, therefore, to be established on a case-by-case basis by taking into account the circumstances of each individual case [295] .

The Court explained that a dominant market position is given, when the use of the SEP is required for entering the market, particularly for securing the general technical interoperability and compatibility of products or services under a standard [295] . The same is true, if the patent user could not market competitive products or services without a licence (for instance, because only a niche market exists for non-compliant products) [295] . No market dominance exists, however, when the SEP covers a technology which is only of little importance to the majority of the buyers in the relevant market [295] .

According to the Court, the latter was not the case here; on the contrary, the Defendant cannot offer competitive products or services in the market for DSL internet connections, without using the SEP in suit [296] .

2. Huawei framework

In the Court’s view, the parties to SEP licensing negotiations need to fulfill the mutual conduct obligations under the Huawei framework step by step and one after another [297] . The Court did not see any flaws in the parties’ conduct with respect to the first two steps of the Huawei framework (SEP holder’s notification of infringement and SEP user’s declaration of willingness to obtain a licence), held, however, that the Claimant did not meet its consequent obligation to make a FRAND licensing offer to the Defendant [298] .

Notification of infringement

The Court found that the Claimant had fulfilled its obligation to notify the Defendant about the infringing use of the SEP in suit prior to the commencement of the injunction proceedings [299] .

First, the Court pointed out that a respective notification (as well as a later licensing offer) can be made by the SEP holder itself, or by any other affiliated company within the same group of companies, especially by the patent holder’s parent company [300] . On the other hand, it is not required that the infringement notification is addressed to the company that will later be party to the infringement proceedings; in general, it is sufficient to address the notification to the parent company within a group of companies [300] .

In terms of content, the notification of infringement must name the patent in suit (including the patent number) and indicate the contested embodiments as well as the (allegedly) infringing acts of use [301] . A detailed (technical and/or legal) explanation of the infringement (particularly an analysis of how the individual features of the patent claims are infringed) is not required; the addressee needs just to be put in the position to assess the infringement allegations, if necessary by seeking expert advice [301] . In this context, the Court disagreed with the District Court of Mannheim which had requested the SEP holder to inform the user about the essentiality of the patent to the standard and/or attach claim charts to the notification of infringement [301] .

In terms of timeliness, the Court took the view that the notification of infringement can be made alongside with SEP holder’s offer for a FRAND licence to the user (prior to the initiation of court proceedings) [302] . In this case, the second step under the Huawei framework will be skipped (that is the SEP user’s declaration of its willingness to obtain a licence). According to the Court, this fact does not, however, have an impact on the SEP holder’s position: If the SEP user is willing to enter into a licence, this approach would safe time (although the SEP user should be granted more time than usual to assess and react to both the notification of infringement and the FRAND offer) [302] . If, on the other hand, the SEP user is unwilling to obtain a FRAND licence, then the SEP holder will just have made a licensing offer absent a respective obligation under the Huawei framework [302] .

In the present case, the fact that the Claimant did not make a separate notification of infringement prior to the initiation of the injunction proceedings, was not considered problematic. The Court pointed out that the Defendant was fully informed about the infringement allegation by the action for damages raised by the Claimant long before the injunction proceedings, so that a separate notification was not required [303] .

Willingness to obtain a FRAND licence

The Court further found that the Defendant had fulfilled its Huawei obligation to express its willingness to obtain a FRAND licence [304] .

In terms of content, no high demands should be placed on the SEP user’s respective declaration; it is not subject to formal requirements and can be of a general nature, as long as the willingness to obtain a licence is clearly stated [305] . Given the circumstances of the specific case, even an implicit behaviour can suffice [305] .

In terms of timeliness, the Court held that a strict deadline, within which the SEP user ought to make its declaration, cannot be set [306] . The respective time frame must be determined on a case-by-case basis under consideration of the circumstances of each case [306] . If the SEP holder’s notification of infringement contains only the minimum required information, a reaction within a period of five or even three months at the most could be expected [306] . In case that the infringement notification contains information going beyond the required minimum, an even quicker reaction could be required from the SEP user under certain circumstances [306] .

In the present case, the Court held that the Defendant has implicitly declared its willingness to enter into a FRAND licence with the Claimant at the latest at the point in time, in which the injunction proceedings were initiated [307] . At that time, the Defendant had already made a counter-offer for a FRAND licence to the Claimant and had also provided security for the use of Claimant’s patents [308] .

In this context, the Court noted that neither the fact that the Defendant contested Claimant’s claims in the parallel liability proceedings not the fact that it raised an action for declaratory judgement against the Claimant before the Dublin High Court can support the argument that the Defendant has deviated from its previous declaration of willingness [309] .

SEP holder’s licensing offer

The Court held that the offer which the Claimant made to the Defendant in course of the injunction proceedings was not FRAND [310] . Since the Claimant expressly relied only on this offer to establish its compliance with the Huawei framework, the Court did not assess the FRAND conformity of the two previous offers of the Claimant to the Defendant [283] .

In terms of timeliness, the Court stressed out that the SEP holder must make a FRAND licensing offer to the user before the initiation of infringement proceedings [311] . Under German procedural law, proceedings are initiated after the claimant has made the required advance payment on costs, even if the statement of claims has not been served to the defendant, yet [312] .

The Court did not rule out that SEP holder’s failure to fulfil its Huawei obligations prior to the commencement of infringement proceedings can be remedied during the course of the proceedings [313] . Depending on the circumstances of each case, the SEP holder should be given the opportunity – within the limits of procedural deadlines – to react to (justified) objections of the SEP user and eventually modify its offer [313] . Denying the SEP holder this opportunity without exceptions would be contrary to the principle of procedural economy; the patent holder would be forced to withdraw its pending action, make a modified licensing offer to the patent user and, subsequently, sue the latter again [313] . In this context, the Court explained that failure to meet the Huawei obligations does not permanently impair SEP holder’s rights [314] . Notwithstanding the above, the Court made, however, clear that the possibility of remedying a flawed licensing offer is subject to narrow limits; the CJEU intended to relieve licensing negotiations between SEP holder and SEP user from the burden imposed on parties by ongoing infringement proceedings, and particularly the potential undue pressure to enter into a licensing agreement which such proceedings can put on the SEP user [315] .

Against this background, the Court expressed doubts that the Claimant’s licensing offer, which was made in the course of the pending injunction proceedings could be considered as timely [285] . Nevertheless, the Court left this question open, because, in its eyes, the Claimant’s offer was not FRAND in terms of content [316] .

The Court did not deem necessary to decide whether the FRAND conformity of the SEP holder’s offer must be fully assessed in infringement proceedings, or whether only a summary assessment of its compatibility with FRAND suffices [317] . In the Court’s view, Claimant’s offer was anyway both not fair and discriminatory [318] .

Fair and reasonable terms

The Court held that the licensing terms offered by the Claimant to the Defendant were not fair and reasonable [319] .

First, the terms did not adequately consider the effects of patent exhaustion [320] . As a rule, FRAND requires licensing offers to contain respective provisions [321] . The clause contained in Claimant’s offer, establishing the possibility of a reduction of the royalties owed by the Defendant in case of the exhaustion of licensed patents, is not fair, because it puts the burden of proof regarding to the amount of the reasonable reduction of the royalties on the Defendant’s shoulders [322] .

Second, the clause, according to which Defendant’s payment obligations regarding to past uses of the SEP in suit should be finally settled without exceptions and/or the possibility to claim reimbursement, was also considered not fair [323] . The Defendant would be obliged to pay royalties for past uses, although it is not clear whether the Claimant is entitled to such payments [324] .

Third, the Court found that the exclusion of the Defendant’s wholesale business from Claimant’s licensing offer was also not fair [325] . According to the principle of contractual autonomy, patent holders are free to choose to which stage of the distribution chain they offer licences [326] . In the present case, however, excluding a significant part of the Defendant’s overall business, namely the wholesale business, from the licensing offer, hinders a fair market access [326] .

Non-discrimination

Besides from the above, the Court ruled that the Claimant’s offer was discriminatory [327] .

To begin with, the Court stressed out that FRAND refers to a range of acceptable royalty rates: As a rule, there is not only a single FRAND-compliant royalty rate [317] . Furthermore, as far as a corresponding commercial/industry practice exists, offers for worldwide portfolio licences are, in general, in line with the Huawei framework, unless the circumstances of the individual case require a different approach (for instance a limitation of the geographical scope of the licence, in case that the user is active only in a single market) [328] .

Furthermore, the Court explained that the non-discriminatory element of FRAND does not oblige the SEP holder to treat all users uniformly [329] . The respective obligation applies only to similarly situated users, whereas exceptions are allowed, provided that a different treatment is justified [329] . In any case, SEP holders are obliged to specify the royalty calculation in a manner that allows the user to assess whether the offered conditions are non-discriminatory or not. The respective information needs to be shared along with the licensing offer; only when the SEP user has obtained this information a licensing offer triggering an obligation of the latter to react is given [330] .

In the Court’s view, presenting all existing essential licensing agreements concluded with third parties, covering the SEPs in suit or a patent portfolio including said SEPs (comparable agreements), has priority over other means for fulfilling this obligation [331] . In addition, SEP holders have to produce also court decisions rendered on the FRAND-conformity of the rates agreed upon in the comparable agreements, if such decisions exist [332] .

Whether presenting comparable agreements (and relevant case law) suffices for establishing the non-discriminatory character of the offered royalty rates depends on the number and the scope of the available agreementsI [333] . In case that no or not enough comparable agreements exist, SEP holders must (additionally) present decisions referring to the validity and/or the infringement of the patents in question and agreements concluded between other parties in the same or a comparable technical field, which they are aware of [334] . If the SEP in suit is part of a patent portfolio, SEP holders must also substantiate the content of the portfolio and its impact on the offered royalty rates [335] .

Having said that, the Court pointed out that an unequal treatment resulting in a discrimination in antitrust terms is not only at hand, when a dominant patent holder grants preferential terms to specific licensees, but also when it chooses to enforce its exclusion rights under a SEP in a selective manner [336] . The latter is the case, when the SEP holder brings infringement actions only against certain competitors and, at the same time, allows other competitors to use its patent(s) without a licence [336] . However, such a conduct is discriminatory only if, depending on the overall circumstances of each case (for instance, the extend of the infringing use and the legal remedies available in the country, in which claims need to be asserted), it would have been possible for the SEP holder with reasonable efforts to enforce its patent rights against other infringers (which it was or should have been aware of) [336] . In favour of an equal treatment of competitors, the level of action which must be taken by the SEP holder in this respect should not be defined narrowly [336] . However, it has to be taken into account, that – especially in the early stages of the implementation of a standard – the SEP holder will usually not have the means required to enforce its rights against a large number of infringers; in this case, the choice to enforce its rights only against infringers with market strength first appears reasonable [337] .

Based on the above considerations, the Court ruled that the Claimant’s choice to sue only the Defendant and its two main competitors, without asserting the SEP in suit against the rest of their competitors, respectively against their suppliers, was discriminatory [338] . The Claimant should have already, at least, requested the companies, against which no action was filed, to obtain a licence, particularly since the remaining period of validity of the SEP in suit is limited [339] . Furthermore, the Court found that the Claimant’s refusal to make a licensing offer to the Intervener, although the latter had requested for a licence, was also discriminatory; in the Court’s view, the Claimant failed to provide an explanation justifying this choice [340] .

Since the Claimant’s offer was found to be non-compliant with FRAND, the Court refrained from ruling on the conformity of Defendant’s counter-offer and the security provided with the Huawei framework [341] .


C. Other issues

The Court ruled that in accordance with Article 30 para. 3 of the German Patent Law (PatG) the registration in the patent register establishes the presumption of ownership, allowing the entity which is registered as patent holder to assert the rights arising from the patent before court [342] .

  • [279] District Court of Düsseldorf, 11 July 2018, Case-No. 4c O 81/17Ibid, paras. 3 and 82.
  • [280] Ibid, para. 13.
  • [281] Ibid, para. 12.
  • [282] Ibid, paras. 14 and 211.
  • [283] Ibid, para. 15.
  • [284] Ibid, para. 16.
  • [285] Ibid, para. 236.
  • [286] Ibid, paras. 140 and 313 et seqq.
  • [287] Ibid, paras. 114 et seqq.
  • [288] Ibid, paras. 60 and 140.
  • [289] Huaweiv ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [290] Ibid, para. 142.
  • [291] Ibid, para. 148.
  • [292] Ibid, paras. 153 and 146.
  • [293] Ibid, paras. 159 - 181.
  • [294] Ibid, para. 158.
  • [295] Ibid, para. 147.
  • [296] Ibid, paras. 183 et seqq.
  • [297] Ibid, para. 191.
  • [298] Ibid, para. 188.
  • [299] Ibid, paras. 195 et seqq.
  • [300] Ibid, para. 199.
  • [301] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [302] Ibid, para. 200.
  • [303] Ibid, para. 203.
  • [304] Ibid, para. 205.
  • [305] Ibid, para. 208.
  • [306] Ibid, para. 207.
  • [307] Ibid, para. 210.
  • [308] Ibid, para. 212.
  • [309] Ibid, paras. 215 et seq.
  • [310] Ibid, para. 220.
  • [311] Ibid, paras. 222 et seqq.
  • [312] Ibid, para. 225.
  • [313] Ibid, para. 233.
  • [314] Ibid, para. 228.
  • [315] Ibid, para. 230.
  • [316] Ibid, para. 237.
  • [317] Ibid. para. 241.
  • [318] Ibid, para. 242.
  • [319] Ibid, paras. 283 et seqq.
  • [320] Ibid, para. 285.
  • [321] Ibid, para. 288.
  • [322] Ibid, paras. 292 et seq.
  • [323] Ibid, paras. 298 et seqq.
  • [324] Ibid, para. 301.
  • [325] Ibid, para. 306.
  • [326] Ibid, para. 311.
  • [327] Ibid, para. 271.
  • [328] Ibid, para. 250.
  • [329] Ibid, para. 248.
  • [330] Ibid, para. 267.
  • [331] Ibid, paras. 256 and 259 et seq.
  • [332] Ibid, para. 262.
  • [333] bid, paras. 258 and 264.
  • [334] Ibid, paras. 263 and 265.
  • [335] Ibid, para. 265.
  • [336] Ibid, para. 273.
  • [337] Ibid, para. 274.
  • [338] Ibid, para. 276.
  • [339] Ibid, para. 277.
  • [340] Ibid, para. 281.
  • [341] Ibid, para. 315.
  • [342] Ibid, paras. 75 et seq.

Updated 6 6月 2019

Koninklijke Philips N.V.対Asustek Computers INC.、ハーグ控訴裁判所

オランダ裁判所の決定
7 5月 2019 - Case No. 200.221.250/01

A. 事実

本件は、消費者向け電子機器製造業者であり欧州電気通信標準化機構(European Telecommunications Standards Institute: ETSI)が開発した様々な標準の実施において潜在的に必須であるとして宣言済みの特許(標準必須特許又はSEP)のポートフォリオの保有者であるPhilipsと、ラップトップ、タブレット、及びスマートフォン等の無線機器の製造業者であるAsusとの間の紛争に関するものである。

Philipsは、公平、合理的、かつ非差別的(Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory: FRAND)な条件で標準の使用者がPhilipsのSEPにアクセスできるようにするとの誓約をETSIに対して行っていた。特に、Philipsは1998年に自社のSEPへのアクセスをFRAND条件でオファーするとの一般的(包括的)な誓約をETSIに対して行っていた。

2013年、Philipsは3G-UMTS及び4G-LTEの無線通信標準に包含される自社のポートフォリオについてAsusに通知し、ライセンス契約を提案した。両当事者間のその後の話し合いにおいて、Philipsは自社の特許の詳細を更に示し自社の特許及び対応する標準をマッピングしたクレームチャートを提供した。またPhilipsは、自社の標準ライセンス契約(Philipsのライセンスプログラムにおける標準ロイヤルティ料率とその計算方法を含む)もAsusに提出した。

2015年、交渉は決裂し、Philipsは欧州の様々な法域(即ち、イングランド、フランス、及びドイツ)において、とりわけ欧州特許1 623 511 (EP 511)に基づき侵害訴訟を提起した。Philipsは、EP 511特許が3G-UMTS及び4G-LTE標準に(潜在的に)必須であるとの宣言を行っていた。イングランド・ウェールズ高等法院は、EP 511 特許の有効性を支持する予備的評決(preliminary verdict)を下した。

Philipsは、オランダでは、とりわけ差止命令を求めてAsusに対する訴訟をハーグ地方裁判所(地方裁判所)において提起していた。地方裁判所は、EP 511特許に基づくPhilipsの差止請求を棄却した [343] 。Philipsは、ハーグ控訴裁判所(控訴裁判所)に控訴した。

本判決では、控訴裁判所がEP 511の有効性及び必須性を支持し、TFEU第102条に基づきFRAND違反を主張するAsusの抗弁(FRAND defense)を退け、Asusに対して係争中の特許を侵害している製品についての差止命令を出した [344]


B. 判決理由

控訴裁判所はEP 511特許の新規性及び進歩性を認め当該特許の有効性に対するAsusの異議を棄却した [345] 。更に、控訴裁判所は、当該特許が必須であり侵害されていると認めた [346]

控訴裁判所は、Asusの主張、即ち、Philipsが差止による救済を求めて侵害訴訟を提起する上でETSI に対する契約上のFRAND義務に違反しており、欧州司法裁判所(Court of Justice of the EU: CJEU) がHuawei対ZTE事件において定めた要件(Huawei要件)を遵守しなかったことによりTFEU第102 条 に違反したとの主張を審理した [347] 。特に、Asusは、(a) ETSI のIPR Policyに従った適切かつ適時なEP 511の開示をPhilipsが行なわず、また(b)提示した条件がFRANDである根拠を明確に示さなかったことでPhilipsがHuawei要件に反していたと主張した。

控訴裁判所は、前者について、EP 511の付与から2年後に当該特許が(潜在的に)必須であるとPhilipsが宣言したことは、SEPの「適時の開示(timely disclosure)」を求めるETSI IPR Policy第4.1条に基づく契約上の義務への違反に当たらないとした。

控訴裁判所は、ETSIの開示義務の根底にある一般的な目的について、ETSI標準に利用可能な最高の技術を組み入れることであって、Asusが主張したようにETSI 標準への参加者が最低のコストで(必須の)技術ソリューションを選択できるようにすることではないとした [348]  。また、宣言を行う義務の目的は、むしろ、使用者にとって事後的に実施できないSEPが現れないようにリスクを減らすことであるとした [349]

その上で控訴裁判所は、Philipsが行った一般的かつ包括的な宣言はETSIのIPR Policyに基づく義務を果たすために十分であったとした。この点について、控訴裁判所は、Philipsが特定のSEPの宣言を遅く行ったことは(必須でない特許を含めた)超過宣言(over-declaration)を招くとのAsusの主張を退け、逆に控訴裁判所は、早期開示ではETSI 標準に必須でない特許が含まれてしまう可能性の方が高いとした [350]  。更に、控訴裁判所は、欧州委員会の水平的協調行為に関するガイドライン(Horizontal Guidelines )によれば包括的宣言はEU競争法の目的上許容されるSEP宣言の形式の1つであり、Philipsの包括的宣言はTFEU第101条違反に当たらないと指摘した  [351]

FRAND違反を主張するAsusの抗弁(FRAND defense)の第一の根拠を退けた上で、控訴裁判所は、両当事者が交渉上Huawei要件に従っていたか否かについて評価した。控訴裁判所は、前置きとして、Huawei 事件におけるCJEUの判決は、Huawei要件に従わない特許保有者が自動的にTFEU第102条違反を犯したものとされる厳格な要件のセットを定めてはいないと述べた [352]  。このため、控訴裁判所は、本事件の特定の状況と両当事者の行為を評価する必要があるとした。

その次に控訴裁判所は、Huawei要件の第一ステップである侵害者への適切な通知の義務をPhilipsが遵守したか否かを審理した。控訴裁判所は、侵害を受けているとされる特許のリストとそれらが必須である標準をPhilipsが提出したこと及びFRAND条件でライセンスをオファーする意思をPhilipsが宣言したことによりAsusへの通知義務をPhilipsが明確に果たしていたと事件記録が示しているとの見解をとった。 [353]  また、その後の技術的議論において、Philipsは自社のポートフォリオとライセンスプログラムについての更なる詳細(クレームチャート及び標準ライセンスでのロイヤルティ料率を含む)を提供していた [354] 。これに対して、AsusはFRAND条件でのライセンスを受ける意思を表示しなかった。控訴裁判所は、交渉が常にPhilipsの側から始められ、AsusはPhilipsのポートフォリオを評価できる技術専門家を交渉に参加させていなかったと事実認定した [355] 。控訴裁判所は、交渉においてAsusが提起した技術的問題が交渉を遅らせることだけを目的としており「ホールドアウト(hold-out)」と言われる行為に当たるとした  [356]

この時点で既に、控訴裁判所はAsusがHuawei要件に基づく義務に違反しており、Philipsは差止命令を求める権利を有していると判断していたが、更に踏み込んでHuaweiフレームワークの第二ステップ以降の遵守についても検討した。控訴裁判所は、 Philipsが自社の標準ライセンス契約を提示したことは、具体的であり提示した料率の計算法も説明している点でCJEU要件を完全に満たしているとした [357] 。更に、控訴裁判所は、ドイツにおいて訴訟が提起された後にAsusが出したカウンターオファー自体は、PhilipsがHuawei要件を遵守しており従って差止命令を求める権利を有するとの結論を変えるものではないとした [358] 。最後に、控訴裁判所はPhilipsが交わしている比較可能なライセンス契約がFRAND適格であるかを評価するためにそれらへのアクセスを求めたAsusの弁護士による要求を却下した。控訴裁判所は、ETSIのIPR Policy、TFEU第102条、及びHuawei フレームワークの何れも当該要求の根拠とはならないとした [359]

  • [343] Koninklijke Philips N.V.対Asustek Computers INC、ハーグ地方裁判所、2017年、事件番号C 09 512839 /HA ZA 16-712。
  • [344] Koninklijke Philips N.V.対Asustek Computers INC、ハーグ控訴裁判所、2019年5月7日判決、事件番号200.221.250/01。
  • [345] 同判決、第4.63節、第4.68節、第4.75節、第4.80節、第4.82節、第4.93節、第4.100節、及び第4.117節。
  • [346] 同判決、第4.118節 以下。
  • [347] Huawei対ZTE、欧州司法裁判所、2015年7月16日判決、事件番号C-170/13。
  • [348] Koninklijke Philips N.V.対Asustek Computers INC、ハーグ控訴裁判所、2019年5月7日判決、事件番号200.221.250/01、第4.153節以下。
  • [349] 同判決、第4.155節及び第4.157節。
  • [350] 同判決、第4.159節。
  • [351] 同判決、第4.164節。
  • [352] 同判決、第4.171節。
  • [353] 同判決、第4.172節。
  • [354] 同判決。
  • [355] 同判決、第4.172節ないし第4.179節。
  • [356] 同判決、第4.179節。
  • [357] 同判決、第4.183節。
  • [358] 同判決、第4.185節。
  • [359] 同判決、第4.202節以下。

Updated 1 11月 2017

Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) 2

英国裁判所の決定
4 5月 2017 - Case No. HP-2014-000005

  1. Facts
    The claimant is a company that grants licenses for patented technologies in the telecommunications industry. The patents at issue (EP (UK) 2 229 744, EP (UK) 2 119 287, EP (UK) 2 485 514, EP (UK) 1 230 818, EP (UK) 1 105 991, EP (UK) 0 989 712) relate to telecommunication network coding and procedures [360] . Most were part of a large patent portfolio that the claimant had acquired from a major telecommunications company in 2013. [361] In 2014, the claimant made a declaration under the ETSI IPR Policy that it was willing to grant licenses on FRAND terms. There were five technical trials relating to the validity, infringement and essentiality of these patents. This summary focuses on the non-technical trial addressed competition law issues, FRAND issues, injunctive relief and damages for past infringements. [362]
    In April 2014 the claimant made an open offer to the defendant, a major international smartphone manufacturer, to grant a license in respect of the claimant’s entire global patent portfolio (containing SEPs and non-SEPs). The defendant refused the offer, contending that there was no patent infringement, that the patents were not essential, and that they were invalid. The defendant also argued that the offer was not FRAND and thus did not constitute an abuse of a dominant market position under Art. 102 TFEU. In July 2014 the claimant made a further offer, limited to the claimant’s SEPs. Again, the defendant refused, arguing that the license conditions were not FRAND. [363] In June 2015 both parties made further offers. These offers were the result of directions from the court. The claimant offered a worldwide portfolio license while the defendant wanted to limit the territorial scope to the United Kingdom. [364] Between August and October 2016 the parties exchanged further offers without reaching an agreement. [365]
    The Patents Court (Birrs J) held that the claimant was in a dominant position, but did not abuse this position. [366] The defendant was not prepared to take a license on FRAND conditions and the claimant was not in breach of competition law. Thus, the court held that a final injunction to restrain patent infringements should be granted. An injunction for infringements of patents EP (UK) 2 229 744 and EP (UK) 1 230 818 was granted on 7 June 2017. [367]
  2. Court’s reasoning
    1. Market power
      The court defined the relevant market for assessing dominance as a distinct market for licensing each SEP individually. [368] European case law indicated that owning an SEP could be a rebuttable presumption for the existence of a dominant position. [369] The claimant’s pleaded position was a non-admission of dominance rather than a denial coupled with a positive case to the contrary. It was the view of the court that this was insufficient to rebut the presumption. In particular, the claimant’s argument of countervailing buyer power was unconvincing because it had not been supported by a proper economic analysis. [370]
    2. SEP Proprietor’s Licensing Offer
      1. FRAND Declaration as Conceptual Basis
        The court pointed out that that the FRAND undertaking also applied in the case that the SEP proprietor was not in a dominant position. It held that the FRAND undertaking operated as a practical constraint on a SEP owner’s market power. [371] The ETSI declaration made by the SEP proprietor is also the starting point for determining the FRAND rate. The underlying issue, which is discussed at length by the court, [372] is if such a declaration forms a contract and whether that contract can benefit third parties. The court acknowledged that the legal effect of this declaration, in particular its enforceability, is a controversial issue under French law. [373] However, the court reasoned that the FRAND declaration is an important aspect of technology standardisation. Holders of SEPs are not compelled to give a FRAND declaration. If they do, the undertaking would be enforceable and irrevocable due to public interest. [373]
        The court applied a procedural approach to FRAND. It emphasised that FRAND describes not only a set of license terms, but also the process by which a set of terms are agreed. [374] It applies to both the SEP-holder and the implementer/defendant. In particular, this approach allows for starting offers that leave room for negotiation. On the other hand, making extreme offers and taking an uncompromising approach which prejudices fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory negotiation is not a FRAND approach. [375] This approach also means that the SEP proprietor is under an obligation to make a FRAND offer and to enter into FRAND license agreements. [376]
      2. ‘True FRAND Rate’
        The court considered that there is only a single set of terms for a given set of circumstances that would meet FRAND conditions (‘true FRAND rate’). [377] This eliminates the so-called Vringo-problem, [378] i.e. if FRAND were a range there would be two different but equally FRAND offers. Thus, if the court would grant or not an injunction, it would be unfair for the alleged infringer or SEP holder respectively. [379]
        The court was of the opinion that the true FRAND rate approach does not cause problems under competition law. Theoretically, if only one set of terms is truly FRAND, and if FRAND also represents the line between abusive and non-abusive conduct under Art. 102 TFEU, then every agreed SEP-licence could be at serious risk of being abusive. [380] However, the court took the view that FRAND-compliance and compliance with Art. 102 TFEU are not the same thing (the court pointed out that the CJEU in the Huawei ruling appears to equate an obligation to make a FRAND offer with compliance with Art 102 TFEU). [381] Since Art. 102 TFEU condemns excessive pricing, [382] a royalty rate can be somewhat higher than the true FRAND rate and still not be contrary to competition law. Conversely, for a breach of competition law, it will be necessary but not sufficient that the rate is not the true FRAND rate. [382]
      3. Discrimination
        The court held that the correct approach is to start from a global rate as a benchmark and to then adjust this rate as appropriate. [383] It distinguished between two concepts of discrimination. First, the ‘general’ concept of non-discrimination describes an overall assessment of FRAND which can be used to derive the benchmark mentioned above. [384] It is based on the intrinsic value of the patent portfolio, but it does not depend on the licensee. The court held that this benchmark should be applied to all licensees seeking the same kind of license. [385]
        Second, the ‘hard-edged’ non-discrimination obligation, which takes into account the nature of the potential licensee, [384] is a distinct concept that could be used to adjust license terms. However, the court held that the FRAND declaration does not introduce such a hard-edged non-discrimination concept. [386] If, contrary to the view taken by the court, the FRAND undertaking did include hard-edged non-discrimination, a licensee could only have the right to a lower rate granted to another licensee (i.e. a specific non-discrimination obligation resulting from the FRAND declaration) if the difference would otherwise distort competition between the two licensees. [385]
      4. Territorial Scope of License
        The court held that the defendant’s offer that was limited to UK licenses was not FRAND. In the court’s opinion country by country licensing is inefficient for goods such as mobile telecommunications devices that are distributed across borders. [387] It would also be inefficient to negotiate many different licenses and then to keep track of so many different royalty calculations and payments. No rational business would do this, if it could be avoided. [387] This was illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of licenses introduced in the trial were worldwide licenses. [388] Further, it is common ground that the industry assesses patent families rather than individual patents within the family. Assessing portfolios on a family basis inevitably involved tying a patent in one jurisdiction with a patent in another. [389] Thus, according to the court, a worldwide license would not be contrary to competition law. As willing and reasonable parties would agree on a worldwide licence, the insistence by the defendant on a license which was limited to the UK was not FRAND. [390]
  3. Court’s reasoning
    1. Comparable agreements and reasonable aggregate royalty rate
      The court held that for determining the royalty rate, the evidence of the parties would be relevant, including evidence of how negotiations actually work in the industry. [391] Other freely-negotiated license agreements might be used as comparables. [392] This may be compared with a top down approach [393] can also be used in which the rate is set by determining the patentee’s share of relevant SEPs and applying that to the total aggregate royalty for a standard, but this may be more useful as a cross-check. [394] Royalty rates determined by other courts might be useful as persuasive precedents. However, in the eyes of the court, a license rate determined at a binding arbitration does not carry much weight as to what parties are usually paying. [391] License agreements must meet certain criteria to be comparable. [395] First, the licensor is the claimant. Second, the license agreement is recent. However, it is not necessary that the licensee is the defendant or a comparable company because different market participants have different bargaining powers, which is reflected in the negotiations and the resulting royalty rates. [395] Finally the court confirmed that a royalty based on the handset price was appropriate and implied a reasonable aggregate royalty rate of 8.8%of the handset price. The court found that the 8.8% was reasonable, in part, because the aggregate implied by either party’s case was higher (10.4% and 13.3%). [396]
    2. Principles derived from Huawei v. ZTE
      The court also provided a compiled overview of its interpretation of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling. [397] In the eyes of the court, the ‘willingness to conclude a licence on FRAND terms’ refers to a willingness in general. The fact that concrete proposals are also required does not mean it is relevant to ask whether the proposals are actually FRAND or not. If the patentee complies with the procedure as set out by the CJEU, then bringing a claim for injunction is not abusive under Art 102. But even if sufficient notice is given, bringing a claim can constitute an abuse because complying with the procedure does not mean that a patentee can behave with impunity. In other words, there might be other aspects that make the claim abusive. Conversely, bringing such a claim without prior notice will necessarily be abusive. Significantly, the court held, the legal circumstances of this case differ from the circumstances assumed by the CJEU in a crucial respect. A FRAND undertaking can be effectively enforced irrespective of Art 102. The defendant does not need Art 102 TFEU to have a defence to the injunction claim.
  • [360] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 2
  • [361] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 54 et seqq.
  • [362] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 3
  • [363] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 5
  • [364] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 7-8
  • [365] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 11-14
  • [366] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 807
  • [367] Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC 1304 (Pat)
  • [368] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 631
  • [369] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 634
  • [370] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 636-646
  • [371] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 656
  • [372] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 108-145
  • [373] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 146
  • [374] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 162
  • [375] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 163
  • [376] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 159
  • [377] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 164
  • [378] See Vringo v ZTE [2013] EWHC 1591 (Pat) and [2015] EWHC 214 (Pat)
  • [379] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 158
  • [380] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 152
  • [381] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 154
  • [382] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 153
  • [383] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 176
  • [384] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 177
  • [385] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 503
  • [386] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 501
  • [387] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 544
  • [388] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 534
  • [389] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 546
  • [390] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 572
  • [391] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 171
  • [392] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 170
  • [393] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 178
  • [394] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 806 (10)
  • [395] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 175
  • [396] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 476
  • [397] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), 744

Updated 20 10月 2020

Sisvel v Wiko

LG Mannheim
4 9月 2019 - Case No. 7 O 115/16

A. 内容

原告Sisvelは、公平、合理的かつ非差別的(FRAND)な条件にて規格実施者に利用を認めるとの約束に基づき、UMTS及びLTE無線通信の規格に必須である(と見込まれる)と宣言された特許を保有している(標準必須特許又はSEP)。Sisvelは、自らのSEPを含め、複数のSEP保有者の特許で構成されるパテントプールを管理している(パテントプール)。

被告は、Wikoグループのフランスに所在する親会社及びドイツに所在する子会社(Wiko)である。Wikoは、LTE規格を実施する携帯電話を特にドイツにおいて販売している。

2015年6月、Sisvelは、パテントプールの存在及びライセンス取得が必要である旨をWikoに通知した。両当事者は、ライセンス契約の協議に入った。Sisvelは、パテントプールに含まれるSEPの情報について、その複数の特許の規格必須性を示したクレームチャートを添えてWikoに提出した。2016年6月1日、Sisvelは、当該パテントプールを対象とするライセンスについてWikoに申出を行ったが、合意には至らなかった。

2016年6月22日、Sisvelは、1つの特許がLTE規格に抵触していることに基づき、Wikoを相手方として、ドイツのマンハイム地方裁判所(本裁判所)に訴訟を提起した(権利侵害訴訟)。Sisvelは、実体的事項に関するWikoの損害賠償責任を確認する宣言的判決とともに、情報及び計算書の提出を求めた。 2016年6月23日、Sisvelは、Wikoのドイツ子会社に対して自己のSEPのみを対象とする双務的ライセンスをオファーしたが、このオファーは、承諾されなかった。さらにWikoは、SEPの無効確認を訴えて、ドイツ連邦特許裁判所に訴訟を提起した(無効確認訴訟)。

2016年10月4日、Sisvelは、侵害訴訟での訴えを変更し、差止命令による救済手段、並びに侵害性を有する製品の市場からの排除及びその後の破棄を追加的に求めた。

2016年11月11日、WikoはSisvelにカウンターオファーを申し出た。その後、Wikoは、当該カウンターオファーに従い、保証金及び情報をSisvelに提供した。

訴訟手続中に、Sisvelは、プールライセンスに関し、ロイヤルティ料率を含めた新たな申出をWikoに行った。Wikoはこれについても拒絶した。2017年12月22日、Sisvelは、並行して行われていた特許の無効確認訴訟においてドイツ連邦特許裁判所によるSEPの有効性にかかわる判断が下るまで、権利侵害訴訟手続の停止を命じるよう本裁判所に申し立てた。Wikoは、Sisvelの申立てに同意した。2018年1月30日、権利侵害訴訟手続の停止が本裁判所により命じられた。

2018年6月26日、権利侵害訴訟手続の停止中に、Sisvelは、自らが策定した、新たな内容のライセンスプログラムに基づき、あらためてWikoにライセンスオファーを申し出た(2018年オファー)。

2018年オファーと同時に、Sisvelは、―とりわけー選定した20件の特許に関するクレームチャート及び新規ライセンスプログラムと既存の2つのプログラム双方の既存のライセンシーのリストをWikoに提供した。当該リストには、各契約の締結日と合意されたライセンス料が記載されていた。しかし、ライセンシーの名は黒塗りされていた。

Wikoは3か月超にわたり2018年オファーに対応しなかった。2018年10月15日、WikoはSisvelに回答したが、2018年オファーの内容に対しては意見を述べず、2016年11月11日付のカウンターオファーを引用するにとどまった。さらにWikoは、Sisvelが2018年オファーの際に提出したリストの中で既存のライセンシーの名を開示しなかったことを批判した。

この主張に応じ、Sisvelは、2018年10月22日、Wikoに秘密保持契約(NDA)の草案を送付した。Sisvelは、WikoがNDAに署名する時点で既存のライセンシーの名を開示するつもりであった。しかしながら、Wikoは、Sisvelから提案されたNDAに署名することを拒否した。

2018年10月、ドイツ連邦特許裁判所は、係争中のSEPを部分的に認めた。爾後、本裁判所は、権利侵害訴訟手続に取り掛かり、特にFRAND関連問題について協議した。

2019年7月の口頭審理終了後、WikoはSisvelに新たなカウンターオファーを申し出、追加情報をSisvelに提供した。しかしWikoは、2016年11月11日付の初回のカウンターオファー後には、保証金額を増額しなかった。

本判決において [398] 、本裁判所は、Wikoに差止命令を下すと共に、侵害性を有する製品を市場から排除し、滅失させるよう命じた。さらに本裁判所は、実体的事項に関するWikoの損害賠償責任を確認し、損害額の算定に必要な情報をSisvelに提供するようWikoに命じた。


B. 判決理由

本裁判所は、Wikoの製品が係争中の特許を侵害していると認めた [399] 。係争中の特許の必須性は、両当事者間で争われなかった [400]

さらに本裁判所は、EU機能条約(TFEU)第102条により、Sisvelが差止命令による救済手段及び権利侵害訴訟において侵害性を有するとされる製品のリコール及び破棄を求める請求権の行使を妨げられるものではないと判示した。Wikoは現訴訟の申立てにより、SisvelがTFEU第102条に反して市場での支配的な地位を濫用していたと異議を申し立てた。

本裁判所の見解によれば、SisvelはHuawei対ZTE事件 [401] においてEU司法裁判所(CJEU)が定めた行動義務(Huaweiフレームワーク又は義務)を履行していたため、本件は支配的な地位の濫用にあたらない。これに対しWikoは、Huaweiフレームワークを遵守していなかった。

Huaweiフレームワーク

これまでの判例法から外れて、本裁判所は、権利侵害訴訟手続の過程で両当事者がHuawei義務を是正することが可能であるとの見解を示した [402] 。しかしながら、これには、CJEUにより要請される通り、両当事者間で圧力のない協議ができるようになることが必要である。このため、両当事者は、並行する無効確認訴訟において連邦特許裁判所の決定がなされるまで、審理停止の申立て [403] 又は同意を得た上での手続停止等の利用可能な手続文書を使用して、訴訟手続の一時停止を求めなければならない [404]

上記を背景に、本裁判所は、権利侵害訴訟手続開始後Huaweiフレームワークに基づき情報開示義務の是正を求めるSEP保有者に対し、審理停止を申し立てるよう求めた [404] 。当該申立てがなされた場合には、「誠実意思を有する実施者は訴訟手続停止に同意するであろう」と本裁判所は期待している [404]

本裁判所は、係争中の権利侵害訴訟手続の過程でHuawei義務の欠点を是正する機会を両当事者に与えることは、英国控訴院(Unwired Planet対Huawei) [405] とハーグ控訴裁判所(Philips対Asus) [406] の双方で採用された「セーフハーバー」方式に準じていると述べた。上記裁判所はいずれも、Huaweiフレームワークについて厳密に実施すべき強制的な正式手続とみなしておらず、したがって、CJEUにより定められた協議の枠組みから逸脱したとしても、必ずしも、特許保有者による差止命令の請求を排除する濫用的な行動にはあたらない [407] 。さらに、これに該当するかどうかは、ケースバイケースで評価する必要がある [408]

権利侵害通知

その上で本裁判所は、Sisvelが係争中のSEPの侵害について権利侵害訴訟手続開始前にWikoに通知するHuawei義務を履行していたと認めた。

SEP保有者の各通知の内容に関し、本裁判所は基本的に、従前の決定と同じ要件を適用した。本裁判所は、当該通知において (1) 係争中の特許についてその特許番号を含めて記載し、(2) 当該特許が規格に必須として関連標準化機関に宣言されていることを通知し、(3) どの規格について当該特許が必須であるのかを示し、かつ、(4) 実施者の製品又はサービスのうち当該規格を実施する技術的機能を説明しなければならないと認めた [409] 。適切とする詳細の水準については、ケースバイケースで判断する [409] 。本裁判所は、原則として、特許保有者が、SEPライセンス許諾の交渉において慣習的に用いられるクレームチャートを実施者に提供することにより、その通知義務を履行したことになる旨を確認した [409] 。本裁判所はさらに、企業グループの親会社に通知が送付された場合、通常、Huaweiフレームワークにおいて十分であることを再確認した [409]

SEP保有者の申出

本裁判所は、SisvelがまたWikoに対して書面による明確なFRAND条件でのライセンスの申出を行うHuawei義務を履行していたことも認めた。各評価に関し、本裁判所は、権利侵害訴訟手続停止中にSisvelからWikoに対してなされた最後の申出である2018年オファーのみを検討した [410]

まず、本裁判所は、どの具体的なライセンス料や追加的な契約条件がFRANDの「客観的側面に該当する」のかについて、侵害を管轄する裁判所がこれを判断する義務を負うものではないとする自らの立場を重ねて強調した [411] 。カールスルーエ高等地方裁判所(superior Higher District Court of Karlsruhe)が以前に示した見解に反し、本裁判所は、CJEUが差止命令及び製品リコールに関する訴訟手続についてFRAND条件の「正確な数量的判断(precise mathematical determination)」を「負わせる」つもりはなかったとの考えを支持した [412] 。さらに、FRANDへの該当が見込まれる条件には「幅」があるため、差止命令の要求がTFEU第102条に抵触するのは、特段の交渉状況及び市況に鑑みて、SEP保有者の申出が「搾取的な濫用」にあたるような場合に限られる [411] 。すなわち、本裁判所の認識は、英国控訴院のUnwired Planet対Huaweiと共通であった [405]

上記にかかわらず、本裁判所は、権利侵害を管轄する裁判所がSEP保有者のライセンスの申出がFRANDに適合するか否かにつき、単なる「表面的」な評価ではなく、それ以上の評価を行うべきであることを明確にした。権利侵害を管轄する裁判所は、具体的な申出の全体的な内容について、両当事者の交渉上の立場における典型的な当初の違いにかかわらず、誠実に行為する実施者に対し当該申出に応じることを要求するものであるか否かを検討しなければならない [413] 。原則として、このような義務は、SEP保有者が自らの申出がFRAND条件での申出であると判断する理由を立証する方法でロイヤルティの算定を説明する場合に生じる [414] 。プールライセンシングプログラム又は標準ライセンシングプログラムが存在する場合は、通常、各プログラムが市場で受け入れられていることを立証すれば十分である。プールごとに十分な数のライセンスが許諾されている場合、特許保有者は、当該プールに包含される特許に言及した適切な数量のクレームチャートを提示して、当該プールの構成を概説すれば良い [415]

この状況において、本裁判所は、特許保有者の申出がFRANDに適合するか否かに関し実施者が申立てをする場合、原則として、個別の契約条項の違法性(の主張)を根拠として申立を行うことができない旨を指摘した。さらに、申出がFRANDに適合しているか否かについては、包括的な契約の概要に基づき評価しなければならない [416] 。例外が適用されるのは、特定の条項が「容認できない効果(unacceptable effect)」を有する場合に限られる [416] 。本件において、本裁判所は、2018年オファーのいずれの条項にもこのような効果がないと判断した [416] 。 とりわけ、本裁判所は、ライセンシー(ここではWiko)に申し出がなされたライセンスの対象たる特許の消尽に関する立証責任を定めた条項が許容されると判断した [417] 。同様の事件におけるデュッセルドルフ地方裁判所の見解とは対照的に、本裁判所は、ライセンシーがサプライヤーを関与させることによりライセンス網を追跡しやすい立場にあることから、関連の事実を確証するようライセンシーに要請することが適切であると論じた [417]

また、本裁判所は、提示されたライセンスの期間を5年に制限する条項が反トラストの観点から「容認できない効果(unacceptable effect)」を有するとは判断しなかった。本裁判所は、その5年の期間について、急速な技術の発展を特徴とする無線通信業界において実勢的な慣行に準じたものであると判示した [418]

さらに本裁判所は、ライセンシーによる報告義務の違反や30日を超える支払遅延が生じた場合のライセンス契約の例外的な終了を求める権利を定めた条項について、上記の「容認できない効果(unacceptable effect)」がないことを指摘した [418]

本裁判所は、2018年オファーにおいて、契約期間中、対象特許の数に変更が生じた場合に合意済みロイヤルティ料率の調整について定めた条項が含まれていなかったことに異議を唱えなかった。本裁判所の見解によれば、FRAND条件でのライセンスに当該条項を含めることは求められていない [418] 。しかしながら、プールを構成する特許の多数がライセンス期間締結後間もなく満了する場合には、例外が認められるべきである [418] 。一般的に、ライセンスの申出において、契約目的の履行不能性を理由にライセンスの調整を要請する両当事者の制定法上の権利(ドイツ民事法典第313条1項)が制限又は排除されていない場合には特に、「調整」条項がなくとも問題にならない [418]

非差別性/秘密保持

FRANDライセンスの申出の非差別的要素に関して、本裁判所は、TFEU第102条においては、係争中の権利侵害訴訟手続において、被告に対する申出が同様の状況に置かれた競業者に比べて被告を差別するものでないことを証明する特許保有者の義務(二次的な)が定められているとの見解を示した [415]

上記にかかわらず、本裁判所は、いかなる事例においても上記の義務が法的に「全面的な透明性」を伴うわけではないことを明確にした [415] 。SEP保有者の反トラスト義務により、法的保護に値する被告の秘密保持上の権利が常に重視されるものではない。さらに言えば、個々の事例の特別な状況により、秘密性を保護しなければならない可能性がある [415]

本裁判所は、SEP保有者と同様の状況に置かれた第三者たるライセンシーとの間の既存のライセンス契約(類似契約)に定められた情報を特段に参照した上で、当該契約を開示する特許保有者の義務については、侵害を管轄する裁判所により、訴訟手続における両当事者の訴答を考慮した上で、ケースバイケースで判断されるべきであるとの見解を示した [415]

本裁判所によれば、特許保有者は、保護されるべき秘密保持上の権利の存在を確立しなければならない。類似契約に秘密保持条項が適用されるというだけでは、本来的には、特許保有者の開示義務の範囲を制限する根拠とはならない [419] 。これに対し被告は、特許保有者のライセンスの申出がFRANDに該当するか否かを評価するに際し、要請した情報が必要であった理由を説明しなければならない [419] 。被告は、SEP保有者の差別的と見られる行動を示し、具体的な事実を確証しなければならない [420]

この点を考慮し、本裁判所は、いかなる場合においてもSEP保有者が権利侵害訴訟手続において既存の類似契約書すべてを提出する義務を負うとのデュッセルドルフ裁判所の見解に異議を申し立てた [421] 。とりわけ、特許保有者が実施者との間で標準的なライセンス契約のみを締結している場合、当該契約の条件が公開されているのであれば、本裁判所には、訴訟手続において(膨大な)同一の契約書を提出する義務を特許保有者に負わせる理由がない。すなわち、それまでに締結した(標準的な)ライセンス契約の件数を開示すれば十分である [421]

したがって、本裁判所は、2018年オファーに際しSisvelからWikoに提出された既存ライセンシーのリストについて、ライセンシーの名が黒塗りされていたとしても、当該オファーのFRAND該否の確証に十分であったと認めた。本裁判所の見解において、Wikoは、2018年オファーのFRAND該否を評価するために既存ライセンシーの身元情報が必要であった理由を説明していなかった [422] 。さらに本裁判所は、Wikoが既存ライセンシーの身元開示を目的として訴訟手続が停止されている間、Sisvelから提示されたNDAの締結を拒絶していた事実も考慮した [423] 。2018年オファーのFRAND該否に異議がなかったため、本裁判所は、WikoによるNDAの締結の拒絶がHuaweiフレームワークを準拠する意思のないこととみなされるかどうかについて判断を下さなかった。しかしながら、本裁判所は、実施者が適切なNDAの締結を拒絶した場合は原則としてこれをSEP保有者の申出の評価に関連して検討すべきとの、この点に関しデュッセルドルフ裁判所が示した見解に同意した [423]

さらに、本裁判所は、ドイツ民事訴訟手続法(Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO)第142条に従い管轄裁判所により発せられた文書提出命令を通じ、権利侵害訴訟手続において類似契約の使用を促す可能性についても検討した [420] 。このオプションは、特に、類似契約に定められた秘密保持条項により、裁判所命令が発せられた場合に限り契約の開示が認められる個別の事例において侵害を管轄する裁判所により検討される。本裁判所によれば、当該秘密保持条項は、それ自体では反トラスト法に反するものでないことから、特許保有者が訴訟手続において保護に値する秘密保持上の利益を確証できない場合を除き、尊重されるべきである [420] 。特許保有者が、秘密保持条項の拘束を受け、審理に際し類似契約書を提出する意思がある場合には、侵害を管轄する裁判所は、各案件の具体的な状況に基づき、ZPO第142条に従い文書提出命令を発する [420] 。特許保有者が当該命令に従わない場合、当該裁判所は、Huaweiフレームワークにおける両当事者の行為を全体的に評価する上で、その行動を不誠実さの顕れであると判断する場合がある [420] 。ZPO第142条に従い発せられた裁判所命令に基づき類似契約書の閲覧が認められた後、実施者が訴訟手続停止に同意しない場合も、同様に適用される [420]

実施者のカウンターオファー

本裁判所は、WikoがSisvelに対し、正当な過程でFRAND条件の対案(カウンターオファー)を行うHuawei義務を履行していなかったと認めた。各評価に関し、本裁判所は、2018年オファーに対するWikoの対応に注目した [424]

本裁判所は、申出がFRANDに該当するとみなしているか否かにかかわらず(通常はあてはまる)、実施者が具体的な事実に基づき、SEP保有者のライセンスオファーに対応する義務を負っていると明言した [420] 。さらに、実施者は、各事例の事実、特定分野での業界慣行及び誠実な原則を検討の上、可能な限り早急に対応しなければならない [404]

Wikoが3か月を超える期間、2018年オファーに一切対応しなかったことに鑑み、本裁判所は、Wikoが上記の義務に違反すると判示した [400] 。本裁判所の見解では、Wikoは時間の引き延ばし戦術をとったとされる [400] 。本裁判所は、フランスの休校期間や、(Wikoの陳述によれば)ライセンス関連業務を担当した従業員がわずか2名であったという事実が、Wikoによる対応の遅延の十分な根拠になるとは認めなかった [424] 。国際的な業務に携わる会社として、Wikoは、今後、各問題に対処できるよう十分な人材を確保すべきである [424]


C. その他の重要事項

差止命令並びに侵害性を有する製品の市場からの排除及び破棄を求めたSisvelの請求とは別に、本裁判所は、実体的事項に関するWikoの損害賠償責任を認め、宣言的判決を下した [425]

本裁判所は、Wikoが係争中の特許を著しく侵害したと判断した。とりわけ、Wikoは、少なくとも過失的行為をなした [425] 。Wikoは、極めて複雑な標準化技術(特に、規格に組み込まれる膨大な数の特許)が極めて複雑であるため、知的財産権に関する状況を評価することが困難になった(よって、過失を除外すべき)と主張した。しかしながら本裁判所は、基盤となる技術がより一層複雑になったために、実施者側に対するデューディリジェンス要件がさらに拡大したことを明言した [426]

  • [398] Sisvel対Wiko、マンハイム地方裁判所2019年9月4日、事件番号7 O 115/16。
  • [399] 同判決、17~31頁。
  • [400] 同判決、46頁。
  • [401] Huawei対ZTE、EU司法裁判所2015年7月16日判決、事件番号C-170/13。
  • [402] Sisvel対Wiko、マンハイム地方裁判所2019年9月4日、事件番号7 O 115/16、42頁。
  • [403] 同判決、43頁及び51頁以下。
  • [404] 同判決、42頁。
  • [405] Unwired Planet対Huawei、英国控訴院2018年10月23日判決、[2018] EWCA Civ 2344、第282節。
  • [406] Philips対Asus、ハーグ控訴裁判所2019年5月7日、事件番号200.221 .250/01。
  • [407] Sisvel対Wiko、マンハイム地方裁判所2019年9月4日、事件番号7 O 115/16、44頁。
  • [408] 同判決、44頁。
  • [409] 同判決、37頁。
  • [410] 同判決、47頁及び53頁。
  • [411] 同判決、38頁。
  • [412] 同判決、37頁。以下。
  • [413] Sisvel対Wiko、マンハイム地方裁判所2019年9月4日、事件番号7 O 115/16、39頁。
  • [414] 同判決、39頁。
  • [415] 同判決、40頁。
  • [416] 同判決、53頁。
  • [417] 同判決、54頁。
  • [418] 同判決、55頁。
  • [419] 同判決、40頁及び49頁。
  • [420] 同判決、41頁。
  • [421] 同判決、49頁。
  • [422] 同判決、50頁。
  • [423] 同判決、51頁。
  • [424] 同判決、47頁。
  • [425] 同判決、35頁。
  • [426] 同判決、35頁以下。

Updated 12 3月 2019

Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (MPEG-LA) v ZTE

LG Düsseldorf
9 11月 2018 - Case No. 4a O 15/17

A. Facts

The Claimant, Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Angewandten Forschung, holds a patent essential to the practice of the AVC/H.264 standard concerning the compression of video data (Standard Essential Patent of SEP) [427] . The patent holder committed towards the relevant standardization body to make this patent accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions. The Claimant contributed the SEP in question to a patent pool administered by MPEG LA LLC (MPEG LA), comprising more the 5,000 patents referring to the AVC/H.264 standard (MPEG LA pool) [428] .

The Defendant, a German subsidiary of a Chinese group of companies, sells – among other things – mobile phones manufactured by its parent company (parent company) which practise the AVC/H.264 standard in Germany [429] .

MPEG LA uses a standard licensing agreement, which is publicly available at its website [430] . It has signed licensing agreements with approx. 1,400 implementers [430] .

By e-mail dated 8 September 2011, MPEG LA sent a copy of its standard licensing agreement to the Defendant’s parent company and informed the latter that its “mobile handset and tablet products” infringe patents included in its “AVC patent portfolio” (without indicating, however, either the concrete patent numbers or the specific infringing products) [431] .

On 15 September 2011, the parent company asked MPEG LA to send any relevant documents by mail to its IPR Manager [432] . A copy of MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement reached the parent company in late September 2011 [433] .

In 2012, the parent company acquired patents included in the MPEG LA pool [428] .

Since MPEG-LA and the parent company could not reach an agreement on a licence covering the MPEG LA pool [434] , the Claimant brought an action against the Defendant before the District Court of Düsseldorf in Germany (Court), requesting for injunctive relief, information and rendering of accounts, the destruction and the recall of infringing products as well as for a declaratory judgement confirming Defendant’s liability for damages on the merits [435] .

During the proceedings, the Defendant declared its willingness to obtain a licence for the patent in suit and other SEPs of the Claimant referring to the AVC/H.264 standard [436] . Moreover, the Defendant sent to MPEG LA two signed copies of MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement, along with a statement of accounts of its past sales and a bank guarantee [437] . MPEG LA did not countersign this agreement. It insisted, instead, on a licence that would cover all companies belonging to the same group as the Defendant [438] .

With the present judgment, the Court granted Claimant’s requests.


B. Court’s reasoning

The Court held that the mobile phones sold by the Defendant in Germany infringe Claimant’s SEP in suit [439] . It also found that by filing the present suit the Claimant did not abuse its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), since it had fully complied with the conduct obligations stipulated by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the matter Huawei v ZTE [440] (Huawei obligations or framework) with respect to dominant undertakings [441] .

1. Dominant market position

The Court found that the Claimant holds a dominant market position in terms of Article 102 TFEU [442] .

The Court defined the relevant market for the assessment of dominance as the market for licences for any given patent [443] . A dominant market position can further also exist, when the patent holder can hinder competition in downstream markets for standard-compliant products and services [443] .

The Court made, however, clear that ownership of a SEP does not per se establish market dominance [444] . A dominant market position is given, when the use of the SEP is required for entering the market [444] . The same is true, if the patent user could not market competitive products or services, without access to the respective SEP [444] .

Based on these considerations, the Court saw no ‘reasonable’ doubt that the Claimant was a dominant undertaking: It was undisputed that almost all mobile phones available worldwide use the AVC/H.264 standard and that no “realistic” alternative to the MPEG LA pool existed in the licensing market for patents essential to this standard [445] .

2. Huawei framework

The Court found, however, that the Claimant did not abuse its dominant position by suing the Defendant in the present case, since its conduct was in line with the Huawei framework [446] . The Huawei framework establishes mutual conduct obligations for both SEP holders and SEP users, which need to be fulfilled step by step and one after another (meaning that each party’s obligation to act arises only after the other party has fulfilled its own obligation) [447] . Subject to the Huawei framework is not only the patent holder’s claim for injunctive relief, but also the claim for the destruction of infringing products [448] .

In this context, the Court pointed out that the Huawei framework applies, irrespective of whether a ‘well-established’ licensing practice concerning the asserted patents already existed before the CJEU delivered the Huawei judgment, or not [449] . The Claimant had argued that, in the present case, the Court should apply the (German) legal standard that preceded the Huawei framework (which was based on the so-called ‘Orange-Book-Standard’ ruling of the Federal Supreme Court [450] ), since with respect to the SEP in suit a ‘routine’ practice already existed prior to the Huawei judgement [451] . The Court explained that the Huawei judgment does not contain either an explicit or an implicit limitation of its scope of application [452] . Furthermore, even if a ‘well-established’ licensing practice existed, the need to apply the Huawei framework will still be given, in order to bridge the nevertheless existing information gap between patent holder and implementer concerning the (potential) infringement of SEPs [453] . Finally, it would be very challenging for courts to distinguish whether a ‘well-established’ licensing practice excluding the application of the Huawei framework is at hand, or not [454] . Notwithstanding the above, according to the Court, the actual licensing practice of the patent holder could be of ‘particular significance’ when assessing the compliance of the latter with the Huawei obligations: Such practice could, for instance, serve as an indicator of the appropriateness of SEP holder’s licensing offer to the implementer [455] .

Having said that, the Court found no flaws in Claimant’s conduct. In the Court’s view, the Claimant had met its Huawei obligation to notify the Defendant about the infringement of its patent as well as the obligation to present the Defendant with a written licensing offer covering also the patent in suit. The Defendant, on the other hand, adequately expressed its willingness to enter into a licence, failed, however, to make a FRAND counter-offer to the Claimant. Since an adequate counter-offer was missing, the Court did not take up the question whether the bank guarantee provided by the Claimant to MPEG LA constitutes an adequate security in terms of the Huawei framework [456] .

Notification of infringement

The Court ruled that the Claimant had adequately notified the Defendant about the infringement of the SEP in suit through the e-mail sent by MPEG LA to the parent company on 8 September 2011 [457] .

The fact that this e-mail was not addressed to the Defendant, but to the parent company, did not raise any concerns as to the compatibility of the notification with the Huawei framework. The Court explained that a notification of infringement addressed only to the parent company of a group of companies is sufficient, as far as it can be assumed that the notification will be forwarded to the subsidiaries con­cerned [458] . The sole fact that a company belongs to a group justifies such an assumption, unless indications to the contrary exist [458] . This was, however, not the case here.

Besides that, the Court did not consider it inappropriate that the aforementioned e-mail was not sent to the parent company by the Claimant, but by MPEG LA (which is not the holder of the SEP in suit) [459] . The Court held that MPEG LA is entitled to perform legal actions in connection with the licensing of the MPEG LA pool on behalf of the Claimant [460] . The Defendant could not contest that this was not the case, since MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement, which it is aware of, contains an indication about MPEG LA’s respective capacity [461] . In addition, the Defendant’s parent company was also aware of MPEG LA’s capacity to act on behalf of the Claimant, since it joined the MPEG LA pool as a patent holder in 2012 [462] .

The Court further ruled that, in terms of content, a notification of infringement must – at least – name the patent in suit (including the patent number) and indicate the contested embodiments as well as the (allegedly) infringing acts of use [463] . A detailed (technical and/or legal) explanation of the infringement is not required; the implementer needs just to be put in the position to assess the infringement allegations, if necessary, by seeking expert advice [464] . A notification of infringement is, therefore, not necessary, when it constitutes just a ‘pointless formality’ [464] . This is true, when according to the overall circumstances of the case, one can safely assume that the implementer is aware of the infringement, so that claiming that the SEP holder failed to provide adequate notification prior to the initiation of court proceedings would appear to be abusive [464] . The respective test is, however, subject to strict conditions [464] .

Based on the above considerations, the Court found that MPEG LA’s e-mail to the parent company dated 8 September 2011 should be considered – as an exception – to constitute a sufficient notification of infringement, although it did not contain the minimum information required (particularly the patent number and a reference to the specific infringing embodiments) [465] . The overall circumstances of the case (especially the fact that the parent company acquired patents included in the MPEG LA pool in 2012 and had also previously been in contact with MPEG LA regarding a standard licensing agreement) [466] , give rise to the assumption that the parent company had already been aware of the MPEG LA pool and the fact that AVC/H.264-compliant products need to be licensed [467] .

Willingness to obtain a FRAND-licence

The Court held that the parent company had adequately expressed its willingness to obtain a FRAND-licence through the e-mail sent to MPEG LA on 15 September 2011 [468] .

In the eyes of the Court, this e-mail indicates the parent company’s intention to deal with issues concerning the licensing of patents referring to the AVC/H.264 standard. This is sufficient under the Huawei framework [469] . The implementer is not required to refer to a specific licensing agreement [469] .

SEP holder’s licensing offer

The Court further found that the standard licensing agreement sent by MPEG LA to the parent company presents an offer accountable to the Claimant which is in line with the Huawei framework in terms of both form and content [470] .

The fact that the offer was addressed to the parent company and not to the Defendant was not relevant, since the parties were discussing about a licensing agreement on group level and the parent company had itself requested to receive the draft agreement [471] .

Furthermore, the fact that the draft agreement sent to the parent company did not directly provide for the licensing of all subsidiaries (including the Defendant) was also not considered as harmful [472] . Insofar, the Court held that under the Huawei framework it is, as a rule, acceptable that the patent holder enters into licensing negotiations only with the parent company within a group of companies [473] . Whether subsidiaries can (or should) also be licensed, will be the object of these negotiations [474] . An exception would apply only then, when it is made clear already at the beginning of the licensing negotiations that the offer made to the parent company cannot include its subsidiaries [475] . This was, however, not the case here, since the standard licensing agreement sent to the parent company indicates MPEG LA’s willingness to grant licences also to the subsidiaries of the former [476] .

Besides that, the Court did not consider the fact that the standard licensing agreement sent to the parent company did not cover the sale of licensed products to wholesalers and retailers (but regarded only sales to end users) to be in conflict with the Huawei framework, although the Defendant was engaged also in this business [477] . According to the Court, sales to wholesalers and retailers would be covered by the effects of patent exhaustion, even without an express provision in a potential licensing agreement [478] .

The Court further ruled that the Huawei requirement, according to which the SEP holder’s licensing offer must specify the royalty calculation, was met, although the draft standard licensing agreement sent to the parent company does not contain detailed explanation of the way the royalties were calculated [479] . In the Court’s view, the respective explanation does not require a ‘strict mathematical derivation’ of the royalty; moreover, it will, as a rule, suffice to demonstrate that the (standard) royalty rates offered have been accepted in the market by presenting existing licensing agreements with third parties (comparable agreements) [480] . If a sufficient number of comparable licences is presented, then the SEP holder will usually not be required to provide further information regarding the appropriateness of its licensing offer [480] . It will need, however, to provide information on all essential comparable agreements, in order to rule out the risk that only agreements supporting the offered royalty level are presented [480] . In this context, the Court noted that it cannot be required from the SEP holder to present all comparable agreements along with the licensing offer to the implementer; a respective industry practice does not exist [481] .

Against this background, the Court did not consider it to be harmful that the standard licensing agreement sent to the parent company by MPEG LA did not include a detailed explanation of the royalty calculation in the above sense [482] . On the one hand, the parent company was aware that this (standard) agreement had been accepted in the market by a great number of licensees [482] . On the other hand, the parent company was also adequately aware of the way the offered royalties were calculated, since it held patents included in the MPEG LA pool itself [483] .

Apart from the above, the Court held that the standard licensing agreement offered to the parent company was FRAND also in terms of content.

According to the Court, a licensing offer cannot be considered as fair and reasonable, if the patent holder requests royalties that go significantly beyond the (hypothetical) price that would have been formed in an effectively competitive market, unless there is a commercial justification for the royalty level requested [484] . Particularly in connection with the licensing of SEPs, an offer can lie outside the FRAND-scope, if the cumulative royalty burden imposed on the implementer would not be tenable in commercial terms [484] . The Court made clear that in this context, no exact mathematical derivation of a FRAND-conform royalty rate is required; moreover, an approximate value is to be determined based on assessments and estimations [484] . In this respect, comparable agreements can serve as an ‘important indicator’ of the fair and reasonable character of the offered royalty rates [484] .

Regarding to the non-discriminatory element of FRAND, the Court pointed out that it applied only to similar situated cases; an unequal treatment is allowed, as long as it is objectively justified [485] . Limitations in this context may especially occur, when the implementation of the patent is necessary for entering a downstream market or when a product becomes competitive only when it uses the patent’s teachings [485] . As a rule, the burden of proof with respect to the discriminatory character of a licensing offer rests on the implementer. Since the latter will usually not be aware of the existence or the content of comparable agreements of the patent holder, it may seem appropriate to request the patent holder to provide the implementer with respective details, as far as this is reasonable [486] . The information to be shared should cover all existing licensees and include which (concretely designated) company with which importance in the relevant market has obtained a licence on which conditions [486] .

Looking at the standard licensing agreement sent to the parent company, the Court observed that the fact the MPEG LA sought for a licence covering all companies within the group, to which the Defendant belonged, was not violating FRAND principles [487] . In the electronics and mobile communications industries, licences covering a group of companies are in line with the industry practice [488] . Patent holder have a special interest in concluding such licences particularly in cases, in which – as in the present case – the parent company manufactures products which are sold worldwide by its subsidiaries. This is because licences at group level makes sure that patent holders can enforce their rights effectively, without having to distinguish between licenced and unlicenced products within a group of companies [489] .

In addition, the Court made clear that pool licences, as the one offered to the parent company, are appropriate under the Huawei framework [490] . An offer for a pool licence cannot per se be seen as abusive (Article 101 TFEU) [491] . On the contrary, such licences usually serve the interest of potential licensees to be granted access to the whole standard on uniform conditions under one roof, without having to seek a licence from every single patent holder separately [491] .

Implementer’s counter-offer

The Court found that the Defendant failed to make a FRAND counter-offer [492] .

Sending signed copies of MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement back to MPEG LA can be regarded as a counter-offer [493] . The fact, however, that this offer concerned a licence limited to the Defendant and, thus, not covering the parent company (and all further companies belonging to the same group) was not FRAND conform [494] . The Court accepted that licences at group level mirror the industry practice in the field in question; accordingly, no objections can be raised when a patent holder contributing its patents to a pool is willing to grant only licences covering all group companies [495] .

Since the counter-offer was not FRAND in terms of content, the Court did not have to decide, whether it was made in due time, or not [496] .

  • [427] Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (MPEG-LA) v ZTE, District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 9 November 2018, cited by www.nrwe.de, para. 56.
  • [428] Ibid, para. 58
  • [429] Ibid, para. 57
  • [430] Ibid, para. 59
  • [431] Ibid, paras. 61 et seqq. and 340
  • [432] Ibid, para. 65
  • [433] Ibid, para. 66
  • [434] Ibid, para. 73
  • [435] Ibid, para. 42
  • [436] bid, para. 74
  • [437] Ibid, paras. 75 et seq
  • [438] Ibid, para. 75
  • [439] Ibid, paras. 127 – 254
  • [440] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13
  • [441] Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (MPEG-LA) v ZTE, District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 9 November 2018, cited by www.nrwe.de, Ibid, para. 280
  • [442] Ibid, para. 283 and paras. 291 et seqq
  • [443] Ibid, para. 286
  • [444] Ibid, para. 287
  • [445] Ibid, paras. 291 et seqq
  • [446] Ibid, para. 296
  • [447] Ibid, para. 300
  • [448] Ibid, para. 302
  • [449] Ibid, para. 308
  • [450] Under the ‘Orange-Book-Standard’ regime, in order to avoid an injunction, the implementer was required to make a licensing offer to the patent holder, which the latter could not refuse without acting in an anticompetitive manner; see Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), judgment dated 6 May 2009, Case No. KZR 39/06
  • [451] Ibid, para. 305
  • [452] Ibid, paras. 306 et seqq
  • [453] Ibid, para. 310
  • [454] Ibid, para. 311
  • [455] Ibid, para. 312
  • [456] Ibid, para. 421
  • [457] Ibid, para. 314
  • [458] Ibid, para. 320
  • [459] Ibid, para. 318
  • [460] Ibid, para. 329
  • [461] Ibid, paras. 336 et seq
  • [462] Ibid, para. 338
  • [463] Ibid, para. 198
  • [464] Ibid, para. 315
  • [465] Ibid, paras. 340 et seq
  • [466] Ibid, paras. 342 et seqq
  • [467] Ibid, para. 344
  • [468] Ibid, para. 346
  • [469] Ibid, para. 348
  • [470] Ibid, para. 352
  • [471] Ibid, para. 367
  • [472] Ibid, para. 369
  • [473] Ibid, para. 370
  • [474] Ibid, para. 378
  • [475] Ibid, para. 371
  • [476] Ibid, para. 374
  • [477] Ibid, para. 376
  • [478] Ibid, para. 377
  • [479] Ibid, para. 380
  • [480] Ibid, para. 381
  • [481] Ibid, para. 386
  • [482] Ibid, para. 382
  • [483] Ibid, para. 387
  • [484] Ibid, para. 391
  • [485] Ibid, para. 392
  • [486] Ibid, para. 393
  • [487] Ibid, para. 397
  • [488] Ibid, para. 398
  • [489] Ibid, para. 399
  • [490] Ibid, para. 402
  • [491] Ibid, para. 404
  • [492] Ibid, para. 410
  • [493] Ibid, para. 413
  • [494] Ibid, para. 416
  • [495] Ibid, para. 417
  • [496] Ibid, para. 411

Updated 9 11月 2020

Nokia対Daimler、マンハイム地方裁判所

LG Mannheim
18 8月 2020 - Case No. 2 O 34/19

A. 内容

原告は、フィンランドに本社を置くNokiaグループに属している(「Nokia」)。Nokiaは、大手通信事業者であり、欧州電気通信標準化機構(「ETSI」)が開発した各種無線通信規格の実施に不可欠(と見込まれる)と宣言されている、重要な特許ポートフォリオ(標準必須特許又はSEP)を保有している。

被告Daimlerは、世界的に有名なドイツの車メーカーである。Daimlerは、ETSIが開発した規格を実装する接続機能を備えた車をドイツで製造し、販売している。

Nokiaは、本件にかかわる特許が4G/LTE規格にとって不可欠であるとETSIに向けて宣言した。ETSIは、規格の実施に不可欠であるか、不可欠となる可能性のある特許の特許権者に対し、ユーザーが公平、合理的、かつ非差別的(FRAND)な条件にてこれを利用できるよう確約することを要求している。

2016年6月21日、Nokiaは、ETSIに不可欠(と見込まれる)と宣言した特許及び特許出願を網羅したリストを提出して自社のSEPポートフォリオをDaimlerに知らせた。これに対しDaimlerは、自社製品が実際にNokiaの特許を侵害しているとの条件でライセンスを取得できると回答した。

2016年11月9日、Nokiaは、Daimlerに1回目のライセンスの申し出を行った。2016年12月7日、Nokiaは、自社の特許ポートフォリオに関する詳細情報をDaimlerに提供した。2016年12月14日、Daimlerは、Daimlerの車に組み込まれている、いわゆる「テレマティクス制御ユニット」(TCU)を製造するサプライヤーへライセンスを付与する方が効率的と思われる旨回答した。2017年1月から2019年2月まで、Daimlerは、Nokiaとの交渉の場に再度就くことはなく、NokiaがDaimlerのサプライヤーと行った協議にも参加しなかった。

2019年2月27日、Nokiaは、Daimlerに対し二度目となるライセンスの申し出を行い、これに際し、自社特許と対象たる規格関連部分との対応関係を図示したクレームチャートを添付した。2019年3月19日、Daimlerは、Nokiaのポートフォリオに関するロイヤルティについて、基本的に、Daimlerが製造した車の台数ではなく、そのサプライヤーからDaimlerに提供されたコンポーネント数を基準として計算すべきであるとして、再度この申込みを拒絶した。

爾後Nokiaは、Daimlerに対し、ドイツのミュンヘン、デュッセルドルフ及びマンハイのム地方裁判所に複数の権利侵害訴訟を申し立てた。

2019年5月9日、権利侵害訴訟開始後間もなく、Daimlerは、Nokiaにカウンターオファーを行った。Nokiaのポートフォリオにかかわるそのロイヤルティの算定根拠は、Daimlerがサプライヤーに支払ったTCUの平均販売価格であった。Nokiaはこのカウンターオファーを拒絶した。

2020年6月10日、Daimlerは、Nokiaに2度目のカウンターオファーを行った。Nokiaは、(ドイツ民法典第315条に従い)ライセンス料を一方的に決定することができたが、Daimlerは、その決定されたライセンス料について裁判で争う権利を有していた。その2度目のカウンターオファーも拒絶された。

2020年6月18日、ドイツ連邦カルテル庁(「カルテル庁」)がマンハイム地方裁判所(「本裁判所」)での本件訴訟に介入し、FRAND宣言の性質に関する問題を本裁判所から欧州司法裁判所(CJEU)に照会するよう勧告した。本裁判所は、カルテル庁の勧告に従わなかった。

現行の判決で [497] 、本裁判所は、Daimlerに差止命令を下すとともに、本案に関するDaimlerの損害賠償責任を認めた。さらに本裁判所は、Nokiaへの損害賠償金の算定に必要な会計帳簿及び情報を提出するようDaimlerに命じた。

 

B. 判決理由

本裁判所は、係争中の特許をDaimlerが侵害したと認定した [498] 。これにより、Nokiaには差止命令等による救済手段が与えられた [499]

Daimler及び当該訴訟に参加したそのサプライヤーは、Nokiaが権利侵害訴訟の申立てにより市場支配的地位を濫用しており、これがEU機能条約第102条に違反していることから、差止命令が却下されるべきとして、いわゆる「FRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁」を主張した。とりわけ、Huawei v ZTE [500] (「Huawei裁定」又は「Huaweiフレームワーク」)事件でCJEUが定めた行動要件をNokiaが遵守していないと論じられた。

本裁判所は、Daimler及びそのサプライヤーのFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁を理由がないとして棄却した [501]

 

Huaweiフレームワーク

本裁判所は、SEP保有者が特許に起因して生じる独占権の行使を本来的に妨げられないことを名言した [502] 。実際のところ、特許が規格に必須であっても、その特許権者に技術利用を許容する義務を負わせることにならない。但し、市場支配的地位を獲得した結果、そのような利用を認めていたか、その利用を認める義務を課されていた場合は、この限りでない [502]

特許権者がHuaweiフレームワークに基づく義務を履行しているのであれば、特許権の行使による市場支配的地位の濫用が生じることはない [503] 。但し上記の義務は、権利者の許諾なしに保護対象技術を既に利用している実施者がFRAND条件でのライセンス取得の意思を有していることを前提とする [504] 。本裁判所は、特許権者から規格利用者に対しライセンスを「押しつける」よう要請することはできないのであるから、ライセンス契約締結を要請する法的請求権については尚更有していないと説示した [504] 。その上、支配的地位に付される「特段の責任」により、SEP保有者は、原則としてライセンス取得の意思を有するライセンシーに契約締結を促すよう「十分な努力」を払う義務を負う [505]

 

権利侵害通知

本裁判所によれば、上記の「努力」には、その実施者に特許侵害について通知するだけでなく、権利侵害訴訟申立て前におけるライセンス取得の可能性および必要性を通知する義務が含まれる [506] 。具体的な事例を参照した結果、本裁判所は、Nokiaが当該義務を履行したと認めた [507]

内容について言えば、上記の権利侵害通知には、被侵害特許の明示並びに侵害性を有する使用法及び訴えの対象たる実施形態を記載しなければならない [506] 。権利侵害について技術的・法的観点から詳細に分析する必要はない。実施者の立場としては、結局は専門家又は弁護士の助言に依拠してその権利侵害の主張を評価するしかない [506] 。通例、クレームチャートが提示されれば十分である(但し、必須ではない) [506] 。さらに本裁判所は、特許権者がその特許を侵害している最終製品メーカーのサプライヤーそれぞれに対し、別個に権利侵害を通知する義務を負わないことを指摘した [508]

本裁判所の見地から、2016年6月21日、2016年11月9日及び2016年12月7日付のNokiaのEメールは、上記要件を満たしている [509] 。実際のところNokiaは、-少なくとも当初は-付託される係争中の特許に該当する標準規格書の具体的部分を示していなかったことは、害にはならない。これは、権利侵害の最終的な評価を行うに際し権利侵害通知が求められていなかったためである [510]

さらに本裁判所は、Nokiaが権利侵害通知において、関連規格によって接続機能を生み出す具体的なコンポーネント(Daimlerの車に組み込まれたTCU等)を特定する必要はないと判断した [511] 。Daimlerは当該コンポーネントを購入した上で自社製品に使用したのだから、情報不足は何ら生じるはずがなかった [511]

 

誠実意思

さらに本裁判所は、DaimlerがNokiaとのFRANDライセンス契約締結の意思を十分に明示ていないことから、差止命令を回避するためにFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁に依拠できないと認定した [512]

本裁判所の見地から、実施者は、「どのような条件が実際にFRANDにあたるのかにかかわらず」SEP保有者とのライセンス契約を締結する意思について、「明確に」かつ「疑義の生じないよう」宣言した上で、爾後「目的志向」の意図にてライセンス供与の協議に従事しなければならなかった(Sisvel v Haier(連邦司法裁判所, 2020年5月5日, Case No. KZR 36/17)、及びUnwired Planet v Huawei(英国及びウェールズ高等法院、2017年4月5日, Case No. [2017] EWHC 711(Pat)の判決) [513] 。ライセンス供与の協議における実施者の「目的志向」は、決定的な重要性を有する。実施者は概して、ライセンス供与の協議が開始される前の時点で特許取得済の標準化技術を既に使用していることから、その特許の有効期間満了までライセンス契約締結を遅延させることに利得を有するが、これはHuawei裁定の趣旨に反する [514] 。よって、権利侵害の通知に対して、ライセンス契約締結を検討する意思を示したり、ライセンス取得の是非及びその条件についての協議に入る意思を示したりするだけでは不十分である [513]

本裁判所はさらに、一定条件下での誠実意思の宣言が許容されないと指摘した [513] 。さらに特許権者へのカウンターオファー内容変更協議の拒絶も、実施側の誠実意思欠如を示すものとみなされうる [513]

上記に基づき、本裁判所は、Daimlerが当初、製品がNokiaの特許を実際に侵害すればライセンス契約を締結すると示したことでは、DaimlerがFRANDライセンス契約を締結する意思を適切に示さなかったとの見解を示した [515] 。本裁判所は、Daimlerのカウンターオファーは契約締結にかかわる意思を十分に示したものになりえず、特に2度目のカウンターオファーについては、Nokiaが片務的に設定できたはずのロイヤルティ料率に異議を唱える権利をDaimlerに求めただけで、ライセンス料の決定に関する両当事者間の紛争を爾後の訴訟に持ち越しただけに過ぎないと付け加えた [516]

本裁判所はさらに、DaimlerがNokiaとの協議に関与しなかったにもかかわらず、自らのサプライヤーにNokiaから直接ライセンスを付与するよう強く主張したことから、Daimlerが「誠実意思を有する」ライセンシーとして行為していなかったと判示した [517] 。さらに、Daimlerの誠実意思の欠落は、NokiaのSEPポートフォリオに対するライセンス料の算定基準として、Daimlerがサプライヤーから購入したTCUの平均価格を適用するよう主張したことからも確認された [518]

 

FRAND料金の算定

本裁判所は、NokiaのSEPポートフォリオに対するロイヤルティ料率の算定に、TCUを「参考値」として使用することは適正でなかったと認定した [519]

一般に、FRAND条件は単一ではなく、FRANDのライセンス供与条件及び料金には幅が設定されるのが通例である [520] 。また、何がFRANDとみなされるかは、業界及び時期によって異なる場合がある [520]

しかしながら、本裁判所は、原則として「バリューチェーンの最終段階で商品として通用する最終製品にかかる技術の経済上の利益」を特許権者に「配分」しなければならないと指摘した [521] 。どの理由は、保護された発明を使用する最終製品で「経済上の利益」を獲得する「機会が創出する」、ためである [521] 。裁判所は、最終製品における特許技術の価値を斟酌して、SEP保有者がバリューチェーンの別の段階でなされるイノベーションから利益を得ているとの考えを認めなかった [522] 。裁判所は、これが生じないと確認するために入手可能な証拠文書が複数存在することを示した [522]

したがって、本裁判所は、いわゆる「最小販売可能特許実施単位(SSPPU)」、すなわち、製品に組み入れられる最小技術単位をFRANDロイヤルティ料率の算定根拠とする考えを否定した [522] 。特許消尽の影響により、SEP保有者は、バリューチェーン最終段階で創出される価値に関与することを妨げられる [522] 。これとは別に、この選択肢は、バリューチェーンの複数の段階において同一特許のライセンスが付与される「二重取り」の特定と回避をより複雑にするおそれがある [522] 。 それでもなお本裁判所は、上記の原則について、必ずしも専ら最終製品製造会社とライセンス契約締結を意味するものでないと明言した [523] 。本裁判所は、販売可能な最終製品の特許技術の価値がサプライチェーンの別の段階で計算に組み込まれる可能性が大いにあるとみなした [523]

この背景に照らし、本裁判所は、TCUの販売価格では、本事件の最終製品にあたるDaimler製造車に対するNokiaのSEPの価値が十分に反映されていないと認定した [524] 。TCUの販売価格が相応するのはDaimlerのそれぞれのコストのみである [525] 。むしろDaimlerは、接続機能により、顧客に追加サービスを提示してこれによる収入を得て、コストを節減し、研究開発費を最適化した [526] 。接続機能はこの価値創出の機会を保証するものである [527] 。さらに、本裁判所は、Daimlerの複数の主要競合会社が(専ら車製造会社にライセンスを付与する)Avanciプラットフォームのライセンシングモデルを承諾したことにより、最終製品向けの保護された技術の価値に焦点があてられることは、自動車業界にとっても合理的と認定した [528]

 

非差別性

さらに本裁判所は、NokiaのDaimlerに対する特許請求の申立ては差別的なものではなく、よってサプライヤーがライセンスを取得するべきとのDaimlerの主張が正当化されるものでないことを認めた [529]

裁判所は、特許権利者が基本的に、サプライヤーンの中で権利を主張する段階を自由に選択できることを説示した [530] 。競争関連法においてこの可能性は本来的に制限されていないため、市場支配的地位を有する特許権者も同様である [530] 。その上、支配的地位を有する特許権利者は、すべての見込ライセンシーに「標準料率」を申出する義務を負うものでない [530] 。TFEU第102条に定められた非差別性に関わる義務は、上流市場又は下流市場での競争の歪みを回避するためであるが、正当な根拠が十分に存在する場合にライセンシーの様々な取扱いを排除するものではない [531]

本件において、本裁判所は、ロイヤルティベースとして最終製品を使用すべきであるとのNokiaの請求が競争に影響を及ぼさないと判断した [532] 。特に、自動車業界では車メーカーに販売されるコンポーネントのライセンスをサプライヤーが取得することが一般的であるとの事実は、Nokiaに慣行の変更を求めるものでない。これは特に、AvanciプラットフォームからDaimlerの競合会社へのライセンス供与は、通信業界において実勢的なその慣行が自動車業界でも既に適用されていることを証しているためである [533] 。さらに本裁判所は、最終製品メーカーにSEPを主張することにより生産、販売及び技術発展の制限がもたらされ、これにより消費者が不利益を被るとはみなさなかった [534] 。この点に関し、本裁判所は、ETSI IPRポリシーに拠ればFRANDライセンスに含められるべきであり、かつ、コンポーネントメーカーに製品の製造、販売及び開発を認めるいわゆる「下請製造権」に言及した [535]

 

SEP保有者の申出/情報提供義務

さらに、本裁判所は、Nokiaがライセンスの申出に関し十分な情報を提供することを拒絶した旨をDaimlerが主張しても、Daimlerのライセンス取得する意思のないことを正当化できないと判示した [536]

本裁判所は、SEP保有者がライセンス要請のFRAND適合性を具体化する義務を負う可能性を指摘した [537] 。特許権利者は、第三者との間で非標準的な条件に基づき既に契約を締結している場合、一般的には、別の契約条件の申出を受けているかどうか実施者が評価できるようにするため、-少なくとも-重要な契約条項の内容を開示し、提示する義務を負う [537] 。各々の義務の範囲および詳細なレベルは、ケースバイケースで判断される [537]

上記に鑑みて、本裁判所は、車両の接続機能の価値に関する調査や他の主要車メーカーとの署名済みライセンス締結等を共有することにより、NokiaがDaimlerに十分な情報を提供していたとの見解を示した [538] 。この状況において、本裁判所は、NokiaがDaimlerに対し、スマートフォンメーカーとのライセンス契約を開示する義務を負っていなかったと示した。本裁判所は、SEP保有者の情報開示義務が、従前に署名されているあらゆるライセンス契約の全文に及んで適用されるとの意見や、SEP保有者がすべての既存契約を開示する義務を負うとの意見を拒絶した [539] 。さらに本裁判所は、通信業界でのライセンス契約は自動車業界でのライセンスのFRAND適合性評価とは無関係であると判示した [539]

 

サプライヤーによるFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁

上記とは別に、本裁判所は、訴訟に参加したサプライヤーが提起したFRAND宣言を理由とする抗弁がDaimlerに利益をもたらさないことを強調した [540]

本裁判所は、訴えられている最終製品メーカーがそのサプライヤーにより提起されるFRAND抗弁に、原則として依拠できるかどうかについて結論を出さなかった。本裁判所によれば、これについてはいかなる場合であれ、サプライヤーが(製造するコンポーネントでなく)最終製品に対する対象特許の価値を根拠として特許権利者からライセンスを取得する意思を有している必要がある [541] 。本訴訟はこのような状況でなかった [542]

本裁判所は、サプライヤーがSEP保有者に支払ったロイヤルティをその顧客に転嫁することが難しいことを無視したわけではない [543] 。しかしながら、第三者との契約上の取決め(ここでは、サプライヤーと最終製品メーカーとの契約)は、裁判所の見地から、最終製品にかかわる特許技術により創出される価値への配分を認めないライセンス契約にSEP保有者に指示するものであってはならない [543]

 

C. その他の問題点

最終的に本裁判所は、-カルテル庁の勧告に反し-、訴訟手続を停止し、かつ、SEP保有者のFRAND宣言により、バリューチェーンに含まれるあらゆる者に双務的なライセンスが付与される直接的な請求(license-to-allの考え方)または標準化技術へのアクセスへの請求(access-to-allの考え方)が確立されるのかをめぐる問題をCJEUに照会する必要はないと判断した。

本裁判所は、Daimlerもそのサプライヤーも、Daimlerが製造した車に関する特許技術の価値に基づきFRAND条件でNokiaからライセンスを取得する意思を有していなかったため、これについて結論を出さなかった [544] 。さらに本裁判所は、係争中の特許の有効期限が今後数年で満了するとの事実に基づき、訴訟手続の停止命令に反対すると述べた [545]

  • [497] Nokia v Daimler(マンハイム地方裁判所, 2020年8月18日判決, 事件番号 2 O 34/19(www.juris.deから引用))
  • [498] 同判決、第49節乃至第136節。
  • [499] 同判決、第138節。
  • [500] Huawei v ZTE(欧州司法裁判所, 2016年7月16日判決、事件番号 C-170/13)
  • [501] Nokia v Daimler(マンハイム地方裁判所、2020年8月18日判決、事件番号 2 O 34/19, 第144節)
  • [502] 同判決、第146節。
  • [503] 同判決、第147節。
  • [504] 同判決、第148節。
  • [505] 同判決、第149節。
  • [506] 同判決、第152節。
  • [507] 同判決、第151乃至第156節。
  • [508] 同判決、第248節。
  • [509] 同判決、第153節以降。
  • [510] 同判決、第154節。
  • [511] 同判決、第155節。
  • [512] 同判決、第157乃至第231節。
  • [513] 同判決、第158節。
  • [514] 同判決、第159節。
  • [515] 同判決、第161節。
  • [516] 同判決、第197乃至第199節。
  • [517] 同判決、第157節、第160節及び第162節乃至第164節。
  • [518] 同判決、第160及び第165節乃至第168節。
  • [519] 同判決、第169節。
  • [520] 同判決、第170節。
  • [521] 同判決、第171節。
  • [522] 同判決、第172節。
  • [523] 同判決、第173節。
  • [524] 同判決、第174節以降。
  • [525] 同判決、第174節。
  • [526] 同判決、第177節。
  • [527] 同判決、第180節。
  • [528] 同判決、第187節以降。
  • [529] 同判決、第201節乃至第212節。
  • [530] 同判決、第202節。
  • [531] 同判決、第203節。
  • [532] 同判決、第205節。
  • [533] 同判決、第210節。
  • [534] 同判決、第213節。
  • [535] 同判決、第215節。
  • [536] 同判決、第216節以降。
  • [537] 同判決、第217節。
  • [538] 同判決、第218節。
  • [539] 同判決、第230節。
  • [540] 同判決、第232節以降。
  • [541] 同判決、第234及び第236節以降。
  • [542] 同判決、第240節以降。
  • [543] 同判決、第239節。
  • [544] 同判決、第253及び第291節。
  • [545] 同判決、第291節。

Updated 6 6月 2017

OLG Düsseldorf 2

OLG Düsseldorf
14 12月 2016 - Case No. I-2 U 31/16

  1. Facts
    The Claimant is holder of a patent declared as essential to a standard (Standard Essential Patent, SEP). The Defendant is a telecommunications company, which inter alia sells mobile phones allegedly using Claimant’s SEPs. Upon Claimant’s action, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf (1) ordered the Defendant to render accounts regarding the sales of mobile phones embedding Claimant’s SEPs and (2) recognized Defendant’s obligation to pay damages to the Claimant resulting from the infringement of its SEPs (cf. Regional Court of Düsseldorf, decision dated 19th January 2016, Case No. 4b O 49/14). The Defendant appealed this judgement. In the appeal proceedings before the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf (Case No. 2 U 31/16), one issue in dispute was whether the license fees, which the Claimant had calculated, were Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND). The Claimant explained its calculation in a statement to the court that was produced in two versions. In the first version, which was filed only with the court, the information regarding the FRAND calculation (including comparable license agreements pre¬sented as evidence), were fully disclosed. In the second version, which was presented to the Defendant and a third party that had joined the proceedings (Intervener), the respective sections (and evidence) were redacted.
    With the present interlocutory application, the Claimant requested the court to order that disclosure of full information (and evidence) regarding its FRAND calculation shall be required only towards Defendant’s and Intervenor’s counsels, provided that the court would oblige the counsels to full confi-dentiality towards everyone, including their clients themselves (that is the Defendant and the Intervener). The Defendant objected this request. The Intervener, on the other hand, stated that it agreed with the proceeding defined in Claimant’s request.
    In its first decision dated 14th December 2016, the court rejected the application with respect to both the Defendant and the Intervener. Instead, the court encouraged the parties to enter into a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) reinforced by a contractual penalty, in case confidentiality was breached.
    This decision was consequently modified by a further decision rendered by the court on 17th January 2017. The court granted Claimant’s application in respect to the Intervener, but again rejected the application in respect to the Defendant. The court, however, requested from the Defendant to present an offer for an NDA to the Claimant incorporating particularly the following conditions within a deadline of three weeks:
    • The confidential information should be used only in the context of the present litigation.
    • The information would be made available only to four company representatives of the Defendant (as well as any experts engaged by the Defendant in the ongoing litigation).
    • These persons shall be themselves obliged to confidentiality by the Defendant.
    • In case confidentiality was breached, the Defendant shall be liable for payment of a contractual pen-alty amounting to EUR 1 million.




  2. Court’s Reasoning
    In its first decision, the court found that the German rules of Civil Procedure do not provide a legal basis for granting an order in the form requested by the Claimant. [546] Such an order would exclude Defendant’s right to be heard with respect to Claimant’s FRAND calculation, in breach of Art. 103 Sec. 1 of the German Constitutional Law (Grundgesetz). [546] The fact that Defendant’s counsels would have access to the relevant information, does not suffice to meet the requirements set forth by the aforementioned provision. Party’s right to be heard contains also the right to personally participate in the proceedings. Consequently, a limitation of a party’s right to be heard reaching so far as Claimant requested, is not possible, unless the party affected expressly waives its right to personally participate in the proceedings. [546] Since the Defendant decided to not do so, a respective order cannot be rendered against it.
    The fact that the Intervener waived its respective right, can also not justify rendering such an order against the Defendant. [547] The Intervener does not join the proceedings as a party, but merely in support of one of the parties. [548] Accordingly, it cannot make decisions that would affect the party’s standing, such as a declaration to waive the right to be heard. In the present case, the Intervener’s decision to waive its respective right may, therefore, impact its own standing in the proceedings, but cannot affect Defendant’s position.

    As a result, the Claimant can either make the confidential information available to the Defendant or keep this information redacted, accepting that the court cannot take redacted information into consideration for its decision. [549]

    Notwithstanding the above, under reference to the “Umweltengel für Tragetaschen” judgement of the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) [550] the court held, that, as a rule, it can be expected from the implementer of SEPs to enter into a NDA reinforced by a contractual penalty with the SEP holder. [551] SEP implementer is obliged to facilitate FRAND licensing negotiations to the best of its ability. This includes also taking justified confidentiality interests of the SEP holder into account. [551]

    In its second decision dated 17th January 2017 the court applied the above considerations. Since the Intervener waived its right to be heard, the court found that there is no reason to deny Claimant’s request in relation to the Intervener. On the other hand, due to Defendant’s denial to waive its respective right, the court still refrained for granting Claimant’s request against the Defendant. Taking Claimant’s confi¬dentiality interests into account, the court ordered, however, the Defendant to submit an offer for a NDA to the Claimant based particularly on the conditions mentioned above.
  • [546] Judgement dated 14th December 2016, para. 1
  • [547] Judgement dated 14th December 2016, para. 2
  • [548] Judgement dated 14th December 2016, para. 2
  • [549] Judgement dated 14th December 2016, para. 3
  • [550] Bundesgerichtshof, Decision dated 19th February 2014, Case No. I ZR 230/12
  • [551] Judgement dated 14th December 2016, para. 5

Updated 30 10月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal

英国裁判所の決定
23 10月 2018 - Case No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344

A. Facts

The Claimant, Unwired Planet International Limited, holds a significant portfolio of patents which are essential for the implementation of the 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE wireless telecommunications standards (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs). The Defendants, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Huawei Technologies (UK) Co. Ltd., manufacture and sell mobile devices complying with the above standards worldwide.

Starting in September 2013, the Claimant contacted the Defendants several times, requesting the latter to engage in discussions for a licence regarding its SEP portfolio. [552] In March 2014, the Claimant sued the Defendants as well as Samsung and Google for infringement of five of its UK SEPs before the UK High Court of Justice (High Court). [553] The Claimant also initiated parallel infringement proceedings against the Defendants in Germany. [554]

The High Court conducted three technical trials first, focusing on the validity and essentiality of four of the SEPs in suit. [555] By April 2016, these trials were completed; the High Court held that two of the SEPs in suit were both valid and essential, whereas two other patents were found to be invalid. [555] The parties agreed to postpone further technical trials indefinitely. [555]

In July 2016, Samsung took a licence from the Claimant covering, among other, the SEPs in suit. [556] The Claimant also settled the infringement proceedings with Google. [557]

In late 2016, the trial concerned with questions regarding to the licensing of the SEPs in suit commenced between the Claimant and the Defendants. Over the course of these proceedings the parties made licensing offers to the each other. However, they failed to reach an agreement. The Defendants indicated they were willing to take a licence under Claimant’s UK patent portfolio, whereas the Claimant contended that it was entitled to insist upon a worldwide licence. [558]

In April 2017, the High Court granted an UK injunction against the Defendant, until such time as it entered into a worldwide licensing agreement with the Claimant on the specific rates, which the court determined to be Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) [559] in accordance with the undertaking given by the Claimant towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). [560] Pending appeal, the High Court stayed the injunction. [561]

Shortly after the High Court delivered its decision, the Defendants began proceedings against the Claimant in China, which are still pending. [562]

With the present judgment, the UK Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendants’ appeal against the decision of the High Court. [563]


B. Court’s reasoning

The Defendants appealed the decision of the High Court on the following three grounds:

1. The High Court’s finding that only a worldwide licence was FRAND is erroneous; the imposition of such a licence on terms set by this court based on a national finding of infringement of UK patents is wrong in principle. [564]

2. The offer imposed to the Defendants by the High Court is discriminatory in violation of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking, since the rates offered are higher than the rates reflected in the licence granted by the Claimant to Samsung. [565]

3. The Claimant is not entitled to injunctive relief; by bringing the infringement proceedings against the Defendants, without meeting the requirements established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in the matter Huawei v ZTE [566] (Huawei judgment) before, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). [567]

Notably, the High Court’s determination of the rates which apply to the worldwide licence that the court requested the Defendants to take was not challenged by any of the parties to the proceedings. [568]


1. Worldwide licences

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Defendants’ notion that imposing a worldwide licence on an implementer is wrong, because it amounts to an (indirect) interference with foreign court proceedings relating to patents subsisting in foreign territories, which would have been subject to materially different approaches to the assessment of FRAND royalty rates and could, therefore, lead to different results (particularly the ongoing litigation between the parties in China and Germany). [569]

The Court of Appeal explained that in imposing a worldwide licence the High Court did neither adjudicate on issues of infringement or validity concerning any foreign SEPs, nor was it deciding what the appropriate relief for infringement of any foreign SEPs might be (particularly since it made clear that a FRAND licence should not prevent a licensee from challenging the validity or essentiality of any foreign SEPs and should make provision for sales in non-patent countries which do not require a licence) [570] . [571]

Moreover, the High Court simply determined the terms of the licence that the Claimant was required to offer to the Defendants pursuant to its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI. [572] Such an undertaking has international effect. [573] It applies to all SEPs of the patent holder irrespective of the territory in which they subsist. [574] This is necessary for two reasons: first, to protect implementers whose equipment may be sold and used in a number of different jurisdictions. [574] Second, to enable SEP holders to prevent implementers from “free-riding” on their innovations and secure an appropriate reward for carrying out their research and development activities and for engaging with the standardisation process. [575]

Accordingly, the High Court had not erred in finding that a worldwide licence was FRAND. On the contrary, there may be circumstances in which only a worldwide licence or at least a multi-territorial licence would be FRAND. [576] German Courts (in Pioneer Acer [577] and St. Lawrence v Vodafone [578] ) as well as the European Commission in its Communication dated 29 November 2017 [579] had also adopted a similar approach. [580]

Having said that, the Court of Appeal recognized that it may be “wholly impractical” for a SEP holder to seek to negotiate a licence for its patents on a country-by-country basis, just as it may be “prohibitively expensive” to seek to enforce its SEPs by litigating in each country in which they subsist. [575] In addition, if in the FRAND context the implementer could only be required to take country-by-country licences, there would be no prospect of any effective injunctive relief being granted to the SEP holder against it: the implementer could avoid an injunction, if it agreed to pay the royalties in respect of its activities in any particular country, once those activities had been found to infringe. [581] In this way, the implementer would have an incentive to hold out country-by-country, until it was compelled to pay. [581]

In its discussion of this topic, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the view taken by the High Court that in every given set of circumstances only one true set of FRAND terms exists. Nevertheless, the court did not consider that the opposite assumption of the High Court had a material effect to the its decision. [582]

In the eyes of the Court of Appeal, it is “unreal” to suggest that two parties, acting fairly and reasonably, will necessarily arrive at precisely the same set of licence terms as two other parties, also acting fairly and reasonably and faced with the same set of circumstances. [583] The reality is that a number of sets of terms may all be fair and reasonable in a given set of circumstances. [583] Whether there is only one true set of FRAND terms or not, is, therefore, more of a “theoretical problem” than a real one. [584] If the parties cannot reach an agreement, then the court (or arbitral tribunal) which will have to determine the licensing terms will normally declare one set of terms as FRAND. The SEP holder would then have to offer that specific set of terms to the implementer. On the other hand, in case that the court finds that two different sets of terms are FRAND, then the SEP holder will satisfy its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI, if it offers either one of them to the implementer. [584]

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal dismissed Defendants’ claim that imposing a worldwide licence is contrary to public policy and disproportionate. [585] In particular, the Defendants argued that this approach encourages over-declaration of patents [586] and is not compatible with the spirit of the Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, [587] which requires relief for patent infringement to be proportionate. [588]

Although the Court of Appeal recognised the existence of the practice of over-declaration and acknowledged that it is a problem, it held that this phenomenon cannot justify “condemning” SEP holders with large portfolios to “impossibly expensive” litigation in every territory in respect of which they seek to recover royalties. [589] The court also found that there was nothing disproportionate about the approach taken by the High Court, since the Defendants had the option to avoid an injunction by taking a licence on the terms which the court had determined. [590]


2. Non-discrimination

The Court of Appeal rejected the Defendants’ argument [591] that the non-discrimination component of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking towards ETSI obliges the Claimant to offer to the Defendants the same rates as those contained in the licence granted to Samsung. [592]

The Court of Appeal made clear that the obligation of the SEP holder not to discriminate is, in principle, engaged in the present case, since the Claimant’s transaction with the Defendants is equivalent to the licence it granted to Samsung. [593] In the court’s eyes, when deciding whether two transactions are equivalent one needs to focus first on the transactions themselves. Insofar, differences in the circumstances in which the transactions were entered into, particularly economic circumstances, such as the parties’ financial position [594] or market conditions (e.g. cost of raw materials), cannot make two otherwise identical transactions non-equivalent (releasing, therefore, the patent holder from the obligation not to discriminate). Changes in such circumstances could only amount to an objective justification for a difference in treatment. [595]

Considering the specific content of the SEP holder’s respective obligation, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court’s finding that the non-discrimination element of a SEP holder’s FRAND undertaking does not imply a so-called “hard-edged” component (imposing on the patent holder an obligation to offer the same rate to similarly situated implementers). [596] It argued that the “hard-edged” approach is “excessively strict” and fails to achieve a balance between a fair return to the SEP owner and universal access to the technology. [597] It could have the effect of compelling the SEP holder to accept a level of compensation for the use of its invention which does not reflect the value of the licensed technology and, therefore, harm the technological development of standards. [598]

Furthermore, the “hard-edged” discrimination approach should be rejected also because its effects would result in the insertion of the “most favoured licensee” clause in the FRAND undertaking. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the industry would most likely have regarded such a clause as inconsistent with the overall objective of the FRAND undertaking. [599]

Conversely, the Court of Appeal followed the notion described by the High Court as the “general” non-discrimination approach: [600] the FRAND undertaking prevents the SEP holder from securing rates higher than a “benchmark” rate which mirrors a fair valuation of its patent(s), but it does not prevent the patent holder from granting licences at lower rates. [600] For determining the benchmark rate, prior licences granted by the SEP holder to third parties will likely form the “best comparables”. [601]

The Court of Appeal argued that the “general” approach is in line with the objectives of the FRAND undertaking, since it ensures that the SEP holder is not able to “hold-up” implementation of the standard by demanding more than its patent(s) is worth. [602] However, the FRAND undertaking does not aim at leveling down the royalty owed to the SEP holder to a point where it no longer represents a fair return for its patent(s), or to removing its discretion to agree royalty rates lower than the benchmark rate, if it chooses to do so. [602]

In this context, the Court of Appeal made clear that it does not consider differential pricing as per se objectionable, since it can in some circumstances be beneficial to consumer welfare. [603] The court sees no value in mandating equal pricing for its own sake. On the contrary, once the hold-up effect is dealt with by ensuring that licences are available at the benchmark rate, there is no reason for preventing the SEP holder from charging less than the licence is worth. [603] Should discrimination appear below the benchmark rate, it should be addressed through the application of competition law; as long as granting licences at rates lower than the benchmark rate causes no competitive harm, there is no reason to assume that the FRAND undertaking constrains the ability of the SEP holder to do so. [604]


3. Abuse of dominant Position / Huawei v ZTE

The Court of Appeal further rejected Defendants’ argument that, by bringing the infringement proceedings prior to fulfilling the obligations arising from the Huawei judgment, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 TFEU. [605]

To begin with, the Court of Appeal confirmed the finding of the High Court that the Claimant held a dominant market position and dismissed the respective challenge by the latter. [606] It did not find any flaw in the High Court’s view that the SEP holder has a 100% market share with respect to each SEP (since it is “common ground” that the relevant market for the purpose of assessing dominance in the case of each SEP is the market for the licensing of that SEP [607] ) and that the constrains imposed upon the SEP holder’s market power by the limitations attached to the FRAND undertaking [608] and the risk of hold-out that is immanent to the structure of the respective market, [609] can either alone or together rebut the assumption that it most likely holds market power. [610]

Notwithstanding the above, the Court of Appeal held that the Claimant had not abused its market power in the present case. [611]

The court agreed with the finding of the High Court that the Huawei judgment did not lay down “mandatory conditions”, in a sense that that non-compliance will per se render the initiation of infringement proceedings a breach of Article 102 TFEU. [612] The language used in the Huawei judgment implies that the CJEU intended to create a “safe harbor”: if the SEP holder complies with the respective framework, the commencement of an action will not, in and of itself, amount to an abuse. [613] If the SEP holder steps outside this framework, the question whether its behaviour has been abusive must be assessed in light of all of the circumstances. [614]

In the court’s eyes, the only mandatory condition that must be satisfied by the SEP holder before proceedings are commenced, is giving notice to the implementer about the infringing use of its patents. [615] This follows from the clear language used by the CJEU with respect to this obligation. [616] The precise content of such notice will depend upon all the circumstances of the particular case. [616] In general, if an alleged infringer is familiar with the technical details of the products it is dealing and the SEP it may be infringing, but has no intention of taking a licence on FRAND terms, it will not be justified to deny the SEP holder an injunction, simply because it had not made a formal notification prior to the commencement of proceedings. [617]

On the merits, the court accepted the High Court’s assessment that the Claimant had not behaved abusively and particularly the finding, that the Defendants, who were in contact with the Claimant prior to the proceedings, had sufficient notice that the Claimant held SEPs which ought to be licensed, if found infringed and essential. [618]

Considering further that the respective conduct requirements were not established at the point in time, in which the infringement action was filed (since the present proceedings were initiated before the CJEU delivered the Huawei judgment), the Court of Appeal noted that it would very likely not be fair to accuse the Claimant of abusive behavior. [619] Insofar the court agreed with the respective approach developed by German courts in co-called “transitional” cases (Pioneer v Acer, [620] St. Lawrence v Vodafone [620] and Sisvel v Haier [621] ) [622] .

  • [552] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, Case-No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, para. 233.
  • [553] Ibid, para. 6 et seqq.
  • [554] Ibid, para. 233.
  • [555] Ibid, para. 7.
  • [556] Ibid, paras. 8 and 137 et seqq.
  • [557] Ibid, para. 8.
  • [558] Ibid, para. 9 et seqq.; para. 31 et seqq.
  • [559] Ibid, para 17.
  • [560] Ibid, para 130.
  • [561] Ibid, para 18.
  • [562] Ibid, para 112.
  • [563] Ibid, para 291.
  • [564] Ibid, paras. 19 and 45 et seqq.
  • [565] Ibid, paras. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [566] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [567] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [568] Ibid, para. 17.
  • [569] Ibid, paras. 74 and 77 et seq.
  • [570] Ibid, para. 82.
  • [571] Ibid, para. 80.
  • [572] Ibid, para. 79 et seq.
  • [573] Ibid, para. 26.
  • [574] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [575] Ibid, para. 54 et seq., para. 59.
  • [576] Ibid, para. 56.
  • [577] Pioneer v Acer, District Court of Mannheim, judgement dated 8 January 2016, Case No. 7 O 96/14.
  • [578] St. Lawrence v Vodafone, District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 31 March 2016, Case No. 4a O 73/14.
  • [579] Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, “Setting out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents”, 29 November 2017, COM(2017) 712 final.
  • [580] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 74.
  • [581] Ibid, para. 111.
  • [582] Ibid, para. 128.
  • [583] Ibid, para. 121.
  • [584] Ibid, para. 125.
  • [585] Ibid, para. 75.
  • [586] Ibid, para. 92
  • [587] Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Official Journal of the EU L 195, 02/06/2004, p. 16)
  • [588] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 94.
  • [589] Ibid, para. 96.
  • [590] Ibid, para. 98.
  • [591] Ibid, para. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [592] Ibid, paras. 207 and 210.
  • [593] Ibid, para. 176.
  • [594] Ibid, para. 173.
  • [595] Ibid, para. 169 et seq.
  • [596] Ibid, paras. 194 et seqq.
  • [597] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [598] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [599] Ibid, para. 199.
  • [600] Ibid, para. 195.
  • [601] Ibid, para. 202.
  • [602] Ibid, para. 196.
  • [603] Ibid, para. 197.
  • [604] Ibid, para. 200.
  • [605] Ibid, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [606] Ibid, para. 212.
  • [607] Ibid, para. 216.
  • [608] Ibid, para. 219.
  • [609] Ibid, para. 220.
  • [610] Ibid, para. 229.
  • [611] Ibid, para. 284.
  • [612] Ibid, para. 269.
  • [613] Ibid, para. 270.
  • [614] Ibid, para. 269 and 282.
  • [615] Ibid, para. 253 and 281.
  • [616] Ibid, para. 271.
  • [617] Ibid, para. 273.
  • [618] Ibid, para. 284
  • [619] Ibid, para. 275
  • [620] See above
  • [621] Sisvel v Haier, Higher District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 30 March 2017, Case No. 15 U 66-15.
  • [622] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 279.

Updated 27 6月 2018

OLG Düsseldorf 3

OLG Düsseldorf
25 4月 2018 - Case No. I-2 W 8/18

A. Facts

The Claimant holds a patent essential to a technical standard (Standard Essential Patent or SEP) which is subject to a so-called “FRAND-undertaking”, that is a commitment to make the SEP accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions. The Claimant entered into nego¬tiations for a FRAND licensing agreement with the Defendant. In June 2017, the parties signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). [623] A few days later, the Claimant entered into an NDA also with a third party, the Intervener . Shortly after signing the NDA, the Intervener [624] argued that several clauses of the agreement were void. [625]

In September 2017, the Claimant initiated infringement proceedings against the Defendant before the District Court of Düsseldorf (District Court). The Intervener joined these proceedings in support of the Defendant. After joining the proceedings, the Intervener claimed that the NDA with the Claimant does not cover information which the latter has to produce in the trial. This is particularly the case with infor-mation regarding to comparable licensing agreements concluded by the Claimant with third parties (comparable licences), which the Claimant regarded as strictly confidential. [626]

In December 2017, the Intervener requested full access to the court files. [627] The District Court dismissed the Intervener’s motion in part, namely by excluding access to confidential information, including information on comparable licences. The District Court held that the protection of such information was not adequately ensured, since the Intervener’s behaviour raised significant doubts that he considered himself bound to confidentiality by the NDA signed with the Claimant. [628] The Intervener appealed this decision.

The Higher District Court of Düsseldorf (Court) set the above ruling aside and requested the District Court to further clarify the facts of the case and decide again on the Intervener’s motion for full access to the court files on basis of the principles set forth in its present judgement. [629] In particular, the Court requested from the District Court to (re-)examine whether the Claimant actually possessed confidential business information which needed protection. [629] If this fact could be positively established, then a limited access to the court files would, basically, be justified, if the party seeking access to the files refused to commit itself to confidentiality. [630]

B. Court’s reasoning

The Court pointed out that parties to court proceedings seeking to protect confidential information must undertake efforts to sign an NDA with the opposing party and any intervener that has joined or is expected to join the proceedings with a high degree of certainty, before disclosing such information in the trial. [631] A party doing so without an NDA has to accept that the opposing party and/or the intervener could gain access to confidential information through an inspection of the court files. [632]

In the eyes of the Court, requesting from the party seeking to protect confidential information to actively pursue the conclusion of NDAs with other parties involved in the proceedings does not put that party at a disadvantage. The unjustified refusal of the opposing party (or an intervener) to enter into an NDA allows the party seeking protection to use only non-confidential information in the proceedings for specifying the FRAND conformity of its licensing offer to the potential licensee. [633] Although still obliged to specify the conditions of its FRAND licensing offer, the party has a lower burden to bear; to the extent (and not be¬yond) that is required for protecting its justified confidentiality interests, the party can meet its respective obligation by making “merely indicative observations” in the trial. [634]

In case that an intervener joins the proceedings at a point in time, in which a party has already produced confidential information on grounds of an NDA previously signed with the opposing party, the intervener’s right to inspect the court files can only be limited, if it was (or can) be established that the party seeking protection actually possesses confidential business information. [635] The fact that the other parties involved in the proceedings have already signed an NDA does not of itself limit the intervener’s right to full access to the court files. [636]

To establish that it possesses confidential business information worthy of protection, a party must identify such information and concretely explain why this information constitutes a business secret. [637] The party also needs to present in detail which measures were taken so far for securing confidentiality with respect to the information in question. [637] In addition, the party has to demonstrate in a substantiated and verifiable manner (for each information separately), which concrete disadvantages would be suffered, if the information would be disclosed. [637] It also needs to be explained, with which degree of certainty the said disadvantages are expected to occur. [637]

When protection of confidential information contained in comparable licences is sought, the existence of confidentiality interests requires, in general, special justification. [638] In the Court’s view, the SEP holder’s FRAND-undertaking entails transparency vis-à-vis interested stakeholders with respect to licensing conditions. [638] Moreover, knowledge of licensing conditions already accepted in the market can help potential licensees exercise their rights in infringement proceedings effectively. [638] Considering the non-discriminating element of SEP holder’s FRAND undertaking, it is not immediately apparent to the Court which interest worthy of legal protection the SEP holder could have in keeping conditions agreed in existing licensing agreements confidential. [638] In fact, several licensing pools (e.g. MPEG) publish their licensing agreements online. [638]

Should the party seeking protection fail to establish that it possesses confidential business information needing protection, full access to the court files must be granted to the intervener upon request, irrespective of whether the latter signs an NDA or not. [639] Conversely, if the existence of confidential business information is established, the intervener’s right to inspect the court files can be limited only to non-confidential information, as long as the intervener refuses to enter into an NDA with the party seeking protection of its confidentiality interests. [630]

In case that a party which has signed an NDA breaches its obligations under this agreement or “backs out” of the NDA, the party relying on the protection of its confidentiality interests can again limit its (future) submissions of facts in the proceedings to non-confidential information. [640] In other words, in terms of detail, the party must again not present information going beyond “merely indicative observations”. [640] Whether a party has “backed out“ of an NDA is a question of fact which has to be decided on a case-by-case basis. [641] For this, it is required that the party’s behaviour has caused a high risk of a breach of confidentiality. [641] For instance, this could be the case, when legal arguments brought by the party against the validity of the NDA are not reasonable, but rather serve as a pretext. [641]

  • [623] Higher District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 25 April 2018, Case No. I-2 W 8/18, para. 26
  • [624] Ibid, para. 26
  • [625] Ibid, para. 32
  • [626] Ibid, para. 35
  • [627] Ibid, para. 2
  • [628] Ibid, para. 27
  • [629] Ibid, para. 36 et seq
  • [630] Ibid, para. 17
  • [631] Ibid, paras 11 and 14
  • [632] Ibid, para. 11
  • [633] Ibid, para. 13
  • [634] Ibid, para. 13
  • [635] Ibid, para. 15
  • [636] Ibid, para. 15 et seq
  • [637] Ibid, para. 23
  • [638] Ibid, para. 24
  • [639] Ibid, para. 16
  • [640] Ibid, para. 20
  • [641] Ibid, para. 21

Updated 30 10月 2018

TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications UK Ltd. and Ors., UK High Court of Justice

英国裁判所の決定
28 9月 2018 - Case No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 2577 (Pat)

A. Facts

The Claimant, TQ Delta LLC, acquired patents that had been declared as essential to the DSL standard under the so-called “ITU Recommen­dations” from a company called Aware Inc. (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs) [642] . The ITU Recommendations require from the SEP holder to make its patents accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions [643] . The Defendants, Zyxel Communications UK Ltd. and Zyxel Communications A/S, manufacture and sell various types of equipment complying with the DSL standard [643] .

The Claimant brought an infringement action against the Defendants before the UK High Court of Justice (Court) based on two SEPs it holds [643] . The proceedings involve, on the one hand, technical issues concerning the validity, essentiality and infringement of the SEPs in question and, on the other hand, the licensing of these SEPs on FRAND terms [644] .

Prior to service of the statements of case, the Court ordered the Claimant to disclose licence agreements concluded with third parties, covering also the SEPs in suit (comparable agreements) [645] . The Claimant requested the Court to establish an “external eyes only” regime with respect to comparable agreements, especially a licence entered with a company called Zhone (Zhone licence) as well as a licence concluded with another company referred to as company “X” (X licence). In June 2018, the Court dismissed Claimant’s motion [646] . After that, the Court ordered standard disclosure, requesting both parties to search for documents relevant to the case and produce so-called “disclosure statements”, containing the documents identified [647] .

In its disclosure statement, the Claimant included only the licences concluded by Aware Inc. with third parties covering also the patents in suit (of which he possessed only redacted copies; “Aware licences”), the assignment agreement signed with Aware Inc., the inter partes correspondence with the latter as well as a few public validity findings made by the US Patent and Trademark Office on certain patents of its portfolio [648] .

The Defendants, who had obtained unredacted copies of the Aware licences directly from Aware Inc. [648] , complained that the Claimant’s disclosure was not appropriate and set out various categories of documents which, in their view, should have been in disclosure [648] . Accordingly, the Defendants requested an order for standard disclosure to be repeated, backed this time by a so-called “unless order” (meaning that non-compliance with the order will be sanctioned by the dismissal of Claimant’s claims) [649] .

On 28 September 2018, the Court made an order requesting disclosure of the following specific categories of documents by the Claimant [650] :

  • Documents concerning the assignment of patents from Aware Inc. to the Claimant (besides the assignment agreement itself);
  • documents regarding to the assessment of the (technical) essentiality of the patents in suitIbid, pages 5 et seq., and
  • documents concerning the Claimant’s royalty calculationIbid, pages 6 et seq..

On the other hand, the Court refused to order disclosure of documents relating to the negotiations leading to the Zhone licence, the X licence and the Aware licences, documents concerning licensing negotiations between the Claimant and third parties which have not resulted in a licence yet [653] , as well as documents regarding to assessments of the validity [654] or the technical significance of Claimant’s patents within the standard [651] .

With judgment dated 11 October 2018, the Court set forth the specific terms of the order [655] . Since the Court held that the Claimant did not carry out a proper search for existing documents under the previous standard disclosure order, it required the Claimant to conduct such a search and deliver a new statement of disclosure [656] . In addition, the Court ordered the Claimant to disclose the aforementioned specific categories of documents, ruling that failure to comply with this order, will lead to the dismissal of Claimant’s claim [656] .

B. Court’s reasoning

The Court explained that disclosure can be refused only with respect to documents not relevant to the case and/or documents which are relevant but might have been privileged or disproportionate to search for [657] . In the Court’s eyes, proportionality comes in play in this context under two aspects: On the one hand, the cost and complexity of searching for and extracting the relevant material should be considered [658] . On the other hand, the impact of the documents on the trial as well as the cost and complexity of deploying any material which is produced in the proceedings needs also to be taken into account [658] .

Further, the Court made clear that disclosure cannot be refused on the grounds that documents referring to a specific transaction (e.g. a licensing agreement) are subjective in nature (whereas FRAND is objective); in the Court’s eyes, even then, the acts of individuals working in a field is capable of being evidence on what “reasonable business people” might do in similar circumstances [653] .

On this basis, the Court held that documents concerning the assignment of the SEPs in suit from Aware Inc. to the Claimant should be disclosed [653] . The fact that the Claimant had disclosed the assignment agreement itself does not mean that further disclosure is not necessary [653] . Documents referring to the assignment might be “potentially highly relevant information” in FRAND-related trials, since they could provide insights into how different parts of the patent portfolio assigned were valued, offering (presumably “at arm's length”) a “concrete data point” for the respective valuation [653] .

The Court further found that documents concerning the assessment of whether the patents in suit are (from a technical perspective) essential to the DSL standard should also be disclosed [654] , because it is particularly relevant to know what proportion of the patents which were assigned to the Claimant by Aware Inc. are essential to the DSL standard [654] .

Furthermore, the Court requested disclosure of documents referring to the Claimant’s royalty calculation, since they were regarded as “directly relevant” to the case [654] . The fact that respective documents were prepared in connection with previous litigation between the parties in the United States does per se hinder disclosure, unless litigation was the “dominant purpose” for which the documents were made [650] . In other words, the litigation privilege applies only to documents created in litigation to put forward arguments about what is and is not FRAND in court; on the contrary, documents which – in Claimant’s practice as a licensing company – led to the creation of the royalty rates and other terms in FRAND offers are subject to disclosure [650] .

On the other hand, the Court held that disclosure of documents relating to the negotiations which had led to the Zhone licence, the X licence and the Aware licences was not required [658] . Although such documents might, in principle, be relevant to the case (particularly for demonstrating what the parties may have said in the licensing negotiations about the value of the patents and their relevance to the standard) [659] , the Court found that disclosure of documents related to the Zhone licence and the X licence would be disproportionate in the present case, since it would have limited probative value [658] . This is because the Defendants had argued that the Zhone licence was not a relevant comparable agreement [649] . In addition, none of the parties advanced the X licence as a comparable agreement in connection with the royalty rates; in the Court’s eyes, the fact that it might be comparable in relation to other licence terms, did not have “significant utility” for the case [658] . With respect to documents related to the negotiations of the Aware licences, the Court refrained from ordering disclosure, because it was convinced that the Claimant was not in possession of such documents [659] .

Regarding to documents concerning licensing negotiations between the Claimant and third parties the Court held that, although these documents might be relevant to the case, their disclosure would also be disproportionate in light of the rather limited probative value that they are likely to have [653] .

Furthermore, the Court explained that documents referring to the individual technical significance of a patent within a standard (in a sense that some patents might be of higher value to the standard than others), were not relevant in the present case, since no party pleaded that respective considerations need to be taken into account for the royalty determination [651] . In this context, the Court expressed doubts about whether a method of determining royalties based on such considerations is workable in practice at all [653] .

The Court finally refused disclosure of documents relating to the validity of Claimant’s patents [654] . Insofar, the Court followed the usual practice of UK Courts in patent cases, according to which, as a rule, unspecific disclosure relating to patent validity is refused [654] .

  • [642] TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 28th September 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 2577 (Pat), page 1.
  • [643] Ibid, page 1.
  • [644] Ibid, page 1 et seq. With respect to the relationship between the “technical trials” (that means the proceedings concerning the validity, essentiality and infringement of the SEPs in suit) and the “non-technical trial” regarding to FRAND licensing see, TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 21st November 2017, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2017] EWHC 3305 (Pat); summary available at caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/english-court-decisions/tq-delta-llc-v-zyxel-communications-ewhc
  • [645] TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 13th June 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 1515 (Ch), paras. 25 and 30; summary available at caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/english-court-decisions/tq-delta-llc-v-zyxel-communications-and-ors-ewhc
  • [646] Ibid, TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 13th June 2018.
  • [647] Q Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 28th September 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 2577 (Pat), page 2.
  • [648] Ibid, page 2.
  • [649] Ibid, page 3.
  • [650] Ibid, page 7.
  • [651] Ibid, pages 5 et seq.
  • [652] Ibid, pages 6 et seq.
  • [653] Ibid, page 5.
  • [654] Ibid, page 6.
  • [655] TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 11th October 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 2677 (Pat).
  • [656] Ibid, pages 2 et seq.
  • [657] TQ Delta LLC v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, 28th September 2018, Case-No. HP-2017-000045, [2018] EWHC 2577 (Pat), page 2.
  • [658] Ibid, page 4.
  • [659] Ibid, pages 3.

Updated 6 10月 2020

Unwired Planet対Huawei Conversant対Huawei 及び ZTE、英国最高裁判所

英国裁判所の決定
26 8月 2020 - Case No. [2020] UKSC 37

A. 内容

英国最高裁判所(最高裁判所)による本判決は、欧州電気通信標準化機構(European Telecommunications Standards Institute: ETSI)が開発した無線通信標準の実施において必須な(と見込まれる)ものとして宣言済みの特許(標準必須特許又はSEP)の侵害に関する2つの別々の事件から提起された上告について判断を下している。ETSIの知的財産権ポリシー(ETSIのIPRポリシー)は、特許権者に対して自らの保有するSEPを公平、合理的、かつ非差別的(Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory:FRAND)な条件で標準の実施者にとってアクセス可能にするとの誓約を推奨している。

Unwired Planet対Huawei

第一の事件は、幾つかの無線通信標準に対応したSEPのポートフォリオを保有する会社であるUnwired Planet International Limited(Unwired Planet)と特に標準準拠のモバイルフォンを製造販売する中国の製造販売会社であるHuaweiグループ中の2社(Huawei)の間の紛争に関わるものである。

2014年3月、Unwired Planetは自社の5つの英国SEPの侵害に関しHuawei、Samsung、及び第三の会社をイングランド・ウェールズ高等法院(高等法院)において提訴した。この訴訟の過程において、Unwired PlanetはHuaweiに対しライセンシングの申し出をいくつか行ったが、ライセンス契約の合意には至らなかった。その一方で、Unwired PlanetとSamsungとの間ではライセンス契約が交わされた。

2017年4月5日、高等法院はHuaweiに対し、同法院がFRANDと決定した特定の条件による ワールドワイド・ライセンス契約をUnwired Planetとの間で交わすまでの差止命令を出した [660] 。Huaweiはこの判決について控訴した。高等法院は控訴が係属中の間、差止命令の強制を停止した。

2018年10月23日、英国控訴院(控訴院)は高等法院の判決を不服とするHuaweiの控訴を棄却した  [661] その後、Huaweiは英国最高裁判所(最高裁判所又は最高裁)に上告を提起した。

Conversant対Huawei and ZTE

第二の事件は、ライセンシング会社であるConversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (Conversant)とHuawei及びZTEグループの2社 (ZTE)の間の紛争に関わるものである。ZTEは中国に拠点を置きネットワーク機器、モバイルフォン、及び消費者向け電子機器を製造し世界的に販売する企業グループである。 2017年にConversantはHuawei及びZTEに対する侵害訴訟を高等法院において提起した。Conversantは、数ある請求の中でもとりわけ、自社の4つの英国特許に対する侵害について差止による救済を求め、また自社のSEPポートフォリオについてグローバルFRANDライセンスの条件を決定することも高等法院に求めた。Huawei及びZTEは同事件について審理し判決を下す高等法院の管轄権について争い、Conversantの中国特許の有効性に異議を唱える訴訟を中国で提起した。

2018年4月16日、高等法院は、グローバルポートフォリオ・ライセンスの条件を決定する権限を含めて当該紛争についての管轄権を同法院が有すると確認した [662]  。HuaweiとZTEは高等法院のこの判決について控訴した。

2019年1月30日、控訴院は控訴を棄却し、英国特許の侵害を根拠としてグローバルライセンスのFRAND条件を決定するための管轄権を英国の裁判所が有すると確認した [663] 。HuaweiとZTEは最高裁判所に上告した。

最高裁判所は、両事件についての控訴を全員一致で棄却し、本判決を下した Unwired Planet対Huawei、Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国最高裁判所、2019年1月30日判決、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38。 。 

B. 判決理由

最高裁判所は、両上告において以下の5つの争点が提起されたと特定し、それらについて判断を下した。

1. 管轄権 最高裁判所は、多国籍SEPポートフォリオについてグローバルFRANDライセンス条件を決定する管轄権を英国の裁判所が有し、従って、標準実施者がかかるライセンス契約の締結を拒否した場合には、英国SEPを根拠とする差止命令を発出する管轄権を有すると確認した  [665]

最高裁は、ETSIのIPRポリシーの下でSEP保有者は国内裁判所に差止命令を求めることを禁じられていないとした [666] 。 最高裁は、国内裁判所が差止命令を出すことで侵害を止める可能性は、むしろ、実施者がFRANDライセンスの交渉を行うことを確実に奨励するのであり 「IPRポリシーが取ろうとするバランスに必要な構成要素である」とした [666]  。

また、最高裁は、英国特許を根拠とする差止命令の裁定の他に、英国の裁判所は、グローバルFRANDライセンスの条件も定めることができるとした。最高裁判所の見解によれば、ETSIのIPRポリシーが定めた「契約上の取り決め」は、英国の裁判所に該当する権限を行使する管轄権も与えている  [667]

最高裁によれば、ETSIのIPRポリシーは「通信業界における商慣習の反映」を試みており 「国際的に効力を有することを意図する」ものである [668] 。通信業界においては、(ポートフォリオ中の)「正確にいくつの特許が有効か又は侵害されているかを知らずに」特許のポートフォリオについてグローバルライセンス契約を結ぶことは一般的である [669] 。特許権者は、特定の特許について必須である(と見込まれる)との宣言を行う時点では、開発中の標準におけるその特許の有効性や侵害の有無について知りえない [669]  。その一方で、実施者は、標準を実施する際にどの特許の有効で侵害しているかについて知ってはいない  [669]

この「不可避の不確実性(unavoidable uncertainty)」は、特許権者が宣言した全てのSEPをワールドワイドに網羅したポートフォリオライセンスの締結によって対処され、その対価は「ポートフォリオ中の多くの特許が未検証であるという性質を反映しなければならない 」 [669]  。かかるライセンスを締結することで、実施者は標準への「アクセス」と、その標準に準拠するために必要とされる全技術の使用を許可されているとの「確実性」を「買う」のである [669]

最高裁判所は、商慣習によれば、FRANDライセンスには「未検証 (untested)」の特許が含まれるため、グローバルライセンスの条件の決定はそれに含まれる全特許についての有効性の評価を意味しないとの見解をとった。従って、ワールドワイドポートフォリオ・ライセンスの条件を定める際、英国の裁判所は外国特許に関する有効性及び侵害の有無について判断しておらず、かかる問題は、まさに各特許が認可された国の国内裁判所の専属的管轄権に服するものである [670]  。それ故、実施者が「これらの特許又はいずれかの特許について該当する外国裁判所において異議を申し立てる権利を留保し、結果として、当該ライセンス上でロイヤルティ料率変更のメカニズムを定めるよう求めることは一般に「公平かつ合理的(fair and reasonable)」であると判断された。 [671]

これに関連して、最高裁判所は、前述のアプローチが英国の法理に特有のものではなく、他の管轄区域、特にアメリカ、ドイツ、中国、及び日本で下された判決とも整合性があることを強調した  [672]

2. 適切な法廷地(フォーラム・コンビニエンス)

最高裁判所が扱った第二の争点も英国の裁判所の管轄権に関するものである。原告は、 Conversant対Huaweiの事件において、英国の裁判所は管轄権を辞退して中国の裁判所に渡すか少なくともConversantの中国特許の有効性に対する異議申し立てについて中国の裁判所が判決を下すまで訴訟を一時停止するべきであったと主張した。

最高裁判所は、英国の裁判所には管轄権を辞退し中国の裁判所に渡す義務はないと判断した [673] 。最高裁は、中国の裁判所については(英国の裁判所と異なり)当該紛争の全当事者の合意がないことから、現時点では中国の裁判所にグローバルFRANDポートフォリオライセンスの条件を定める管轄権はなく、本事件には所謂「フォーラム・コンビニエンス(forum conveniens)」の法理が適用されないとした [673]  。更に、最高裁は、現状況下でConversantが中国の裁判所への管轄権付与を承諾するとは合理的に考えにくいと判断した [673]  。 最高裁判所は、本紛争に関わる英国の裁判所には、有効性に関する中国での訴訟の結果を待って英国での訴訟を一時停止する義務もないとの見解を示した [674] 。最高裁は、英国で提起された訴訟がConversantのグローバルSEPポートフォリオについてのFRAND ライセンス条件の決定に関するものであるのに対し、中国での訴訟はConversantの中国特許の有効性のみに関連しているためであるとした  [674]

3. 非差別性

最高裁判所が審理した第三の争点は、FRANDの非差別性要件の解釈に関するものである。この訴訟においては、トライアル開始後にSamsungと合意した条件よりも不利なライセンス条件をHuaweiに対して申し出たことによりUnwired PlanetがFRANDの非差別性の部分に違反していたか否かという問題が生じていた。

最高裁判所は、高等法院及び控訴院の判断を支持し、(Unwired Planetは)違反してはいなかったとした。最高裁は、全ての同様の状況にあるライセンシーに対して同一又は同様の条件を申し出ることを特許権者に義務づけるような、所謂「厳格な(hard-edged)」非差別性の要件をFRANDは暗示してはいないと説明した [675] ] 。

ETSIの IPR ポリシー(第6条第1項)によれば、特許権者はFRAND条件のライセンスを提供することにコミットしなければならないとされている。最高裁判所は、この義務は「単一の一体化された義務(single, unitary obligation)」であり、ライセンス条件の公平性、合理性、及び非差別性に関する別々の3つの義務ではないとの見解を示した  [676]  。よって、条件は「全ての市場参加者に公平なロイヤルティ価格として一般的に提供されるべきものであり」、特定のライセンシーの「個別の特性による調整なしに」SEPポートフォリオの「適正市価(true value)」を反映するべきであるとされた [677]   。

最高裁判所は、更に、ETSIのIPRポリシーに基づくFRAND誓約は、所謂「最も有利なライセンス(most favourable license)」の条項を暗示するものではなく、全ての同様の状況にあるライセンシーに対して最も有利な条件と同等の条件でライセンス許諾を行うことを特許権者に義務づけてはいないと明確に示した [678]  。最高裁は、ETSIによるIPRポリシー制定の経緯について詳しく検討した上で、 以前ETSIが前述のような条項をFRAND誓約に含める提案を明確に却下していたとの所見を述べた [679]  。 最高裁は、更に、価格差別化がそれに関わる私的又は公的な利益にとって有害であるとの「一般的推定(general presumption)」は存在しないとした [680]  。最高裁は、むしろ、特定のライセンシーに対するベンチマーク料率よりも低いロイヤルティのオファーをSEP保有者が選択することが商取引上の意味合いから合理的な状況も存在するとした [681]  。 このことは、例えば、所謂「先行者利益(first mover advantage)」にも当てはまる。最高裁は、一番初めのライセンシーとの間で低いロイヤルティ料率を合意することは、SEPから最初の収益を生むだけでなく、締結されたライセンスが当該ポートフォリオを市場において「有効化(validate)」し将来的なライセンシングに資する可能性もあるため、「経済的合理性(economically rational)」と「商取引上の重要性(commercially important)」を有し得ると認めた [681]  。このことは、Unwired PlanetがSamsung とライセンス契約を締結した当時のように、特許権者が自らの商業的な生き残りを確実にするのため低いロイヤルティ料率でのライセンス許諾を強いられる所謂「投売り(fire sales)」の状況にも当てはまるとされた [682]  。

4. 市場における支配的地位の濫用/Huaweiフレームワーク

最高裁判所が審理した第四の争点は、Huaweiに対する侵害訴訟を提起したことにより Unwired Planetが市場における支配的地位を濫用し「EUの機能に関する条約(the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU:TFEU)」 第102条への違反を犯しており、従って差止による救済へのアクセスを認められるべきでないのかという問題である。Huaweiは、この問題について、欧州連合司法裁判所(the Court of Justice of the European Union:CJEU)がHuawei対ZTE事件で確立した要件(Huawei判決又はHuaweiスキーム) にUnwired Planetが従っていなかったため差止命令の請求は却下されるべきであると主張していた [683]  。

最高裁判所は、この主張は当てはまらないと判断した [684] 。Huawei判決は、特許権者が標準の実施者に対して問題となっているSEPの使用が侵害を犯しているとの通知を差止による救済を求める訴訟の提起前に行う義務を定めており、違反した場合には、TFEU第102条における濫用行為に該当するとの見解を最高裁は示した [685] 。しかし、この義務の「性質(nature)」については、個別の事件の状況によって決まるとした  [685]  。最高裁は、Unwired Planetが本侵害訴訟の提起に先立ちHuaweiに妥当な通知を行っていたと判断した  [686]

Huawei判決が定めたその他の義務を考察して、最高裁判所は、Huaweiスキームは「強制的(mandatory)」なものではなく、正確に従えば第102条に違反するリスクを冒さずに [特許権者]が差止命令を求めることができる「ルートマップ(route map)」を示したものであるとの高等法院及び控訴院が以前に示した見解を支持した [687] 。最高裁は、それ以外にも、各当事者にFRAND条件でライセンスを締結する意思があるか否かという極めて重要な問題の評価を助けるいくつかの基準をHuawei判決が定めているとした[1076]。 最高裁判所は、その上でUnwired PlanetにはFRANDライセンスをHuaweiに許諾する意思があったのであり、濫用行為を行ってはいなかったと判断した  [686]  。

5. 損害賠償か差止命令かの問題

最高裁が審理した五番目で最後の争点は、SEPの侵害に対する適切な救済についての問題である。最高裁判所における上告審において、(原告は)Unwired PlanetのSEPに対する侵害への適切かつ相応な(appropriate and proportionate) 救済措置は差止命令ではなく損害賠償の裁定であるとの主張を初めて行った。 最高裁判所は、本事件において損害賠償の裁定を差止命令の代替とする根拠は存在しないと判断した [688] 。最高裁は、Unwired PlanetとConversantのいずれも、裁判所が既にFRANDとして確認していたはずの条件でライセンス許諾を申し出た場合にのみ差止命令を求める権利を得たのであるから「差止命令の威嚇(threat of an injunction)」をHuawei又はZTEに「法外な料金(exorbitant fees)」を課すための方法として用いることはできなかったとした [689]

更に、最高裁は、(損害賠償訴訟の場合)SEP保有者は実施者に対して特許毎かつ国毎に訴訟を提起することを余儀なくされ実際的ではない(impractical)と考えられるため、損害賠償の裁定が「差止命令の裁定を差し控えることにより失われるものに対する適切な代替手段となり得る可能性は低い」との見解を示した [690]  。更に、最高裁判所は、(損害賠償が適切な救済とされれば)標準の実施者が「特許毎かつ国毎にロイヤルティの支払いを強制されるまで侵害を続けることへの誘因」を得るのであり、自発的にライセンス契約を締結することは侵害者にとって「経済的に意味がなくなる」ため、FRANDライセンシングがより困難なものになるだろうと指摘した [691]  。

それに対し、差止命令であれば「より効果的な救済となり得る」と最高裁は判断した。差止命令は、侵害を全体的に禁止することにより、「侵害者が市場に留まろうとするなら」 SEP保有者の申し出たFRAND条件を受け入れる以外には侵害者に「ほとんど選択肢を与えない」ためである[1081]。このような理由により、最高裁判所は、差止命令が「正義を成すために必要(necessary in order to do justice)」であると強調した [692]

  • [660] Unwired Planet対Huawei、イングランド・ウェールズ高等法院、2017年4月5日判決、事件番号 [2017] EWHC 711(Pat)。
  • [661] Unwired Planet対Huawei、英国控訴院、2018年10月23日判決、事件番号 [2018] EWCA Civ 2344。
  • [662] Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、イングランド・ウェールズ高等法院、2018年4月16日判決、事件番号 [2018] EWHC 808 (Pat)。
  • [663] Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国控訴院、2019年1月30日判決、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [664]  Unwired Planet対Huawei、Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国最高裁判所、2019年1月30日判決、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [665] 同判決、第49節以下。
  • [666] 同判決、第61節。
  • [667] 同判決、第58節。
  • [668] 同判決、第62節。
  • [669] 同判決、第60節。
  • [670] 同判決、第63節。
  • [671] 同判決、第64節。
  • [672] 同判決、第68節ないし第84節。
  • [673] 同判決、第97節。
  • [674] 同判決、第99節以下。
  • [675] 同判決、第112節以下。
  • [676] 同判決、第113節。
  • [677] 同判決、第114節。
  • [678] 同判決、第116節。
  • [679] 同判決、第116節以下
  • [680] 同判決、第123節。
  • [681] 同判決、第125節。
  • [682] 同判決、第126節。
  • [683] Huawei対ZTE、欧州連合司法裁判所、2015年7月16日判決、事件番号 C-170/13。
  • [684] Unwired Planet対Huawei、Conversant対Huawei及びZTE、英国最高裁判所、2019年1月30日、事件番号 [2019] EWCA Civ 38、第149節以下。
  • [685] 同判決、第150節。
  • [686] 同判決、第158節。
  • [687] 同判決、第157節及び第158節。
  • [688] 同判決、第163節。
  • [689] 同判決、第164節。
  • [690] 同判決、第166節。
  • [691] 同判決、第167節。
  • [692] 同判決、第169節。

Updated 2 8月 2019

Tagivan (MPEG-LA) v Huawei

LG Düsseldorf
15 11月 2018 - Case No. 4a O 17/17

A. Facts

The Claimant, Tagivan II LLC, holds a patent essential to the practice of the AVC/H.264 standard concerning the compression of video data (Standard Essential Patent, or SEP). The patent in question is subject to a FRAND commitment (FRAND stands for Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory terms and conditions) made towards the relevant standardisation body. It was included into a patent pool administered by MPEG LA LLC (MPEG LA), comprising more the 5,000 patents referring to the AVC/H.264 standard (MPEG LA pool) [693] .

The Defendant, a German subsidiary of a Chinese group of companies, sells – among other things – mobile phones in Germany that practise the AVC/H.264 standard [694] .

MPEG LA uses a standard licensing agreement, which is publicly available at its website [695] . Since 2004, MPEG-LA has signed approx. 2,000 agreements with implementers [696] , 1,400 of which are still in force [695] .

In 2009, MPEG LA and the Defendant’s parent company (parent company) started discussions about a potential licence covering other standards, especially the MPEG-2 standard. On 6 September 2011, MPEG LA informed the parent company about the possibility to obtain a licence also regarding the AVC/H.264 standard, by sending PDF-copies of its standard licensing agreement to the parent company via email [697] . On 15 September 2011, the parent company suggested to arrange a call on this issue [698] . In February 2012, MPEG LA sent the pool’s standard licensing agreement for the AVC/H.264 standard to the parent company also by mail [699] .

In November 2013, the discussions between MPEG LA and the parent company ended without success [700] . The parties resumed negotiations in July 2016; again, no agreement was reached [700] .

The Claimant then brought an action against the Defendant before the District Court of Düsseldorf in Germany (Court), requesting for injunctive relief, information and rendering of accounts, the destruction and the recall of infringing products as well as for a declaratory judgement confirming Defendant’s liability for damages on the merits [701] .

In November 2017, during the course of the present proceedings, the Defendant made a counteroffer to the Claimant for a licence, which – in contrast to MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement – was limited to the Claimant’s patent portfolio and established different royalty rates for different regions, in which the Defendant sold products [702] .

In March and September 2018 (again during the proceedings), the Defendant provided bank guarantees to the Claimant covering past and future sales of (allegedly) infringing products. The security amounts were calculated based on the Defendant’s counteroffer dated November 2017 [703] . Furthermore, the Defendant made a second counteroffer to the Claimant shortly after the last oral hearing before the Court [704] .

With the present judgment, the Court granted Claimant’s requests.

B. Court’s reasoning

The Court found that the patent in suit was valid [705] , standard essential [706] and infringed by the products sold by the Defendant in Germany [707] . Furthermore, the Court held that by filing the present suit the Claimant did not abuse its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), since it had fully complied with the conduct obligations stipulated by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the matter Huawei v ZTE [708] (Huawei obligations or framework) with respect to dominant undertakings [709] .

Dominant market position

The Court found that the Claimant holds a dominant market position in terms of Article 102 TFEU [710] .

The Court defined the relevant market for the assessment of dominance as the market, in which licences for any given patent are offered [711] . A dominant market position can further also exist, when the patent holder can hinder competition in downstream markets for standard-compliant products and services [711] .

The Court made clear that ownership of a SEP does not per se establish market dominance [712] . A dominant market position is given, when the use of the SEP is required for entering the market [713] . The same is true, if the patent user could not market competitive products or services, without access to the respective SEP [714] .

Based on these considerations, the Court saw no ‘reasonable’ doubt that the Claimant was a dominant undertaking: It was undisputed that almost all mobile phones available worldwide use the AVC/H.264 standard and that no ‘realistic’ alternative to the MPEG LA pool existed in the licensing market for patents essential to this standard [715] .

Huawei framework

The Court found, however, that the Claimant did not abuse its dominant position by suing the Defendant in the present case, since its conduct was in line with the Huawei framework [716] . The Huawei framework establishes mutual conduct obligations for both SEP holders and SEP users, which need to be fulfilled step by step and one after another (meaning that each party’s obligation to act arises only after the other party has fulfilled its own obligation) [717] . Subject to the Huawei framework is not only the patent holder’s claim for injunctive relief, but also the claim for the destruction of infringing products [718] .

In this context, the Court pointed out that the Huawei framework applies, irrespective of whether a ‘well-established’ licensing practice concerning the asserted patents already existed before the CJEU delivered the Huawei judgment, or not [719] . The Claimant had argued that, in the present case, the Court should apply the (German) legal standard that preceded the Huawei framework (which was based on the so-called ‘Orange-Book-Standard’ ruling of the Federal Supreme Court [720] ), since with respect to the SEP in suit a ‘routine’ practice already existed prior to the Huawei judgement. The Court explained that the Huawei judgment does not contain either an explicit or an implicit limitation of its scope of application [721] . Furthermore, even if a ‘well-established’ licensing practice existed, the need to apply the Huawei framework will still be given, in order to bridge the, nevertheless, existing information gap between patent holder and implementer concerning the (potential) infringement of SEPs [722] . Finally, it would be very challenging for courts to distinguish whether a ‘well-established’ licensing practice excluding the application of the Huawei framework is at hand, or not [722] . Notwithstanding the above, according to the Court, the actual licensing practice of the patent holder could be of ‘particular significance’ when assessing the compliance of the latter with the Huawei obligations: Such practice could, for instance, serve as an indicator of the appropriateness of SEP holder’s licensing offer to the implementer [723] .

Having said that, the Court found no flaws in Claimant’s conduct. In the Court’s view, the Claimant had met its Huawei obligation to notify the Defendant about the infringement of its patent as well as the obligation to present the Defendant with a written FRAND licensing offer covering also the patent in suit. The Defendant, on the other hand, adequately expressed its willingness to enter into a licence, failed, however, to make a FRAND counteroffer to the Claimant. Since an adequate counteroffer was missing, the Court did not take up the question whether the bank guarantees provided by the Defendant constitute an adequate security in terms of the Huawei framework.

Notification of infringement

The Court ruled that the Claimant had adequately notified the Defendant about the infringement of the SEP in suit through the email sent by MPEG LA to the parent company on 6 September 2011 [724] .

The fact that this email was not addressed to the Defendant, but to the parent company, did not raise any concerns as to the compatibility of the notification with the Huawei framework. The Court explained that a notification of infringement addressed only to the parent company of a group of companies is sufficient, as far as it can be assumed that the notification will be forwarded to the subsidiaries concerned [725] . The sole fact that a company belongs to a group justifies such an assumption, unless indications to the contrary exist [726] . This was, however, not the case here.

Besides that, the Court did not consider it inappropriate that the aforementioned e-mail was not sent to the parent company by the Claimant, but by MPEG LA (which is not the holder of the SEP in suit) [727] . The Court held that MPEG LA is entitled to perform legal actions in connection with the licensing of the MPEG LA pool on behalf of the Claimant. The Defendant could not contest that this was not the case, since MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement, which it is aware of, contains an indication about MPEG LA’s respective capacity [728] . In addition, the Defendant’s parent company was most likely aware of MPEG LA’s capacity to act on behalf of the Claimant, since it had entered into direct negotiation with MPEG LA already in 2009, that is almost two years prior to the notification of infringement [729] .

The Court further ruled that, in terms of content, a notification of infringement must – at least – name the infringed patent (including the patent number) and indicate the contested embodiments as well as the (allegedly) infringing acts of use [730] . A detailed (technical and/or legal) explanation of the infringement is not required; the implementer needs just to be put in the position to assess the infringement allegations, if necessary, by seeking expert advice [730] . A notification of infringement is, therefore, not necessary, when it constitutes just a ‘pointless formality’ [730] . This is true, when according to the overall circumstances of the case, one can safely assume that the implementer is aware of the infringement, so that claiming that the SEP holder failed to provide adequate notification prior to the initiation of court proceedings would appear to be abusive [730] . The respective test is, however, subject to strict conditions [730] .

Based on the above considerations, the Court found that MPEG LA’s email to the parent company dated 6 September 2011 should be considered – as an exception – to constitute a sufficient notification of infringement, although it did not contain the minimum information required (particularly the patent number and a reference to the specific infringing embodiments) [731] . The overall circumstances of the case (especially the fact that the parent company had been in negotiations with MPEG LA already since 2009 and, therefore, should have been aware that MPEG LA has granted licences for the AVC/H.264 standard to the implementers mentioned at its website), give rise to the assumption that the parent company had been conscious of the fact that AVC/H.264-compliant products need to be licensed [732] .

Willingness to obtain a licence

The Court held that the parent company had adequately expressed its willingness to obtain a FRAND-licence through the email sent to MPEG LA on 15 September 2011 [733] .

In the eyes of the Court, this email indicates the parent company’s intention to deal with issues concerning the licensing of patents referring to the AVC/H.264 standard, especially if it is seen in the context of the negotiations between MPEG LA and the parent company that had commenced in 2009 [733] . This is sufficient under the Huawei framework: A general, informal statement suffices [734] . The implementer is not required to refer to a specific licensing agreement (on the contrary, this could be considered harmful under certain circumstances) [734] .

SEP holder’s offer

The Court further found that the standard licensing agreement sent by MPEG LA to the parent company in February 2012 presents an offer accountable to the Claimant which is in line with the Huawei framework in terms of both form and content [735] .

The fact that the standard licensing agreement was not tailored to the parent company but was designed for use towards a large number of (potential) licensees (the name of the licensee ought to be added in each case separately), was not criticized by the Court. MPEG-LA had made clear that the documents sent by mail in February 2012 would serve as the basis for negotiations and a future agreement with the parent company [736] .

In addition, the Court did not take an issue with the fact that the offer was addressed to the parent company and not to the Defendant, since the parties were discussing about a licensing agreement on group level and the parent company had been involved in the communications from the beginning [737] .

The Court further ruled that the Huawei requirement, according to which the SEP holder’s licensing offer must specify the royalty calculation, was met, although the draft standard licensing agreement sent to the parent company did not contain a detailed explanation of the way the royalties were calculated [738] . The Court found that, in the present case, it was sufficient that the parent company was aware that the (standard) agreement presented to her had been accepted in the market by a great number of licensees [739] . In the Court’s view, the explanation of the royalty calculation does not require a ‘strict mathematical derivation’ of the royalty; moreover, it will, as a rule, suffice to demonstrate that the (standard) royalty rates offered have been accepted in the market by presenting existing licensing agreements with third parties (comparable agreements) [740] . If a sufficient number of comparable licences is presented, then the SEP holder will usually not be required to provide further information regarding the appropriateness of its licensing offer [740] . It will need, however, to provide information on all essential comparable agreements, in order to rule out the risk that only agreements supporting the offered royalty level are presented [740] . In this context, the Court noted that it cannot be required from the SEP holder to present all comparable agreements along with the licensing offer to the implementer; a respective industry practice does not exist [741] .

Apart from the above, the Court held that the standard licensing agreement offered to the parent company was FRAND also in terms of content [742] .

According to the Court, a licensing offer cannot be considered as fair and reasonable, if the patent holder requests royalties that go significantly beyond the (hypothetical) price that would have been formed in an effectively competitive market, unless there is a commercial justification for the royalty level requested [743] . Particularly in connection with the licensing of SEPs, an offer can lie outside the FRAND-scope, if the cumulative royalty burden imposed on the implementer would not be tenable in commercial terms [743] . The Court made clear that, in this context, no exact mathematical derivation of a FRAND-conform royalty rate is required; moreover, an approximate value is to be determined based on assessments and estimations [743] . In this respect, comparable agreements can serve as an ‘important indicator’ of the fair and reasonable character of the offered royalty rates [743] .

Non-discrimination

Regarding to the non-discriminatory element of FRAND, the Court pointed out that it applied only to similar situated cases [744] . Even then, an unequal treatment is allowed, as long as it is objectively justified [744] . Limitations may, nevertheless, occur, especially when the implementation of the patent is necessary for entering a downstream market or when a product becomes competitive, only when it uses the patent’s teachings [744] . As a rule, the burden of proof with respect to the discriminatory character of a licensing offer rests on the implementer. Since the latter will usually not be aware of the existence or the content of comparable agreements of the patent holder, it may, however, seem appropriate to request the patent holder to provide the implementer with respective details, as far as this is reasonable [745] . The information to be shared should cover all existing licensees and include which (concretely designated) company with which importance in the relevant market has obtained a licence on which conditions [745] .

Against this background, the Court found that the offer made by MPEG LA to the parent company was not discriminatory. The Defendant had argued that seeking a licence also covering sales in China violated FRAND, since not every other competitor in the Chinese market was licensed by MPEG LA [746] . The Court observed that the selective assertion of patents against only a part of the competitors in a downstream market might, in principle, be discriminatory [747] . This was, however, not the case here, because the Claimant had already sued another company active in China and was attempting to persuade other companies to obtain a licence [748] . Due to the high cost risk associated with court proceedings, the patent holder is not obliged to sue all potential infringers at once; choosing to assert its patents against larger implementers first was considered by the Court as reasonable, since a win over a large market player could motivate smaller competitors to also obtain a licence (without litigation) [749] .

Furthermore, the Court did not consider the fact that the offered standard licensing agreement contained a cap for the annual licensing fees payable to the MPEG LA pool to be discriminatory [750] . The Defendant had argued that the respective cap disproportionally favoured licensees with high volume sales which offered not only mobile phones, but also other standard compliant products in the market. The Court made, however, clear that Art. 102 TFEU does not establish a ‘most-favoured-licensee’ principle (meaning that the patent holder must offer the same conditions to all licensees) [751] . It is not per se discriminatory to use sale volumes as a criterion for discounts, especially if a company has managed to open up a larger market than its competitors [752] . Discounts can further hardly be discriminatory, if they are offered to every (potential) licensee under the same conditions [752] .

Besides that, the Court dismissed the Defendant’s argument that MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement is discriminatory, because it is offered to both MPEG LA pool members and third licensees. The Court found that the share of the licensing income paid to pool members, who have also signed a MPEG LA licence, reflects their contribution to the pool and, therefore, does not discriminate the latter against third licensees (who have not contributed any patents to the pool) [753] . In this context, the Court also pointed out that the clauses contained in MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement, providing for deductions or instalment payments are not discriminatory, particularly because they are offered to all licensees [754] .

The Court was further not convinced that the parent company was discriminated by MPEG LA’s offer, because the MPEG LA pool had refrained from requesting a licence at group level from a competitor, but had only granted a licence to a subsidiary within the respective group, instead. In the Court’s eyes, the Claimant had managed to establish that this exception was objectively justified, since only the subsidiary granted a licence had activities concerning the patents included in the pool [755] .

Fair and reasonable terms

With respect to the assessment of whether MPEG LA’s offer to the parent company was also fair and reasonable, the Court placed particular emphasis on the existing licensing agreements between the MPEG-LA pool and third licensees. The Court took the view, that existing licences can establish the actual presumption that the terms offered (as well as the scope of the licence) are fair and reasonable [756] . Moreover, the fact that licences regarding the same patent portfolio have already been granted for similar products prima facie suggests that the selection of the patents included in the pool was adequate [756] .

Based on these premises, the Court found that the approx. 2,000 standard licensing agreements concluded by the MPEG LA pool provide a ‘strong indication’ (‘erhebliche Indizwirkung’) that the underlying licensing terms are fair and reasonable [757] . In the Court’s view, the Defendant had failed to show sufficient facts that could rebut this indication.

In particular, the Court did not accept Defendant’s claim that, as a rule, licences for products sold in the Chinese market are subject to special conditions. On the contrary, the Court found that the existing MPEG LA pool licences allow the assumption that setting worldwide uniform licence fees corresponds to industry practice [758] . Accordingly, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument, that the royalties offered by MPEG LA to the parent company would hinder the Defendant from making profits with its sales in China, since the overall licensing burden (including licences needed from third parties) would be too high. The Court noted that the price level for Defendant’s sales in China does not significantly differ from the price level in other regions [759] . What is more, the Defendant did not show that further licences are needed with respect to the AVC/H.264 standard [760] . The Court further did not recognise a need to apply special conditions for the Chinese market, because – compared to patents from other regions – a lower number of Chinese patents is contained in the MPEG LA pool. According to the Court, the number of patents in a specific market should not be ‘overestimated’ as a factor for assessing the FRAND conformity of an offer, since even a single patent can block an implementer from a market, generating, therefore, the need for obtaining a licence [761] .

Apart from the above, the Court did not criticise that MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement did not contain an adjustment clause. Such clauses can secure that the agreed licensing fees remain reasonable, in case that the number of patents contained in the pool changes during the term of the licensing agreement. They are, however, in the Court’s view, not the only mean to reach this goal: Moreover, the clause contained in MPEG LA’s standard licensing agreement, according to which the agreed royalties will not be adjusted either when more patents are added to the pool or when patents are withdrawn from the pool, offers an adequate balance of risk and is, therefore, FRAND compliant [762] . This assumption is also confirmed by the fact that all existing licensees have accepted this clause [763] .

In addition, the Court made clear that pool licences, as the one offered to the parent company, are, in general, appropriate under the Huawei framework. An offer for a pool licence cannot per se be seen as abusive (Article 101 TFEU) [764] . On the contrary, such licences usually serve the interest of potential licensees to be granted access to the whole standard on uniform conditions under one roof, without having to seek a licence from every single patent holder separately [764] .

An offer for a pool licence can, nevertheless, violate FRAND in ‘special circumstances’ [765] , for instance, if not all patents included in the pool are used by the licensee [766] . According to the Court, the fact that the Defendant – as well as mobile phone manufacturers in general – usually use only one of four available profiles of the AVC-Standard does not, however, render the standard licensing agreement offered by MPEG LA unreasonable [767] . This is particularly the case, since Defendant’s products – and especially its latest smartphones – have the technical capability to implement more than one available profile [768] . Besides that, it is reasonable to offer one single licence covering all profiles, since modern products incorporate functionalities of several types of devices (e.g. smartphones offer also digital television functionalities) [768] .

In this context, the Court dismissed Defendant’s arguments that the licence offered by MPEG LA was not FRAND, because it allegedly covered both standard-essential and non-essential patents. The Court recognised that the ‘bundling’ of essential and non-essential patents in a patent pool could, in principle, be incompatible with FRAND, if it is done with the intention to extract higher royalties from licensees by increasing the number of patents contained in the pool [769] . The Defendant failed, however, to present any reliable evidence that this was the case with the MPEG-LA pool [770] .

In the Court’s eyes, the Defendant also failed to establish that the rates offered by MPEG LA would lead to an unreasonably high total burden of licensing costs (‘royalty stacking’) [771] . The theoretical possibility that the Defendant might need to obtain licences also for patents not included in a pool does not per se lead to royalty stacking; the Defendant would have been obliged to establish that the total amount of royalties actually paid does not allow to extract any margin from the sale of its products [772] .

The Court further pointed out that MPEG-LA’s offer did not violate FRAND principles, because it referred to a licence covering all companies within the group, to which the Defendant belonged [773] . In the electronics and mobile communications industries, licences on a group level are in line with the industry practice and, therefore, FRAND-compliant [774] .

Implementer’s counteroffer

Having said that, the Court found that the Defendant failed to make a FRAND counteroffer [775] .

In particular, the counteroffer made in November 2017 after the commencement of the present proceedings violated the FRAND principles in terms of content, because it was limited to a licence covering solely the Claimant’s patent portfolio and not all patents included in the MPEG LA pool [776] . Furthermore, the counteroffer established different licensing rates for different regions (especially for China) without factual justification [777] .

Furthermore, the second counteroffer made by the Defendant after the end of the last oral hearing was belated and, therefore, not FRAND. The Court held that the Claimant was not given sufficient time to respond to that counteroffer, so that there was no need for any further assessment of its content [704] . On the contrary, the Court expressed the view that the purpose of this counteroffer was most likely to delay the infringement proceedings [704] .

Provision of security

Since Defendant’s counter-offers were not FRAND in terms of content, the Court did not have to decide, whether the security provided in form of bank guarantees was FRAND or not. The Court noted, however, that the amounts provided were insufficient, since they were calculated on basis of Defendant’s counteroffer from November 2017, which itself failed to meet the FRAND requirements [778] .

  • [693] Tagivan (MPEG-LA) v Huawei, District Court of Düsseldorf, 9 November 2018, para. 36.
  • [694] Ibid, para. 35.
  • [695] Ibid, para. 37.
  • [696] Ibid, para. 453.
  • [697] Ibid, para. 39.
  • [698] Ibid, para. 43.
  • [699] Ibid, para. 44.
  • [700] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [701] Ibid, para. 2.
  • [702] Ibid, para. 54.
  • [703] Ibid, para. 65.
  • [704] Ibid, para. 716.
  • [705] Ibid, paras. 143-208.
  • [706] Ibid, paras. 209-293.
  • [707] Ibid, paras. 295-302.
  • [708] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [709] Tagivan (MPEG-LA) v Huawei, District Court of Düsseldorf, 9 November 2018, paras. 304 et seqq.
  • [710] Ibid, para. 307.
  • [711] Ibid, para. 310.
  • [712] Ibid, para. 310. In this respect, the Court pointed out that – vice versa – also a non-essential patent might confer a dominant position, if the patented invention is superior in terms of technological merit and/or economical value, para. 312.
  • [713] Ibid, paras. 310 et seq.
  • [714] Ibid, para. 311.
  • [715] Ibid, paras. 315 et seqq.
  • [716] Ibid, para. 321.
  • [717] Ibid, para. 326.
  • [718] Ibid, para. 327.
  • [719] Ibid, para. 330.
  • [720] Under the ‘Orange-Book-Standard’ regime, in order to avoid an injunction, the implementer was required to make a licensing offer to the patent holder, which the latter could not refuse without acting in an anticompetitive manner; see Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), judgment dated 6 May 2009, Case No. KZR 39/06.
  • [721] Ibid, paras. 331 et seqq.
  • [722] Ibid, para. 335.
  • [723] Ibid, para. 337.
  • [724] Ibid, para. 339.
  • [725] Ibid, para. 343.
  • [726] Ibid, para. 345.
  • [727] Ibid, para. 356.
  • [728] Ibid, paras. 357 et seqq.
  • [729] Ibid, paras. 366 et seqq.
  • [730] Ibid, para. 340.
  • [731] Ibid, para. 341.
  • [732] Ibid, paras. 395 et seqq.
  • [733] Ibid, paras. 400 et seqq.
  • [734] Ibid, para. 399.
  • [735] Ibid, para. 405.
  • [736] Ibid, paras. 411-417.
  • [737] Ibid, para. 419.
  • [738] Ibid, para. 421.
  • [739] Ibid, para. 425.
  • [740] Ibid, para. 422.
  • [741] Ibid, paras. 426 et seqq.
  • [742] Ibid, para. 429.
  • [743] Ibid, para. 431.
  • [744] Ibid, para. 432.
  • [745] Ibid, para. 433.
  • [746] Ibid, para. 438.
  • [747] Ibid, para. 443.
  • [748] Ibid, para. 444.
  • [749] Ibid, para. 445.
  • [750] Ibid, para. 579.
  • [751] Ibid, para. 582.
  • [752] Ibid, paras. 583 et seqq.
  • [753] Ibid, para. 564.
  • [754] Ibid, paras. 568 et seqq.
  • [755] Ibid, paras. 573 et seqq.
  • [756] Ibid, para. 451.
  • [757] Ibid, para. 449.
  • [758] Ibid, para. 454.
  • [759] Ibid, paras. 487 et seqq.
  • [760] Ibid, para. 491.
  • [761] Ibid, para. 495.
  • [762] Ibid, paras. 591 et seqq., particularly para. 596.
  • [763] Ibid. para. 597.
  • [764] Ibid. para. 504.
  • [765] Ibid. para. 508.
  • [766] Ibid. para. 514.
  • [767] Ibid. paras. 511 et seqq.
  • [768] Ibid. para. 524.
  • [769] Ibid, para. 528.
  • [770] Ibid, paras. 531-543.
  • [771] Ibid, paras. 545 et seqq.
  • [772] Ibid, para. 546.
  • [773] Ibid, para. 599.
  • [774] Ibid, para. 600.
  • [775] Ibid, para. 603.
  • [776] Ibid, paras. 605 et seqq.
  • [777] Ibid, paras. 617 et seqq.
  • [778] Ibid, para. 625.