在欧洲联盟法院华为诉中兴通信案判决后所做成的判例
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Updated 17 一月 2018

Sisvel v Haier

OLG Düsseldorf
30 三月 2017 - Case No. I-15 U 66/15

A. Facts

The claimant is the owner of European patent EP B1, allegedly covering data transmission technology under the GPRS standard. The defendants produce and market devices using the GPRS standard. On 10 April 2013, the claimant made a commitment towards ETSI by declaring to grant a license on FRAND terms regarding, inter alia, patent EP B1. In various letters and meetings between 2012 and 2015, the claimant informed the parent companies of the defendants about its patent portfolio and made an offer, but no licensing agreement was entered into. These interactions took place before the CJEU handed down its Huawei v. ZTE ruling in July 2015. On 3 November 2015, the District Court granted an injunction order. [1] The District Court also held that the defendants were liable for compensation in principle and ordered them to render full and detailed account of its sales. Further, the District Court ordered a recall and removal of all infringing products from the relevant distribution channels.

The defendants lodged an appeal with the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf. They argued, inter alia, that the District Court had not taken into account the procedural requirements set out by the CJEU in the decision Huawei v. ZTE [2] and that the claimant had not made a license offer on FRAND conditions. [3] The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf partially granted the appeal. It held that the defendants were under an obligation to render accounts and that they owed compensation in principle. [4] However, it held that the defendants were under no obligation to recall and remove the products from the relevant distribution channels because the claimant was in breach of its obligations under EU competition law (‘kartellrechtlicher Zwangslizenzeinwand’). [5] The Higher Regional Court did not have to decide about the injunction order because the parties had agreed to settle the matter in this regard (the patent had expired in September 2016). [6]

B. Court’s reasoning

1. Market Power

The Higher Regional Court held that the claimant was a dominant undertaking within the meaning of Art 102 TFEU. [7] In the eyes of the court, proprietorship of an SEP does not automatically constitute a dominant market position because not all SEPs necessarily influence competition in the downstream product market. [8] Rather, it needs to be ascertained whether or not market dominance exists in respect of each SEP individually. A dominant market position exists, for example, if it would not be possible to successfully market a competitive product without using the respective SEP, or if compatibility and interoperability under the standard could not be guaranteed. In contrast, a dominant position does not exist if the technology covered by the SEP is only of little importance for consumers in the relevant market. [8] On this basis, the Higher Regional Court had no doubts that the claimant was in a dominant market position [9] because the patent in question was related to data transfer, an essential function of the GPRS standard. [10]

2. Notice of Infringement

The Higher Regional Court held that the claimant had given proper notice of infringement under the CJEU requirements. According to the court, the procedure set out by the CJEU in the Huawei v. ZTE ruling applied to transitional cases (i.e. proceedings that had commenced before the CJEU decision, but where the decisions were handed down after). [11] The District Court had wrongfully assumed that the Huawei v. ZTE principles did not apply to the case at hand. CJEU decisions pursuant to Art 267 TFEU apply ab initio (‘ex tunc’) and thus to transitional cases. [12] The Higher Regional Court argued that the Huawei v. ZTE case itself had been of a transitional nature and that the CJEU had been aware of the diverging principles created by the German Federal Court of Justice in the Orange Book Standard decision in 2009. [12] Nevertheless, the CJEU had not distinguished between transitional and ‘new’ cases. As a consequence, the claimant was under an obligation to notify the defendants of the infringement. The written correspondence between the parties from 2012 and 2013 met this requirement [13]

The Higher Regional Court also held that it was sufficient to notify the defendants’ parent companies. [14] The claimant can reasonably expect that the parent company will pass on the respective information to all subsidiaries that are active on the relevant product markets. Requiring the claimant to give additional notices to the subsidiaries would be an unjustified formality (‘bloße Förmelei’). [14]

3. The Defendant’s Willingness to Enter into a License Agreement

As a consequence, the defendants were under an obligation to declare their willingness to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms. [15] Several months had passed between the notice of infringement and the defendants’ declaration of willingness. However, the defendants had made it clear in an email from December 2013 that they were willing to enter into a license agreement. In the eyes of the Higher Regional Court, this was sufficient because there was ample time between this declaration and the commencement of proceedings in 2014.

In the further course of the negotiations, the rejection of certain license terms by the defendant was not necessarily an indicator for general unwillingness. [16] The defendant’s willingness needs to be seen in the overall context of the case. Unwillingness would be demonstrated only if the defendant definitively and finally rejects the claimant’s offers (the ‘last word’). [16] The Higher Regional Court held that the statements made by the defendants in the course of the negotiations did not justify such a conclusion. [16]

4. The SEP Owner’s Licensing Offer and the Standard Implementer’s Reaction

The Higher Regional Court held that the District Court had been incorrect to leave open the question as to whether the claimant’s offer had been FRAND. [17] The Higher Regional Court took the view that the CJEU had established an intricate system of consecutive actions that the parties must take. A claimant needs to make an offer on FRAND terms only if the defendant declared its willingness to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms. Similarly, a defendant is under an obligation to make a counter-offer on FRAND terms only if the claimant made an offer on FRAND terms. [18] According to the Higher Regional Court, this view flows from the wording of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling that relates the content of offer and counter-offer (‘such an offer’; ‘responded to that offer’). [18] An SEP owner who has given a commitment to an SSO to offer FRAND licenses can be expected to make a FRAND offer that can reasonably be accepted by the defendant. In addition, a defendant needs to be able to assess whether the conditions of the claimant’s offer are FRAND. Requiring a defendant to make a FRAND counter-offer no matter what the claimant had offered earlier would be a contradiction of this basic proposition of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling. [18] Thus, it was necessary to have a decision in respect of the conditions of the claimant’s licensing offer.

The Higher Regional Court held that the claimant’s licensing offer did not meet FRAND requirements [19] because it discriminated against the defendants. [20] The court reiterated that infringement courts cannot limit their assessment to a summary review of whether the conditions were not evidently non-FRAND. Rather, infringement courts need to make a full assessment of the license conditions. [21]

The court held that dominant undertakings are under no obligation to treat all business partners in exactly the same way. [22] SEP owners have discretion regarding the license fees that they charge. [23] Different treatment of licensees is accepted if it can be justified as a result of normal market behavior. [24] Further, license conditions can be abusive only if they are significantly different between licensees. [24] These principles also apply to SEP owners who have given a FRAND declaration because this commitment refers to Art 102 lit. c) TFEU. [25] The burden of proof for such substantially unequal treatment lies with the defendant, [26] whilst the onus is on the claimant to prove that this unequal treatment is justified. [26] However, as the defendant will typically not have the necessary information, the claimant is under an obligation to provide information as to which competitors have been granted licenses and on what terms. [26] On this basis the Higher Regional Court concluded that the claimant had treated the defendants significantly differently from their competitors [27] without having a proper justification. [28] In particular, the claimant could not prove that discounts given to a competitor were common in the industry, [29] or that these discounts were a result of the particularities of the case. [30]

  • [1] LG Düsseldorf, 3 November 2015, File No. 4a O 93/14
  • [2] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 32.
  • [3] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 34.
  • [4] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 75.
  • [5] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 74 and 175.
  • [6] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 47.
  • [7] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 177 et seqq.
  • [8] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 182.
  • [9] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 185.
  • [10] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 186.
  • [11] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 202.
  • [12] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 203.
  • [13] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 215.
  • [14] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 213.
  • [15] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 220.
  • [16] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 240.
  • [17] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 244.
  • [18] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 245.
  • [19] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 242.
  • [20] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 251.
  • [21] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 249.
  • [22] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 254.
  • [23] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 255 and 257.
  • [24] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 256.
  • [25] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 257.
  • [26] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 258.
  • [27] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 263.
  • [28] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, para 268.
  • [29] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 270 et seqq.
  • [30] OLG Düsseldorf, 30 March 2017, File No. I-15 U 66/15, paras 275 et seqq. and paras 290 et seqq.

Updated 16 六月 2021

慕尼黑一区地区法院康文森诉戴姆勒案

慕尼黑地区法院
30 十月 2020 - Case No. 21 O 11384/19

A. 事实

原告康文森(Conversant)持有被声明为对实施多项无线通信标准而言(潜在)必要的专利(以下称“标准必要专利”或“SEPs”)。

康文森向欧洲电信标准协会(ETSI)作出了承诺,表示愿意将其所持有的标准必要专利依照公平、合理且无歧视(FRAND)的条款和条件向标准实施人提供。

被告戴姆勒是一家总部位于德国的跨国汽车制造公司。戴姆勒在德国生产并销售具有实施欧洲电信标准协会所发展出的LTE标准的连网功能的汽车。

康文森于2018年10月加入了Avanci许可平台,该平台提供专为联网汽车量身定制的专利许可计划。

康文森于2018年12月18日向戴姆勒提出了全球范围内的双边许可要约,同时也向戴姆勒提供了与其所持有的标准必要专利组合相关的各项信息,其中也包括了该专利组合中所涵盖的若干专利的权利要求对照表。 在康文森于2019年2月27日对其发出了相应的提醒通知后,戴姆勒回复表示愿意签署FRAND许可协议的同时,也特别强调了对供应商进行知识产权许可在汽车行业中是一种很常见的做法。戴姆勒还要求康文森提供有关其所持有的专利组合现有被许可人的相关信息,并且就哪些专利在哪些对应的组件上实现,以及其所提供的条款为什么是符合FRAND的条款进行解释。随后,戴姆勒就专利持许可问题与Avanci开始进行谈判。

由于康文森接获了Avanci的通知表示其与戴姆勒间的许可谈判未获成功,康文森遂于2019年7月5日向戴姆勒发送了一封电子邮件,提出双方在2019年7月15日亲自会面的要求。 康文森同时也指出了参与 Avanci计划的汽车制造商在其所持有的标准必要专利组合下取得许可,并且通过引用相关判例(主要是英国高等法院于2017年4月5日所作成的无线星球诉华为案判决)在内的各种方式解释了构成其所提出的双边许可要约基础的许可费计算。康文森起先还打算向戴姆勒提供其所持有的专利组合中所包含的各项专利的完整清单,然而,相应的文件却因过失而未被添加到发送给戴姆勒电子邮件的附件之中。

戴姆勒于2019年7月29日作出回应,并表示其正与

Avanci进行许可谈判。戴姆勒重申了其认为在供应商层级进行许可更为高效此一观点,并且反驳认为,由于康文森尚未提供所有必要的信息,双方面对面的会议应该在稍后的时间点进行。

康文森于是于2019年8月13日在慕尼黑一区地区法院(以下称“法院”)对戴姆勒提起了侵权诉讼,而其中并未包含禁令救济主张。2019年8月24日,康文森将其在慕尼黑提起的诉讼告知戴姆勒,并指出其认为戴姆勒实际上并没有兴趣取得FRAND 许可。康文森并强调,在计算许可费时,应将(其专利)于终端产品阶段所产生的价值纳入考量。

2019年9月18日,戴姆勒重申了其取得许可的意愿,并且首次指出康文森在2019 年7月5日所发送的电子邮件中并未包含康文森所提及的专利组合的完整清单。这份清单其后于2019年9月20日被提交给戴姆勒。同时,康文森提议双方在2019年10月初召开会议面对面进行协商。戴姆勒于2019年10月8日回应称,由于所需的信息仍然缺失,该会议只能在十月底举行。

双方于2019年12月4日在戴姆勒总部会面。2020年1月15日,康文森将在本次会议进行过程中所演示的文稿发送给戴姆勒,并表示愿意为戴姆勒的一级供应商设定许可计划,同时为此也准备与戴姆及戴姆勒所有的一级供应商召开会议进行讨论。除此之外,康文森还提出了向中立的第三方寻求协助,例如采用仲裁程序来判定许可的价值。戴姆勒于2020年1月24日表示其已经与供应商进行了讨论,并且愿意组织一次会议。 2020年1月29日,康文森在其正于慕尼黑进行中的未决诉讼里对戴姆勒追加提出了禁令救济以及召回并销毁侵权产品的诉讼主张。

双方于2020年2月及3月就与戴姆勒的一级供应商会面的问题进行了讨论。然而,戴姆勒并未组织其所有供应商共同参加会议。

2020年4月8日,戴姆勒向康文森提出了许可反要约,该许可反要约是以在车辆上实现LTE连接功能的车载信息控制单元 (TCU) 这一元件的价值为基础来进行计算的。

康文森于2020年6月30日再度向戴姆勒提出了进一步的许可要约,但未获接受。 2020年8月10日,戴姆勒向康文森提供了有关其过去车辆销售的相关信息,并为其过去的使用提交了保证金。

法院在当前判决 [31] 中做出了包含对戴姆勒出发禁令在内的多项有利于康文森的裁决。
 

B. 法院的论理

法院认为,本案涉案专利为实施4G / LTE标准时所必要,并且该专利遭受了侵权行为 [32] ,康文森所提出的索赔主张因此而被法院准许。

康文森就关于禁令救济以及召回并销毁侵权产品的诉讼主张也应该被准许。康文森对戴姆提起侵权诉讼的行为既不会构成《欧洲联盟运作条约》(TFEU)第102条所规定对市场支配地位的滥用行为(以下称“竞争法上抗辩”,参见下段第 1 项),也没有违反其因欧洲电信标准协会专利政策所应承担的合同义务(以下称“合同法上抗辩”,参见下段第 2 项) [33]
 

1. 竞争法上抗辩
市场支配地位

法院认为,康文森具备《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条涵义下的市场支配地位 [34]

享有专利所授与的独占权本身并不会造成市场支配地位的形成 [35] 。当一项专利对符合标准发展组织所发展出的标准(或事实上的标准)而言具备技术上的必要性,并且在(下游)市场提供的产品中并没有可以替代该标准的技术时 [36] ,市场支配地位才会形成。在法院看来,此一原则适用于本案涉案专利 [37]

在本案中,可以排除康文森市场支配地位的特殊情况并不存在。法院认为,单就康文森向欧洲电信标准协会做出FRAND承诺,从而确立其必须依照FRAND条款与条件授予许可的义务这一事实本身,并不会排除康文森的市场支配地位,并且,此一问题决定性的关键在于标准必要专利持有人是否真正履行了这一义务 [38] 。此外,潜在实施人也可以选择从Avanci平台获得本案涉案专利许可的这一替代途径也并不会对康文森的市场支配地位造成限制 [39]
 

未构成对市场支配地位的滥用

尽管如此,法院认为,康文森向戴姆勒提起禁令救济以及召回并销毁侵权产品的诉讼这一行为并不会构成其对市场支配地位的滥用。

在实施人已经使用了受(专利)保护的标准化技术的情况下,对标准必要专利持有人行为的评估则需要采取更全面的综合分析,一方面需要考虑知识产权所享有的是宪法所赋予的强大保障,另一方面也需要将实施人可以实施标准的利益纳入考量,二者之间必须相互平衡 [40] 。在这种情况下,不仅只是私人利益,也应该将公共利益纳入考量范围之中 [41] 。法院强调,公共利益不应仅仅被视为“单纯的使用标准化技术各私人利益的总和”,而同时也应该包含对公众利益实质性的保护以保障知识产权的完整性并确保有效的执行力 [41]

考虑到标准必要专利在“本质上所具备的特殊性”,尤其是在通信领域,法院采取了与欧洲联盟法院(CJEU)华为诉中兴案判决(以下称“华为案判决”) [42] 一致的观点,认为对标准必要专利持有人施加某些特定的行为义务是合理且正当的。其原因基本上在于,与其他“普通”专利不同,标准必要专利是在专利持有人无需采取任何进一步行动的情况下,因该专利被纳入某一标准中而在市场上被确立 [43] 。因此,对于标准必要专利而言,通过授予专利技术的发明人在特定期间内的独占性的排他性权利来确保专利技术的发明人在市场上的竞争优势的需求,相较于非标准必要专利而言也就并不那么强烈 [44]

尽管如此,法院仍然明确表示,华为案判决对标准必要专利持有人所施加的行为义务仅存在于“严肃看待而不仅仅是口头上表示”愿意签署许可协议的实施人身上 [45] 。因此,一项基于对滥用市场支配地位的指控的抗辩只有在想要使用或者已经在未经授权的情况下使用专利的实施人愿意取得FRAND许可,并且在其与标准必要专利持有人进行许可谈判的整个过程中没有使用拖延战术的情况下,才有可能成立 [46] 。法院阐明到,华为案判决的关键概念在于谈判双方才是最有资格在公平、平衡且即时的许可谈判中确定 FRAND者,而是否能达成协议则将取决于谈判双方受为达成协议的实际“真诚动机”驱使的积极性参与 [47]
 

侵权通知

在对双方的行为进行审视后,法院认为,通过发送了日期为2018年12月18日的信函,康文森已经履行了就其标准必要专利遭受侵权情事对戴姆勒进行通知的义务,此信函的内容包含了与其专利组合相关的足够信息,其中也包括了数个各别专利所对应的权利要求对照表 [48] 。至于康文森是否充分解释了本信函中所附带的许可要约背后的许可费究竟是如何计算的则无关紧要,因为在此一阶段,康文森甚至还没有向戴姆勒提出许可要约的义务 [49]
 

取得许可的意愿

另一方面,法院认定戴姆勒不具备从康文森处取得许可的意愿。相反地,法院发现了一个“特别明显不具备取得许可意愿的案例” [50]

在内容方面,实施人必须“清楚”且“明确”地表明其愿意依照“任何实际上符合FRAND的条款”与标准必要专利持有人达成许可协议,并且随后以一种“目的性导向”且“积极”的态度来进行许可谈判 [51] 。相反地,在对(第一次)侵权通知做出回应时,仅仅是对侵权通知作出表达愿意考虑签署许可协议或就是否以及在什么条件下才考虑取得许可进行谈判是不够的 [51]

法院阐明,关于实施人是否具备取得许可的意愿的评估,需要通过对截至侵权诉讼程序中口头听证程序结束为止的所有案例事实进行全面性的分析来确定 [52] 。实施人是否表达出取得许可的意愿这一问题,并不能通过对实施人行为的“形式性的简略印象”来回答;更重要的是,实施人不能持续保持被动状态,直到在实施人眼中看来标准必要专利持有人已经履行了其义务时 [52]

此外,法院强调,谈判进行中的时机是在评估实施人是否具备取得许可的意愿时必须纳入考量范围的一项因素 [53] 。否则,实施人将会缺乏及时且积极地参与谈判的动力 [54] 。关于即时的概念法院认为严格的期限无法被设定,仍需要视个案具体情况逐一评估 [55] 。然而,已被告知侵权的实施人有义务通过与标准必要专利持有人签署 FRAND 许可而尽快使对该专利的非法使用合法化 [55]

此外,法院认为,实施人是否以及在何时向标准必要专利持有人提出许可反要约也可以作为实施人是否具备取得许可意愿的“重要指标” [53] 30。在侵权诉讼程序开始后才提出的许可反要约在通常情况下是不被认可的 [56] 。法院认为,实施人仅仅为了“做表面功夫”而进行谈判,然后透过提出许可反要约来对在侵权诉讼中可能被定罪的劣势进行“紧急刹车”,这种行为是不应该被允许的 [54] 。仅有在实施人自谈判开始时就愿意,并且始终积极地参与与专利持有人间的讨论这种特殊的情况下,在诉讼审判期间提出的许可反要约才可以被纳入对判断是否具备取得许可意愿的考量范围中 [57]

承上所述,法院认为,一般而言,实施人最初采用的拖延战术是无法在稍后的某一个时间点不费吹灰之力而被“消除”的 [58] 。尽管如此,对取得许可的意愿迟来的表述并不会“自动”排除实施人在侵权诉讼程序中提出“FRAND抗辩”的权利:无论是否出现这种情况,都还是应该根据具体个案在历史谈判过程中的各别情况逐一进行判断 [59]

在此背景下,考虑到戴姆勒的整体行为,法院得出了结论——尽管对戴姆勒而言,以符合FRAND要求的原则行事实际上有可能并且是合理的 [60] ,而戴姆勒仍然选择了采用拖延战术 [61]

法院认为,戴姆勒将康文森导引至其供应商的行为,并未表达出其愿意依照“任何实际上符合FRAND 的条款”来取得许可的意愿,反而是明确地展现出其本身并不准备从康文森处取得许可的态度 [62] 。戴姆勒与其供应商之间可能存在的关于第三方知识产权的赔偿条款在此处并不能发挥任何作用,因为戴姆勒的行为独立地造成了对康文森所持有的专利的侵权行为,因此必须为此承担相应的责任 [62]

另一个显示出戴姆勒并不具备取得许可的意愿的征兆是,戴姆勒花了超过两个月的时间才通知康文森其并未收到那一份本应该被附加于康文森在2020年7月5日发送的电子邮件中但因过失而未被添加的专利组合清单 [63] 。法院同样批评了戴姆勒此前从未针对康文森所提供的权利要求对照表向康文森提出任何问题,反而却是在侵权诉讼审判过程中才对相关专利的质量提出质疑此一事实 [64]

法院在戴姆勒於2020年7月27日所作出的回覆中,還發現了另一个“重大性指標”顯示出戴姆勒並不具備取得許可的意愿,在此回覆中,戴姆勒明确表示其签署许可協議的意愿僅限于尚未被许可或者由不愿自行向康文森取得许可的供应商處所購買的產品 [65] 。法院對於戴姆勒将其供应商的“不具備取得許可的意愿”設定為其己身与康文森签署许可協議的条件這一選擇特別反感 [66]

此外,戴姆勒没有针对康文森在2019年12月4日举行的当事方会议上所提出的使用替代性争议解决机制,特别是以仲裁程序来确定FRAND许可费的提议做出回应,这一事实也被法院认为是戴姆勒方并不具备取得许可意愿的表现 [67]

法院指出,另一个“明显”展现出戴姆勒不具备取得许可意愿且采用拖延战术的迹象在于,于2019年12月4日双方间的讨论结束以后,尽管戴姆勒曾暗示其已与其供应商讨论过有关由供应商直接向康文森取得许可此一潜在选项,然而实际上戴姆勒并未组织其所有一级供应商就此议题召开会议讨论 [68]
 

许可反要约

随后,法院指出,戴姆勒于2020年4月8日所提出的许可反要约并无法弥补戴姆勒在此之前表现出的取得许可意愿缺失 [69] 。更有甚者,这更像是一种“不在场证明” [60]

在法院看来,由于此一许可反要约是在康文森对戴姆勒提出许可要约后的一年零四个月以后才提出的,此一许可反要约的发出是迟延的 [69] 。更重要的是,此一许可反要约是戴姆勒在侵权诉讼程序进行的过程中才提出的,如前所述,此一行为是不被认可的,因为在此之前戴姆勒很显然是不愿意取得许可的 [70] 。法院近一步阐明,戴姆勒以康文森未提供相关的必要信息为借口来正当化其延迟回覆的行为是站不住脚的,因为该许可反要约仅基于公开且可供公众使用的数据撰写,而并未进行任何进一步的详细分析;因此,该许可反要约本来可以在戴姆勒收到康文森初次许可要约后不久的一个更早的时间点发出 [71]

除此之外,法院也认为,戴姆勒所提出的许可反要约在内容上“显然并不符合FRAND” [72] 。根据概括性的分析,戴姆勒所提出的许可费被认为明显是过低的 [73]

法院指出,FRAND费率是一个数值范围,并且有多种可以用于计算 FRAND许可费的方法 [73] 。法院采用了所谓的“自上而下法”(此一方法康文森与戴姆勒双方都曾经使用过) [74] 。在检视过戴姆勒提出的按照“自上而下法”而进行的计算后,法院认为,将所有向欧洲电信标准协会作出声明其为标准必要专利的专利总数作为确定康文森所持有的与LTE相关的标准必要专利所占份额的基础这种做法并不符合FRAND [75] 。考虑到并非所有被声明为标准必要专利的专利实际上都确实属于标准必要专利(这种现象被称为“过度声明”),使用被声明的专利总数作为计算基础将有利于戴姆勒:如果采用的是真正属于LTE标准必要专利的(较低)专利数量做为计算的基础,则康文森所持有的标准专利数量就其本身而言将会变得更高 [75]

此外,法院也指出,采用车载信息控制单元的平均采购价格作为计算基础并不是在FRAND下适当的许可费计算基础 [76] 。标准必要专利的价值是通过许可费而体现的,而该许可费与所提供服务的价值应符合比例原则 [76] 。法院认为,在本案中,通过在戴姆勒汽车上提供支持LTE技术的相关功能以及戴姆勒汽车的消费者对这些功能的使用而创造了经济价值 [76] 。因此,在此处真正相关的是戴姆勒的消费者对因为LTE技术而得以在车辆上实现的各项功能所赋予的价值 [76] 。戴姆勒向供应商支付的车载信息控制单元的采购价格并不能反映该项价值 [76]
 

供应商提出的FRAND抗辩 / 许可层级

法院进一步阐明,戴姆勒不能援引其供应商(据称的)具备直接从康文森处取得许可的意愿做为其FRAND抗辩 [77]

如果一个实施人在声明了自己具备取得许可意愿的同时,也表示了希望该许可的授与可以在其供应商层级进行,则其有义务以书面形式全面地披露其产品中包含了哪些符合标准的元件,以及哪些供应商向其提供了哪些对应的元件 [78] 。如果此一信息披露义务并没有被履行,正如同本案的情况一样,则实施人要求在其供应商层级别进行许可的请求与实施人表示愿意与自己与标准必要专利持有人签署许可协议的声明彼此矛盾,因此,属于恶意行为(见德国民法典第242条) [79] 。在这种情况下,法院明确表示,实施人仍然有义务以一种及时且有目的性的态度积极地与标准必要专利持有人进行双边谈判,即便在实施人已经向标准必要专利持有人提供上述信息后,仍应该同时积极参与促进在供应商层级相关许可机制的建立 [80] 。并且,在与标准必要专利持有人的双边谈判过程中,实施人可以要求在许可协议中包含一项排除对供应商已取得许可的组件双重支付许可费的条款 [80]

承上所述,法院認為,康文森要求由戴姆勒來取得許可的做法並没有構成滥用或歧视性行為 [81]

法院认为,關於在供应链中對标准必要专利的许可应遵循所谓的“所有人均有權要求取得许可”或者是“所有人均有權使用许可”的作法这一基礎性问题,在此无需被回答 [82] 。在标准必要专利持有人与终端设备制造商之间的法律纠纷中,从竞争法的角度而言,只要标准必要专利持有人在诉讼中所追求達成的目标並不会将供应商完全排除在市场之外便已足夠;当供应商通过由终端设备制造商签署的许可協議建立的“委託製造”权而被授予对标准化技术的使用权时,情况正是如此,正如同此處康文森所提供的那样 [82] 。供应商是否有權要求單獨取得许可則是一个不同的问题,而這個問題可能可以在标准必要专利持有人与供应商之间的另外的訴訟程序中被提出 [83]

法院补充到,标准必要专利持有人有权自由决定对供应链中的哪个侵权者向法院提起诉讼 [84] 。该自由选择权源自于宪法对财产权的保障,以及专利作为一种排他性权利的本质 [85] 。 法院认为,尽管在汽车行业的普遍做法是当零部件被出售给汽车制造商时不受第三方权利的限制,然而这并会不因此使康文森要求戴姆勒取得许可的行为成为竞争法上的滥用行为 [86] 。终端设备制造商与其供应商间的各别协议仅具有双边(合同)效力而不能损害第三方的法律地位 [86] 。特别是,此类条款并不能限制标准必要专利持有人选择向供应链中哪个层级的实施人主张其专利权的权利 [87] 。法院指出,鉴于附加技术的整合符合戴姆勒进入新市场与吸引消费者群的经济利益,从竞争法上的角度而言,汽车行业是否有必要放弃其现有的做法并不重要 [87]

在此背景下,法院同时阐明,只要是侵权诉讼仅针对终端设备制造商发动,标准必要专利持有人对供应商并没有履行华为案判决所确定的义务 [88] 。因此,参与此类诉讼的供应商不能以例如略过单独向供应商发送侵权通知等理由而主张标准必要专利持有人滥用其市场支配地位 [89] 。法院否定了标准必要专利持有人应承担这种全面性的通知义务,因为尝试在多层次的复杂供应链中找出所有可能牵涉到的供应商既不可行也不合理 [90]

法院认为,关于标准必要专利持有人拒绝直接对供应商授与许可是否会构成对其市场支配地位的滥用这一问题,应视竞争法上的一般性原则而定 [91] 。在本案中,法院并没有发现充足的理由可以支撑这种滥用行为的成立 [91] 。法院不认为若是供应商没有取得一份专属于自己的双边许可协议,那么其就无法享有权利或将面临法律上的不确定性 [92] 。然而,取得一份专属于自己的双边许可协议将赋予供应商相较于通过“委托制造权”所取得者更广泛的经营自由,从而更能契合其商业利益的这一事实,在供应商对标准充分的使用权仍然可以通过“委托制造权”而被保障的情况下,此问题便与标准必要专利持有人及终端设备制造商间的诉讼程序没有任何相关性了 [93] 。于此范围内,法院同时指出,以“委托制造权”为基础的供应链内部合作在现实中广泛存在且十分普遍,并且也得到了欧盟相关法律的支持(见欧洲联盟委员会12 月 18 日关于与欧洲联盟条约第 85 (1) 条有关分包协议的评估的通知,OJ C 1,1979 年 1 月 3 日) [93]

最后,法院驳回了戴姆勒方关于康文森与Avanci平台的其他成员勾结,通过排除实施人对相关标准的使用而对实施人为具体歧视行为的指控 [94] 。法院并没有发现任何迹象表明此种情况确实存在,相反地,法院强调了专利池通常被认为具有促进竞争的效果,尤其是在欧盟法律体系之下(详见关于欧洲联盟运作条约第 101 条应用于技术转让协议的指南第245段;2014/C 89/03) [94]
 

2. 合同法上抗辩

法院进一步指出,戴姆勒无法因其被授与FRAND许可而引用合同法上的抗辩以对抗康文森的禁令救济主张,因为此种主张并不存在 [95] 。戴姆勒曾经主张,根据康文森对欧洲电信标准协会所作出的FRAND承诺,康文森不被允许向法院提出禁令救济主张。

法院认为,欧洲电信标准协会的FRAND承诺并未创造出与欧盟竞争法(特别是《欧洲联盟运作条约》第 102 条)规定下所应遵守或享有者不同的义务或权利,而在本案中,康文森已经满足了这些要求 [96] 。在法律上,欧洲电信标准协会的FRAND承诺是根据法国法律所规定的为第三方利益所签订的合同(’stipulation pour l’autrui’),其中包含了标准必要专利持有人必须在稍后时间点授予 FRAND 许可这项具有约束力的承诺 [97] 。然而,关于许可协商的进行以及相对应的义务的内容及范围应按华为案判决所创立的规则来解释,这些规则包括了依据《欧洲联盟运作条约》第 102 条所制定的行为准则 [97] 。事实上,欧洲电信标准协会的FRAND承诺实现了在《欧洲联盟运作条约》第 102 条的规定下提供对标准的使用权的要求,同时也支持采用统一的行为标准 [97] 。在法院看来,法国法律不能创设其他进一步的行为义务,因为法国法律也必须按照欧盟法律的精神来进行解释 [97]
 

C. 其他重要问题

最后,基于比例原则的考量,法院采取了没有理由限制康文森禁令救济主张的观点 [98] 。根据德国法律,比例原则是一项具备宪法位阶的一般性法律原则,如果被告在审判中根据此项原则提出了相应的反对意见,则在审查是否核准禁令救济时也应将此原则纳入考量范围之中 [98] 。德国联邦法院(Bundesgerichtshof)也认可在实施人将遭受的损害因为专利持有人行使其排他性权利时违反诚信原则而无法被合理化的情况下,禁令将可能无法立即被执行(详见2016 年 5 月 10 日’Wärmetauscher’案裁决,案件编号 X ZR 114/13) [98] 。然而,在法院看来,戴姆勒在本次诉讼中并未就任何相关事实进行抗辩 [98]
 

  • [31] Conversant v Daimler, District Court of Munich I, 30 October 2020, Case-No. 21 O 11384/19 (cited by juris)。
  • [32] 同上注,段122-265。
  • [33] 同上注,段285。
  • [34] 同上注,段286。
  • [35] 同上注,段288。
  • [36] 同上注,段287及以下。
  • [37] 同上注,段291及以下。
  • [38] 同上注,段295。
  • [39] 同上注,段296。
  • [40] 同上注,段299。
  • [41] 同上注,段300。
  • [42] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13。
  • [43] Conversant v Daimler, District Court of Munich I, 30 October 2020, Case-No. 21 O 11384/19, 段301。
  • [44] 同上注,段301。
  • [45] 同上注,段307。
  • [46] 同上注,段308。
  • [47] 同上注,段302及308。
  • [48] 同上注,段323及以下。
  • [49] 同上注,段324。然而,法院对于康文森仅提及英国高等法院在无限星球诉华为案中使用的计算方法是否足以解释其向戴姆勒所提供的费率表示怀疑。
  • [50] 同上注,段309。
  • [51] 同上注,段310。
  • [52] 同上注,段316。
  • [53] 同上注,段311。
  • [54] 同上注,段312。
  • [55] 同上注,段320。
  • [56] 同上注,段312及316。
  • [57] 同上注,段315。
  • [58] 同上注,段317及以下。
  • [59] 同上注,段321。
  • [60] 同上注,段357。
  • [61] 同上注,段322及358。
  • [62] 同上注,段328。
  • [63] 同上注,段331及336。
  • [64] 同上注,段332。
  • [65] 同上注,段334及336。
  • [66] 同上注,段335。
  • [67] 同上注,段337。
  • [68] 同上注,段338。
  • [69] 同上注,段339。
  • [70] 同上注,段340。
  • [71] 同上注,段355及以下。
  • [72] 同上注,段341及354。
  • [73] 同上注,段341。
  • [74] 同上注,段341及348。
  • [75] 同上注,段352。
  • [76] 同上注,段353。
  • [77] 同上注,段360。
  • [78] 同上注,段362。
  • [79] 同上注,段362及364。
  • [80] 同上注,段363。
  • [81] 同上注,段365。
  • [82] 同上注,段366。
  • [83] 同上注,段367。
  • [84] 同上注,段368及382。
  • [85] 同上注,段368。
  • [86] 同上注,段370。
  • [87] 同上注,段372。
  • [88] 同上注,段373及376-378。
  • [89] 同上注,段373。
  • [90] 同上注,段373及382。
  • [91] 同上注,段373及379。
  • [92] 同上注,段374。
  • [93] 同上注,段375。
  • [94] 同上注,段380。
  • [95] 同上注,段384。
  • [96] 同上注,段384及以下。
  • [97] 同上注,段385。
  • [98] 同上注,段269。

Updated 6 五月 2021

Sisvel v Haier

德国联邦法院
24 十一月 2020 - Case No. KZR 35/17

A. Facts

The claimant, Sisvel, holds patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of several wireless telecommunications standards (standard essential patents, or SEPs). Sisvel has made a commitment towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to make SEPs accessible to users on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.

The defendants are two European subsidiaries of the Haier group (Haier), which has its headquarters in China. The Haier group produces and markets -among other things- mobile phones and tablets complying with various standards, including the GPRS and UMTS standards developed by ETSI.

On 20 December 2012, Sisvel informed the parent company of the Haier group (Haier China) that it offers licences for its SEPs and shared a list of approx. 235 patents included in its portfolio. In August and November 2013, Sisvel sent further letters with information about its licensing program to Haier China.

Haier China replied to Sisvel only in December 2013. It expressed 'hope' to have 'a formal negotiation' with Sisvel and asked for information regarding potential discounts mentioned in previous communi­cations.

In August 2014, Sisvel made an offer for a global portfolio licence to Haier, which was rejected.

Shortly after that, Sisvel filed infringement actions against Haier before the District Court of Duesseldorf (District Court). One of the actions was based on a SEP reading on the UMTS standard (patent in suit). The other action involved a patent reading on the GPRS standard. Haier filed nullity actions against both patents asserted before the German Federal Patent Court.

During the infringement proceedings, Haier made certain counteroffers to Sisvel. These offers had a limited scope, since they covered only the patents (patent families) asserted against Haier in court.

On 3 November 2015, the District Court decided in favour of Sisvel in both cases [99] . It granted injunctions against Haier and ordered the recall and destruction of infringing products. The District Court further recognised Haier's liability for damages on the merits and ordered Haier to render full and detailed account of the sales of infringing products to Sisvel. Haier appealed both decisions.

In the subsequent proceedings before the Higher District Court of Duesseldorf (Appeal Court), Haier argued –among other things– that the District Court had not adequately taken into account the conduct requirements imposed on SEP holders by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the Huawei v ZTE ruling [100] (Huawei judgment) rendered after Sisvel had filed the infringement actions.

On 16 January 2016, during the course of the proceedings before the Appeal Court, Haier declared that it was willing to take a FRAND licence from Sisvel, however, only in case that the German courts would finally confirm the validity and infringement of the patent in suit. Haier also requested claim charts with respect to all patents included in Sisvel's portfolio.

In December 2016, Sisvel made a further licensing offer to Haier, which was also rejected.

On 20 January 2017, that is a few weeks prior to the end of the oral arguments in the appeal proceedings, Haier made a further counteroffer to Sisvel. The licence offered would cover only the two subsidiaries of the Haier group sued in Germany. An agreement was not reached.

By two judgments dated 30 March 2017, the Appeal Court partially granted Haier's appeals in both parallel proceedings [101] . The claims for injunctive relief as well as the recall and destruction of infringing products were dismissed on the grounds that Sisvel had not complied with its obligations under the Huawei judgment, especially by failing to make a FRAND licensing offer to Haier.

Sisvel appealed the decisions of the Appeal Court.

In April 2020, the Federal Court of Justice (FCJ or Court) finally dismissed the invalidity action filed by Haier against the patent in suitFederal Court of Justice, judgment dated 28 April 2020, Case No. X ZR 35/18..

On 5 May 2020, FCJ rendered a judgment in the parallel proceedings pending between the parties concerning the patent reading on the GPRS standard [103] . The Court decided in favour of Sisvel and reversed the judgment of the Appeal Court. With the present judgmentSisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17 (cited by )., the Court reversed the decision of the Appeal Court also in the case involving the patent in suit.
 

B. Court's reasoning

The Court found that the patent in suit was essential to the UMTS standard and infringedIbid, paras. 10-43..

Contrary to the view previously taken by the Appeal Court, FCJ found that by initiating infringement proceedings against Haier, Sisvel had not abused a dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) [106] .
 

Dominant market position

The Court held that Sisvel had a dominant market position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEUIbid, paras. 48 et seqq..

FCJ explained that a dominant market position is given, when a patent is technically essential for comply­ing with a standard developed by a standardisation body (or a de facto standard) and technical alterna­tives to the standard are not available for products brought on a downstream marketIbid, para. 49.. Even when alternative (technical) options exist, market domi­nance can arise as long as products not using the teaching of the patent cannot compete in a (downstream) market.Ibid, para. 49. According to the FCJ, this applied with respect to the patent in suit.
 

Abuse of market dominance

The Court found, however, that Sisvel had not abused its dominant market position by filing infringement actions against HaierIbid, para. 52.. An abuse of market dominance can occur, when the SEP holder
 

  • refuses to grant a FRAND licence to an implementer willing to take such licence and brings a court action against the latter, asserting claims for injunctive relief (and/or the recall and destruction of infringing products), or
  • has not made 'sufficient efforts' in line with the 'particular responsibility' attached to its dominant position to facilitate the signing of a licence agreement with an implementer, who is, basically, willing to take a licenceIbid, para. 53..

In the eyes of the Court, in both above scenarios, the filing of an action against a 'willing' implementer amounts to an abuse, only because the latter has a claim to be contractually allowed by the SEP holder to use the teachings of the patent under FRAND conditionsIbid, para. 54.. On the other hand, an abuse is regularly not per se established by an offer made by the patent holder at the beginning of negotiations, even when the terms offered would unreasonably impede or discriminate the implementer, if contractually agreed.Ibid, para. 54. An abuse would be given, if the SEP holder insisted on such conditions also at the end of licensing negotiations with the imple­menter.Ibid, para. 54.
 

Notification of infringement

The Court explained that the 'particular responsibility' of a market dominant patent holder materializes in an obligation to notify the implementer about the infringement of the patent in suit prior to filing an action, in case that the implementer is (potentially) not aware that by complying with the standard said patent is usedIbid, para. 55..

In the present case, the Court found that by the letter dated 20 December 2012 and the following correspondence Sisvel had given proper notification of infringement to HaierIbid, para. 84..
 

Willingness

On the other hand, the Court found that Haier did not act as a licensee willing to obtain a FRAND licence from SisvelIbid, paras. 86 et seqq.. In this respect, FCJ disagreed with the Appeal Court, which had taken the opposite view.

In the Court's eyes, the implementer must 'clearly' and 'unambiguously' declare willingness to conclude a licence agreement with the SEP holder on FRAND terms and, subsequently, engage in negotiations in a 'target-oriented' manner [115] . By contrast, it is not sufficient, in response to a notification of infringement, to just demonstrate willingness to consider signing a licensing agreement or to enter into negotiations about whether and under which conditions taking a licence comes into question [115] .

The Court reasoned that the willingness of the implementer to legitimise the unauthorized use of the patent for the future by creating a respective contractual base is a prerequisite for placing the burden on the SEP holder to negotiate a FRAND licence with the implementer. [116] What is more, willingness (on both sides) is essential, because an adequate solution balancing the opposing interests of the parties results, as a rule, from an interest-based negotiation. [117] The fact that a party fails to contribute in negotiations towards a FRAND agreement will regularly be considered to its detriment. [118] An implementer, who has not shown interest in a FRAND-licence over a longer period after receipt of an infringement notification will have to undertake 'additional efforts' to make sure, that despite the delay caused a licence can be signed as soon as possible. [119]

The Court highlighted particularly that implementers should not engage in 'patent hold-out' by exploiting the 'structural disadvantage', which SEP holders face due to the limitation of their right to assert patents in court. [120] Otherwise, competition could be distorted, because the infringer would gain unfair advantages over implementers that have taken a licence in a timely manner. [120]

FCJ took the view that the above interpretation of the requirements related to the implementers' obligation to demonstrate willingness to obtain a FRAND-licence is in line with the Huawei judgment; a new referral of the respective questions to the CJEU, as requested by Haier, was not needed.Ibid, para. 63. The Huawei judgment created a 'safe harbour' against antitrust liability in the sense that compliance with the obligations established will regularly suffice to exclude an abuse of market dominance.Ibid, para. 65. Under special circumstances, however, stricter or less strict conduct duties of the parties could be justified.Ibid, para. 65.

The Court observed that the Huawei judgment supports the notion that the implementer should remain willing to obtain a licence throughout the course of negotiations.Ibid, para. 65. The 'continuous' willingness is an 'indispensable condition' for successful negotiations or, in case negotiations fail, for a finding of abuse of market dominance on the side of the SEP holder.Ibid, para. 68. The refusal of SEP holder to grant a FRAND licence would, indeed, have no relevance in antitrust terms, when the implementer is not objectively willing and able to obtain such licence. [124]

Accordingly, FCJ explained that willingness shall (still) be in place, also when the SEP holder makes a licensing offer.Ibid, para. 69. In this regard, the Court disagreed with the District Court of Duesseldorf, which had expressed the opposite view in the recent referral of certain FRAND-related questions to the CJEU in the matter Nokia v Daimler.Ibid, para. 69. See Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Duesseldorf, order dated 26 November 2020, Case No. 4c O 17/19. According to FCJ, the offer of the SEP holder is just the 'starting point' of negotiations; since FRAND is a range, it is the goal of negotiations to reach a fair and reasonable result considering the interests of both sides.Ibid, paras. 70 and 71. The implementer has, therefore, a duty to examine the FRAND-conformity of the terms of the SEP holder's offer.Ibid, para. 71. If the offer is 'obviously' not FRAND, it will be sufficient that the implementer explains the reasons why this is the case.Ibid, para. 71.

In this context, the Court made clear that the implementer's duty to examine SEP-holder's licensing offer exists, irrespective of whether the offer is, in terms of content, FRAND-compliant in every respect.Ibid, para. 72. If one would require from the SEP holder to make a 'perfect' FRAND offer right away, licensing negotiations would be obsolete.Ibid, para. 73. It is also not possible to assess the FRAND-conformity of the offer in the abstract, without reference to the aspects which each side considers relevant.Ibid, para. 74. The Court reiterated that an non-FRAND licensing offer does not per se amount to an abuse of market dominance.Ibid, para. 76.

Having said that, FCJ noted that for the assessment of the willingness of the implementer its entire conduct (including its reaction to the SEP holder's licensing offer) must be taken into account.Ibid, para. 77. Consequently, willingness can change in the course of time: a court action filed by the SEP holder could become abusive at a later point in time, if the implementer adequately raises a request for a FRAND-licence.Ibid, paras. 79 et seqq. However, the longer the implementer waits with asserting such request, the higher the threshold for considering it as a willing licensee will be. [135] The Court again noted that the above inter­pretation is in line with the Huawei judgment, so that no additional referral to the CJEU is needed, as Haier had requested.Ibid, para. 77.

Against this background, the Court observed that the first response of Haier China to Sisvel's notification almost one year after receipt of the infringement notification was belated [136] . An implementer taking several months to respond to a notification of infringement, typically, sends a signal that there is no interest in taking a licence [136] . Besides that, FCJ found that Haier's response in December 2013, in which only the 'hope' to have a 'formal negotiation' was expressed, was not a sufficient declaration of willing­ness, in terms of content [137] . Since it had reacted belatedly to the notification of infringement, Haier should have undertaken 'additional efforts' to demonstrate willingness, which had been, however, not the case. [138]

Similarly, Haier's letter dated 16 January 2016 did not contain a sufficient declaration of willingness, since Haier had made the signing of a licence subject to the prior confirmation of the validity and infringement of the patent in suit by German courts [139] . Although the implementer is, in principle, allowed to preserve the right to contest the validity of a licensed patent after conclusion of an agreement, the Court held that a declaration of willingness cannot be placed under a respective conditionIbid, para. 95.. Besides that, requesting the production of claim charts for all patents of Sisvel's portfolio almost three years after the receipt of the notification of infringement was, according to the Court, an indication that Haier was only interested in delaying the negotiations until the expiration of the patent in suit [141] .

Furthermore, FCJ found that Haier's willingness to enter into a FRAND licence could also not be extracted from the counteroffers made during the infringement proceedings.Ibid, paras. 102 et seqq. The fact that these counteroffers were, in terms of scope, limited only to the patents asserted by Sisvel in court indicated that Haier had not seriously addressed Sisvel's request for a worldwide portfolio licence. [143] Given that it had more than sufficient time to examine Sisvel's portfolio, one could expect from Haier to provide substantive grounds for such 'selective licensing'. [143]

What is more, the Court held that the counteroffer dated 20 January 2017, which Haier had made shortly before the end of the appeal proceedings, was no sufficient demonstration of willingness either.Ibid, paras. 108 et seqq. The Court focused particularly on the fact that the licence would cover only the two affiliates of the Haier group sued in Germany.Ibid, para. 116. According to FCJ, Haier had no 'legitimate interest' on such 'selective licensing'; on the contrary, a limited licence would offer no sufficient protection against infringement by other companies of the Haier group and force Sisvel to a cost-intensive assertion of its SEPs 'patent to patent and country-by-country'.Ibid, para. 118.

In addition, the Court also criticised the proposed royalty regime.Ibid, paras. 124 et seqq. Haier based the royalty calculation only on a small portion (four patent families) of the SEPs that should be included in the licence, which, in its eyes, were 'probably' essential.Ibid, para. 124. The Court reasoned that the scope of the licence must be clarified in negotiations, whereas in the ICT-sector, due to the large number of relevant patents, it is common to rely on estimations regarding both essentiality and validity, which, on the one hand, allow to take 'necessary remaining uncertainties' adequately into account and, on the other hand, help to avoid disproportionate high transaction costs.Ibid, para. 125.

Apart from that, the fact that the counteroffer was made only in the 'last minute' of the appeal proceedings allowed the conclusion that Haier was not actually aiming at signing a FRAND licence, but was rather motivated by tactical considerations with respect to the pending proceedings.Ibid, para. 126.
 

SEP holder's licensing offer

Having found that Haier had not sufficiently demonstrated willingness to obtain a FRAND licence, the Court did not examine the FRAND-conformity of Sisvel's licensing offers to Haier in the present case [151] . According to FCJ, this question is not relevant, when the implementer has not adequately expressed willingness to sign a FRAND licence.Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17, para. 107.

The Court highlighted that -apart from the obligation to notify the implementer about the infringement- duties of the SEP holder (including the duty to make a FRAND licensing offer) arise only if the implementer has demonstrated willingness to obtain a licence on FRAND terms.Ibid, para. 56. The FRAND-undertaking of the patent holder towards the relevant standardisation body does not change the fact that the user of a patent is, in principle, obliged to seek a licence from the right holder.Ibid, para. 56.
 

C. Other important issues

Patent ambush

The Court dismissed Haier's defence based on the 'patent ambush' argument.Ibid, paras. 127 et seqq. Haier argued that the patent in suit was unenforceable, because the initial patent holder, from whom Sisvel had acquired said patent, had failed to disclose the patent towards ETSI in due course during the development of the UMTS standard.

The Court did not examine whether a 'patent ambush' in the above sense indeed occurred in the present case.Ibid, para. 130. FCJ took the view that an implementer can assert 'patent ambush' only against the patent holder that actually participated in the standard development process; on the contrary, such defence cannot be raised against its successor (here: Sisvel).Ibid, para. 130.

Notwithstanding the above, the Court noted that a 'patent ambush' requires that the decision-making process within the relevant standardisation body was distorted by the withheld information.Ibid, para. 131. Insofar, the implementer must establish at least some indication that the standard would have taken a different form, if the information considering the relevant patent application had been disclosed in time.Ibid, paras. 131 et seq. Haier had, however, failed to do so.Ibid, paras. 131 et seq.
 

Damages

Finally, the Court found that Sisvel's damage claims were given on the merits. Negligence establishing Haier's liability for damages was given: The implementer is, in principle, obliged to make sure that no third party rights are infringed, before starting manufacturing or selling products, which Haier had not done. [158]

What is more, Sisvel's claim for damages was not limited to the amount of a FRAND licensing rate ('licensing analogy'). [159] The SEP holder is entitled to full damages, unless the implementer can assert an own counterclaim, requesting to be placed in the position, in which it would have been, in case that the SEP holder had fulfilled the obligations arising from its dominant market position. [158] An implementer is, however, entitled to such (counter)claim, only when it adequately expressed its willingness to enter into a licence, which had not been the case here.77

  • [99] Sisvel v Haier, District Court of Duesseldorf, judgment dated 3 November 2015, Case No. 4a O 144/14 (UMTS-related patent) and Case No. 4a O 93/14 (GPRS-related patent).
  • [100] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [101] Sisvel v Haier, Higher District Court of Duesseldorf, judgment dated 30 March 2017, Case No. I-15 U 65/15 (UMTS-related patent) and Case No. I-15 U 66/15 (GPRS-related patent).
  • [102] Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 28 April 2020, Case No. X ZR 35/18.
  • [103] Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 5 May 2020, Case No. KZR 36/17.
  • [104] Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17 (cited by ).
  • [105] Ibid, paras. 10-43.
  • [106] Ibid, para. 44.
  • [107] Ibid, paras. 48 et seqq.
  • [108] Ibid, para. 49.
  • [109] Ibid, para. 52.
  • [110] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [111] Ibid, para. 54.
  • [112] Ibid, para. 55.
  • [113] Ibid, para. 84.
  • [114] Ibid, paras. 86 et seqq.
  • [115] Ibid, para. 57.
  • [116] Ibid, para. 58.
  • [117] Ibid, para. 59.
  • [118] Ibid, para. 60.
  • [119] Ibid, para. 62.
  • [120] Ibid, para. 61.
  • [121] Ibid, para. 63.
  • [122] Ibid, para. 65.
  • [123] Ibid, para. 68.
  • [124] Ibid, paras. 66 and 68.
  • [125] Ibid, para. 69.
  • [126] Ibid, para. 69. See Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Duesseldorf, order dated 26 November 2020, Case No. 4c O 17/19.
  • [127] Ibid, paras. 70 and 71.
  • [128] Ibid, para. 71.
  • [129] Ibid, para. 72.
  • [130] Ibid, para. 73.
  • [131] Ibid, para. 74.
  • [132] Ibid, para. 76.
  • [133] Ibid, para. 77.
  • [134] Ibid, paras. 79 et seqq.
  • [135] Ibid, para. 83.
  • [136] Ibid, para. 87.
  • [137] Ibid, paras. 88 et seqq.
  • [138] Ibid, para. 89.
  • [139] Ibid, paras. 93 et seqq.
  • [140] Ibid, para. 95.
  • [141] Ibid, paras. 96-99.
  • [142] Ibid, paras. 102 et seqq.
  • [143] Ibid, para. 102.
  • [144] Ibid, paras. 108 et seqq.
  • [145] Ibid, para. 116.
  • [146] Ibid, para. 118.
  • [147] Ibid, paras. 124 et seqq.
  • [148] Ibid, para. 124.
  • [149] Ibid, para. 125.
  • [150] Ibid, para. 126.
  • [151] The Court had, however, undertaken such analysis in its earlier decision between the same parties dated May 2020. See Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 5 May 2020, Case No. KZR 36/17, especially paras. 76-81 and 101 et seqq.
  • [152] Sisvel v Haier, Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17, para. 107.
  • [153] Ibid, para. 56.
  • [154] Ibid, paras. 127 et seqq.
  • [155] Ibid, para. 130.
  • [156] Ibid, para. 131.
  • [157] Ibid, paras. 131 et seq.
  • [158] Ibid, para. 135.
  • [159] Ibid, paras. 134 et seqq.

Updated 17 一月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat)

英国法院判决
7 六月 2017 - Case No. HP-2014-000005

A. Facts and Main Judgment

The claimant is a company that grants licenses for patented technologies in the telecommunications industry. The patents at issue relate to telecommunication network coding and procedures. In 2014, the claimant made a declaration under the ETSI IPR Policy that it was willing to grant licenses on FRAND terms. There were five technical trials relating to the validity, infringement and essentiality of these patents and one non-technical trial relating to competition law issues, FRAND issues, injunctive relief and damages for past infringements.Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2017/1304.html In its decision on 5 April 2017 (the ‘main judgment’), the Patents Court (Birrs J) held that two patents were valid and that they had been infringed, and that the claimant was in a dominant position, but had not abused this position. The court stated that a final decision about an injunction to restrain patent infringements should be made separately. A few weeks after the main judgment, a license representing the FRAND terms between the two parties was prepared (the ‘settled license’), but had not yet been entered into. [161] Further, the defendant offered to give an undertaking to the court to enter into the license settled by the Patents Court or any other court. [162]

In its subsequent decision on 7 June 2017 (the case at hand), the parties argued whether the court should grant an injunction order given the existence of the settled license. Other minor issues of the case related to damages, declaratory relief, costs and permission to appeal. [163] The court granted an injunction for infringements of patents EP (UK) 2 229 744 and EP (UK) 1 230 818 (the ‘final order’). [164] The injunction order would be discharged if the defendant entered into a FRAND license and it would be stayed pending appeal. The court also declared that the settled license represented the FRAND terms in the given circumstances between the parties and that the defendant had to pay GBP 2.9 million of the claimant’s costs. Permission to appeal was granted to the defendant in respect of three issues and to the claimant in respect of one issue. [164]

B. Court’s Reasoning

1. Injunction

The main issue considered by the court was the interplay between the injunction, the settled license and the undertaking offered by the defendant. Patent EP (UK) 2 229 744 will expire in 2028. The settled license’s expiry date is 31 December 2020, [165] which would put the defendant in a difficult position if it attempts to renegotiate the license while the injunction is still in place. The defendant would even risk being in contempt of court if it continued to sell equipment if there was an argument that the license had come to an end for other reasons (e.g. repudiatory breach of contract). [166] However, the court took the view that it cannot be said that the defendant must be free to sell products if the license has ceased to exist. [165] Similarly, it cannot be said with certainty that the claimant must have an injunction at that date.

Thus, the court considered what the correct form of injunction in respect of a FRAND undertaking should be when a court has settled a license but the defendant has not entered into it (‘FRAND injunction’). [167] The court held that the FRAND injunction should contain a proviso that it will cease to have effect as soon as the defendant enters into the FRAND license. The injunction should also be subject to an express liberty to either party to return to court in the future if the FRAND license ceases to exist or expires while the patent is still valid. [167]

The court also held that despite the court’s discretion as to whether an injunction is granted, an injunction is normally effective, proportionate and dissuasive in IP cases. [168] Although the practical effect of a defendant’s undertaking and an injunction are similar, rights holders usually insist on an injunction. [169] One reason is that it involves a public vindication of the claimant’s rights. [169] As the claimant has been forced to come to court, an offer of undertaking after judgment is usually considered too late. [169] In this case, the defendant had maintained throughout the negotiations and the trial that it was under no obligation to accept a worldwide license. [170] Thus, according to the court, the right thing to do was to grant a FRAND injunction which will be stayed on terms pending appeal.

2. Other Issues

The court held that the issue of damages is closely related to the main issue. [171] If the defendant entered into the settled license, all payments would be covered by the license. If the defendant did not enter into the settled license, an order for damages is required. As a consequence, the court order should be in the same form as the FRAND injunction (stayed pending appeal and ceasing to have effect if the parties enter into the settled license). [171]

The parties also disagreed about the wording of the court declaration regarding the FRAND terms of the settled license. [172] The court dismissed the defendant’s suggestion as too complicated and the claimant’s suggestion as incomprehensive. Instead, the court declaration would be ‘the license annexed to the judgment represents the FRAND terms applicable between the parties in the relevant circumstances’. [173] Further, the court rejected the defendant’s petition to make a declaration that the claimant had not abused its dominant market position. [174] It took the view that the main judgment made a clear finding on this issue in summary paragraph 807(17).

Further, the parties disagreed about the extent of the defendant’s obligation to bear the claimant’s costs. The claimant argued that it should be regarded as the successful party so that the defendant had to pay its costs (GBP 6.4million). [175] The defendant argued the claimant had been clearly wrong regarding the applicable FRAND rate [176] and the appropriate thing would be to make no cost order. The court rejected the idea that there was no overall winner (as argued by the defendant) because the claimant was successful on the issues of the nature of the license and the existence and abuse of market dominance. [177] The ensuing question was whether any deductions were appropriate. [178] The court held that neither party had offered terms that were essentially FRAND. [179] However, the rates offered by the claimant were significantly further away from the end result than the rates offered by the defendant. [179] Thus, the defendant’s costs in relation to the FRAND rate issue were not recoverable by the claimant.

The fifth and final issue was in respect of permission to appeal. The court granted the defendant permission on three grounds: first, the necessity of granting a global license (including the court’s view that there is only one applicable license fee); [180] second, the hard-edged non-discrimination point; [181] and third, the issue of injunctive relief and abuse of market dominance under the CJEU ruling Huawei v. ZTE. [182] Conversely, the claimant was granted permission to appeal on the blended global benchmark issue (using a blended global rate as a benchmark, leading to the question whether another discount for the Chinese market should given). [183]

  • [160] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2017/1304.html
  • [161] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 2.
  • [162] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 8.
  • [163] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 1.
  • [164] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 70.
  • [165] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 22.
  • [166] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 19.
  • [167] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 20.
  • [168] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 25.
  • [169] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 26.
  • [170] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 29.
  • [171] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 33.
  • [172] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 34.
  • [173] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 36.
  • [174] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 38.
  • [175] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), paras 39-40.
  • [176] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 41.
  • [177] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 44.
  • [178] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 45.
  • [179] Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat), para 56.
  • [180] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 170 et seqq.
  • [181] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 177 and 481 et seqq.
  • [182] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 627 et seqq.
  • [183] See Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 537 et seqq.

Updated 1 十一月 2017

Unwired Planet v Huawei, [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) 2

英国法院判决
4 五月 2017 - Case No. HP-2014-000005

  1. Facts
    The claimant is a company that grants licenses for patented technologies in the telecommunications industry. The patents at issue (EP (UK) 2 229 744, EP (UK) 2 119 287, EP (UK) 2 485 514, EP (UK) 1 230 818, EP (UK) 1 105 991, EP (UK) 0 989 712) relate to telecommunication network coding and procedures [184] . Most were part of a large patent portfolio that the claimant had acquired from a major telecommunications company in 2013. [185] In 2014, the claimant made a declaration under the ETSI IPR Policy that it was willing to grant licenses on FRAND terms. There were five technical trials relating to the validity, infringement and essentiality of these patents. This summary focuses on the non-technical trial addressed competition law issues, FRAND issues, injunctive relief and damages for past infringements. [186]
    In April 2014 the claimant made an open offer to the defendant, a major international smartphone manufacturer, to grant a license in respect of the claimant’s entire global patent portfolio (containing SEPs and non-SEPs). The defendant refused the offer, contending that there was no patent infringement, that the patents were not essential, and that they were invalid. The defendant also argued that the offer was not FRAND and thus did not constitute an abuse of a dominant market position under Art. 102 TFEU. In July 2014 the claimant made a further offer, limited to the claimant’s SEPs. Again, the defendant refused, arguing that the license conditions were not FRAND. [187] In June 2015 both parties made further offers. These offers were the result of directions from the court. The claimant offered a worldwide portfolio license while the defendant wanted to limit the territorial scope to the United Kingdom. [188] Between August and October 2016 the parties exchanged further offers without reaching an agreement. [189]
    The Patents Court (Birrs J) held that the claimant was in a dominant position, but did not abuse this position. [190] The defendant was not prepared to take a license on FRAND conditions and the claimant was not in breach of competition law. Thus, the court held that a final injunction to restrain patent infringements should be granted. An injunction for infringements of patents EP (UK) 2 229 744 and EP (UK) 1 230 818 was granted on 7 June 2017. [191]
  2. Court’s reasoning
    1. Market power
      The court defined the relevant market for assessing dominance as a distinct market for licensing each SEP individually. [192] European case law indicated that owning an SEP could be a rebuttable presumption for the existence of a dominant position. [193] The claimant’s pleaded position was a non-admission of dominance rather than a denial coupled with a positive case to the contrary. It was the view of the court that this was insufficient to rebut the presumption. In particular, the claimant’s argument of countervailing buyer power was unconvincing because it had not been supported by a proper economic analysis. [194]
    2. SEP Proprietor’s Licensing Offer
      1. FRAND Declaration as Conceptual Basis
        The court pointed out that that the FRAND undertaking also applied in the case that the SEP proprietor was not in a dominant position. It held that the FRAND undertaking operated as a practical constraint on a SEP owner’s market power. [195] The ETSI declaration made by the SEP proprietor is also the starting point for determining the FRAND rate. The underlying issue, which is discussed at length by the court, [196] is if such a declaration forms a contract and whether that contract can benefit third parties. The court acknowledged that the legal effect of this declaration, in particular its enforceability, is a controversial issue under French law. [197] However, the court reasoned that the FRAND declaration is an important aspect of technology standardisation. Holders of SEPs are not compelled to give a FRAND declaration. If they do, the undertaking would be enforceable and irrevocable due to public interest. [197]
        The court applied a procedural approach to FRAND. It emphasised that FRAND describes not only a set of license terms, but also the process by which a set of terms are agreed. [198] It applies to both the SEP-holder and the implementer/defendant. In particular, this approach allows for starting offers that leave room for negotiation. On the other hand, making extreme offers and taking an uncompromising approach which prejudices fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory negotiation is not a FRAND approach. [199] This approach also means that the SEP proprietor is under an obligation to make a FRAND offer and to enter into FRAND license agreements. [200]
      2. ‘True FRAND Rate’
        The court considered that there is only a single set of terms for a given set of circumstances that would meet FRAND conditions (‘true FRAND rate’). [201] This eliminates the so-called Vringo-problem, [202] i.e. if FRAND were a range there would be two different but equally FRAND offers. Thus, if the court would grant or not an injunction, it would be unfair for the alleged infringer or SEP holder respectively. [203]
        The court was of the opinion that the true FRAND rate approach does not cause problems under competition law. Theoretically, if only one set of terms is truly FRAND, and if FRAND also represents the line between abusive and non-abusive conduct under Art. 102 TFEU, then every agreed SEP-licence could be at serious risk of being abusive. [204] However, the court took the view that FRAND-compliance and compliance with Art. 102 TFEU are not the same thing (the court pointed out that the CJEU in the Huawei ruling appears to equate an obligation to make a FRAND offer with compliance with Art 102 TFEU). [205] Since Art. 102 TFEU condemns excessive pricing, [206] a royalty rate can be somewhat higher than the true FRAND rate and still not be contrary to competition law. Conversely, for a breach of competition law, it will be necessary but not sufficient that the rate is not the true FRAND rate. [206]
      3. Discrimination
        The court held that the correct approach is to start from a global rate as a benchmark and to then adjust this rate as appropriate. [207] It distinguished between two concepts of discrimination. First, the ‘general’ concept of non-discrimination describes an overall assessment of FRAND which can be used to derive the benchmark mentioned above. [208] It is based on the intrinsic value of the patent portfolio, but it does not depend on the licensee. The court held that this benchmark should be applied to all licensees seeking the same kind of license. [209]
        Second, the ‘hard-edged’ non-discrimination obligation, which takes into account the nature of the potential licensee, [208] is a distinct concept that could be used to adjust license terms. However, the court held that the FRAND declaration does not introduce such a hard-edged non-discrimination concept. [210] If, contrary to the view taken by the court, the FRAND undertaking did include hard-edged non-discrimination, a licensee could only have the right to a lower rate granted to another licensee (i.e. a specific non-discrimination obligation resulting from the FRAND declaration) if the difference would otherwise distort competition between the two licensees. [209]
      4. Territorial Scope of License
        The court held that the defendant’s offer that was limited to UK licenses was not FRAND. In the court’s opinion country by country licensing is inefficient for goods such as mobile telecommunications devices that are distributed across borders. [211] It would also be inefficient to negotiate many different licenses and then to keep track of so many different royalty calculations and payments. No rational business would do this, if it could be avoided. [211] This was illustrated by the fact that the vast majority of licenses introduced in the trial were worldwide licenses. [212] Further, it is common ground that the industry assesses patent families rather than individual patents within the family. Assessing portfolios on a family basis inevitably involved tying a patent in one jurisdiction with a patent in another. [213] Thus, according to the court, a worldwide license would not be contrary to competition law. As willing and reasonable parties would agree on a worldwide licence, the insistence by the defendant on a license which was limited to the UK was not FRAND. [214]
  3. Court’s reasoning
    1. Comparable agreements and reasonable aggregate royalty rate
      The court held that for determining the royalty rate, the evidence of the parties would be relevant, including evidence of how negotiations actually work in the industry. [215] Other freely-negotiated license agreements might be used as comparables. [216] This may be compared with a top down approach [217] can also be used in which the rate is set by determining the patentee’s share of relevant SEPs and applying that to the total aggregate royalty for a standard, but this may be more useful as a cross-check. [218] Royalty rates determined by other courts might be useful as persuasive precedents. However, in the eyes of the court, a license rate determined at a binding arbitration does not carry much weight as to what parties are usually paying. [215] License agreements must meet certain criteria to be comparable. [219] First, the licensor is the claimant. Second, the license agreement is recent. However, it is not necessary that the licensee is the defendant or a comparable company because different market participants have different bargaining powers, which is reflected in the negotiations and the resulting royalty rates. [219] Finally the court confirmed that a royalty based on the handset price was appropriate and implied a reasonable aggregate royalty rate of 8.8%of the handset price. The court found that the 8.8% was reasonable, in part, because the aggregate implied by either party’s case was higher (10.4% and 13.3%). [220]
    2. Principles derived from Huawei v. ZTE
      The court also provided a compiled overview of its interpretation of the Huawei v. ZTE ruling. [221] In the eyes of the court, the ‘willingness to conclude a licence on FRAND terms’ refers to a willingness in general. The fact that concrete proposals are also required does not mean it is relevant to ask whether the proposals are actually FRAND or not. If the patentee complies with the procedure as set out by the CJEU, then bringing a claim for injunction is not abusive under Art 102. But even if sufficient notice is given, bringing a claim can constitute an abuse because complying with the procedure does not mean that a patentee can behave with impunity. In other words, there might be other aspects that make the claim abusive. Conversely, bringing such a claim without prior notice will necessarily be abusive. Significantly, the court held, the legal circumstances of this case differ from the circumstances assumed by the CJEU in a crucial respect. A FRAND undertaking can be effectively enforced irrespective of Art 102. The defendant does not need Art 102 TFEU to have a defence to the injunction claim.
  • [184] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 2
  • [185] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 54 et seqq.
  • [186] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 3
  • [187] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 5
  • [188] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 7-8
  • [189] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 11-14
  • [190] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 807
  • [191] Unwired Planet v Huawei, EWHC 1304 (Pat)
  • [192] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 631
  • [193] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 634
  • [194] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 636-646
  • [195] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 656
  • [196] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), paras 108-145
  • [197] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 146
  • [198] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 162
  • [199] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 163
  • [200] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 159
  • [201] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 164
  • [202] See Vringo v ZTE [2013] EWHC 1591 (Pat) and [2015] EWHC 214 (Pat)
  • [203] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 158
  • [204] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 152
  • [205] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 154
  • [206] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 153
  • [207] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 176
  • [208] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 177
  • [209] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 503
  • [210] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 501
  • [211] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 544
  • [212] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 534
  • [213] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 546
  • [214] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 572
  • [215] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 171
  • [216] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 170
  • [217] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 178
  • [218] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 806 (10)
  • [219] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 175
  • [220] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), para 476
  • [221] Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711(Pat), 744

Updated 15 五月 2018

Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, [2018] EWHC 808 (Pat)

英国法院判决
16 四月 2018 - Case No. HP-2017-000048

A. Facts

The claimant, Conversant, is a licensing firm incorporated in Luxembourg. The defendants are two major Chinese telecoms equipment and handset manufacturers, Huawei and ZTE, and their English affiliates. After years of negotiations that failed to result in licenses for claimant’s portfolio of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) reading on ETSI wireless telecoms standards (and comprising inter alia Chinese and UK patents),Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE[2018] EWHC 808 (Pat) para 5. the claimant filed an action for infringement of four of its UK SEPs before the High Court of Justice (Court), and requested the Court to define Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms for its global SEP portfolio. [223] The defendants in separate proceedings initiated in China disputed the validity, essentiality and infringement of claimant’s Chinese patents. Since the defendants failed to unequivocally commit to conclude licenses on FRAND terms decided by the Court, the plaintiff amended its pleading to include injunctive relief, unless and until the defendants comply with the Court’s FRAND determination. [224]

The judgment at hand involves the defendants’ challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction to decide upon the terms of a global portfolio license. According to the defendants, a UK court has no jurisdiction to decide on the validity and infringement of foreign (in the present case: Chinese) patents. [225] Furthermore, the defendants claim that the jurisdiction most closely connected to the case is China which is the centre of the defendants’ manufacturing activities as well as the jurisdiction where the bulk of their sales takes place. [226]

B. Court’s Reasoning

The court dismissed the defendants’ challenge of jurisdiction. Following the reasoning of Birss J in Unwired Planet,Unwired Planet v. Huawei[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) paras 565-67 Carr J held that, although issues of validity of patents granted in foreign jurisdictions are not justiciable in the UK, nevertheless the issue of validity should be distinguished from the issue of the determination of a global portfolio license on FRAND terms. According to Carr J, the defendants are free to challenge the validity, essentiality, and infringement of claimant’s Chinese patents in separate proceedings before Chinese courts; the pending issues of validity, essentiality and infringement do not preclude, however, the Court from determining FRAND terms for a global license and providing a mechanism of adjusting the royalty rate according to the validity and infringement decisions of courts in other jurisdictions.Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE(n. 1) paras 17 et seq. Furthermore, the defendants’ justiciability defense, were it to be accepted, would make it impossible for patent holders with a global portfolio of SEPs to obtain relief in the form of court-determined FRAND terms for a global license, since they would need to commence litigation on a country-by-country basis. [229] Forcing the patent holder to seek separate licenses for every individual country where it held SEPs could be characterized as a ‘hold-out chater’, in the eyes of the Court. [229]

Moreover, the Court seized jurisdiction over the case on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim concerns four patents granted in the UK; the issue of relief for patent infringement, and in particular whether such relief will take the form of setting FRAND terms for a global license, is to be decided in the context of a ‘FRAND trial’, after a decision on infringement is reached. [230] Were the defendants’ argument to be accepted, the Court would, in effect, be barred from deciding on the infringement and the proper relief for patents granted in the UK. [226] Besides that, the Court also held that the defendants’ failed to establish that the Chinese courts would be the appropriate forum for the dispute. [231] In this respect, given that royalty rates for telecommunication SEPs are usually lower in China than in other countries, the Court particularly pointed out that no holder of a global SEP portfolio would voluntarily prefer to submit to determination of a FRAND license for the entirety of portfolio in a country, where the rates applied would be lower than the rest of the world. [232]

  • [222] Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE[2018] EWHC 808 (Pat) para 5.
  • [223] ibid, para 7.
  • [224] ibid, para 8.
  • [225] ibid, paras 9, 12 and 13.
  • [226] ibid.
  • [227] Unwired Planet v. Huawei[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) paras 565-67
  • [228] Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE(n. 1) paras 17 et seq.
  • [229] ibid, para 28.
  • [230] ibid, para 69.
  • [231] ibid, paras 72 et seq.
  • [232] ibid, para 63.

Updated 30 十月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal

英国法院判决
23 十月 2018 - Case No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344

A. Facts

The Claimant, Unwired Planet International Limited, holds a significant portfolio of patents which are essential for the implementation of the 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE wireless telecommunications standards (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs). The Defendants, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Huawei Technologies (UK) Co. Ltd., manufacture and sell mobile devices complying with the above standards worldwide.

Starting in September 2013, the Claimant contacted the Defendants several times, requesting the latter to engage in discussions for a licence regarding its SEP portfolio. [233] In March 2014, the Claimant sued the Defendants as well as Samsung and Google for infringement of five of its UK SEPs before the UK High Court of Justice (High Court). [234] The Claimant also initiated parallel infringement proceedings against the Defendants in Germany. [235]

The High Court conducted three technical trials first, focusing on the validity and essentiality of four of the SEPs in suit. [236] By April 2016, these trials were completed; the High Court held that two of the SEPs in suit were both valid and essential, whereas two other patents were found to be invalid. [236] The parties agreed to postpone further technical trials indefinitely. [236]

In July 2016, Samsung took a licence from the Claimant covering, among other, the SEPs in suit. [237] The Claimant also settled the infringement proceedings with Google. [238]

In late 2016, the trial concerned with questions regarding to the licensing of the SEPs in suit commenced between the Claimant and the Defendants. Over the course of these proceedings the parties made licensing offers to the each other. However, they failed to reach an agreement. The Defendants indicated they were willing to take a licence under Claimant’s UK patent portfolio, whereas the Claimant contended that it was entitled to insist upon a worldwide licence. [239]

In April 2017, the High Court granted an UK injunction against the Defendant, until such time as it entered into a worldwide licensing agreement with the Claimant on the specific rates, which the court determined to be Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) [240] in accordance with the undertaking given by the Claimant towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). [241] Pending appeal, the High Court stayed the injunction. [242]

Shortly after the High Court delivered its decision, the Defendants began proceedings against the Claimant in China, which are still pending. [243]

With the present judgment, the UK Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendants’ appeal against the decision of the High Court. [244]


B. Court’s reasoning

The Defendants appealed the decision of the High Court on the following three grounds:

1. The High Court’s finding that only a worldwide licence was FRAND is erroneous; the imposition of such a licence on terms set by this court based on a national finding of infringement of UK patents is wrong in principle. [245]

2. The offer imposed to the Defendants by the High Court is discriminatory in violation of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking, since the rates offered are higher than the rates reflected in the licence granted by the Claimant to Samsung. [246]

3. The Claimant is not entitled to injunctive relief; by bringing the infringement proceedings against the Defendants, without meeting the requirements established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in the matter Huawei v ZTE [247] (Huawei judgment) before, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). [248]

Notably, the High Court’s determination of the rates which apply to the worldwide licence that the court requested the Defendants to take was not challenged by any of the parties to the proceedings. [249]


1. Worldwide licences

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Defendants’ notion that imposing a worldwide licence on an implementer is wrong, because it amounts to an (indirect) interference with foreign court proceedings relating to patents subsisting in foreign territories, which would have been subject to materially different approaches to the assessment of FRAND royalty rates and could, therefore, lead to different results (particularly the ongoing litigation between the parties in China and Germany). [250]

The Court of Appeal explained that in imposing a worldwide licence the High Court did neither adjudicate on issues of infringement or validity concerning any foreign SEPs, nor was it deciding what the appropriate relief for infringement of any foreign SEPs might be (particularly since it made clear that a FRAND licence should not prevent a licensee from challenging the validity or essentiality of any foreign SEPs and should make provision for sales in non-patent countries which do not require a licence) [251] . [252]

Moreover, the High Court simply determined the terms of the licence that the Claimant was required to offer to the Defendants pursuant to its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI. [253] Such an undertaking has international effect. [254] It applies to all SEPs of the patent holder irrespective of the territory in which they subsist. [255] This is necessary for two reasons: first, to protect implementers whose equipment may be sold and used in a number of different jurisdictions. [255] Second, to enable SEP holders to prevent implementers from “free-riding” on their innovations and secure an appropriate reward for carrying out their research and development activities and for engaging with the standardisation process. [256]

Accordingly, the High Court had not erred in finding that a worldwide licence was FRAND. On the contrary, there may be circumstances in which only a worldwide licence or at least a multi-territorial licence would be FRAND. [257] German Courts (in Pioneer Acer [258] and St. Lawrence v Vodafone [259] ) as well as the European Commission in its Communication dated 29 November 2017 [260] had also adopted a similar approach. [261]

Having said that, the Court of Appeal recognized that it may be “wholly impractical” for a SEP holder to seek to negotiate a licence for its patents on a country-by-country basis, just as it may be “prohibitively expensive” to seek to enforce its SEPs by litigating in each country in which they subsist. [256] In addition, if in the FRAND context the implementer could only be required to take country-by-country licences, there would be no prospect of any effective injunctive relief being granted to the SEP holder against it: the implementer could avoid an injunction, if it agreed to pay the royalties in respect of its activities in any particular country, once those activities had been found to infringe. [262] In this way, the implementer would have an incentive to hold out country-by-country, until it was compelled to pay. [262]

In its discussion of this topic, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the view taken by the High Court that in every given set of circumstances only one true set of FRAND terms exists. Nevertheless, the court did not consider that the opposite assumption of the High Court had a material effect to the its decision. [263]

In the eyes of the Court of Appeal, it is “unreal” to suggest that two parties, acting fairly and reasonably, will necessarily arrive at precisely the same set of licence terms as two other parties, also acting fairly and reasonably and faced with the same set of circumstances. [264] The reality is that a number of sets of terms may all be fair and reasonable in a given set of circumstances. [264] Whether there is only one true set of FRAND terms or not, is, therefore, more of a “theoretical problem” than a real one. [265] If the parties cannot reach an agreement, then the court (or arbitral tribunal) which will have to determine the licensing terms will normally declare one set of terms as FRAND. The SEP holder would then have to offer that specific set of terms to the implementer. On the other hand, in case that the court finds that two different sets of terms are FRAND, then the SEP holder will satisfy its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI, if it offers either one of them to the implementer. [265]

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal dismissed Defendants’ claim that imposing a worldwide licence is contrary to public policy and disproportionate. [266] In particular, the Defendants argued that this approach encourages over-declaration of patents [267] and is not compatible with the spirit of the Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, [268] which requires relief for patent infringement to be proportionate. [269]

Although the Court of Appeal recognised the existence of the practice of over-declaration and acknowledged that it is a problem, it held that this phenomenon cannot justify “condemning” SEP holders with large portfolios to “impossibly expensive” litigation in every territory in respect of which they seek to recover royalties. [270] The court also found that there was nothing disproportionate about the approach taken by the High Court, since the Defendants had the option to avoid an injunction by taking a licence on the terms which the court had determined. [271]


2. Non-discrimination

The Court of Appeal rejected the Defendants’ argument [272] that the non-discrimination component of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking towards ETSI obliges the Claimant to offer to the Defendants the same rates as those contained in the licence granted to Samsung. [273]

The Court of Appeal made clear that the obligation of the SEP holder not to discriminate is, in principle, engaged in the present case, since the Claimant’s transaction with the Defendants is equivalent to the licence it granted to Samsung. [274] In the court’s eyes, when deciding whether two transactions are equivalent one needs to focus first on the transactions themselves. Insofar, differences in the circumstances in which the transactions were entered into, particularly economic circumstances, such as the parties’ financial position [275] or market conditions (e.g. cost of raw materials), cannot make two otherwise identical transactions non-equivalent (releasing, therefore, the patent holder from the obligation not to discriminate). Changes in such circumstances could only amount to an objective justification for a difference in treatment. [276]

Considering the specific content of the SEP holder’s respective obligation, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court’s finding that the non-discrimination element of a SEP holder’s FRAND undertaking does not imply a so-called “hard-edged” component (imposing on the patent holder an obligation to offer the same rate to similarly situated implementers). [277] It argued that the “hard-edged” approach is “excessively strict” and fails to achieve a balance between a fair return to the SEP owner and universal access to the technology. [278] It could have the effect of compelling the SEP holder to accept a level of compensation for the use of its invention which does not reflect the value of the licensed technology and, therefore, harm the technological development of standards. [279]

Furthermore, the “hard-edged” discrimination approach should be rejected also because its effects would result in the insertion of the “most favoured licensee” clause in the FRAND undertaking. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the industry would most likely have regarded such a clause as inconsistent with the overall objective of the FRAND undertaking. [280]

Conversely, the Court of Appeal followed the notion described by the High Court as the “general” non-discrimination approach: [281] the FRAND undertaking prevents the SEP holder from securing rates higher than a “benchmark” rate which mirrors a fair valuation of its patent(s), but it does not prevent the patent holder from granting licences at lower rates. [281] For determining the benchmark rate, prior licences granted by the SEP holder to third parties will likely form the “best comparables”. [282]

The Court of Appeal argued that the “general” approach is in line with the objectives of the FRAND undertaking, since it ensures that the SEP holder is not able to “hold-up” implementation of the standard by demanding more than its patent(s) is worth. [283] However, the FRAND undertaking does not aim at leveling down the royalty owed to the SEP holder to a point where it no longer represents a fair return for its patent(s), or to removing its discretion to agree royalty rates lower than the benchmark rate, if it chooses to do so. [283]

In this context, the Court of Appeal made clear that it does not consider differential pricing as per se objectionable, since it can in some circumstances be beneficial to consumer welfare. [284] The court sees no value in mandating equal pricing for its own sake. On the contrary, once the hold-up effect is dealt with by ensuring that licences are available at the benchmark rate, there is no reason for preventing the SEP holder from charging less than the licence is worth. [284] Should discrimination appear below the benchmark rate, it should be addressed through the application of competition law; as long as granting licences at rates lower than the benchmark rate causes no competitive harm, there is no reason to assume that the FRAND undertaking constrains the ability of the SEP holder to do so. [285]


3. Abuse of dominant Position / Huawei v ZTE

The Court of Appeal further rejected Defendants’ argument that, by bringing the infringement proceedings prior to fulfilling the obligations arising from the Huawei judgment, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 TFEU. [286]

To begin with, the Court of Appeal confirmed the finding of the High Court that the Claimant held a dominant market position and dismissed the respective challenge by the latter. [287] It did not find any flaw in the High Court’s view that the SEP holder has a 100% market share with respect to each SEP (since it is “common ground” that the relevant market for the purpose of assessing dominance in the case of each SEP is the market for the licensing of that SEP [288] ) and that the constrains imposed upon the SEP holder’s market power by the limitations attached to the FRAND undertaking [289] and the risk of hold-out that is immanent to the structure of the respective market, [290] can either alone or together rebut the assumption that it most likely holds market power. [291]

Notwithstanding the above, the Court of Appeal held that the Claimant had not abused its market power in the present case. [292]

The court agreed with the finding of the High Court that the Huawei judgment did not lay down “mandatory conditions”, in a sense that that non-compliance will per se render the initiation of infringement proceedings a breach of Article 102 TFEU. [293] The language used in the Huawei judgment implies that the CJEU intended to create a “safe harbor”: if the SEP holder complies with the respective framework, the commencement of an action will not, in and of itself, amount to an abuse. [294] If the SEP holder steps outside this framework, the question whether its behaviour has been abusive must be assessed in light of all of the circumstances. [295]

In the court’s eyes, the only mandatory condition that must be satisfied by the SEP holder before proceedings are commenced, is giving notice to the implementer about the infringing use of its patents. [296] This follows from the clear language used by the CJEU with respect to this obligation. [297] The precise content of such notice will depend upon all the circumstances of the particular case. [297] In general, if an alleged infringer is familiar with the technical details of the products it is dealing and the SEP it may be infringing, but has no intention of taking a licence on FRAND terms, it will not be justified to deny the SEP holder an injunction, simply because it had not made a formal notification prior to the commencement of proceedings. [298]

On the merits, the court accepted the High Court’s assessment that the Claimant had not behaved abusively and particularly the finding, that the Defendants, who were in contact with the Claimant prior to the proceedings, had sufficient notice that the Claimant held SEPs which ought to be licensed, if found infringed and essential. [299]

Considering further that the respective conduct requirements were not established at the point in time, in which the infringement action was filed (since the present proceedings were initiated before the CJEU delivered the Huawei judgment), the Court of Appeal noted that it would very likely not be fair to accuse the Claimant of abusive behavior. [300] Insofar the court agreed with the respective approach developed by German courts in co-called “transitional” cases (Pioneer v Acer, [301] St. Lawrence v Vodafone [301] and Sisvel v Haier [302] ) [303] .

  • [233] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, Case-No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, para. 233.
  • [234] Ibid, para. 6 et seqq.
  • [235] Ibid, para. 233.
  • [236] Ibid, para. 7.
  • [237] Ibid, paras. 8 and 137 et seqq.
  • [238] Ibid, para. 8.
  • [239] Ibid, para. 9 et seqq.; para. 31 et seqq.
  • [240] Ibid, para 17.
  • [241] Ibid, para 130.
  • [242] Ibid, para 18.
  • [243] Ibid, para 112.
  • [244] Ibid, para 291.
  • [245] Ibid, paras. 19 and 45 et seqq.
  • [246] Ibid, paras. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [247] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [248] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [249] Ibid, para. 17.
  • [250] Ibid, paras. 74 and 77 et seq.
  • [251] Ibid, para. 82.
  • [252] Ibid, para. 80.
  • [253] Ibid, para. 79 et seq.
  • [254] Ibid, para. 26.
  • [255] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [256] Ibid, para. 54 et seq., para. 59.
  • [257] Ibid, para. 56.
  • [258] Pioneer v Acer, District Court of Mannheim, judgement dated 8 January 2016, Case No. 7 O 96/14.
  • [259] St. Lawrence v Vodafone, District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 31 March 2016, Case No. 4a O 73/14.
  • [260] Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, “Setting out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents”, 29 November 2017, COM(2017) 712 final.
  • [261] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 74.
  • [262] Ibid, para. 111.
  • [263] Ibid, para. 128.
  • [264] Ibid, para. 121.
  • [265] Ibid, para. 125.
  • [266] Ibid, para. 75.
  • [267] Ibid, para. 92
  • [268] Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Official Journal of the EU L 195, 02/06/2004, p. 16)
  • [269] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 94.
  • [270] Ibid, para. 96.
  • [271] Ibid, para. 98.
  • [272] Ibid, para. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [273] Ibid, paras. 207 and 210.
  • [274] Ibid, para. 176.
  • [275] Ibid, para. 173.
  • [276] Ibid, para. 169 et seq.
  • [277] Ibid, paras. 194 et seqq.
  • [278] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [279] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [280] Ibid, para. 199.
  • [281] Ibid, para. 195.
  • [282] Ibid, para. 202.
  • [283] Ibid, para. 196.
  • [284] Ibid, para. 197.
  • [285] Ibid, para. 200.
  • [286] Ibid, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [287] Ibid, para. 212.
  • [288] Ibid, para. 216.
  • [289] Ibid, para. 219.
  • [290] Ibid, para. 220.
  • [291] Ibid, para. 229.
  • [292] Ibid, para. 284.
  • [293] Ibid, para. 269.
  • [294] Ibid, para. 270.
  • [295] Ibid, para. 269 and 282.
  • [296] Ibid, para. 253 and 281.
  • [297] Ibid, para. 271.
  • [298] Ibid, para. 273.
  • [299] Ibid, para. 284
  • [300] Ibid, para. 275
  • [301] See above
  • [302] Sisvel v Haier, Higher District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 30 March 2017, Case No. 15 U 66-15.
  • [303] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 279.

Updated 6 十月 2020

无线星球诉华为 暨 康文森诉华为及中兴通讯

英国法院判决
26 八月 2020 - Case No. [2020] UKSC 37

A. 事实

本案中,英国最高法院(以下称“最高法院”)针对就两个个别独立案件所提出的上诉进行判决。这两个案件均涉及由欧洲电信标准协会(ETSI)所制定的对实施无线电通信技术标准必不可少(或潜在不必可少)的专利(标准必要专利或SEP)的侵权行为。根据欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策的要求,该协会鼓励标准必要专利持有人对其愿依照公平、合理且无歧视(FRAND)的条款与条件向标准实施人提供其所持有的标准必要专利做出承诺。

1. 无线星球诉华为

第一个案件涉及一家拥有一组符合数项无线通信技术标准的标准必要专利组合的公司—— 无线星球国际有限公司(Unwired Planet International Limited,以下称“无线星球”)与另一家中国制造商和供应商——华为集团旗下的两家公司之间,关于使用此项标准的手机设备以及一些其他项目的纠纷。

2014年3月,无线星球于英格兰和威尔士高等法院(以下称“高等法院”)起诉华为、三星以及另一家公司侵害其所持有的五项英国标准必要专利。在这些诉讼进行的过程中,无线星球向华为提出了几项许可要约,然而最终并未能达成协议。另一方面,无线星球在诉讼进行中与三星公司签署了许可协议。

高等法院于2017年4月5日对华为核发了禁令,禁令的期限直到该公司与无线星球签订了法院认为符合FRAND原则的特定条款的全球许可协议为止 [304] 。华为对该决定提起了上诉,在上诉程序确定之前,高等法院中止了对该禁令的执行。

英国上诉法院(以下称“上诉法院”)于2018年10月23日驳回了华为对高等法院判决的上诉 [305] 。随后,华为向英国最高法院(以下称“最高法院”)提出了上诉。

2. 康文森诉华为及中兴通讯 第二起案件涉及一家专利许可公司——康文森无线许可有限公司(Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L.,以下称“康文森”)与华为以及中兴通讯集团(ZTE,以下称“中兴通讯”)旗下的两家公司之间的纠纷。中兴通讯是一家中国公司,生产网络设备、手机和消费电子产品,并销往世界各地。

康文森于2017年向高等法院提起了对华为以及中兴通信的侵权诉讼。除了一些其他的主张外,康文森还向高等法院提出了对其所持有的四项英国专利权侵权行为的禁令救济,同时也要求高等法院就其所持有的标准必要专利组合确定符合FRAND的全球许可条款。华为和中兴通信都对高等法院是否具备审理和裁决此案的管辖权提出异议,于此同时,并在中国提起诉讼,对康文森所持有的中国专利的有效性进行挑战。

高等法院于2018年4月16日确认了其对包括确定该专利组合的全球许可条款在内的,此一系列争议的管辖权限 [306] 。华为和中兴通信对高等法院的判决不服并提起上诉。 2019年1月30日,上诉法院驳回了该上诉,并以该侵权行为侵害英国专利为由,确认了英国法院对包含确定全球许可条款在内的各项纷争的管辖权 [307] 。华为和中兴通信对此判决不服,从而再向最高法院提起上诉。

根据目前的判决 [308] ,最高法院全体一致同意驳回了这两个案件的上诉。

B. 法院的论理

最高法院指出并解决了上诉中提出的如下五个问题:

1. 管辖权

最高法院在其判决中确认,英国法院对跨国标准必要专利组合的全球FRAND许可条款判定事宜有管辖权,因此,如果标准实施人拒绝签订此类许可,则英国法院有权基于其中的英国标准必要专利授予禁令 [309]

法院认为,根据欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策,标准必要专利持有人并未被禁止于各国家法院系统中寻求禁令救济[7]。相反地,透过国家法院授予的禁令来阻止侵权行为的可能性被认为是“知识产权政策寻求平衡下的必要组成部分”,借此并能够确保实施人有动力去进行FRAND许可谈判 [310]

除了有权基于英国专利授与禁令外,英国法院也有权决定涉及全球范围的FRAND许可条款。最高法院认为,欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策所确立的“合同关系”赋予英国法院各自行使管辖权的权利 [311]

在最高法院看来,欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策订定时即“有意使其具备国际效力”,因为此政策的制定即是为了尝试“反映电信行业中的商业惯例” [312] 。在电信行业中,通常的做法是,即便是在不明确知道究竟有多少被许可的专利是有效的或者是侵权的的情况下,仍然以专利组合为单位签署全球范围的许可 [313]

此原因一方面在于,专利持有人无法在其宣告该专利具备(或可能具备)标准必要性之时,就预测到在接下来标准不断发展的过程中,该专利将持续有效或者产生侵权 [313] ;另一方面,实施人在实施标准之时也不会知道其中哪些专利是有效的或者哪些专利是侵权的 [313]

这种“不可避免的不确定性”,是通过以一种“基本上能够反映专利组合中必然含有许多未经验证的专利此一性质“的价格[10]而缔结一次性涵盖全球范围内专利持有人所持有的全部已宣告的标准必要专利组合的许可协议来解决的。借由获取这种许可,实施人购买“实施标准的权利”与“确定性”,确保其有权使用符合该项标准的所有技术 [313]

由于依照商业惯例,FRAND许可必然包括“未经验证”的专利,最高法院认为,确定涵盖全球范围的许可条款和条件并不意味着必须评估其所涵盖的所有专利的有效性。因此,在设定全球范围的专利组合许可条款时,英国法院并不会就外国专利的有效性以及是否侵权这一实际上应由授予该项专利的各国国家法院享有专属管辖权的问题于进行裁决 [314] 。因此,通常来说,实施人“保留在各相关外国法院对这些专利或这些专利的样本提出挑战,并借此要求专利持有人提供一个对许可费率进行调整的机制的权利”将是“公平合理的” [315]

在此范围内,最高法院强调,上述见解并非英国法院独有,而与其他司法管辖区,特别是美国、德国、中国和日本的相关判例所采取的见解一致 [316]

2. 合适的法庭(便利法庭原则)

最高法院审查的第二个问题同样涉及英国法院的管辖权问题。在康文森诉华为一案中,被告抗辩称,在中国法院对康文森所持有的中国专利的有效性做出裁决之前,英国法院本应该拒绝其管辖权,转而选择由中国法院进行管辖,或者至少应该中止该诉讼程序。 然而,最高法院认为,英国法院没有义务拒绝其管辖权转而选择由中国法院进行管辖 [317] 。所谓的“便利法庭原则”在本案中不适用,其原因在于,与英国法院不同的是,由于本案当事人并没有达成协议由中国法院对涵盖全球范围的FRAND专利组合许可条款的决定等相关事项行使管辖权,中国法院于此类争议上没有管辖的权利 [317] 。此外,法院认为,在目前的情况下,可能无法合理预期康文森会同意将管辖权授予中国法院 [317]

在最高法院的眼中,涉及本次争议的英国法院也没有义务为了等待进行中的中国专利有效性诉讼的结果而中止其诉讼程序[15]。其原因在于,此有效性诉讼仅涉及康文森所持有的中国专利的有效性,而在英国提起的这一诉讼所涉及的却是对康文森所持有的全球范围内标准必要专利组合的FRAND许可条款的确定 [318]

3. 无歧视

最高法院审查的第三个问题涉及对FRAND承诺中无歧视义务的解释。在此前的诉讼程序中产生了一个争议点,即无线星球是否会因为其向华为所提供的许可条款比起审判开始后与三星达成协议的条款更为不利而违反了FRAND的无歧视义务。

最高法院对高等法院以及上诉法院就此问题的决定均表示赞同,并指出此一区别不会构成对FRAND的无歧视义务的违反。法院解释到,FRAND并不意味着所谓的“严格无歧视义务”而要求专利持有人向所有条件相似的被许可人提供完全相同或者相似的条款 [319]

根据欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策(第6.1条)的要求,专利持有人必须承诺按照FRAND条款提供许可。在最高法院看来,这是一个“单一且整体性的义务”,而并非三项各自独立的义务,要求许可条款分别应公平、分别应合理、分别应无歧视 [320] 。因此,这些条款和条件“在通常情况下应能够由任何市场参与者以公平的市场价格获得”,并且应能够反映标准必要专利组合的“真实价值”,同时不须根据特定被许可人的个别特征进行调整 [321]

最高法院更进一步地明确表示,在欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策要求下所进行的FRAND承诺并不代表所谓的“最惠许可”条款而表示专利持有人被要求必须以相当于最惠许可条款的许可条件向所有类似情况的被许可人授予许可 [322] 。在仔细查看欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策的创建过程后,法院认为欧洲电信标准协会先前曾明确地表示拒绝将此类条款纳入FRAND承诺的提案 [323]

此外,法院指出,有关差别费率会损害所涉及的私人或公共利益的“一般性推定”并不存在 [324] 。相反地,在某些情况下,标准必要专利持有人选择向特定被许可人提供低于基准费率的许可费这一选择在商业上是合理的 [325] 。举例言之,此种做法适用于所谓的“先行者优势”,法院承认,与第一位被许可人达成费率较低的许可协议具备“经济上的合理性“以及”商业上的重要性“,因为如此一来除了能为标准必要专利创造初始收入,更可以透过许可协议的签署于市场中对专利组合进行“验证”,并促进未来许可协议的达成[22]。此外,对于所谓的“减价销售”而言,情况亦是如此。在这种情况下,专利持有人为了确保其能够在市场上生存而被迫以较低的费率进行许可,而当初在无线星球与三星签署许可协议之时即是属于这种情况 [326]

4. 滥用市场支配地位/华为框架

最高法院审查的第四个问题是,无线星球是否会因为其对华为提起了侵权诉讼,而违反《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条所称的滥用了市场支配地位,并且因此不能主张禁令救济。尤其是,华为曾经提出抗辩指称,由于无线星球并未遵守欧洲联盟法院于华为诉中兴案中所确立的行为义务(华为判决或华为框架),因此其禁令救济主张应予否决 [327] 。 然而,最高法院认为情况并非如此 [328] 。在法院看来,华为判决确立了一项义务,即专利持有人在提出禁令救济诉讼前,必须就标准实施人对涉案标准必要专利的侵权使用行为向其进行通知,而如果标准必要专利持有人违反了此项义务,则将构成《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条下的滥用行为[26]。这项义务的“性质”将取决于每个个案的具体情况来进行个案判断 [329] 。本案中,法院认为,无线星球在提起本侵权诉讼之前已经对华为进行了适当的通知 [330]

有关华为判决所确立的其他各项义务,最高法院赞同了先前高等法院和上诉法院的观点,即认为华为框架并不是“强制性的”,而只是建立了一个“路线图”,如果专利持有人能严格遵循此一路线图行事,则其寻求禁令救济的权利将能够获得保障,而不会产生违反第102条的风险 [331] 。此外,华为判决还提供了“多项能帮助评估许可各方是否有按照FRAND条款达成许可协议的意愿此一核心问题的参考点” [330] 。话虽如此,最高法院认为,无线星球一直以来都有按照FRAND条款对华为进行许可的意愿,因此不能认为其表现出滥用行为 [330]

5. 损害赔偿而非禁令救济?

最高法院审查的第五个(也是最后一个问题)涉及对标准必要专利侵权行为的适当补偿措施。在最高法院的上诉程序中,就无线星球所持有的标准必要专利所遭受侵权损害此一事实而言,最适当且符合比例原则的补偿措施应是判给损害赔偿金而不是核发禁令此一抗辩首次被提出。

最高法院认为,在本案中,以损害赔偿取代禁令救济的做法没有依据 [332] 。无线星球和康文森都不可能利用“申请禁令救济”作为向华为或中兴收取“过高费用”的威胁手段,因为他们只有在提交了其条款可能符合法院认定的FRAND许可要约后,才有权获得强制令 [333]

此外,法院认为,判给损害赔偿金“不太可能能够恰当地替代因不能核发禁令所可能造成的损失”,因为如此一来标准必要专利持有人就必须就每一个个别专利在各个国家逐一对实施人提起专利诉讼,而这被认为是“不切实际的” [334] 。更有甚者,标准实施人将“产生动机持续性地为侵权行为,直到其就逐个专利在逐个国家中被迫支付许可费为止”,而这将使得FRAND许可变得更加困难,正如同最高法院所指出的,对侵权者而言,主动取得许可不具备“经济上意义” [335]

另一方面,禁令救济“可能是更有效的补救方法”,通过对各种侵权行为的全面性禁止,禁令带给侵权人的可能只剩下接受标准必要专利持有人所提供的FRAND许可条款这一“有限的选择”,“如果其希望能继续留在市场当中” [335] 。出于上述原因,最高法院强调,禁令救济是“维持司法公正所必需的” [336]

  • [304] Unwired Planet v Huawei, High Court of Justice for England and Wales, judgment dated 5 April 2017, Case No. [2017] EWHC 711(Pat)。
  • [305] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, judgment dated 23 October 2018, Case No. [2018] EWCA Civ 2344。
  • [306] Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, High Court of Justice for England and Wales, judgment dated 16 April 2018, Case No. [2018] EWHC 808 (Pat)。
  • [307] Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Court of Appeal, judgment dated 30 January 2019, Case No. [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [308] Unwired Planet v Huawei and Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Supreme Court, judgment dated 30 January 2019, Case No. [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [309] 同上注, 段 49 及以下。
  • [310] 同上注, 段 61。
  • [311] 同上注, 段 58。
  • [312] 同上注, 段 62。
  • [313] 同上注, 段 60。
  • [314] 同上注, 段 63。
  • [315] 同上注, 段 64。
  • [316] 同上注, 段 68-84。
  • [317] 同上注, 段 97。
  • [318] 同上注, 段 99 及以下。
  • [319] 同上注, 段 112 及以下。
  • [320] 同上注, 段 113。
  • [321] 同上注, 段 114。
  • [322] 同上注, 段 116。
  • [323] 同上注, 段 116 及以下。
  • [324] 同上注, 段 123。
  • [325] 同上注, 段 125。
  • [326] 同上注, 段 126。
  • [327] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13。
  • [328] Unwired Planet v Huawei and Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Supreme Court, judgment dated 30 January 2019, Case No. [2019] EWCA Civ 38, 段 149 及以下。
  • [329] 同上注, 段 150。
  • [330] 同上注, 段 158。
  • [331] 同上注, 段 157 及 158。
  • [332] 同上注, 段 163。
  • [333] 同上注, 段 164。
  • [334] 同上注, 段 166。
  • [335] 同上注, 段 167。
  • [336] 同上注, 段 169。