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Updated 1 April 2021

InterDigital v Xiaomi, District Court (Landgericht) Munich I

LG Munich
25 February 2021 - Case No. 7 O 14276/20

A. Facts

The claimants are two US-based companies that are part of InterDigital Group (InterDigital). InterDigital Group holds a portfolio of patents declared as (potentially) essential, to various wireless telecommunications standards (standard essential patents, or SEPs) developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The claimants hold German SEPs which are subject to a commitment to be made accessible to standard users on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions, in accordance with the ETSI IPR Policy.

The defendants are four companies belonging to the Xiaomi group that has its headquarters in China (Xiaomi). Xiaomi produces and sells -among other products- smartphones that comply with ETSI standards worldwide.

On 9 June 2020, Xiaomi filed an action against InterDigital before the Intermediate People’s Court in Wuhan, China (Wuhan Court). In its complaint, Xiaomi asked the Wuhan Court to determine specific rates or a range of rates for the licensing of InterDigital’s worldwide 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE SEP portfolio (Chinese main proceedings). On 28 July 2020, Xiaomi, for the first time, informed InterDigital by telephone that it had filed a case in China. However, the Xiaomi representative did not provide any details regarding the filing.

On the 29 July 2020, InterDigital filed an infringement action against Xiaomi before the High Court of Delhi, India (Delhi Court) with a request for injunctive relief (Indian proceedings). In addition, InterDigital requested a preliminary cease-and-desist order against Xiaomi.

On 4 August 2020, Xiaomi, applied for an anti-suit injunction (ASI) before the Wuhan Court.

On 23 September 2020, the Wuhan Court issued its ASI order, ordering InterDigital to withdraw or suspend the actions in the pending Indian proceedings (Wuhan ASI). InterDigital was also ordered to refrain from filing infringement actions on its 3G and 4G SEPs for (1) permanent and/or temporary injunctions or (2) FRAND rate determinations against Xiaomi in any country of the world during the pendency of the Chinese main proceedings. The Wuhan Court ordered a fine amounting to RMB 1,000,000 per day in case of violation of the above order. InterDigital was advised of the issued ASI for the first time when the Wuhan court sent an email to several InterDigital email addresses on 25 September 2020.

On 29 September 2020, InterDigital filed an action for an anti-anti-suit injunction (AASI) before the Delhi Court. On 9 October 2020, the Delhi Court issued an AASI, restraining Xiaomi from enforcing the Wuhan ASI (Delhi AASI).

On 30 October 2020, InterDigital filed a motion for an AASI before the District Court of Munich I (Munich District Court or Court) as well.

On 9 November 2020, the Munich District Court issued an AASI ordering Xiaomi to refrain from pursuing the Wuhan ASI or take further (court and/or administrative) measures against InterDigital, intended to directly or indirectly prevent InterDigital from prosecuting infringement proceedings based on its SEPs in Germany (Munich AASI). Each violation of the Munich AASI order triggers a fine amounting up to EUR 250,000 or detention up to six months.

On 22 December 2020, Xiaomi filed an appeal of the Munich AASI and also requested a stay of the enforcement of this order. On 24 January 2021, the Munich District Court rejected the request for a stay of the enforcement of the AASI.

With the present judgment dated 25 February 2021, the Munich District Court dismissed Xiaomi’s appeal on the merits and confirmed the Munich AASI. [149] (cited by www.gesetze-bayern.de/Content/Document/Y-300-Z-BECKRS-B-2021-N-3995?hl=true)
 

B. Court’s reasoning

The Munich District Court held that InterDigital had a claim for preliminary injunction and that sufficient grounds for issuing an AASI were given. [150]
 

Claim for preliminary injunction

The Court explained that the filing, prosecution and enforcement of an ASI in China with the goal to prevent the assertion of claims for injunctive relief against patent infringement in Germany impairs the ‘property-like legal position’ of the patent holder and constitutes a tortious act (in terms of Section 823 para. 1 of the German Civil Code). [151] The same is true with respect to court orders, which restrain a party from initiating AASI-proceedings in Germany (so-called ‘anti-anti-anti-suit injunctions’, or AAASI). [151]

In the eyes of the Munich District Court, the Wuhan ASI had the aforementioned effect. According to its wording and reasoning, the Wuhan ASI attempted to have a global reach and would also have impacted those InterDigital Group entities holding German SEPs that were involved in the present proceedings. [152] The fact that these companies did not directly face fines or other sanctions imposed by the Wuhan Court, did not change the fact that the Wuhan ASI tried to impair their legal position: These measures threatened other affiliated companies within InterDigital Group and, thus, created a coercive situation in an attempt to limit the freedom of the companies that actually hold German SEPs to act for their protection of their rights. [152]

In addition, the Court expressed the view that InterDigital was in a position to invoke the right for self-defence against the Wuhan ASI. [151] Section 227 of the German Civil Code provides that any action, which is necessary for averting a present illicit attack, is not unlawful.

 

Grounds for preliminary injunction

Furthermore, the Munich District Court found that there was sufficient justification for ordering interim measures. [153]

First, it could not be requested from InterDigital to defend itself against the Wuhan ASI in regular (main) court proceedings. [154] Given that injunctions are available only for the limited lifetime of a patent, regular proceedings against an ASI would not sufficiently protect patent holders’ rights; the latter would be, effectively, deprived of the right to injunctive relief for a considerable period of time, at least until the enforcement of the first instance decision of the German court. [155] This limitation would occur irrespective of the fact that a foreign ASI violates public order (ordre public) and, thus, does not have any legal effect in Germany. [154] The Court repeated that sanctions imposed or threatened in foreign jurisdictions can place the patent holder under pressure and stand in the way of effective patent enforcement in Germany. [154] This applies equally, when a foreign court has granted an AAASI, preventing a party to seek for protective measures in the form of a AASI in Germany, as was the case with the order of the Wuhan Court. [156]

Second, the Munich District Court held that the urgency required for interim measures was given. [157] Inter-digital had filed the request for an AASI in a timely fashion. [158] As a rule, Munich courts require that requests for preliminary injunctions concerning patents must be filed within a deadline of one-month of knowledge of the act. [159] The Munich District Court suggested that this deadline, basically, also applies to AASIs (refraining, however, from a final assessment of this question). [160]

In case that an AASI is directed against an ASI already granted by a foreign court (risk of repetition), the respective request should be filed within a month after the patent holder obtained ‘secure knowledge’ of the foreign court order, irrespective of whether formal service took place or not. [161] For assuming ‘secure knowledge’, it can be required that the patent holder gets access to the ASI request as well as the evidence used in the foreign proceedings, especially when the court order itself does not contain clear information about the parties, the content and the legal grounds of the order. [162]

If a request for an AASI is filed before a foreign ASI has been issued, that is when only a ‘risk of first infringement’ of a violation of SEP holder’s ‘property-like’ rights exists, the one-month deadline begins at the moment in time, in which the patent holder gains ‘secure knowledge’ of the filing of an ASI request before the foreign court or of the existing risk of such measures, which is especially materialized, when the implementer threatens with respective action. [163] In this context, the Court clarified that filing early countermeasures before a grant of an ASI is only an option; patent holders are, basically, free to wait for the outcome of foreign ASI proceedings, before filing a request for an AASI. [163]

Having said that, the Munich District Court outlined that it will, as a rule, assume that a required risk of a first infringement’, which could result in an AASI, is present, if the one of the following circumstances occur:

  • The implementer has threatened to file a request for an ASI;
  • The implementer has filed a request for an ASI;
  • The implementer has filed a (regular) action for the grant of a licence or the determination of reason-able global licensing rates in a jurisdiction, in which ASIs can, in principle, be granted;
  • The implementer has already threatened an ASI or filed a respective request against other patent holders and the party filing an AASI in Germany has no indication that the implementer will refrain from such actions against it in the future;
  • The implementer failed to declare in text form within a short deadline set by the patent holder (e.g. with the first notification of infringement) that it will not file a request for an ASI. [164]
ASI and implementer’s willingness to obtain a licence

The Munich District Court further made clear that an implementer who threatens an ASI or files a respective request, can, as a rule, not be treated as a ‘willing licensee’ within the meaning of the Huawei v ZTE ruling (Huawei v ZTE) [165] of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the recent case-law of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) in the Sisvel v Haier [166] cases. [167] According to the Court, an implementer truly willing to obtain a FRAND-licence would regularly refrain from actions impairing SEP holder’s ‘property-like’ rights even further than the past and ongoing acts of patent infringement (such as the filing of a request for an ASI). [168]

Looking particularly at the negotiation framework established in Huawei v ZTE, the Munich District Court noted that balanced negotiations on an equal footing -as envisioned by the CJEU- can only be ensured if the parties have equal access to legal remedies: The implementer’s ability to attack patent validity should be counterbalanced by the patent holder’s ability to assert its patent rights before court. [169] This is no longer the case when the judicial assertion of claims against patent infringement is precluded based on an ASI. [169] In this context, the Court noted that an ASI directly violates the SEP holders’ right to have access to courts which is established in both European law (Article 47 para. 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and German constitutional law. [169]

Furthermore, the Munich District Court expressed the view that an implementer who has been notified about the infringement of SEPs can be required not only to adequately demonstrate willingness to obtain a FRAND-licence, but also to declare that it will not file a request for an ASI against the patent holder. [168] The Court explained that, otherwise, the negotiation process set forth by Huawei v ZTE could not be followed. [170] In particular, the SEP holder could no longer be obliged to notify the implementer about the infringement before filing a court action. [170] By making a notification of infringement, the patent holder exposes itself to an ASI. If an ASI is granted, then the patent holder will in many cases be de facto prevented from exercising its right to injunctive relief even towards implementers unwilling to take a licence. [171] According to the Court, this result conflicts with the so-called EU IPR Enforcement-Directive (Articles 9-11) [172] as well as the case law of the CJEU. [173]

The Court also added that SEP holders cannot be expected to pre-emptively prepare countermeasures against potential future ASIs [168] . Even when SEP holders seek global portfolio licences, preparing the filing of AASIs in many different jurisdictions would lead to disproportionate high costs at a point in time, in which neither the risk nor the impact of an ASI could be reliably assessed. [168]
 

Balance of interests

After weighing the interests of the parties against each other, the Munich District Court held that an AASI was justified. [174]

On the one hand, the Court recognized that InterDigital had an interest to be granted the requested AASI. Although the Wuhan ASI violated public order and could not be enforced in Germany, InterDigital had an interest to limit the reach of the Chinese order as far as German SEPs are concerned; otherwise, the threat of sanctions that could be imposed in China would de facto prevent InterDigital from enforcing its patent rights in Germany for an unforeseeable period of time. [175]

On the other hand, the Court highlighted that a German AASI would not impair the rights of Xiaomi. [176] The AASI would only oblige Xiaomi to withdraw the Wuhan ASI and, therefore, have no impact on the Chinese main proceedings. [176] The Chinese main proceedings would also not be impaired, in case that InterDigital filed infringement proceedings against Xiaomi in Germany, following the grant of an AASI. The Munich District Court expects that German infringement proceedings would not revolve around the same question raised in the Chinese proceedings, that is the determination of the global rate for InterDigital’s SEP portfolio. [176] On the contrary, German infringement courts would probably not examine the amount of an adequate global licensing rate, because it is very unlikely that they would examine a FRAND defence raised by Xiaomi on the merits. [176] The Court reasoned that the very act of requesting an ASI, or threatening to do so, is evidence that the implementer is an unwilling licensee, such that a FRAND defence raised by Xiaomi in German infringement proceedings would hardly have any prospects of success. [176]

In addition, the Court took the view that Xiaomi’s interest to avoid infringement trials in Germany during the pendency of the Chinese main proceedings was not worthy of protection. [177] Xiaomi did neither constantly monitor the IPR landscape, as it is obliged to, nor obtain necessary licences before starting production. [177] What is more, Xiaomi refused to do so for more than seven years, such that InterDigital can no longer be expected to further wait to assert its rights. [177]

 

C. Other issues

The Munich District Court also confirmed that InterDigital had a legitimate interest in legal remedies. [178] Under German law, this is a prerequisite for any court action and is, basically, given, when the claims asserted by the claimant have not been fulfilled by the defendant yet. [179] The fact that InterDigital could defend itself against the ASI also in so-called ‘reconsideration proceedings’ before Chinese courts did not remove InterDigital’s legitimate interest that its case is heard by German courts. [180] The Court held that such proceedings could not sufficiently protect InterDigital’s ‘property-like’ rights in Germany, especially since a reliable assessment of the prospects of success of such legal remedy is very challenging. [180]

Furthermore, the Court confirmed that the pendency of the Chinese and Indian proceedings did not prevent German courts from hearing the case in question (no lis pendens). [181]

Finally, the Court also found that the Munich AASI had been served to Xiaomi within the relevant deadline, which under German law is a prerequisite for such orders to remain in force. [182]

  • [149] InterDigital v Xiaomi, District Court (Landgericht) Munich I, judgment dated 25 February 2021, Case-No. 7 O 14276/20.
  • [150] Ibid, para. 75.
  • [151] Ibid, para. 120.
  • [152] Ibid, para. 121.
  • [153] Ibid, para. 129.
  • [154] Ibid, para. 130.
  • [155] Ibid, para. 130. The Munich District Court highlighted that the right to injunctive relief is the ‘essential feature’ of exclusionary rights, such as patent rights, and the ‘sharpest weapon’ against infringement. Patents would be ‘worthless’, if the patent holder would be denied the possibility to enforce its rights by way of court proceedings.
  • [156] Ibid, para. 131.
  • [157] Ibid, para. 132.
  • [158] Ibid, para. 132 as well as paras. 151 et seqq.
  • [159] Ibid, para. 133.
  • [160] Ibid, paras. 134-135.
  • [161] Ibid, para. 134.
  • [162] Ibid. para. 136.
  • [163] Ibid, para. 138.
  • [164] Ibid, para. 142.
  • [165] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [166] Sisvel v Haier I, Bundesgerichtshof, judgment dated 5 May 2020, Case No. KZR 36/17 and Sisvel v Haier II, Bundesgerichtshof, judgment dated 24 November 2020, Case No. KZR 35/17.
  • [167] InterDigital v Xiaomi, District Court (Landgericht) Munich I, judgment dated 25 February 2021, Case-No. 7 O 14276/20, para. 146.
  • [168] Ibid, para. 146.
  • [169] Ibid. para. 148.
  • [170] Ibid, para. 147.
  • [171] Ibid, para. 149.
  • [172] Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (OJ L 157, 30.4.2004).
  • [173] InterDigital v Xiaomi, District Court (Landgericht) Munich I, judgment dated 25 February 2021, Case-No. 7 O 14276/20, para. 149.
  • [174] Ibid, para. 168.
  • [175] Ibid, para. 169.
  • [176] Ibid, para. 170.
  • [177] Ibid, para. 173.
  • [178] Ibid, para. 75.
  • [179] Ibid, para. 107.
  • [180] Ibid, para. 108.
  • [181] Ibid, paras. 75 and 109.
  • [182] Ibid, para. 75 and paras. 80-106.

Updated 7 April 2021

Sisvel v Wiko

OLG Karlsruhe
9 December 2020 - Case No. 6 U 103/19

A. Facts

The claimant, Sisvel, holds patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of the UMTS and LTE wireless telecommunications standards, which are subject to a commitment to be made accessible to users on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions (standard-essential patents or SEPs). Sisvel also administrates a patent pool, comprising patents of several SEP holders, including Sisvel's own SEPs (patent pool).

The defendants are two companies that are part of the Wiko group (Wiko). [250] Wiko sells mobile phones complying with the LTE standard - among other markets- in Germany.

In June 2015, the patent pool informed Wiko for the first time about the need to obtain a licence. On 1 June 2016, Sisvel (as the patent pool's administrator) offered Wiko a portfolio licence, which also covered the patent in suit. Agreement was, however, not reached.

On 22 June 2016, Sisvel brought an action against Wiko before the District Court (Landgericht) of Mannheim in Germany (District Court) based on one patent reading on the LTE standard (infringement proceedings). Sisvel requested a declaratory judgment confirming Wiko's liability for damages on the merits, as well as information and rendering of accounts.

On 23 June 2016, Sisvel made an offer for a bilateral licence limited to its own SEP portfolio to the German subsidiary of Wiko. This offer was not accepted. Moreover, Wiko filed a nullity action against the SEP in suit before the German Federal Patent Court (nullity proceedings).

In October 2016, Sisvel extended the lawsuit. Claims for injunctive relief as well as the recall and destruction of infringing products were added to the other claims initially asserted.

On 11 November 2016, Wiko made a counteroffer to Sisvel. Some days prior to the oral hearing in the infringement proceedings, Wiko informed the Court that it had provided information to Sisvel and had also deposited a security amount for past uses.

On 8 November 2017, Sisvel made a new offer to Wiko with reduced royalty rates. Wiko did not immediately react to this offer.

On 22 December 2017, Sisvel asked the District Court to order a stay of the infringement proceedings, until the decision of the Federal Patent Court in the parallel nullity proceedings. Wiko agreed with Sisvel's motion. On 30 January 2018, the infringement proceedings were stayed.

On 9 February 2018, Sisvel sent a reminder to Wiko regarding the offer made on 8 November 2017. Wiko responded on 16 February 2018, requesting further claim charts and more time to examine the patents covered by the offer.

On 26 June 2018, during the stay of the infringement proceedings, Sisvel made another licensing offer to Wiko based on a new restructured licensing program (2018 offer). Along with the 2018 offer, Sisvel provided Wiko with claim charts regarding 20 selected patents and a list of existing licensees of both its new licensing program and two pre-existing programs. The list contained the date of the conclusion of each agreement as well as the agreed licence fees. The names of the licensees were, however, redacted.

Wiko did not react to the 2018 offer for more than three months. On 15 October 2018, following a respective reminder sent by Sisvel on 14 September 2018, Wiko replied, without, however, commenting the 2018 offer; it just referred back to its counteroffer dated 11 November 2016. Wiko also criticized the fact that Sisvel did not disclose the names of the existing licensees so far.

In response to that claim, Sisvel shared a draft Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) with Wiko on 22 October 2018, based on which it would be willing to disclose the names of the existing licensees. Wiko refused to sign the NDA proposed by Sisvel.

In October 2018, the Federal Patent Court upheld the SEP in suit in part. Subsequently, the District Court moved on with the infringement proceedings. After the end of the oral hearings in July 2019, Wiko made a new counteroffer to Sisvel and provided the latter with additional information. However, Wiko did not increase the amount of security deposited after its first counteroffer dated 11 November 2016.

In the beginning of September 2019, Sisvel set up an electronic data room containing redacted versions of Sisvel's existing licensing agreements with third parties and granted Wiko respective access rights. Wiko did not make use of this data room at any point in time.

On 4 September 2019, the District Court granted an injunction against Wiko and ordered the removal and destruction of infringing products from the market. It also confirmed Wiko's liability for damages on the merits and ordered Wiko to provide Sisvel with information required for the calculation of damages. Wiko appealed the decision of the District Court.

Shortly after the District Court rendered its decision, the term of the patent-in-suit expired. Sisvel, however, enforced the injunction granted by the District Court.

With the present judgment [251] (cited by http://lrbw.juris.de/cgi-bin/laender_rechtsprechung/list.py?Gericht=bw&GerichtAuswahl=Oberlandesgerichte&Art=en&sid=2b226ea73cc9637362d8e1af04a34d05), the Higher District Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Karlsruhe (Court) predominantly upheld the judgment of the District Court [252] .
 

B. Court's reasoning

The Court found that Wiko could not successfully raise a so-called 'FRAND-defence' based on an alleged abuse of market dominance (Article 102 TFEU) against the claims for injunctive relief and the recall and destruction of infringing products asserted by Sisvel. [253]

This question was still decisive in the present case, despite the fact that the patent-in-suit expired before the start of the appeal proceedings. The Court explained that the expiration of a patent affects only future acts of use (which, then, no longer constitute infringement): On the contrary, claims that had arisen prior to expiration based on acts of use during the lifetime of the patent are not impaired. [254] Whether claims were given before the expiration of the patent-in-suit is of particular importance, especially when the patent holder has enforced a (first-instance) judgment delivered in proceedings conducted within the term of protection of the patent, as it was the case here. [255]
 

Dominant market position

Having said that, the Court agreed with the finding of the District Court that Sisvel had a market dominant position in terms of Article 102 TFEU with respect to the patent-in-suit in the relevant time period prior to its expiration. [256]

The Court followed the District Court also insofar, as it confirmed that, by filing an infringement action, Sisvel had not abused its market dominance.
 

Notification of infringement

In the eyes of the Court, Sisvel had sufficiently notified Wiko about the infringement of the patent-in-suit prior to filing a court action. [257] The purpose of the notification of infringement is to draw the implementer's attention to the infringement and the necessity of taking a license on FRAND terms and conditions. [258] In terms of content, the notification must identify the patent infringed, the form of infringement and also designate the infringing embodiments. [258] Detailed technical or legal analysis of the infringement allegation is not required. [258] The production of so-called 'claim charts', which is common in practice, will, as a rule, suffice, but is not mandatory. [258] If the patent holder offers a portfolio licence, respective extended information duties occur. [258]

In the present case, it was not disputed that Sisvel had notified Wiko about the patent-in-suit prior to litigation. [259] As far as Wiko complained that no claim charts were presented before trial, the Court reiterated that no respective obligation of Sisvel existed. [260] What is more, the Court held that the court action initially filed by Sisvel, which did not include claims for injunctive relief and the recall and destruction of infringing products, could also be seen as an adequate notification of infringement. [259]
 

Willingness to obtain a licence

The Court then found that Wiko behaved as an unwilling (potential) licensee both prior and during the infringement proceedings [261] . The Court agreed with the assessment of the District Court that Wiko delayed the licensing negotiations between the parties with the goal to avoid taking a licence for as long as possible, in order to gain economic benefits. [262]

According to the Court, the 'expression of a general willingness to license' is not sufficient for assuming that an implementer is a 'willing licensee'. [263] Moreover, the implementer must 'clearly and unambiguously' declare willingness to conclude a license agreement on FRAND terms, 'whatever FRAND terms may actually look like" [263] . The respective declaration must be 'serious and unconditional'. [263]

The Court highlighted that for the assessment of willingness the overall facts and the particular conduct of the implementer shall be taken into account. [263] Willingness is not 'static': the finding that an implementer was willing (or unwilling) at a certain moment in time does not remain unchanged henceforth. [263]

The implementer must always be willing to obtain a licence and participate in negotiations in a 'target-oriented manner'; since implementers might be inclined to delay negotiations until the expiration of the patent-in-suit, there is a need to make sure that their behaviour in negotiations will not lead to delays. [264] Moreover, it should be expected that a willing implementer would seek a license as soon as possible, in order to shorten the period, in which it makes use of the patent-in-suit or the SEP holder's portfolio without authorisation and without paying licensing fees. [265] Accordingly, a willing licensee would not consider the 'negotiation obligations' of the SEP holder primarily as a means to defend itself against a court action, but as a means to utilize in order to reach a FRAND agreement, if needed. [265]

In the view of the Court, the above requirements are in line with the Huawei v ZTE judgment (Huawei judgment or Huawei) [266] of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). [267] In Huawei, CJEU focused on the will of the infringer to conclude a license agreement on FRAND terms and emphasized that the latter must not pursue 'delaying tactics'. The Court explained that, although in Huawei the requirement to refrain from 'delaying tactics' is expressly mentioned only with respect to the duty of the implementer to react to a licensing offer of the SEP holder, it applies 'at all times' as long as the implementer uses the patents without a licence; otherwise, the suspension of SEP holder's right to the injunctive relief cannot be justified. [268]

In this context, the Court pointed out that not every 'reluctant involvement' of the implementer in licensing discussions will necessarily allow for the assumption of unwillingness. [269] Such behaviour could be justified in individual cases, especially when the SEP holder does not act in a 'target-oriented' manner itself. [269] Nevertheless, implementers must, as a rule, react timely even to a belated action of the SEP holder. [269] Furthermore, implementers must, in principle, inform the SEP holder of any objections at an early stage and should not wait to raise those much later in court proceedings. [269]

Looking at Wiko's conduct, the Court criticized especially the fact that it became active mostly as a reaction to new developments in the pending infringement proceedings. [270] A willing implementer would have, however, sought a licence independently of the initiation of legal steps and independently of the course of litigation. [271] As an example, the Court highlighted the fact that Wiko's counteroffer dated 11 November 2016 was made only shortly after Sisvel extended the infringement suit by adding a claim for injunctive relief. [272] Wiko also provided information on past acts of infringement only a few days prior to the first oral hearing in February 2017 (and refrained from constantly updating this information afterwards, as it would be expected by a willing licensee). [273]

The Court identified also further facts that indicate that Wiko engaged in delaying tactics. [274] Wiko reacted to Sisvel's licensing offers made during the course of the proceedings always belatedly and only after a reminder by Sisvel (for instance, it took Wiko more than three months to react to the 2018 offer) [275] . It also demanded further claim charts in February 2018, years after the action was filed. [276]

Wiko's refusal to sign the NDA offered by Sisvel -despite multiple reminders of the latter- without providing any reasons was also considered as a sign of unwillingness. [277] According to the Court, it should be expected by a willing licensee, who is not interested in delaying negotiations, to swiftly raise any criticisms regarding an NDA proposed by the SEP holder in writing or by e-mail, and not wait to raise any concerns several months later in the infringement proceedings, as Wiko had done here. [278] The Court also considered the fact that Wiko did not access the electronic data room set up by Sisvel containing redacted versions of Sisvel's third party agreements as an additional indication of unwillingness. [279]

Furthermore, the Court clarified that -contrary to Wiko's view- school holidays and/or staff shortages cannot provide sufficient justification for delays in negotiations. [280] Even if such circumstances occur, a willing implementer would have communicated any obstacles immediately. [280] Wiko failed to do so.
 

SEP holder's offer

Since Wiko was found to have been an unwilling licensee, the Court explained that the question whether Sisvel fulfilled its duty to make and adequately elaborate a FRAND licensing offer, was no longer decisive. [281] In fact, no such duty had arisen in the present case, due to Wiko's unwillingness to obtain a licence. [281] Notwithstanding the above, the Court provided guidance on the content and extend of the respective obligation of the SEP holder.

The Court first explained that FRAND is a 'range', which leaves room for flexibility. [282] As a rule, FRAND is determined in bilateral good faith negotiations between SEP holders and implementers, taking into account the specific circumstances of each individual case [282] ; indeed, parties are best situated to determine the exact content of FRAND in a specific setting. [282]

In order to meet its obligation, an SEP holder must present an offer to a willing licensee, which 'in general' complies with FRAND requirements and is fair, reasonable and not discriminatory with respect to the 'average licensee'. [283] The SEP holder shall further explain its offer in a way that permits the licensee to understand the assumptions, on which the offered rate and further conditions are based. [284] The rationale behind this obligation is to create a sufficient basis of information for the implementer for assessing the offer and eventually formulating a counteroffer. [285]

In this context, the Court made clear that implementers should not expect that the SEP holder individually adapts its (first) offer to the specific circumstances of each particular case. [286] The SEP holder's FRAND commitment does not give rise to such obligation. [286] The (first) offer is intended to launch the negotiations and provide an adequate information basis to the implementer, who will then be in a position to suggest necessary amendments by means of a counteroffer. [286] Accordingly, it will regularly be acceptable that the SEP holder's offer is 'not clearly and evidently' non-FRAND and sufficient information was provided to the implementer. [287]

The Court dismissed the notion that the implementer is obliged to negotiate (and eventually) make a counteroffer, only when the SEP holder's offer was fully FRAND-compliant. [287] This would bring the negotiations to a stand-still and, therefore, conflict with the spirit of the Huawei judgment, which is to encourage the parties to reach agreement on the licensing terms. [288] Moreover, the Court explained that –irrespective of whether the offer triggers an obligation of the implementer to submit a counter-offer– the latter will be regularly required, at least, to analyse the SEP holder's offer in due course and express any objections and queries without delay. [289]

Against this background, the Court found that none of the offers made to Wiko during the infringement proceedings was 'clearly and evidently' non-FRAND. [290] The fact that the offers did not define the start of the contract or the amount of royalties payable for past uses was not considered problematic. [291] The Court also found that the royalty rates offered were not 'evidently non-FRAND', since they were sufficiently substantiated by reference to existing licensing agreements and calculated on basis of a 'top-down' method. [292] A need to calculate royalties on grounds of the costs that incurred for the creation of the patented invention (cost-based approach) was not given, since this factor was not relevant for establishing value. [293]

In addition, the Court did not raise any concerns against the fact that Sisvel's offer concerned a worldwide portfolio licence: On the one hand, agreements with such scope are common in the telecommunications industry. [294] On the other hand, Wiko had worldwide activities, so that a licence with a limited scope would not provide sufficient coverage. [294]

The fact that some of the patents included in Sisvel's portfolio were -allegedly- not standard-essential did not render the offers 'un-FRAND'. [295] The Court stressed that, for the purpose of licensing negotiations and the conclusion of a licence, it is not necessary to conclusively clarify whether each portfolio patent is standard-essential. [296] Implementers can reserve the right to challenge the validity and essentiality of affected patents even after the conclusion of a licensing agreement. [296]

Similarly, the Court had no objections against a clause placing the burden of proof with regard to the exhaustion of licenced patents on Wiko. [297] This rule corresponds with the common allocation of the burden of proof under German law and does not place unreasonable weight on the licensee, since it will be better situated to trace the licensing chain by engaging with its suppliers. [298]

The question whether an adjustment clause is necessary for an offer to be considered FRAND was left unanswered by the Court. [299] Such clause would allow the implementer to adapt the agreed royalties, in case that patents fall out of the scope of the licence (e.g. due to expiration or invalidation). The Court saw no need for a respective contractual provision, since the licences offered by Sisvel would expire and, therefore, be re-negotiated after five years. [299] The Court did not express any concerns against the term of the offered licence or the termination clauses contained therein, either. [300]

Furthermore, the Court made clear that Sisvel had adequately elaborated the licensing rates offered to Wiko. [301] In the infringement proceedings, Sisvel responded to the 'top-down' calculation of Wiko in detail and made relevant clarifications. [302] According to the Court, Sisvel was under no circumstances obliged to elaborate on a cost-based calculation of royalties, as requested by Wiko; such demand was considered just another means to delay negotiations. [303]
 

Implementers' counteroffer

The Court also found that the counteroffers made by Wiko during the course of the first instance infringement proceedings were not FRAND. [304]

The Court highlighted that the obligation of the implementer to submit a FRAND counteroffer to the SEP holder is already triggered, when the previous licensing offer of the latter is not 'clearly and evidently' non-FRAND and sufficient information was provided, enabling the implementer to formulate its counteroffer. [305]

Having said that, the Court took the view that the royalty rates which Wiko offered were very low and, thus, not FRAND-compliant. [306] The Court criticized especially the fact that the rates were significantly lower than the rates which were considered to be adequate in previous court decisions. [307] Notwithstanding the above, the Court explained that, even if Wiko's counteroffer had been FRAND, this would not change the conclusion that Wiko had acted as an unwilling licensee. [308] According to the Court, a willing licensee would not have submitted a counteroffer around one year after receipt of the SEP holder's offer, as Wiko did. [309]
 

C. Other important issues

The Court stressed that for generating pressure-free licensing negotiations during pending infringement proceedings, it will, as a rule, be sufficient, if the proceedings are stayed with a view to parallel nullity proceedings concerning the patent-in-suit. [310] This is particularly true, when the SEP holder takes the respective initiative, as it was the case here. [310] Nevertheless, even if a pressure-free negotiation situation is not given, the infringers is not released from the obligation to act in good faith and engage in licensing negotiations, for instance by analysing a licensing offer of the SEP holder. [310] The refusal of the infringer to act accordingly could, in the eyes of the Court, allow the conclusion that it is an unwilling licensee. [310]

Apart from that, the Court confirmed that Wiko had no legal ground for requesting full disclosure of Sisvel's third party agreements [311] . Even if one would recognize a duty of the SEP holder to share information about the core content of existing licensing agreements (that are still in force), it is questionable whether this duty would also extend to agreements signed by previous patent holders. [312] The Court expressed particular doubts that this applies in cases in which a portfolio was assembled from patents acquired from different patent holders, since the relevance of bilateral or pool licensing agreements of the former patent holder can be limited in this case. [313]

Furthermore, the Court expressed the view that under German law a so-called 'covenant not to sue' does not have the effect of a (royalty-free) licence: such agreements will, as a rule, have only a procedural effect in terms of a pactum de non petendo, excluding only the initiation of court proceedings. [314]

Finally, the Court denied Wiko's motion to order a stay in the appeal proceedings due to the recent referral of several questions regarding the interpretation of the Huawei framework to the CJEU by the District Court of Düsseldorf in the matter Nokia v Daimler [315] . [316] According to the Court, it appears unlikely that the CJEU will establish criteria, by which SEP-based court actions against implementers engaging in delaying tactics would amount to an abuse of market dominance. [317]
 

  • [250] The action was extended to a third defendant, an individual person, who had served as a managing director for both aforementioned companies.
  • [251] Sisvel v Wiko, Higher Regional Court Karlsruhe, judgment dated 9 December 2020, Case-No. 6 U 103/19
  • [252] The claims for injunctive relief, rendering of accounts and damages asserted against the former managing director of the two Wiko companies were limited to the period of time until the end of its tenure; ibid, paras. 265-288.
  • [253] Ibid, para. 289.
  • [254] Ibid, paras. 284 et seqq.
  • [255] Ibid, para. 287.
  • [256] Ibid, paras. 290 et seq. Insofar, the Court made clear that a market dominant position ceases to exist after the expiration of the relevant patent.
  • [257] Ibid, paras. 292 et seqq.
  • [258] Ibid, para. 293.
  • [259] Ibid, para. 297.
  • [260] Ibid, paras. 297 et seq.
  • [261] Ibid, para. 299.
  • [262] Ibid, para. 299 and paras. 320 et seqq.
  • [263] Ibid, para. 301.
  • [264] Ibid, para. 302.
  • [265] Ibid, para. 303.
  • [266] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case-No. C-170/13.
  • [267] Sisvel v Wiko, Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, judgment dated 9 December 2020, para. 304.
  • [268] Ibid, para. 304.
  • [269] Ibid, para. 305.
  • [270] Ibid, paras. 321 et seqq.
  • [271] Ibid, para. 321.
  • [272] Ibid, para. 322.
  • [273] Ibid, paras. 323 et seq.
  • [274] In addition, the Court found that Wiko’s lack of willingness to obtain a license is also manifested in the fact that it (i) attempted to impede the enforcement of the first instance ruling of the District Court by questionable means (para. 335) and (ii) did not accept the offer of the District Court of The Hague, in which proceedings between the parties were pending in parallel, to engage in settlement negotiations (para. 336).
  • [275] Ibid, paras. 325, 328 and 331.
  • [276] Ibid, para. 327.
  • [277] Ibid, paras. 333 et seqq.
  • [278] Ibid, paras. 334 and 338.
  • [279] Ibid, paras. 337 and 341 et seqq.
  • [280] Ibid, para. 330.
  • [281] Ibid, para. 342.
  • [282] Ibid, para. 307.
  • [283] Ibid, para. 308.
  • [284] Ibid, paras. 308 and 310.
  • [285] Ibid, para. 309.
  • [286] Ibid, para. 310.
  • [287] Ibid, paras. 311 et seqq.
  • [288] Ibid, paras. 311 and 313 et seqq.
  • [289] Ibid, paras. 316 et seqq.
  • [290] Ibid, para. 352.
  • [291] Ibid, para. 353.
  • [292] Ibid, paras. 354 et seqq.
  • [293] Ibid, para. 358.
  • [294] Ibid, para. 359.
  • [295] Ibid, para. 360.
  • [296] Ibid, para. 361.
  • [297] Ibid, para. 362.
  • [298] Ibid, para. 363.
  • [299] Ibid, paras. 365 et seqq.
  • [300] Ibid, paras. 367 et seqq.
  • [301] Ibid, para. 366.
  • [302] Ibid, para. 344.
  • [303] Ibid, para. 346.
  • [304] Ibid, paras. 379 et seqq.
  • [305] Ibid, para. 311.
  • [306] Ibid, paras. 379 et seqq.
  • [307] Ibid, para. 380.
  • [308] Ibid, para. 378.
  • [309] Ibid, para. 384.
  • [310] Ibid, para. 348.
  • [311] Ibid, para. 389.
  • [312] Ibid, paras. 389 et seq.
  • [313] Ibid, para. 391.
  • [314] Ibid, paras. 260 et seqq.
  • [315] Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Düsseldorf, order dated 26 November 2020, Case No. 4c O 17/19.
  • [316] Sisvel v Wiko, Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, judgment dated 9 December 2020, para. 395.
  • [317] Ibid, para. 395.