Unwired Planet v Huawei & Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Supreme Court

26 August 2020 - Case No. [2020] UKSC 37

http://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/english-court-decisions/uk-supreme-court/unwired-planet-v-huawei-conversant-v-huawei-and-zte-uk-supre

A. Facts

The present judgment of the UK Supreme Court (Supreme Court) addresses appeals resulting from two separate cases, both of which concern the infringement of patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of wireless telecommunications standards (Standard Essential Patents or SEPs) developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Under the Intellectual Property Rights Policy of ETSI (ETSI IPR Policy), patent holders are encouraged to commit that their SEPs will be made accessible to standards users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.

Unwired Planet v Huawei

The first case involves a dispute between Unwired Planet International Limited (Unwired Planet), a company holding a portfolio of SEPs reading on several wireless telecommunications standards, and two companies of the Huawei group (Huawei), a Chinese manufacturer and vendor of -among other things- standard compliant mobile phones.

In March 2014, Unwired Planet sued Huawei as well as Samsung and a third company for infringement of five of its UK SEPs before the High Court of Justice for England and Wales (High Court). During the course of these proceedings, Unwired Planet made several licensing offers to Huawei, which, however, did not lead to the conclusion of an agreement. On the other hand, Unwired Planet signed a licence with Samsung.

On 5 April 2017, the High Court granted an injunction against Huawei, until such time as it entered into a worldwide licensing agreement with Unwired Planet on the specific terms, which the court determined to be FRAND [1] . Huawei appealed this decision. Pending appeal, the High Court stayed the enforcement of the injunction.

On 23 October 2018, the UK Court of Appeal (Court of Appeal) dismissed Huawei's appeal against the decision of the High Court [2] . Subsequently, Huawei appealed before the Supreme Court for the United Kingdom (Supreme Court or Court).

Conversant v Huawei and ZTE

The second case revolves around a dispute between the licensing company Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (Conversant), on the one hand, and Huawei as well as two companies of the ZTE group (ZTE), on the other hand. ZTE is a China-based group of companies manufacturing network equipment, mobile phones, and consumer electronics sold worldwide.

In 2017, Conversant brought an infringement action against Huawei and ZTE before the High Court. Conversant requested -among other claims- injunctive relief for the infringement of four of its UK patents and also asked the High Court to determine the terms of a global FRAND licence for its SEP portfolio. Both Huawei and ZTE contested the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear and decide the case and initiated proceedings in China challenging the validity of Conversant's Chinese patents.

On 16 April 2018, the High Court confirmed its jurisdiction over the dispute, including its competence to determine the terms for a global portfolio licence [3] . Huawei and ZTE appealed the decision of the High Court.

On 30 January 2019, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the jurisdiction of UK courts to determine FRAND terms for a global licence on the basis of infringement of UK patents [4] . Huawei and ZTE appealed before the Supreme Court.

With the present judgment [5] , the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeals in both cases.

B. Court's reasoning

The Supreme Court identified and addressed the following five issues raised by the appeals:

1. Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court confirmed that UK courts have jurisdiction to determine the terms of a global FRAND licence for a multinational SEP portfolio and, accordingly, grant an injunction based on UK SEPs, in case a standards implementer refuses to enter into such licence [6] .

The Court held that under the ETSI IPR Policy SEP holders are not prohibited from seeking an injunction by national courts [7] . On the contrary, the possibility to stop infringement by means of an injunction granted by a national court was considered to be 'a necessary component of the balance which the IPR Policy seeks to strike', by ensuring that implementers are incentivised to negotiate a FRAND licence [7] .

Apart from granting an injunction based on UK patents, English courts can also set the terms of a global FRAND licence. In the view of the Supreme Court, the 'contractual arrangement' established by the ETSI IPR Policy gives UK courts the jurisdiction to exercise the respective power [8] .

According to the Court, the ETSI IPR Policy is 'intended to have an international effect', as it attempts to 'mirror commercial practice in the telecommunications industry' [9] . In the telecommunications industry, it is common practice to sign global licences for a portfolio of patents, 'without knowing precisely how many of the licenced patents are valid or infringed' [10] . On the one hand, the patent holder cannot know at the time of the declaration of a patent as (potentially) essential whether it will be valid and infringed by the still developing standard [10] . The implementer, on the other hand, does not know which patents are valid and infringed when using the standard [10] .

This 'unavoidable uncertainty' is dealt with by the conclusion of portfolio licences covering all declared SEPs of the patent holder worldwide, at a price which 'ought to reflect the untested nature of many patents in the portfolio' [10] . By taking such a licence, the implementer 'buys access' to the standard and 'certainty' that it has authorisation to use all technology needed to comply with the standard [10] .

Since, according to the commercial practice, FRAND licences include 'untested' patents, the Supreme Court took the view that the determination of the terms and conditions of a global licence does not imply an assessment of the validity of all patents covered. Therefore, when setting the terms of a worldwide portfolio licence, English courts do not rule on the validity and infringement of foreign patents, which is, indeed, a question subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the national courts of the state that granted each patent [11] . Accordingly, it will, as a rule, be 'fair and reasonable' for the implementer to 'reserve the right to challenge those patents or a sample of those patents in the relevant foreign court and to require that the licence provide a mechanism to alter the royalty rates as a result' [12] .

In this context, the Supreme Court highlighted that the above approach is not unique to UK jurisprudence, but is in line with case law delivered in other jurisdictions, particularly in the United States, Germany, China and Japan [13] .

2. Suitable forum (forum conveniens)

The second issue which the Supreme Court addressed dealt also with the jurisdiction of the English courts. In the Conversant v Huawei case, the defendants had argued that English courts should have declined jurisdiction in favour of Chinese courts or at least stayed their proceedings, until the Chinese courts have decided on validity challenges raised against Conversant's Chinese patens.

The Supreme Court found that UK Courts were not obliged to decline jurisdiction in favour of the Chinese courts [14] . The so-called 'forum conveniens' doctrine was not applicable in the present case, since -unlike the courts in England- Chinese courts had currently no jurisdiction to determine the terms of global FRAND portfolio licences in the absence of an agreement of the parties to the dispute [14] . What is more, the Court found that it could reasonably not be expected by Conversant to consent in granting jurisdiction to the Chinese courts in the current setting [14] .

In the eyes of the Supreme Court, the English courts involved in the present dispute were also not obliged to stay their proceedings in expectation of the outcome of the Chinese validity proceedings [15] . The latter concerned only the validity of Conversant's Chinese patents, whereas the proceedings initiated in England referred to the determination of the terms of a FRAND licence for Conversant's global SEP portfolio [15] .

3. Non-discrimination

The third issue examined by the Supreme Court referred to the interpretation of the non-discrimination element of FRAND. In the proceedings, the question had arisen whether Unwired Planet had breached the non-discrimination prong of FRAND by offering to Huawei licensing terms less favourable than those agreed with Samsung after the start of the trial.

The Supreme Court agreed with both the High Court and the Court of Appeal and found that this was not the case. The Court explained that FRAND does not imply a so-called 'hard-edged' non-discrimination obligation, requiring from the patent holder to offer the same or similar terms to all similarly situated licensees [16] .

Under the ETSI IPR Policy (Article 6.1.), the patent holder must commit to make licences available on FRAND terms. In the eyes of the Supreme Court, this is a 'single, unitary obligation', not three distinct obligations that the licence terms should be fair, and separately, reasonable, and separately, non-discriminatory [17] . Accordingly, the terms and conditions should be 'generally available as a fair market price for any market participant' and reflect the 'true value' of the SEP portfolio, 'without adjustment depending on the individual characteristics' of a particular licensee [18] .

The Supreme Court made further clear, that the FRAND undertaking under the ETSI IPR Policy does not imply a so-called 'most favourable licence' clause, obliging patent holders to grant licences on terms equivalent to the most favourable licence terms to all similarly situated licensees [19] . Looking in detail at the creation of the ETSI IPR Policy, the Court observed that ETSI had previously expressly rejected proposals to include such a clause in the FRAND undertaking [20] .

Furthermore, the Court noted that there is no 'general presumption' that differential pricing is harmful to private or public interests involved [21] . On the contrary, there are circumstances in which the SEP holder's choice to offer lower than the benchmark rates to specific licensees is reasonable in a commercial sense [22] . This applies, for instance, with respect to the so-called 'first mover advantage': The Court recognised that it can be 'economically rational' and 'commercially important' to agree a lower rate with the first ever licensee, because, apart from generating initial income on the SEPs, the licence signed can also 'validate' the portfolio in the market and facilitate licensing in the future [22] . The same is also true with respect to so-called 'fire sales', that is cases, in which the patent holder is forced to licence at lower rates in order to secure its commercial survival, as it has been the case at the time, in which Unwired Planet signed the licensing agreement with Samsung [23] .

4. Abuse of market dominance / Huawei framework

The fourth issue examined by the Supreme Court was whether, by bringing infringement proceedings against Huawei, Unwired Planet had abused a dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and should, therefore, be denied access to injunctive relief. In particular, Huawei had argued that an injunction should be denied, because Unwired Planet had failed to comply with the conduct requirements established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the matter Huawei v ZTE (Huawei judgment or scheme) [24] .

The Supreme Court held that this was not the case [25] . In the eyes of the Court, the Huawei judgment establishes an obligation of the patent holder to notify the standards implementer about the infringing use of the SEPs in question, prior to filing an action for injunctive relief, which, if breached, results in abusive behaviour in terms of Article 102 TFEU [26] . The 'nature' of this obligation depends on the circumstances of each individual case [26] . The Court held that Unwired Planet had given adequate notice to Huawei prior to filing the present infringement action [27] .

Considering the further duties established by the Huawei judgment, the Supreme Court confirmed the view previously taken by the High Court and the Court of Appeal that the Huawei scheme is not 'mandatory', but rather establishes a 'route map, which, if followed precisely, will ensure that [the patent holder] can seek an injunction without risking infringing article 102' [28] . Other than that, the Huawei judgment provides 'a number of points of reference to assist in assessing the all-important question of whether each of the parties is willing to enter into a licence on FRAND terms' [27] . Having said that, the Supreme Court found that Unwired Planet had been willing to grant a FRAND licence to Huawei, so that it had not behaved abusively [27] .

5. Damages instead of injunctive relief?

The fifth and final issue addressed by the Court concerned the proper remedies for the infringement of SEPs. In the appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court, it was argued for the first time that the most appropriate and proportionate measure to remedy the infringement of Unwired Planet's SEPs would have been an award of damages instead of an injunction.

The Supreme Court found that there is no basis for substituting an injunction by an award of damages in the present case [29] . On the one hand, neither Unwired Planet nor Conversant could employ the 'threat of an injunction' as a means for imposing 'exorbitant fees' on Huawei or ZTE, since they would be entitled to an injunction, only if they have offered a licence on terms which the court would have already confirmed as FRAND [30] .

Furthermore, the Court took the view that an award of damages is 'unlikely to be an adequate substitute for what would be lost by the withholding of an injunction', since the SEP holder would be required to bring proceedings against an implementer patent-by-patent and country-by-country, which was considered to be 'impractical' [31] . What is more, standards implementers would then have 'an incentive to continue infringing until, patent by patent, and country by country, they were compelled to pay royalties', a fact that would make FRAND licensing more difficult, since, as the Supreme Court pointed out, 'it would not make economic sense' for infringers to voluntarily take a licence [32] .

On the other hand, an injunction 'is likely to be a more effective remedy': By prohibiting infringement altogether, an injunction may give an infringer 'little option' but to accept the FRAND terms offered by the SEP holder, 'if it wishes to remain in the market' [32] . For the above reasons, the Supreme Court highlighted that an injunction is 'necessary in order to do justice' [33] .

• [1] Unwired Planet v Huawei, High Court of Justice for England and Wales, judgment dated 5 April 2017, Case No. [2017] EWHC 711(Pat).
• [2] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, judgment dated 23 October 2018, Case No. [2018] EWCA Civ 2344.
• [3] Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, High Court of Justice for England and Wales, judgment dated 16 April 2018, Case No. [2018] EWHC 808 (Pat).
• [4] Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Court of Appeal, judgment dated 30 January 2019, Case No. [2019] EWCA Civ 38.
• [5] Unwired Planet v Huawei and Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Supreme Court, judgment dated 30 January 2019, Case No. [2019] EWCA Civ 38.
• [6] Ibid, paras. 49 et seqq.
• [7] Ibid, para. 61.
• [8] Ibid, para. 58.
• [9] Ibid, para. 62.
• [10] Ibid, para. 60.
• [11] Ibid, para. 63.
• [12] Ibid, para. 64.
• [13] Ibid, paras. 68-84.
• [14] Ibid, para. 97.
• [15] Ibid, paras. 99 et seqq.
• [16] Ibid, paras. 112 et seqq.
• [17] Ibid, para. 113.
• [18] Ibid, para. 114.
• [19] Ibid, para. 116.
• [20] Ibid, paras. 116 et seqq.
• [21] Ibid, para. 123.
• [22] Ibid, para. 125.
• [23] Ibid, para. 126.
• [24] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
• [25] Unwired Planet v Huawei and Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Supreme Court, judgment dated 30 January 2019, Case No. [2019] EWCA Civ 38, paras. 149 et seqq.
• [26] Ibid, para. 150.
• [27] Ibid, para. 158.
• [28] Ibid, paras. 157 and 158.
• [29] Ibid, para. 163.
• [30] Ibid, para. 164.
• [31] Ibid, para. 166.
• [32] Ibid, para. 167.
• [33] Ibid, para. 169.