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Sharp v Daimler, Regional Court (Landgericht) of Munich

10 September 2020 - Case No. 7 O 8818/19

A. Facts

The claimant is part of the Sharp group with headquarters in Japan (Sharp). Sharp holds a portfolio of patents declared as (potentially) essential to the practice of various wireless telecommunication standards (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs) developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).

The defendant, Daimler, is a major German car manufacturer. Daimler produces and sells cars in Germany with connectivity features which implement standards developed by ETSI.

Sharp declared the patent involved in the present case as (potentially) essential for the 4G/LTE standard towards ETSI. ETSI requires right holders to commit to make patents that are or might become essential to the practice of a standard accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.

In 2017, Sharp joined the Avanci licensing platform. Avanci offers licences to SEPs reading on connectivity standards to car manufacturers based on a standard licensing agreement and fixed rates. Avanci had been in contact with Daimler about a potential licence already since September 2016 without, however, signing an agreement.

On 20 May 2019, after an initial contact, Sharp sent claim charts to Daimler mapping its SEPs – including the patent in suit – to the relevant parts of the affected standards.

On 7 June 2019, Daimler responded that it is, in principle, willing to take a licence for patents used, but asked whether Sharp offered a bilateral licence or a licence from the Avanci platform. If a bilateral licence was offered, Daimler pointed out that it assumed that its suppliers could also be licensed.

On 23 July 2019, Daimler sent a further letter to Sharp arguing that not Daimler, but its (not individually identified) suppliers should be licensed. Daimler claimed that Sharp would breach its FRAND commitment towards ETSI, in case no licences were offered to Daimler's suppliers and requested information about agreements already signed by Sharp, especially with companies supplying connectivity units to Daimler.

On 8 August 2019, Sharp responded and informed that it intended to make an individual licensing offer to Daimler. For this, Sharp requested certain information from Daimler, particularly regarding Daimler's suppliers.

On 18 September 2019, Daimler refused to provide the information requested by Sharp and referred again to its suppliers as the correct addressees for Sharp's licensing demands.

On 22 October 2019, Sharp made an offer for a bilateral FRAND licence to Daimler. This offer was not accepted.

Subsequently, Sharp filed the present infringement action against Daimler before the District Court of Munich (Court). Several of Daimler's suppliers joined the proceeding in support of Daimler.

On 17 December 2019, after the action was filed, Daimler made a counteroffer which was followed by a request towards Sharp to consent to a stay of the pending infringement proceedings. On 31 December 2019, Sharp rejected Daimler's counteroffer.

During the course of the trial, Sharp agreed with one of Daimler's suppliers that joined the proceedings on a licensing agreement. Consequently, Sharp adapted the claims asserted in trial.

With the present judgment [1447] (cited by, the Court granted an injunction against Daimler and also recognised Daimler's liability to pay damages on the merits. The Court further ordered Daimler to recall and destroy infringing products, render accounts and provide information necessary for the calculation of damages to Sharp.

B. Court's reasoning

The Court found that the patent-in-suit is essential to the practice of the 4G/LTE standard [1448] and infringed [1449] . For this reason, Sharp was entitled -among other claims- to injunctive relief [1450] .

Daimler asserted a so-called 'FRAND-defence', basically, arguing that by filing an infringement action, Sharp abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and should, therefore, be denied an injunction. Among other points, it was argued that Sharp had failed to comply with the conduct requirements established by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the matter Huawei v ZTE [1451] (Huawei decision, or framework).

The Court dismissed the FRAND-defence raised by Daimler and also found that Daimler could not rely on a FRAND-defence derived from its suppliers [1452] .

Abuse of market dominance

According to the Court, an abuse of market dominance by the enforcement of SEPs can occur, if the patent holder did not make 'sufficient efforts' to satisfy the 'particular responsibility' attached to its dominant position and facilitate the signing of an agreement with a licensee, which is 'in principle willing to take a licence' [1453] . This requires, however, that the implementer, who already uses the protected technology without authorization by the right holder, is willing to take a licence on FRAND terms [1454] . The Court explained that it cannot be requested by the SEP holder to 'impose' a licence to any standards user [1454] .

Based on the above, the Court found that the initiation of the present proceedings by Sharp was not abusive in terms of Article 102 TFEU [1455] . The Court did not establish whether Sharp had a dominant market position, but just assumed that this was the case [1455] Nevertheless, an abuse of (assumed) dominance was not given, since Daimler had failed to adequately express willingness to obtain a licence for Sharp's SEP portfolio [1456] .


The Court explained that the implementer has to 'clearly' and 'unambiguously' declare that it is willing to sign a licence with the SEP holder 'on whatever terms are in fact FRAND' and, subsequently, engage in licensing negotiations in a 'target-oriented' manner (citing Federal Court of Justice, judgment dated 5 May 2020 – Sisvel v Haier, Case No. KZR 36/17 and High Court of Justice of England and Wales, judgment dated 5 April 2017, Case No. [2017] EWHC 711(Pat) – Unwired Planet v Huawei) [1454] .

This means that the implementer should not delay licensing negotiations [1457] . In the eyes of the Court, this is particularly important since implementers, which already use the patented standardized technology prior to negotiations, could have the -sole or predominant- interest to delay the signing of a licence until the expiration of the patent [1457] .

Having said that, the Court found that Daimler did not behave as a 'willing' licensee [1456] .

Looking at Daimler's behaviour before the counteroffer to Sharp was made, the Court held that a 'clear' declaration of willingness is missing [1458] . In its first response to Sharp dated 7 June 2019, Daimler did not express a commitment of any kind going beyond the general willingness to discuss a licence, if Sharp's patents were used [1459] . Furthermore, Daimler's letter dated 23 July 2019 did neither contain an adequate declaration of willingness, particularly since Daimler referred Sharp -without specification- to its suppliers and insisted that Sharp is obliged to license the latter [1460] . The same is true with respect to the statement dated 18 September 2019, in which Daimler again referred to its suppliers and refused to provide Sharp with information necessary for drawing up a licensing offer [1461] . The Court noted that although no legal obligation to share the information requested by Sharp existed, Daimler's respective refusal made clear that it did not engage in the discussions in a 'target-oriented manner', but rather aimed at delaying the negotiations [1462] . This is also confirmed by the fact that Daimler's response came almost six weeks after Sharp's respective request; the Court did not see any reason why Daimler's reaction took so long [1462] .

In addition, the Court noted that the finding that Daimler acted as an 'unwilling' licensee was reinforced by Daimler's overall behaviour in the discussions with the Avanci platform [1463] . The Court held that for the assessment of the 'willingness' of an implementer who raises a FRAND defence the entire conduct must be taken into account, not only facts occurring, in terms of time, directly after receipt of an infringement notification [1464] . The standard for the assessment of willingness should not depend on the -rather random- fact of whether the implementer was first approached by the patent holder or took the initiative to seek a licence itself, instead [1465] . Although the duties established in the Huawei judgment (one of which is to react to an infringement notification by expressing 'willingness' to obtain a licence) shall, as a rule, be followed as 'steps' in the order described by the CJEU, exceptions must be allowed on a case-by-case basis, if the parties' behaviour allows for that and a purely 'formalistic' view of the Huawei framework does not appear appropriate [1466] . According to the Court this was the case here, since Daimler that had been in contact with Avanci since September 2016 and had not expressed the willingness to take a licence at any point in time [1467] .

The Court further found that Daimler's counteroffer dated 17 December 2019, which was made only after the infringement action was filed, could not remedy the missing willingness [1468] . In the view of the Court, the fact that the counteroffer was followed by a request towards Sharp to consent to a stay of the ongoing proceedings showed, in the present case, that Daimler only aimed at causing delay; the counteroffer could, therefore, not compensate the 'massive unwillingness' which Daimler had demonstrated up to that point in time [1469] . In this respect, the Court noted that the possibility to remedy flaws during pending court proceedings (e.g. by making a counteroffer), is, in principle, given, however, under increasingly stricter conditions as the trial progresses [1470] .

The Court also highlighted that, in terms of content, Daimler's counteroffer did not express a willingness to obtain a licence on 'whatever terms are in fact FRAND' [1471] . By using a different 'reference point' for the royalty calculation, Daimler had counteroffered only a fraction of the fees offered by Sharp or collected by Avanci from its competitors, so that the rejection of the counteroffer was 'logically necessary' [1472] .

In this context, the Court made clear that for the assessment of willingness only the behaviour of Daimler was relevant [1473] . What is more, Daimler could not rely on the -alleged- willingness of the suppliers that joined the proceedings to obtain a licence from Sharp, in order to avoid an injunction [1474] . Accordingly, the Court did not examine whether Daimler's suppliers had indeed acted as 'willing licensees' [1474] .

Non-discrimination / licensing level

Apart from the above, the Court explained that Sharp did not act in an abusive or discriminatory manner by seeking to license only Daimler as the end device manufacturer [1475] .

The Court took the view that Sharp was not obliged to license Daimler's suppliers [1476] . The fact that in the (German) automotive sector it is common that suppliers take licences concerning components sold to car manufacturers, does not oblige Sharp to respect and accept this practice [1477] . On the contrary, as far as its products increasingly use wireless telecommunications technologies, Daimler must accept the practices prevailing in this field which include licensing also to end device manufacturers [1477] .

Irrespective of this, Sharp is under no legal duty to grant licences to component manufacturers; it is only obliged to grant 'access' to the standard, on which its SEPs read [1478] . The patent holders' commitment towards ETSI creates an obligation to license SEPs to third parties [1479] . The Court highlighted that this does not entail, however, an obligation to grant licences at all levels of the value chain [1480] . Such an obligation does not arise either from competition nor from patent or contract law in conjunction with the FRAND undertaking towards ETSI [1480] .

In particular, EU competition law does not establish an obligation to license SEPs at all levels of the value chain [1481] . According to the Court, patent holders are, in principle, free to choose the level of the value chain for licensing [1482] . In the Huawei judgment, the CJEU pointed out that the FRAND undertaking creates 'legitimate expectations' on the part of third parties to be licensed by the patent holder. The Court held, however, that by that no obligation to license all suppliers of an end-device manufacturer is created; access to the market does not necessarily require a licence, but just a 'possibility of legal use', which can be, for instance, given through a licence granted at the last level of the value chain, from which suppliers can draw 'have-made-rights' [1482] .

The Court also explained that neither patent law dictates the level of the value chain, at which SEP licences must be granted [1483] . Especially the fact that not all patents contained in a SEP portfolio are necessarily exhausted at all times at the level of component manufacturers speaks for licensing at the end-device level (in addition to the more efficient 'management' of the licensing fees which is possible in this scenario) [1484] .

Finally, the Court pointed out that contract law in conjunction with the FRAND undertaking towards ETSI do not impose an obligation on the patent holder to license every interested third party [1485] . Under the applicable French law, Section 6.1. ETSI IPR Policy is to be understood as establishing only an obligation to negotiate a FRAND agreement in good faith with a party seeking a licence [1486] . However, by referring to 'equipment', this provision addresses only end-device manufacturers, since not all components necessarily implement the standard as a whole [1487] . In the eyes of the Court, the views expressed by the European Commission in different occasions in the past do not lead to a different conclusion [1488]

FRAND defence raised by suppliers

The Court further found that Daimler cannot profit from a FRAND defence raised by suppliers [1489] . The defendant can rely on such defence only if the patent holder is under an obligation to license the suppliers; this does not apply, however, when the defendant is in a position to sign a licence with the SEP holder itself which sufficiently considers patent exhaustion within the relevant value chain [1489] .

The Court considered that this was the case here. Daimler's suppliers did not have an own claim to be granted a licence against Sharp, but a claim for a 'legally secured access' to standardised technology which cannot be considered in favour of Daimler [1490] .

C. Other issues

Furthermore, the Court ruled that there are no grounds for a limitation of Sharp's claim for injunctive relief based on proportionality considerations [1491] . Daimler had argued that no injunction should be granted based on the patent in suit, since the vehicles it manufactures are 'complex' products integrating a large number of components and the telematic control unit, on which Sharp's SEPs read, is of minor importance for the car.

The Court made clear that, under German law, proportionality is a general principle of constitutional rank that is to be considered also with respect to injunctive relief, if a respective objection is raised by the defendant [1492] . According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Justice, an injunction might not be immediately enforceable in exceptional cases, in which the implementer would suffer hardships not justified by the patent holder's exclusionary right in violation of the principle of good faith [1493] .

In the eyes of the Court, any limitation of the right to injunctive relief shall come into question 'in very few exceptional cases' and must, thus, be subject to strict conditions, not least for preserving the 'legal order' as well as 'legal certainty and predictability' [1494] . A case-by-case assessment of all relevant facts must take place, whereas the overall substantive and procedural framework (including e.g. the need to provide security for the enforcement of first-instance injunctions) should be considered [1494] . The Court explained that only hardships going beyond the usual consequences of an injunction can be taken into account [1494] . It should be expected from the infringer to make efforts towards the signing of a licence as soon as possible and take precautions against a potential injunction after receipt of an infringement notification, at the latest [1494] .

Against this background, the Court noted that even if only a single component of Daimler's vehicles might be affected in the present case, the dispute revolves around the licensing of a complex patent portfolio (either Sharp's or Avanci's portfolio) [1495] . The Court was further not convinced that the features enabled by Sharp's patents were of minor importance to Daimler's vehicles, since a significant part of innovation referring to 'connected cars' relates from both technical and economic angle closely to mobile telecommunications technologies [1496] . Finally, the Court also criticized the fact that Daimler did not make serious efforts for signing a licence with Sharp or Avanci [1497] .

  • [1447] Sharp v Daimler, District Court of Munich, judgment dated 10 September 2020, Case-No. 7 O 8818/19
  • [1448] Ibid, paras. 68 et seqq
  • [1449] Ibid, paras. 25 et seqq
  • [1450] Ibid, para. 90
  • [1451]  Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13
  • [1452] Sharp v Daimler, District Court of Munich, judgment dated 10 September 2020, Case-No. 7 O 8818/19, para. 121
  • [1453] Ibid, para. 124
  • [1454] Ibid, para. 125
  • [1455] Ibid, para. 128
  • [1456] Ibid, paras. 130 et seqq
  • [1457] Ibid, para. 126
  • [1458] Ibid, paras. 132 et seqq
  • [1459] Ibid, paras. 134 et seq
  • [1460] Ibid, paras. 136 et seq
  • [1461] Ibid, paras. 138 et seqq
  • [1462] Ibid, para. 140
  • [1463] Ibid, para. 141
  • [1464] Ibid, paras. 142 et seq
  • [1465] Ibid, paras. 143 et seq
  • [1466] Ibid, para. 144
  • [1467] Ibid, paras. 146-149
  • [1468] Ibid, para. 150
  • [1469] Ibid, paras. 151 and 153
  • [1470] Ibid, para. 152
  • [1471] Ibid, para. 154
  • [1472] Ibid, paras. 154 et seqq
  • [1473] Ibid, paras. 158 and 159
  • [1474] Ibid, para. 158
  • [1475] Ibid, paras. 161 et seqq
  • [1476] Ibid, para. 162
  • [1477] Ibid, para. 164
  • [1478] Ibid, para. 165
  • [1479] Ibid, para. 168
  • [1480] Ibid, para. 169
  • [1481] Ibid, paras. 170 et seqq
  • [1482] Ibid, para. 171
  • [1483] Ibid, paras. 173 et seq
  • [1484] Ibid, para. 174
  • [1485] Ibid, paras. 175 et seqq
  • [1486] Ibid, paras. 177 et seqq
  • [1487] Ibid, para. 178
  • [1488] Ibid, paras. 180-183. The Court referred particularly to the decision of the European Commission, Case No. AT.39985 – Motorola; the Communication on the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements (2011/C 11/01); and the Communication on ICT Standardisation Priorities for the Digital Single Market, COM(2016) 176 final.
  • [1489] Ibid, para. 167
  • [1490] Ibid, para. 185
  • [1491] Ibid, paras. 92-102
  • [1492] Ibid, para. 93
  • [1493] Ibid, para. 94
  • [1494] Ibid, para. 95
  • [1495] Ibid, paras. 97 et seq
  • [1496] Ibid, paras. 100 et seq
  • [1497] Ibid, para. 99