Acer and ASUS v Nokia
A. Facts
The Claimants are Acer Incorporated and Acer U.K. Limited (Acer) and ASUSTeK Computer Inc and ASUS Global Pte Ltd (ASUS) [1] . They make and sell personal computer devices that can encode and decode video streams. [2]
The Defendant, Nokia Technologies Oy (Nokia), owns or has the right to license a portfolio of standard-essential patents (SEPs). [3] These are declared as potentially essential to the H.264/AVC and H.265/HEVC video decoding standards of the International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T). [3]
Nokia’s parent company declared to the ITU-T that it was prepared to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms worldwide (RAND obligation) [4] . It later made declarations specifying three European patents designating the UK (Challenged Patents), which were assigned to Nokia subject to that obligation. [5]
The parties have negotiated for years without agreeing on RAND terms. [6] It is common ground that the licences should be global. [6]
From 28 March 2025, Nokia sued the Claimants for infringement in Germany, the Unified Patent Court, the US, Brazil and India. [7] In those proceedings Nokia sought injunctive or exclusionary relief, but no determination of RAND terms. [7]
On 11 June 2025 (Acer) and 17 July 2025 (ASUS), the Claimants sued Nokia before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (High Court). [8] They sought relief on the validity, essentiality and infringement of the Challenged Patents (Patent Claims). [9] They also sought a determination of RAND terms for a global licence and declarations that a willing licensor would grant interim licences (together, RAND Claims). [10] Both Claimants undertook unconditionally to enter into any interim or final licence determined to be RAND, subject to adjustment on appeal. [8]
As Nokia is a Finnish company, the Claimants obtained permission to serve the RAND Claims on it outside the jurisdiction. [11]
Nokia challenged the jurisdiction of the English courts over the RAND Claims. [12] It also offered each Claimant an interim licence whose terms would be adjusted to the final RAND terms determined by an arbitral tribunal (Adjustable Licence Offers). [13] Nokia proposed arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and the Claimants made no counterproposal. [14] Alternatively, Nokia sought declarations that its offers were RAND and that it had discharged its RAND obligations, and a stay of the RAND Claims. [15]
On 18 December 2025, the High Court rejected Nokia’s jurisdictional challenges, refused a case management stay and made some of the interim licence declarations sought. [16] Nokia appealed. [17]
With the present judgment, the Court of Appeal (Court) dismissed Nokia’s appeal on jurisdiction but allowed its appeal on the case management stay. [18] It granted the stay and consequently discharged the interim licence declarations. [19]
B. Court’s reasoning
Adjustable Licence Offers as RAND offers
The Court held that the Adjustable Licence Offers were RAND licence offers capable of acceptance, which complied with Nokia’s RAND obligation. [20] It recalled that a SEP owner complies with that obligation by offering a licence on terms that are objectively RAND. [21]
The Court rejected the High Court’s view that each offer was ‘merely an offer to enter into arbitration’. [22] It recorded that Nokia’s offer of an immediate global licence, which would protect the Claimants from exclusion, was not disputed. [23] The Court did not decide whether a mere offer of arbitration would suffice, as that question did not arise. [24] It identified the real dispute as whether the terms were RAND, given that the final terms would be set by arbitration without the Claimants’ consent. [25]
Consent to arbitration
The Court held that the Adjustable Licence Offers did not breach the principle that arbitration is consensual. [26] It was common ground that RAND disputes can be arbitrated by agreement, although there is no settled industry practice of doing so. [27] The Claimants argued that Nokia could not force them to arbitrate, as the ITU-T declaration was silent on arbitration and they did not consent. [28] The Court accepted that it is not for national courts to solve structural issues in standards bodies’ policies, such as the absence of arbitration clauses. [29]
The Court found there could be no objection to arbitration under the ICC Rules other than the lack of consent. [30] It observed that the Claimants no longer relied on the High Court’s criticism of arbitration as lacking transparency. [31] Nokia’s proposal left the seat to the Claimants’ discretion, provided for a tribunal drawn from outside both sides’ home jurisdictions and offered disclosure of comparable licences. [32] The Court further stated that it saw no good reason why an arbitral tribunal should not publish its RAND award, subject to redacting confidential information. [31]
The Court held that determination by an independent and impartial ICC tribunal is RAND, so an immediate licence on whatever terms it determines was objectively RAND. [33] The Claimants were not compelled to arbitrate, but faced consequences if they refused. [34] By refusing such an offer, an implementer cannot invoke the English courts’ declaratory jurisdiction, which depends on its willingness to accept RAND terms. [34] The Court rejected the Claimants’ reliance on their willingness to accept court-determined terms, as the choice between sets of RAND terms lay with Nokia. [34]
Nokia’s position in other proceedings
The Court held that Nokia could make the Adjustable Licence Offers while accepting determination of RAND terms by the English courts in other cases. [35] In separate proceedings brought by other implementers, Nokia had accepted the English courts’ jurisdiction and agreed to grant interim licences. [36]
The Court expressed concern about the inconsistency between Nokia’s positions in this and the other proceedings, but accepted its argument of an inherent asymmetry. [35] That asymmetry lies in the SEP owner’s ability to bring infringement proceedings. [37] An implementer without an infringement claim has only declaratory relief and possibly an order compelling a licence. [37] The implementer’s claim is therefore a more limited basis for jurisdiction, and a SEP owner may insist on the RAND terms most favourable to itself. [38]
The Court stated that, although courts should seek a level playing field, they do not redress imbalances inherent in the RAND system. [39] It recalled that, although forum shopping is not encouraged, a SEP owner may choose the forum that best suits its interests. [40] The Court did not decide whether an implementer could rely on an offer of arbitration where the SEP owner is unwilling to arbitrate. [41]
Case management stay and interim licence declarations
The Court held that the RAND Claims had no real prospect of success and should therefore be stayed on case management grounds. [42] The Court stated that such a stay is ordinarily temporary and granted only in rare or compelling circumstances. [43] It is available where parallel foreign proceedings, or an arbitration, would resolve the same issues earlier and better serve the interests of justice. [43]
The Court observed that Nokia sought a permanent stay, rather than a temporary one pending the arbitration. [44] It noted that Nokia relied on the Claimants’ claims having no real prospect of success, rather than on arbitration being the better forum. [44] The Court added that Nokia had not applied for summary judgment. [44] It nevertheless found no procedural unfairness, as the Claimants suffered no prejudice and the substance of Nokia’s argument was the same either way. [45]
The Court noted that a stay is a discretionary remedy and proposed to condition it on an agreement by Nokia. [46] If the Claimants accept its offers, the existing pleadings, disclosure, evidence and costs would carry over into the arbitration. [46] The purpose was to minimise wasted costs, and the parties may make submissions on the condition. [46]
The Court held that, given the stay, the interim licence declarations made by the High Court had to be discharged. [47] It therefore did not decide whether those declarations were otherwise correctly made. [47]
Jurisdiction
The Court held that the RAND Claims were properly served out of the jurisdiction, as they fell within one of the service out gateways relied on. [48] Service out requires (i) a serious issue to be tried, (ii) a good arguable case under one of the gateways and (iii) England and Wales as the appropriate forum. [49] On appeal, Nokia challenged only whether the claims fell within a gateway. [50] A good arguable case required the Claimants to show a stronger case than Nokia on whether a gateway applied. [49] The High Court had held that the RAND Claims passed through three gateways. [50]
The Court held that the RAND Claims fell within the gateway for claims relating wholly or principally to property within the jurisdiction (gateway 11). [51] It characterised them as contractual claims to enforce Nokia’s obligation to license the Challenged Patents on RAND terms. [52] The Court rejected Nokia’s argument that, since a RAND licence would be global, the claims concerned property largely outside the UK. [53] Adhering to Tesla v InterDigital, the Court distinguished between the property itself and the RAND obligation that affects it. [54] It added that owning UK patents is a sufficient connection with England and Wales. [55] Gateway 11 applied at least to the claims as they would stand after the Claimants’ proposed deletion of pleas referring to the global portfolio. [56]
The Court held that the RAND Claims did not fall within the gateway for declarations of non-liability (gateway 16A). [57] The pleaded declarations of non-infringement rested on a pass-through licence and technical workarounds, not on any threat by Nokia to sue. [58] Nokia’s infringement proceedings abroad were not a threat to enforce its UK SEPs, as ‘Patents are territorial’. [59] Nor was the absence of an undertaking by Nokia not to sue, which showed only that the Claimants feared being sued. [60] The Court also rejected the narrower argument that the pleaded declaration that Nokia was not entitled to an injunction satisfied gateway 16A. [61] It held that, absent any threat to sue in the UK, there was no threat of a UK injunction. [62]
The Court further held that the RAND Claims could not be served out as claims closely connected to the Patent Claims (gateway 4A). [63] The Patent Claims concerned invalidity, non-essentiality and non-infringement, none of which had anything to do with Nokia’s RAND obligation. [64]
- [1] Acer and ASUS v Nokia [2026] EWCA Civ 564, para. 5.
- [2] Ibid, para. 5.
- [3] Ibid, para. 4.
- [4] Ibid, paras. 1, 21.
- [5] Ibid, paras. 8, 21.
- [6] Ibid, para. 6.
- [7] Ibid, para. 7.
- [8] Ibid, para. 8.
- [9] Ibid, paras. 8, 25.
- [10] Ibid, paras. 2, 8, 26, 40.
- [11] Ibid, para. 9.
- [12] Ibid, para. 10.
- [13] Ibid, paras. 11, 27.
- [14] Ibid, para. 16.
- [15] Ibid, para. 11.
- [16] Ibid, para. 17.
- [17] Ibid, para. 18.
- [18] Ibid, paras. 94-96.
- [19] Ibid, paras. 92-93.
- [20] Ibid, para. 91.
- [21] Ibid, para. 24.
- [22] Ibid, paras. 73, 77, 89.
- [23] Ibid, paras. 74, 77.
- [24] Ibid, para. 74.
- [25] Ibid, para. 77.
- [26] Ibid, paras. 83-84.
- [27] Ibid, paras. 62-63, 66.
- [28] Ibid, para. 67.
- [29] Ibid, paras. 81-82.
- [30] Ibid, paras. 80, 84.
- [31] Ibid, para. 79.
- [32] Ibid, para. 29.
- [33] Ibid, para. 84.
- [34] Ibid, para. 85.
- [35] Ibid, paras. 86, 88.
- [36] Ibid, para. 68.
- [37] Ibid, para. 86.
- [38] Ibid, paras. 69, 86.
- [39] Ibid, para. 88.
- [40] Ibid, para. 88, citing Samsung v ZTE [2025] EWCA Civ 1383, paras. 73-74.
- [41] Acer and ASUS v Nokia [2026] EWCA Civ 564, para. 87.
- [42] Ibid, paras. 91-92.
- [43] Ibid, para. 58.
- [44] Ibid, para. 59.
- [45] Ibid, para. 60.
- [46] Ibid, para. 92.
- [47] Ibid, para. 93.
- [48] Ibid, paras. 41, 56.
- [49] Ibid, para. 30.
- [50] Ibid, para. 31.
- [51] Ibid, paras. 32, 41.
- [52] Ibid, para. 33.
- [53] Ibid, paras. 33, 36-37.
- [54] Ibid, paras. 34, 37, citing Tesla v InterDigital [2025] EWCA Civ 192, para. 109.
- [55] Acer and ASUS v Nokia [2026] EWCA Civ 564, para. 37, citing Amazon v InterDigital [2025] EWHC 3334 (Pat), para. 69.
- [56] Acer and ASUS v Nokia [2026] EWCA Civ 564, paras. 39-41.
- [57] Ibid, para. 51.
- [58] Ibid, para. 45.
- [59] Ibid, para. 46.
- [60] Ibid, para. 47.
- [61] Ibid, paras. 48, 50.
- [62] Ibid, paras. 49-50.
- [63] Ibid, paras. 53-55.
- [64] Ibid, para. 54.


