在欧洲联盟法院华为诉中兴通信案判决后所做成的判例
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Updated 16 六月 2021

慕尼黑一区地区法院康文森诉戴姆勒案

慕尼黑地区法院
30 十月 2020 - Case No. 21 O 11384/19

A. 事实

原告康文森(Conversant)持有被声明为对实施多项无线通信标准而言(潜在)必要的专利(以下称“标准必要专利”或“SEPs”)。

康文森向欧洲电信标准协会(ETSI)作出了承诺,表示愿意将其所持有的标准必要专利依照公平、合理且无歧视(FRAND)的条款和条件向标准实施人提供。

被告戴姆勒是一家总部位于德国的跨国汽车制造公司。戴姆勒在德国生产并销售具有实施欧洲电信标准协会所发展出的LTE标准的连网功能的汽车。

康文森于2018年10月加入了Avanci许可平台,该平台提供专为联网汽车量身定制的专利许可计划。

康文森于2018年12月18日向戴姆勒提出了全球范围内的双边许可要约,同时也向戴姆勒提供了与其所持有的标准必要专利组合相关的各项信息,其中也包括了该专利组合中所涵盖的若干专利的权利要求对照表。 在康文森于2019年2月27日对其发出了相应的提醒通知后,戴姆勒回复表示愿意签署FRAND许可协议的同时,也特别强调了对供应商进行知识产权许可在汽车行业中是一种很常见的做法。戴姆勒还要求康文森提供有关其所持有的专利组合现有被许可人的相关信息,并且就哪些专利在哪些对应的组件上实现,以及其所提供的条款为什么是符合FRAND的条款进行解释。随后,戴姆勒就专利持许可问题与Avanci开始进行谈判。

由于康文森接获了Avanci的通知表示其与戴姆勒间的许可谈判未获成功,康文森遂于2019年7月5日向戴姆勒发送了一封电子邮件,提出双方在2019年7月15日亲自会面的要求。 康文森同时也指出了参与 Avanci计划的汽车制造商在其所持有的标准必要专利组合下取得许可,并且通过引用相关判例(主要是英国高等法院于2017年4月5日所作成的无线星球诉华为案判决)在内的各种方式解释了构成其所提出的双边许可要约基础的许可费计算。康文森起先还打算向戴姆勒提供其所持有的专利组合中所包含的各项专利的完整清单,然而,相应的文件却因过失而未被添加到发送给戴姆勒电子邮件的附件之中。

戴姆勒于2019年7月29日作出回应,并表示其正与

Avanci进行许可谈判。戴姆勒重申了其认为在供应商层级进行许可更为高效此一观点,并且反驳认为,由于康文森尚未提供所有必要的信息,双方面对面的会议应该在稍后的时间点进行。

康文森于是于2019年8月13日在慕尼黑一区地区法院(以下称“法院”)对戴姆勒提起了侵权诉讼,而其中并未包含禁令救济主张。2019年8月24日,康文森将其在慕尼黑提起的诉讼告知戴姆勒,并指出其认为戴姆勒实际上并没有兴趣取得FRAND 许可。康文森并强调,在计算许可费时,应将(其专利)于终端产品阶段所产生的价值纳入考量。

2019年9月18日,戴姆勒重申了其取得许可的意愿,并且首次指出康文森在2019 年7月5日所发送的电子邮件中并未包含康文森所提及的专利组合的完整清单。这份清单其后于2019年9月20日被提交给戴姆勒。同时,康文森提议双方在2019年10月初召开会议面对面进行协商。戴姆勒于2019年10月8日回应称,由于所需的信息仍然缺失,该会议只能在十月底举行。

双方于2019年12月4日在戴姆勒总部会面。2020年1月15日,康文森将在本次会议进行过程中所演示的文稿发送给戴姆勒,并表示愿意为戴姆勒的一级供应商设定许可计划,同时为此也准备与戴姆及戴姆勒所有的一级供应商召开会议进行讨论。除此之外,康文森还提出了向中立的第三方寻求协助,例如采用仲裁程序来判定许可的价值。戴姆勒于2020年1月24日表示其已经与供应商进行了讨论,并且愿意组织一次会议。 2020年1月29日,康文森在其正于慕尼黑进行中的未决诉讼里对戴姆勒追加提出了禁令救济以及召回并销毁侵权产品的诉讼主张。

双方于2020年2月及3月就与戴姆勒的一级供应商会面的问题进行了讨论。然而,戴姆勒并未组织其所有供应商共同参加会议。

2020年4月8日,戴姆勒向康文森提出了许可反要约,该许可反要约是以在车辆上实现LTE连接功能的车载信息控制单元 (TCU) 这一元件的价值为基础来进行计算的。

康文森于2020年6月30日再度向戴姆勒提出了进一步的许可要约,但未获接受。 2020年8月10日,戴姆勒向康文森提供了有关其过去车辆销售的相关信息,并为其过去的使用提交了保证金。

法院在当前判决 [1] 中做出了包含对戴姆勒出发禁令在内的多项有利于康文森的裁决。
 

B. 法院的论理

法院认为,本案涉案专利为实施4G / LTE标准时所必要,并且该专利遭受了侵权行为 [2] ,康文森所提出的索赔主张因此而被法院准许。

康文森就关于禁令救济以及召回并销毁侵权产品的诉讼主张也应该被准许。康文森对戴姆提起侵权诉讼的行为既不会构成《欧洲联盟运作条约》(TFEU)第102条所规定对市场支配地位的滥用行为(以下称“竞争法上抗辩”,参见下段第 1 项),也没有违反其因欧洲电信标准协会专利政策所应承担的合同义务(以下称“合同法上抗辩”,参见下段第 2 项) [3]
 

1. 竞争法上抗辩
市场支配地位

法院认为,康文森具备《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条涵义下的市场支配地位 [4]

享有专利所授与的独占权本身并不会造成市场支配地位的形成 [5] 。当一项专利对符合标准发展组织所发展出的标准(或事实上的标准)而言具备技术上的必要性,并且在(下游)市场提供的产品中并没有可以替代该标准的技术时 [6] ,市场支配地位才会形成。在法院看来,此一原则适用于本案涉案专利 [7]

在本案中,可以排除康文森市场支配地位的特殊情况并不存在。法院认为,单就康文森向欧洲电信标准协会做出FRAND承诺,从而确立其必须依照FRAND条款与条件授予许可的义务这一事实本身,并不会排除康文森的市场支配地位,并且,此一问题决定性的关键在于标准必要专利持有人是否真正履行了这一义务 [8] 。此外,潜在实施人也可以选择从Avanci平台获得本案涉案专利许可的这一替代途径也并不会对康文森的市场支配地位造成限制 [9]
 

未构成对市场支配地位的滥用

尽管如此,法院认为,康文森向戴姆勒提起禁令救济以及召回并销毁侵权产品的诉讼这一行为并不会构成其对市场支配地位的滥用。

在实施人已经使用了受(专利)保护的标准化技术的情况下,对标准必要专利持有人行为的评估则需要采取更全面的综合分析,一方面需要考虑知识产权所享有的是宪法所赋予的强大保障,另一方面也需要将实施人可以实施标准的利益纳入考量,二者之间必须相互平衡 [10] 。在这种情况下,不仅只是私人利益,也应该将公共利益纳入考量范围之中 [11] 。法院强调,公共利益不应仅仅被视为“单纯的使用标准化技术各私人利益的总和”,而同时也应该包含对公众利益实质性的保护以保障知识产权的完整性并确保有效的执行力 [11]

考虑到标准必要专利在“本质上所具备的特殊性”,尤其是在通信领域,法院采取了与欧洲联盟法院(CJEU)华为诉中兴案判决(以下称“华为案判决”) [12] 一致的观点,认为对标准必要专利持有人施加某些特定的行为义务是合理且正当的。其原因基本上在于,与其他“普通”专利不同,标准必要专利是在专利持有人无需采取任何进一步行动的情况下,因该专利被纳入某一标准中而在市场上被确立 [13] 。因此,对于标准必要专利而言,通过授予专利技术的发明人在特定期间内的独占性的排他性权利来确保专利技术的发明人在市场上的竞争优势的需求,相较于非标准必要专利而言也就并不那么强烈 [14]

尽管如此,法院仍然明确表示,华为案判决对标准必要专利持有人所施加的行为义务仅存在于“严肃看待而不仅仅是口头上表示”愿意签署许可协议的实施人身上 [15] 。因此,一项基于对滥用市场支配地位的指控的抗辩只有在想要使用或者已经在未经授权的情况下使用专利的实施人愿意取得FRAND许可,并且在其与标准必要专利持有人进行许可谈判的整个过程中没有使用拖延战术的情况下,才有可能成立 [16] 。法院阐明到,华为案判决的关键概念在于谈判双方才是最有资格在公平、平衡且即时的许可谈判中确定 FRAND者,而是否能达成协议则将取决于谈判双方受为达成协议的实际“真诚动机”驱使的积极性参与 [17]
 

侵权通知

在对双方的行为进行审视后,法院认为,通过发送了日期为2018年12月18日的信函,康文森已经履行了就其标准必要专利遭受侵权情事对戴姆勒进行通知的义务,此信函的内容包含了与其专利组合相关的足够信息,其中也包括了数个各别专利所对应的权利要求对照表 [18] 。至于康文森是否充分解释了本信函中所附带的许可要约背后的许可费究竟是如何计算的则无关紧要,因为在此一阶段,康文森甚至还没有向戴姆勒提出许可要约的义务 [19]
 

取得许可的意愿

另一方面,法院认定戴姆勒不具备从康文森处取得许可的意愿。相反地,法院发现了一个“特别明显不具备取得许可意愿的案例” [20]

在内容方面,实施人必须“清楚”且“明确”地表明其愿意依照“任何实际上符合FRAND的条款”与标准必要专利持有人达成许可协议,并且随后以一种“目的性导向”且“积极”的态度来进行许可谈判 [21] 。相反地,在对(第一次)侵权通知做出回应时,仅仅是对侵权通知作出表达愿意考虑签署许可协议或就是否以及在什么条件下才考虑取得许可进行谈判是不够的 [21]

法院阐明,关于实施人是否具备取得许可的意愿的评估,需要通过对截至侵权诉讼程序中口头听证程序结束为止的所有案例事实进行全面性的分析来确定 [22] 。实施人是否表达出取得许可的意愿这一问题,并不能通过对实施人行为的“形式性的简略印象”来回答;更重要的是,实施人不能持续保持被动状态,直到在实施人眼中看来标准必要专利持有人已经履行了其义务时 [22]

此外,法院强调,谈判进行中的时机是在评估实施人是否具备取得许可的意愿时必须纳入考量范围的一项因素 [23] 。否则,实施人将会缺乏及时且积极地参与谈判的动力 [24] 。关于即时的概念法院认为严格的期限无法被设定,仍需要视个案具体情况逐一评估 [25] 。然而,已被告知侵权的实施人有义务通过与标准必要专利持有人签署 FRAND 许可而尽快使对该专利的非法使用合法化 [25]

此外,法院认为,实施人是否以及在何时向标准必要专利持有人提出许可反要约也可以作为实施人是否具备取得许可意愿的“重要指标” [23] 30。在侵权诉讼程序开始后才提出的许可反要约在通常情况下是不被认可的 [26] 。法院认为,实施人仅仅为了“做表面功夫”而进行谈判,然后透过提出许可反要约来对在侵权诉讼中可能被定罪的劣势进行“紧急刹车”,这种行为是不应该被允许的 [24] 。仅有在实施人自谈判开始时就愿意,并且始终积极地参与与专利持有人间的讨论这种特殊的情况下,在诉讼审判期间提出的许可反要约才可以被纳入对判断是否具备取得许可意愿的考量范围中 [27]

承上所述,法院认为,一般而言,实施人最初采用的拖延战术是无法在稍后的某一个时间点不费吹灰之力而被“消除”的 [28] 。尽管如此,对取得许可的意愿迟来的表述并不会“自动”排除实施人在侵权诉讼程序中提出“FRAND抗辩”的权利:无论是否出现这种情况,都还是应该根据具体个案在历史谈判过程中的各别情况逐一进行判断 [29]

在此背景下,考虑到戴姆勒的整体行为,法院得出了结论——尽管对戴姆勒而言,以符合FRAND要求的原则行事实际上有可能并且是合理的 [30] ,而戴姆勒仍然选择了采用拖延战术 [31]

法院认为,戴姆勒将康文森导引至其供应商的行为,并未表达出其愿意依照“任何实际上符合FRAND 的条款”来取得许可的意愿,反而是明确地展现出其本身并不准备从康文森处取得许可的态度 [32] 。戴姆勒与其供应商之间可能存在的关于第三方知识产权的赔偿条款在此处并不能发挥任何作用,因为戴姆勒的行为独立地造成了对康文森所持有的专利的侵权行为,因此必须为此承担相应的责任 [32]

另一个显示出戴姆勒并不具备取得许可的意愿的征兆是,戴姆勒花了超过两个月的时间才通知康文森其并未收到那一份本应该被附加于康文森在2020年7月5日发送的电子邮件中但因过失而未被添加的专利组合清单 [33] 。法院同样批评了戴姆勒此前从未针对康文森所提供的权利要求对照表向康文森提出任何问题,反而却是在侵权诉讼审判过程中才对相关专利的质量提出质疑此一事实 [34]

法院在戴姆勒於2020年7月27日所作出的回覆中,還發現了另一个“重大性指標”顯示出戴姆勒並不具備取得許可的意愿,在此回覆中,戴姆勒明确表示其签署许可協議的意愿僅限于尚未被许可或者由不愿自行向康文森取得许可的供应商處所購買的產品 [35] 。法院對於戴姆勒将其供应商的“不具備取得許可的意愿”設定為其己身与康文森签署许可協議的条件這一選擇特別反感 [36]

此外,戴姆勒没有针对康文森在2019年12月4日举行的当事方会议上所提出的使用替代性争议解决机制,特别是以仲裁程序来确定FRAND许可费的提议做出回应,这一事实也被法院认为是戴姆勒方并不具备取得许可意愿的表现 [37]

法院指出,另一个“明显”展现出戴姆勒不具备取得许可意愿且采用拖延战术的迹象在于,于2019年12月4日双方间的讨论结束以后,尽管戴姆勒曾暗示其已与其供应商讨论过有关由供应商直接向康文森取得许可此一潜在选项,然而实际上戴姆勒并未组织其所有一级供应商就此议题召开会议讨论 [38]
 

许可反要约

随后,法院指出,戴姆勒于2020年4月8日所提出的许可反要约并无法弥补戴姆勒在此之前表现出的取得许可意愿缺失 [39] 。更有甚者,这更像是一种“不在场证明” [30]

在法院看来,由于此一许可反要约是在康文森对戴姆勒提出许可要约后的一年零四个月以后才提出的,此一许可反要约的发出是迟延的 [39] 。更重要的是,此一许可反要约是戴姆勒在侵权诉讼程序进行的过程中才提出的,如前所述,此一行为是不被认可的,因为在此之前戴姆勒很显然是不愿意取得许可的 [40] 。法院近一步阐明,戴姆勒以康文森未提供相关的必要信息为借口来正当化其延迟回覆的行为是站不住脚的,因为该许可反要约仅基于公开且可供公众使用的数据撰写,而并未进行任何进一步的详细分析;因此,该许可反要约本来可以在戴姆勒收到康文森初次许可要约后不久的一个更早的时间点发出 [41]

除此之外,法院也认为,戴姆勒所提出的许可反要约在内容上“显然并不符合FRAND” [42] 。根据概括性的分析,戴姆勒所提出的许可费被认为明显是过低的 [43]

法院指出,FRAND费率是一个数值范围,并且有多种可以用于计算 FRAND许可费的方法 [43] 。法院采用了所谓的“自上而下法”(此一方法康文森与戴姆勒双方都曾经使用过) [44] 。在检视过戴姆勒提出的按照“自上而下法”而进行的计算后,法院认为,将所有向欧洲电信标准协会作出声明其为标准必要专利的专利总数作为确定康文森所持有的与LTE相关的标准必要专利所占份额的基础这种做法并不符合FRAND [45] 。考虑到并非所有被声明为标准必要专利的专利实际上都确实属于标准必要专利(这种现象被称为“过度声明”),使用被声明的专利总数作为计算基础将有利于戴姆勒:如果采用的是真正属于LTE标准必要专利的(较低)专利数量做为计算的基础,则康文森所持有的标准专利数量就其本身而言将会变得更高 [45]

此外,法院也指出,采用车载信息控制单元的平均采购价格作为计算基础并不是在FRAND下适当的许可费计算基础 [46] 。标准必要专利的价值是通过许可费而体现的,而该许可费与所提供服务的价值应符合比例原则 [46] 。法院认为,在本案中,通过在戴姆勒汽车上提供支持LTE技术的相关功能以及戴姆勒汽车的消费者对这些功能的使用而创造了经济价值 [46] 。因此,在此处真正相关的是戴姆勒的消费者对因为LTE技术而得以在车辆上实现的各项功能所赋予的价值 [46] 。戴姆勒向供应商支付的车载信息控制单元的采购价格并不能反映该项价值 [46]
 

供应商提出的FRAND抗辩 / 许可层级

法院进一步阐明,戴姆勒不能援引其供应商(据称的)具备直接从康文森处取得许可的意愿做为其FRAND抗辩 [47]

如果一个实施人在声明了自己具备取得许可意愿的同时,也表示了希望该许可的授与可以在其供应商层级进行,则其有义务以书面形式全面地披露其产品中包含了哪些符合标准的元件,以及哪些供应商向其提供了哪些对应的元件 [48] 。如果此一信息披露义务并没有被履行,正如同本案的情况一样,则实施人要求在其供应商层级别进行许可的请求与实施人表示愿意与自己与标准必要专利持有人签署许可协议的声明彼此矛盾,因此,属于恶意行为(见德国民法典第242条) [49] 。在这种情况下,法院明确表示,实施人仍然有义务以一种及时且有目的性的态度积极地与标准必要专利持有人进行双边谈判,即便在实施人已经向标准必要专利持有人提供上述信息后,仍应该同时积极参与促进在供应商层级相关许可机制的建立 [50] 。并且,在与标准必要专利持有人的双边谈判过程中,实施人可以要求在许可协议中包含一项排除对供应商已取得许可的组件双重支付许可费的条款 [50]

承上所述,法院認為,康文森要求由戴姆勒來取得許可的做法並没有構成滥用或歧视性行為 [51]

法院认为,關於在供应链中對标准必要专利的许可应遵循所谓的“所有人均有權要求取得许可”或者是“所有人均有權使用许可”的作法这一基礎性问题,在此无需被回答 [52] 。在标准必要专利持有人与终端设备制造商之间的法律纠纷中,从竞争法的角度而言,只要标准必要专利持有人在诉讼中所追求達成的目标並不会将供应商完全排除在市场之外便已足夠;当供应商通过由终端设备制造商签署的许可協議建立的“委託製造”权而被授予对标准化技术的使用权时,情况正是如此,正如同此處康文森所提供的那样 [52] 。供应商是否有權要求單獨取得许可則是一个不同的问题,而這個問題可能可以在标准必要专利持有人与供应商之间的另外的訴訟程序中被提出 [53]

法院补充到,标准必要专利持有人有权自由决定对供应链中的哪个侵权者向法院提起诉讼 [54] 。该自由选择权源自于宪法对财产权的保障,以及专利作为一种排他性权利的本质 [55] 。 法院认为,尽管在汽车行业的普遍做法是当零部件被出售给汽车制造商时不受第三方权利的限制,然而这并会不因此使康文森要求戴姆勒取得许可的行为成为竞争法上的滥用行为 [56] 。终端设备制造商与其供应商间的各别协议仅具有双边(合同)效力而不能损害第三方的法律地位 [56] 。特别是,此类条款并不能限制标准必要专利持有人选择向供应链中哪个层级的实施人主张其专利权的权利 [57] 。法院指出,鉴于附加技术的整合符合戴姆勒进入新市场与吸引消费者群的经济利益,从竞争法上的角度而言,汽车行业是否有必要放弃其现有的做法并不重要 [57]

在此背景下,法院同时阐明,只要是侵权诉讼仅针对终端设备制造商发动,标准必要专利持有人对供应商并没有履行华为案判决所确定的义务 [58] 。因此,参与此类诉讼的供应商不能以例如略过单独向供应商发送侵权通知等理由而主张标准必要专利持有人滥用其市场支配地位 [59] 。法院否定了标准必要专利持有人应承担这种全面性的通知义务,因为尝试在多层次的复杂供应链中找出所有可能牵涉到的供应商既不可行也不合理 [60]

法院认为,关于标准必要专利持有人拒绝直接对供应商授与许可是否会构成对其市场支配地位的滥用这一问题,应视竞争法上的一般性原则而定 [61] 。在本案中,法院并没有发现充足的理由可以支撑这种滥用行为的成立 [61] 。法院不认为若是供应商没有取得一份专属于自己的双边许可协议,那么其就无法享有权利或将面临法律上的不确定性 [62] 。然而,取得一份专属于自己的双边许可协议将赋予供应商相较于通过“委托制造权”所取得者更广泛的经营自由,从而更能契合其商业利益的这一事实,在供应商对标准充分的使用权仍然可以通过“委托制造权”而被保障的情况下,此问题便与标准必要专利持有人及终端设备制造商间的诉讼程序没有任何相关性了 [63] 。于此范围内,法院同时指出,以“委托制造权”为基础的供应链内部合作在现实中广泛存在且十分普遍,并且也得到了欧盟相关法律的支持(见欧洲联盟委员会12 月 18 日关于与欧洲联盟条约第 85 (1) 条有关分包协议的评估的通知,OJ C 1,1979 年 1 月 3 日) [63]

最后,法院驳回了戴姆勒方关于康文森与Avanci平台的其他成员勾结,通过排除实施人对相关标准的使用而对实施人为具体歧视行为的指控 [64] 。法院并没有发现任何迹象表明此种情况确实存在,相反地,法院强调了专利池通常被认为具有促进竞争的效果,尤其是在欧盟法律体系之下(详见关于欧洲联盟运作条约第 101 条应用于技术转让协议的指南第245段;2014/C 89/03) [64]
 

2. 合同法上抗辩

法院进一步指出,戴姆勒无法因其被授与FRAND许可而引用合同法上的抗辩以对抗康文森的禁令救济主张,因为此种主张并不存在 [65] 。戴姆勒曾经主张,根据康文森对欧洲电信标准协会所作出的FRAND承诺,康文森不被允许向法院提出禁令救济主张。

法院认为,欧洲电信标准协会的FRAND承诺并未创造出与欧盟竞争法(特别是《欧洲联盟运作条约》第 102 条)规定下所应遵守或享有者不同的义务或权利,而在本案中,康文森已经满足了这些要求 [66] 。在法律上,欧洲电信标准协会的FRAND承诺是根据法国法律所规定的为第三方利益所签订的合同(’stipulation pour l’autrui’),其中包含了标准必要专利持有人必须在稍后时间点授予 FRAND 许可这项具有约束力的承诺 [67] 。然而,关于许可协商的进行以及相对应的义务的内容及范围应按华为案判决所创立的规则来解释,这些规则包括了依据《欧洲联盟运作条约》第 102 条所制定的行为准则 [67] 。事实上,欧洲电信标准协会的FRAND承诺实现了在《欧洲联盟运作条约》第 102 条的规定下提供对标准的使用权的要求,同时也支持采用统一的行为标准 [67] 。在法院看来,法国法律不能创设其他进一步的行为义务,因为法国法律也必须按照欧盟法律的精神来进行解释 [67]
 

C. 其他重要问题

最后,基于比例原则的考量,法院采取了没有理由限制康文森禁令救济主张的观点 [68] 。根据德国法律,比例原则是一项具备宪法位阶的一般性法律原则,如果被告在审判中根据此项原则提出了相应的反对意见,则在审查是否核准禁令救济时也应将此原则纳入考量范围之中 [68] 。德国联邦法院(Bundesgerichtshof)也认可在实施人将遭受的损害因为专利持有人行使其排他性权利时违反诚信原则而无法被合理化的情况下,禁令将可能无法立即被执行(详见2016 年 5 月 10 日’Wärmetauscher’案裁决,案件编号 X ZR 114/13) [68] 。然而,在法院看来,戴姆勒在本次诉讼中并未就任何相关事实进行抗辩 [68]
 

  • [1] Conversant v Daimler, District Court of Munich I, 30 October 2020, Case-No. 21 O 11384/19 (cited by juris)。
  • [2] 同上注,段122-265。
  • [3] 同上注,段285。
  • [4] 同上注,段286。
  • [5] 同上注,段288。
  • [6] 同上注,段287及以下。
  • [7] 同上注,段291及以下。
  • [8] 同上注,段295。
  • [9] 同上注,段296。
  • [10] 同上注,段299。
  • [11] 同上注,段300。
  • [12] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13。
  • [13] Conversant v Daimler, District Court of Munich I, 30 October 2020, Case-No. 21 O 11384/19, 段301。
  • [14] 同上注,段301。
  • [15] 同上注,段307。
  • [16] 同上注,段308。
  • [17] 同上注,段302及308。
  • [18] 同上注,段323及以下。
  • [19] 同上注,段324。然而,法院对于康文森仅提及英国高等法院在无限星球诉华为案中使用的计算方法是否足以解释其向戴姆勒所提供的费率表示怀疑。
  • [20] 同上注,段309。
  • [21] 同上注,段310。
  • [22] 同上注,段316。
  • [23] 同上注,段311。
  • [24] 同上注,段312。
  • [25] 同上注,段320。
  • [26] 同上注,段312及316。
  • [27] 同上注,段315。
  • [28] 同上注,段317及以下。
  • [29] 同上注,段321。
  • [30] 同上注,段357。
  • [31] 同上注,段322及358。
  • [32] 同上注,段328。
  • [33] 同上注,段331及336。
  • [34] 同上注,段332。
  • [35] 同上注,段334及336。
  • [36] 同上注,段335。
  • [37] 同上注,段337。
  • [38] 同上注,段338。
  • [39] 同上注,段339。
  • [40] 同上注,段340。
  • [41] 同上注,段355及以下。
  • [42] 同上注,段341及354。
  • [43] 同上注,段341。
  • [44] 同上注,段341及348。
  • [45] 同上注,段352。
  • [46] 同上注,段353。
  • [47] 同上注,段360。
  • [48] 同上注,段362。
  • [49] 同上注,段362及364。
  • [50] 同上注,段363。
  • [51] 同上注,段365。
  • [52] 同上注,段366。
  • [53] 同上注,段367。
  • [54] 同上注,段368及382。
  • [55] 同上注,段368。
  • [56] 同上注,段370。
  • [57] 同上注,段372。
  • [58] 同上注,段373及376-378。
  • [59] 同上注,段373。
  • [60] 同上注,段373及382。
  • [61] 同上注,段373及379。
  • [62] 同上注,段374。
  • [63] 同上注,段375。
  • [64] 同上注,段380。
  • [65] 同上注,段384。
  • [66] 同上注,段384及以下。
  • [67] 同上注,段385。
  • [68] 同上注,段269。

Updated 25 六月 2020

IPCom v Lenovo, Court of Paris

法国法院判决
20 一月 2020 - Case No. RG 19/60318

A. Facts

In 2014, Lenovo acquired Motorola [69] . Both companies have a French subsidiary [70] .

Digital River Ireland Limited sells Lenovo products on Lenovo’s French website [71] . Modelabs Mobile S.A. (Modelabs) imports Motorola devices in France alongside Lenovo [70] .

IPCom GmbH & Co. KG (IPCom) acquired over 160 patent families from Robert Bosch in 2017 [69] . IPCom’s Patents cover the 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecommunications standards [70] . One of the acquired patents is EP 1 841 268 B1 (EP 268) [70] , which is essential to the 3G standard [72] . EP 268 expires on 15 February 2020 [73] . IPCom made a FRAND commitment for its essential patents towards ETSI [74] .

In 2018, IPCom contacted Lenovo for a licence under its patents, including EP 268 [72] . There were some discussions between the parties [70] . On 1st March 2019 [70] , IPCom renewed its offer to license Lenovo and requested Lenovo to respond to this offer by 15 March 2019 [71] .

Absent a reply from Lenovo by this date, IPCom stated that it would initiate proceedings against Lenovo for patent infringement [70] .

On 14 March 2019, US subsidiaries of Lenovo and Motorola filed a claim against IPCom before the District Court for the Northern District of California (US District Court) in the US [70] . The requested the US District Court to set the terms for a worldwide FRAND licence for IPCom’s portfolio [70] .

On 4 July 2019, IPCom filed a complaint against the UK subsidiaries of Lenovo and Motorola before the High Court for England and Wales for patent infringement of the UK counterpart of EP 268 [75] .

On 18 September 2019, Lenovo’s and Motorola’s US subsidiaries filed a motion for an anti-suit injunction with the US District Court to prevent IPCom from continuing the infringement proceedings initiated in the UK as well as from filing any further infringement actions in any foreign jurisdiction, as long as there was no final decision on the US complaint [71] .

On 8 November 2019, the Court of Paris required Lenovo and Motorola to withdraw their anti-suit request with respect to EP 268 by 14 November 2019 the latest [75] . The anti-anti-suit injunction granted by the Court of Paris also applied to any subsequent request to the same end that would be introduced by Motorola and Lenovo. Lenovo and Motorola’s US counterparts partially withdrew the motion for an anti-suit injunction brought before the US District Court [70] .

On 14 November 2019, IPCom filed infringement proceedings against Lenovo and Motorola before the Court of Paris [76] . Before that, on 30 October 2019, IPCom had also sought temporary measures until the patent expiration day, i.e. a preliminary injunction, as well as an order for the recall of all 3G products and the confiscation and sequestration of 3G compliant products [77] .

With the present judgment, the Court rejected IPCom’s request for a preliminary injunction, holding that it was not proportionate and that it could provide an unjustified advantage to IPCom that could lead the company to negotiate licensing terms and conditions that would not be FRAND [78] .

B. Court’s reasoning

With respect to the request for a preliminary injunction, the Court applied Article L615-3 of the French Intellectual Property Code. This provision allows courts to order urgent measures to prevent an irreparable damage to be caused to the right-holder [79] . For this, it is required that patent infringement is likely and the damages potentially suffered cannot be compensated by monetary payments [80] .

The Court also took recourse to the EU Directive 2004/48, which provides that preliminary measures should be proportionate considering the specificity of a dispute on a case by case basis [81] .

The Court concluded that there was no irreparable harm to IPCom that could not be compensated by damages, if a preliminary injunction would be denied. [82] IPCom had claimed that the absence of an injunction would put existing licensees at a disadvantage and that a request for interim measures could not be considered as abusive, given the fact that the absence of a preliminary injunction would reduce the value of its patent portfolio [83] . The Court was not convinced that this would be the case. Moreover, the Court placed weight on the fact that IPCom did not practise the patents itself and, therefore, did not face a risk to lose market shares by competing products infringing IPCom’s rights [84] .

On the other hand, the Court found that an injunction, even of a temporary nature (until the patent expiration date, i.e. 15 February 2020), affecting almost all Lenovo and Motorola products, would heavily impact these companies. In addition, such an abrupt withdrawal of most of the products from the market would harm the reputation of the defendants and impair the distribution operations of Digital River [84] .

Lenovo and Motorola had argued that IPCom’s request was disproportionate [72] . They highlighted that the injunction request applied to most of their cellphones and tablets, what would lead to a serious financial harm [70] . In their view, IPCom’s behaviour was not FRAND, because IPCom did not wait for the end of the negotiations between the parties on the first offer to submit a second offer that was not negotiable [70] . And IPCom filed infringement procedures in the UK and France, instead of negotiating a FRAND license under the US proceedings [70] . Apart from that, Lenovo and Motorola claimed that the patent was not essential to a mandatory, but only to an optional portion of the standard [70] . They also added that the patent was close to expiration and IPCom did not exploit the patent itself [70] . Therefore, there was no harm that could not be compensated by financial damages [70] .

The injunction would impact Lenovo and Motorola market share, including on the new 5G market, and affect their reputation towards main telecom operators [74] .

C. Other issues

Translation of documents

Modelabs argued that IPCom had breached a French law dated 1539Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts by providing documents that were in their majority drafted in English instead of French. This behaviour violated Modelabs’ right to an equitable process [86] . The Court pointed out that, since Modelabs imports and commercialises electronic products in France, it had to understand English [70] . Additionally, IPCom had provided documents in French [70] . Therefore, the Court found that Modelabs’ right to an equitable process was not violated [70] .

Patent ownership / Transfer of patents

The defendants challenged IPCom’s ownership of the patent in suit [87] . They claimed that the patent had not been assigned to IPCom. Would the assignment from Robert Bosch to IPCom, nonetheless, have taken place, there had been a second assignment, since IPCom had merged with another company and as a result of the merger, a new company was created, IPCom GmbH & Co [70] .

The Court highlighted that neither Robert Bosch nor the inventors had made any claim under the patent [88] . Additionally, IPCom published the assignment and justified the transfer [89] . The merger came with a transfer of all IPCom assets to IPCom GmbH & Co [88] . The merger and the change of name were notified to the French Patent Office on 13 September 2019 and was published before the notification of the writ of summons to the defendants [72] .

  • [69] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 2.
  • [70] Ibidem
  • [71] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 3.
  • [72] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 13.
  • [73] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 8.
  • [74] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 14.
  • [75] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 4.
  • [76] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 5.
  • [77] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, pages 4-7.
  • [78] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 17.
  • [79] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, pages 10- 11.
  • [80] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 10.
  • [81] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, pages 11, 14-16.
  • [82] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page17.
  • [83] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 15.
  • [84] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 16.
  • [85] Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts
  • [86] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 9.
  • [87] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 11.
  • [88] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 12.
  • [89] Court of Paris, judgement dated 20 January 2020, page 12-13.

Updated 7 五月 2019

TQ Delta诉合勤科技

英国法院判决
18 三月 2019 - Case No. HP-2017-000045 - [2019] EWHC 745 (Pat)

A. 事实

原告TQ Delta LLC持有在国际电信联盟建议书(ITU Recommendations)中被宣告为实施某些特定xDSL标准时必要的专利(以下称“标准必要专利”或“SEPs“)。国际电信联盟建议书中要求标准必要专利持有人必须按照合理且无歧视(RAND)的条款和条件向标准实施人提供其专利。

被告合勤科技股份有限公司(Zyxel Communications Ltd.及Zyxel Communications A / S,以下称“合勤“)生产并销售各种符合DSL标准的设备。

原告于2013年时联系了被告,寻求就其所持有的标准必要专利向被告进行许可。由于双方未能达成协议,原告在美国对被告提起了侵权诉讼。其后,被告就其所持有的两项标准必要专利于英国高等法院(以下称“法院“)向被告提起了包含核发禁令在内等多项主张的侵权诉讼。这些诉讼一方面涉及与涉案专利的有效性、标准必要性、以及侵权与否相关的技术性问题(以下称”技术审查“),另一方面也涉及了是否依照RAND条款对涉案专利进行许可的问题(以下称”RAND审查“)。

被告并未向原告人支付任何款项 [90] 。并且在诉讼过程中,被告更拒绝确认其将会按照任何法院判定符合RAND的条款取得(全球或英国范围内的)专利许可 [91]

法院同时对技术部分及RAND问题进行了审判 [92] 。法院于2019年3月11日就技术审查部分作出判决,法院裁定涉案专利中的一项具备有效性及标准必要性,并且构成侵权,而另一项涉案专利则为无效的,但如果该项专利为有效的话,则将会具备标准必要性且会构成侵权 [93] 。该项被认定为有效且具备标准必要性并构成侵权的专利将于2019年6月25日到期失效 [94] ,而本案的RAND审查部分则被安排在2019年9月才进行。

法院在2019年3月18日考量了因技术审查的结果而产生的各项禁令形式 [95] 。法院立即核发了针对被告的禁令,拒绝了中止禁令执行或者将禁令适用范围进行拆分而允许被告继续处理某些现有客户关于涉案侵权产品的订单的主张。此外,法院还拒绝许可被告于本案中得提起上诉的主张 [96]


B. 法院的论理

在考虑是否应该于本案中核发禁令时,法院特别强调了对被告行为的考量。法院认为,由于被告从事“反向专利挟持“的行为,因此没有理由拒绝禁令的核发——多年以来,被告一直在对这两项专利中的一项实施侵权行为,而没有向原告支付任何许可费,并且还拒绝服从法院做出的符合RAND的适当判决结果 [97]

在法院看来,在这种情况下拒绝核发禁令将会是“不公正的” [98] ,因为如此一来“将使合勤(被告)通过采取反向专利挟持的策略而获益“,其”将可以避开禁令的执行“,并且当[F]RAND许可条款不如其所预期时,还可能拒绝按照法院认为适当的条款达成许可协议 [98] 。此外,剥夺原告寻求禁令救济的权利,“事实上相当于通过法院创造了强制许可”,这在法院看来属于“原则性的错误” [99] 。在此一背景下,法院驳回了被告由于涉案专利将于法院作出判决后的数个月内到期失效,核发禁令将显失公平的主张。

除此之外,法院认为没有理由按被告要求中止禁令的执行一个月,并且也没有理由允许对禁令适用范围进行拆分而允许被告继续满足某些现有客户的订单 [100] 。被告并未提供充足的证据供法院评估其因为禁令的立即执行所可能产生的任何不利之处 [101]

此外,法院拒绝准许被告对其所核发的禁令提起上诉。法院认为,许可被告上诉是“错误的”,因为上诉法院近期已经在无线星球诉华为案的裁决 [102] 中确立了一套正确的基本原则。此外,法院认为,对此类裁决提起上诉成功的机率微乎其微,授予禁令的决定属于一种法院对其自由裁量权的行使,一般而言很难对此提起上诉。此外,法院的判决是相当有理的,因为拒绝核发禁令“将构成对专利权人专属权利的强制许可,并在被告有意识地选择不执行[F]RAND承诺的情况下剥夺了对专利权人有意义的保护” [103]

  • [90] TQ Delta v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, judgment dated 18 March 2019, 段 6。
  • [91] 同上注, 段 10。
  • [92] See TQ Delta v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, judgment dated 21 November 2017, [2017] EWHC 3305 (Pat),案例摘要请参阅:www.4ipcouncil.com。
  • [93] See TQ Delta v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, judgment dated 11 March 2019, [2019] EWHC 562 (ChD)。
  • [94] TQ Delta v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, judgment dated 18 March 2019, 段 2。
  • [95] 在RAND审查的审判过程中,法院就特别是关于如何在诉讼中处理潜在机密信息等问题作出了暂时裁定,详见:TQ Delta v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, judgment dated 13 June 2018, [2018] EWHC 1515 (Ch); judgement dated 28 September 2018, [2018] EWHC 2577 (Pat) and judgment dated 11 October 2018, [2018] EWHC 2677 (Pat)。上述案例摘要请参阅:www.4ipcouncil.com。
  • [96] TQ Delta v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, judgment dated 18 March 2019, 段 19。
  • [97] 同上注, 段 12。
  • [98] 同上注, 段 13。
  • [99] 同上注, 段 14。
  • [100] 同上注, 段 15。
  • [101] 同上注, 段16及以下。
  • [102] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, judgement dated 23 October 2018, Case No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2244, 段53及54,案例摘要请参阅:www.4ipcouncil.com。
  • [103] TQ Delta v Zyxel Communications, UK High Court of Justice, judgment dated 18 March 2019, 段 22。

Updated 4 六月 2020

Sisvel v Xiaomi, Court of Appeal of The Hague

荷兰法院判决
17 三月 2020 - Case No. C/09/573969/ KG ZA 19-462

A. Facts

Sisvel International S.A. (Sisvel) is the parent company of the Sisvel group [104] . In 2012, Sisvel acquired EP 1 129 536 B1 (EP 536) [105] . EP 536 relates to the EGPRS technology, which forms part of a GSM telecommunications standard that implements EDGE [106] .

Xiaomi is a manufacturer of mobile phones with headquarters in China [107] .

On 10 April 2013, Sisvel submitted to the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) a declaration under which it committed to make a list of patents, including EP 536, accessible to standard users under Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions (FRAND commitment) [108] .

On 15 October 2013, Sisvel notified Xiaomi about its Wireless Patent Portfolio [106] . On 16 July 2014, Sisvel sent a letter to Xiaomi, inviting Xiaomi to contact Sisvel regarding to the conclusion of a licence [106] . Further e-mails were sent to Xiaomi on 3 December 2014, 4 December 2014 and 5 March 2015 [106] .

In an article dated 29 March 2019 published on nu.nl [109] and ad.nl [109] , Xiaomi announced that it would enter the Dutch market with online shops and physical stores [110] .

On 23 April 2019, Sisvel initiated legal proceedings against Xiaomi before the English High Court of Justice in London (English proceedings) [111] . Sisvel requested the court to declare that the terms and conditions of the MCP Pool Licence, under which EP 536 as part of the Wireless Patent Portfolio is licensed [112] , are FRAND or alternatively, to determine FRAND licensing terms and conditions and find three patents (including EP 536) to be valid and infringed [111] .

On 30 August 2019, Xiaomi filed two legal actions against Sisvel in Beijing [113] . Xiaomi asked, in one of the cases, the court to determine FRAND terms and conditions for a licence limited to China and, in the other case, to declare that Sisvel had abused its dominant position [106] .

In the Netherlands, Sisvel requested a preliminary injunction against Xiaomi, until Xiaomi accepts Sisvel’s offer to go to arbitration, as well as the recall and destruction of products, information over profit made and additional documentation with respect to resellers, a penalty fee, and – as a subsidiary motion – the removal of the EGPRS/EDGE extension of the GSM functionality [114] . With judgment dated 1 August 2019, the Court of The Hague rejected Sisvel’s claims in first instance and sentenced Sisvel to the process costs, in view of the balance of interests between the parties and the complexity of the case [115] .

Sisvel appealed the first instance decision on 29 August 2019 [116] . During the course of the appeal proceedings, on 22 January 2020, Xiaomi deposited funds [117] on an escrow account held by Intertrust [118] . With the present judgment, the Court of Appeal of The Hague (Court) rejected Sisvel’s appeal and sentenced Sisvel to higher process costs [119] .

B. Court’s reasoning

The Court focused on the balance of interests between the parties.

Injunction

The Court considered that the harm caused to Sisvel by the infringement of EP 536 was limited, taking into account only infringing uses in the Netherlands, as well as the fact that EP 536 is only one out of many patents held by Sisvel, and almost expired [120] . Considering that Sisvel’s business model is to conclude licences, Sisvel did not have to fear damages caused by free riding on the cellphone market, but only damages resulting from denied profits under a license [121] . Therefore, only financial damages could incur which the Court considers to be relatively simply compensated at a later point in time [122] . Additionally, Xiaomi had provided security [122] . The security addresses the problem raised by Sisvel, i.e. Xiaomi becoming insolvent and unable to pay damages for patent infringement [106] .

With respect to Xiaomi’s interest, the Court noted that an injunction would force Xiaomi to stop sales, close shops in the Netherlands and stop its distribution contracts with customers [123] . The consequences would thus be severe and could hardly be undone, even if Xiaomi could resume sales again after the expiration of EP 536 [106] . The only way for Xiaomi to avoid those consequences would be to take a license, which also brings important consequences. Indeed, the MCP license offered by Sisvel is not only for EP 536 but for more than 1000 patents in all countries worldwide [124] . By accepting a licence Xiaomi would be irrevocably bound to comply with it, including with its rate [125] . The stop of sales in the Netherlands would create loss of profits for Xiaomi and worsen its relationships with its customers [106] . The Court highlighted such damages are difficult to evaluate as Xiaomi is still building its market position and there are many other players on the market [106] .

The Court further argued that the case was complex for a preliminary decision, because it required an opinion on the validity and scope of a patent protecting a complex technology as well as an assessment of Xiaomi’s FRAND defence, for which parties have arguments over many facts and the principles to determine a FRAND rate [126] . Additionally, the court that would be entrusted with the main proceedings could have a different opinion on the validity of the technology and the FRAND defence [106] . Therefore, the Court concluded there was no reason, even if the patent was valid and the FRAND defence had to be rejected, to force Xiaomi to leave the Dutch market or to take a licence from Sisvel [106] . The Court found that Xiaomi’s interest to reject the request for a preliminary injunction was stronger than Sisvel’s interest to stop the continuation of the infringement [126] .

The Court also rejected Sisvel’s claim that Xiaomi was an unwilling licensee [127] . Such claim could be used to invalidate Xiaomi’s FRAND defence, but the Court stated that the examination of Xiaomi’s FRAND defence had to be separated from the balance of interests’ assessment in preliminary proceedings [106] .

Reviewing Sisvel’s request based on the EU enforcement directive 2004/48 and Article 9 of such directive did not lead the Court to another conclusion: in light of the enforcement directive, the injunction would not be proportionate in this case, therefore the Court had no obligation to use Article 9 of the EU enforcement directive [128] .

Even in combining the application of Article 3 of the EU enforcement directive, Article 5, 17 and 47 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights the Court came to the same interpretation: an injunction for the limited remaining time of EP 536 would not help [129] . The lack of an injunction would not unreasonably delay the case as the Court argued that the effective remedy would be compensation for the damages in main proceedings [106] . Additionally, the Court found this conclusion to be supported by the fact that Sisvel had only initiated main proceedings against other parties in the Netherlands and abroad [106] .

Sisvel’s claim that the lack of an injunction would create an unfair playing field between market participants was also rejected by the Court [130] . The Court stated that Xiaomi’s security and the possibility for Sisvel to get compensation for damages in main proceedings created an equal playing field [106] . Sisvel had relied on a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court, according to which a patent can only be effectively protected if there is a quick stop to further infringement [131] . The Court explained that this is the case only when the damages for patent infringement are difficult to determine; this was, however, not the case here [106] .

Security

The Court rejected Sisvel’s claim that the deposit on the escrow account had been made in such a way that it would be impossible for Sisvel to get paid [132] . Indeed, the Court underlined that Sisvel can unilaterally reclaim payment, especially if a FRAND rate is determined in the English proceedings [106] . Moreover, Xiaomi declared itself to be ready to adapt the amount placed on the escrow account in close cooperation with Sisvel, if Sisvel wishes to do so or has requests about the escrow account [106] . The Court noted it did not seem Sisvel made use of this possibility to adapt the amount [106] .

The amount deposited for fees under Sisvel’s MCP Patent Licence was considered as sufficient by the Court for the products sold in the Netherlands for the lifetime of EP 536 [133] . The Court added that this would still be the case even in the event that Sisvel wanted to increase the licensing rate for non-compliant users or to account for profits based on the infringement [106] . The Court underlined that in the Huawei v. ZTE decision of the CJEU [134] , the security had to be “appropriate”, which depends on the context of the FRAND defence [106] .

Recall and destruction of products

Sisvel’s request to have infringing products recalled and destroyed, as well as all mentions about those products removed, resellers informed and profits provided was rejected by the Court [135] . Sisvel had asserted the same urgent interest as for the preliminary injunction to support this request: stopping and preventing infringement of EP 536. Since the request for a preliminary injunction failed, the further claims asserted by Sisvel had to follow the same fate [106] . The Court stated that there was no urgent interest to have Xiaomi disclosing its profits, or at least that was more important than having Xiaomi keeping this information confidential [106] . Sisvel did also not explain why profits data should be disclosed in advance of the main proceedings [106] .

C. Other important issues

The Court also denied Sisvel’s request to grant a preliminary injunction, as long as Xiaomi did not agree to initiating arbitration procedures [136] . The Court argued that if Xiaomi would be forced to have an arbitration tribunal determining the terms and conditions for all patents of the MCP Patent Licence for the whole world, this would deprive Xiaomi of its fundamental right of access to a court [106] . The acceptance of such arbitration proposal without conditions would have drastic consequences on Xiaomi’s position [106] .

  • [104] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 2, par.2.2.
  • [105] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 2, par.2.4.
  • [106] Ibidem
  • [107] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 2, par.2.8.
  • [108] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 2, par.2.5.
  • [109] Dutch newspaper.
  • [110] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 4, par.2.11.
  • [111] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 4, par.2.12.
  • [112] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, pages 3 and 4, par.2.7 and 2.12.
  • [113] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 4, par.2.13.
  • [114] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 4, par.2.14.
  • [115] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, pages 4 and 5, par.3.3.
  • [116] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 2, par.1.
  • [117] Amount has been redacted.
  • [118] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 5, par.3.5.
  • [119] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, pages 10 and 11, par. 4.24 and following.
  • [120] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 5, par.4.3.
  • [121] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, pages 5 and 6, par.4.3.
  • [122] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 6, par.4.3.
  • [123] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 6, par.4.7.
  • [124] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, pages 6 and 7, par.4.8.
  • [125] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 7, par.4.9.
  • [126] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 7, par.4.11.
  • [127] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 7, par.2.12.
  • [128] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 8, par.4.14.
  • [129] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 8, par.4.15.
  • [130] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 8, par.4.16.
  • [131] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, pages 8 and 9, par.4.17.
  • [132] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 6, par. 4.5.
  • [133] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 6, par. 4.6.
  • [134] Court of Justice of the European Union, Huawei Technologies Co.Ltd. v. ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland GmbH, 16 July 2015.
  • [135] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 9, par. 4.2.1.
  • [136] Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgement dated 17 March 2020, page 9, par.4.18.