在欧洲联盟法院华为诉中兴通信案判决后所做成的判例
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Updated 10 四月 2019

华为诉中兴通信

欧洲联盟法院判决
16 七月 2015 - Case No. C-170/13

A. 事实

原告华为技术有限公司持有由欧洲电信标准协会(ETSI)所发展的对实施LTE无线通信技术标准必不可少的专利(标准必要专利或SEP) [1] 。 原告于2009年3月向ETSI承诺愿依照公平、合理和无歧视(FRAND)的条款与条件向实施人提供该专利 [2]

被告中兴通讯股份有限公司以及中兴通讯德国分公司本身也拥有几项与LTE标准相关的标准必要专利 [3] ,同时其也在德国等市场销售符合LTE标准的产品 [4]

在2010年11月至2011年3月之间,双方就原告所持有的标准必要专利组合的许可事宜进行了讨论 [4] 。原告提出了其所认为合理的许可费率,而另一方面,被告则试图达成交叉许可协议 [5] 。于是,此项许可协议的要约未能达成最终协议 [5]

原告其后于2011年4月在德国杜塞尔多夫地区地方法院(Landgericht)向被告提起诉讼,寻求针对被告的禁令救济,要求被告就其过去的使用行为开立担保帐户的账目,召回其产品,并针对其专利侵权行为请求损害赔偿 [6]

杜塞尔多夫地区地方法院暂时停止了诉讼程序,并根据《欧洲联盟运作条约》(TFEU)第267条的规定,向欧洲联盟法院(CJEU)提出了进行先行裁决的请求。简而言之,杜塞尔多夫地区地方法院指出,德国联邦法院(Bundesgerichtshof)和欧洲联盟委员会在有关于何种情况下,标准必要专利持有人对标准必要专利实施人提出的禁令诉讼将构成对市场支配地位的滥用而违反了《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条此一问题上,似乎采取了相互矛盾的立场 [7] 。德国联邦法院在其橙皮书案裁决中裁定,在涉及标准必要专利的侵权诉讼中,被告只有在其以达成许可协议为目的向专利持有人发出不含附带条件、公平的许可要约,并且对其过去以及其后可能发生的使用行为所衍生的许可费的支付提交保证金的情况下,才有权根据《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102 条提出抗辩(并且因此可避免禁令的核发) [8] 。然而,欧洲联盟委员会在有关三星于多个欧盟成员国内针对苹果公司采取的执法行动的几个诉讼中却认为,在被告已经表明愿意根据专利持有人的FRAND承诺,以FRAND条款进行许可谈判的情况下,针对标准必要专利采取禁令救济的行为原则上违反了《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条 [9]

根据本判决,欧洲联盟法院确立了有关标准必要专利持有人在何种情况下可以对专利实施人主张禁令救济而不违反《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条的条件。欧洲联盟法院特别针对当已就其所持有的标准必要专利做出以FRAND条款进行许可的不可撤销承诺的标准必要专利持有人,在提起相应的诉讼前已经履行下列行为时,其寻求禁令救济和/或要求召回侵权产品的行为并不会构成对市场支配地位的滥用作出裁决:

  • 首先,标准必要专利持有人必须透过“明确指出其遭受侵权的为何项专利,并指明被指控的侵权人以何种方式侵权”的方式,对专利实施人进行侵权通知,并且
  • 第二,如果被指控的侵权人表示愿意按照FRAND条款达成许可协议,则标准必要专利持有人必须“向该被指控的侵权人提出符合此种条款的具体书面许可要约,特别是必须指明许可费及其所使用的计算方式 [10]

相对地,标准必要专利实施人只有在没有任何延迟地回应标准必要专利持有人所发出的许可要约的情况下,才可以主张标准必要专利持有人寻求禁令救济和/或召回侵权产品的行为具备滥用市场支配地位的性质 [11] 。如果标准必要专利实施人拒绝接受该许可要约,则必须:

  • 立即以书面提出向标准必要专利持有人提出符合FRAND条款的特定反许可要约 [12] ,并且
  • 如果其所提出的反许可要约遭到拒绝,则必须就其对该专利的使用行为提供适当的担保,例如提供银行担保或将所需金额存入保证金帐户 [13]

欧洲联盟法院明确指出,上述框架不适用于标准必要专利持有人对实施人过去的使用行为所造成的损害提出损害赔偿和/或开设担保帐户的主张;与这些主张相关的诉讼不会构成对《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条的违反,因为它们对符合该项标准的产品是否可以出现或保留在市场上没有影响 [14]

B. 法院的论理

欧洲联盟法院强调对衡平的需求,一方面需要对标准必要专利持有人的核心基本知识产权进行有效司法保护,另一方面也需要维持自由且不失真的市场竞争的公共利益 [15]

由于当事各方并未就原告在市场上的支配地位提出异议,法院的分析着重于是否存在《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条所称的“滥用行为” [16] 。欧洲联盟法院认为,行使知识产权权利的行为本身并不会构成“滥用行为”,即便此一行使权利者是在市场中占有支配地位的企业 [17] 。此外,仅在“特殊情况”下,行使知识产权权利的行为才可能构成滥用市场支配地位的行为 [18]

涉及标准必要专利的案件与其他与知识产权相关的案件存在本质上的不同,其原因在于:首先,一项专利已取得标准必要专利地位这一事实意味着该专利的持有人可以透过“阻止竞争对手制造的产品出现或保留在市场上,从而将涉案产品的制造权保留专属于自己” [19] 。除此之外,对实施标准的第三方而言,专利持有人通过做出FRAND承诺创造出一种第三方可以按FRAND条款取得标准必要专利的“合法期待” [19] 。考虑到标准必要专利持有人创造了此一“合法期待”,原则上,当标准必要专利持有人拒绝授予其FRAND许可时,在侵权诉讼中被起诉的专利实施人可以通过援用《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条为自己进行抗辩 [20]

尽管标准必要专利持有人诉诸法律程序来保护其知识产权的权利不能被剥夺,欧洲联盟法院仍然认为,标准必要专利持有人做出FRAND承诺正当化了其在寻求禁令救济时应该遵守某些特定要求的义务 [21] 。特别是为了避免违反《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条,标准必要专利持有人应满足以下条件:(a)在提起禁令救济诉讼之前,标准必要专利持有人必须透过“明确指出其遭受侵权的为何项专利,并指明被指控的侵权人以何种方式侵权”的方式,对专利实施人进行侵权通知 [22] ,并且(b)如果被指控的侵权人表示愿意按照FRAND条款达成许可协议,则标准必要专利持有人必须“向该被指控的侵权人提出符合此种条款的具体书面许可要约,特别是必须指明许可费及其所使用的计算方式 [23] 。在这种情况下,欧洲联盟法院认为,可以合理期待标准必要专利持有人有能力提出这样的要约,因为一般来说并不存在公开的标准必要专利许可协议,并且标准必要专利持有人与第三方间签订的现有协议条款也不会被公开,因此,标准必要专利人“比起被指控的侵权人更有能力检查其要约是否符合不歧视的条件” [24]

另一方面,(被指控的)侵权人也必须“本于善意并依据该领域公认的既存商业惯例”对标准必要专利持有人的要约认真地做出回应 [11] 。(被指控的)侵权人是否符合此要求则必须基于“客观因素”来判定,这尤其意味着(被指控的)侵权人没有使用“延迟策略” [11]

如果(被指控的)侵权人认为标准必要专利持有人所提出的条款不符合其FRAND承诺,并选择拒绝标准必要专利持有人所提出的许可要约,则(被指控的)侵权人就必须向标准必要专利持有人提交一份符合FRAND条款的具体书面反要约 [12] 。如果其所提出的反要约遭到标准必要专利持有人的拒绝,并且(被指控的)侵权人已经在没有许可的情况下使用了涉案的标准必要专利,则(被指控的)侵权人有义务根据该领域公认的既存商业惯例就其使用行为提供“适当的担保”,例如提供银行担保或将所需金额存入保证金帐户 [13] 。针对该担保的计算除了必须包含“ 对标准必要专利过去的使用行为的数额”外,(被指控的)侵权人还必须能够就这些使用行为开立担保帐户 [13]

当(被指控的)侵权人提出反要约后双方仍然不能达成协议时,欧洲联盟法院指出,当事方可以选择以“共同协议”的方式,没有拖延地请求“由独立的第三方即刻对许可费数额进行决定” [25]

最后,欧洲联盟法院明确指出,(被指控的)侵权人有权在许可谈判进行的同时,对标准必要专利持有人所持有的专利的有效性和/或标准必要性和/或实际使用进行挑战,或保留未来这样做的权利 [26]

 

  • [1] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment dated 6 July 2015, 段 22。
  • [2] 同上注, 段 22。
  • [3] 同上注, 段 40。
  • [4] 同上注, 段 24。
  • [5] 同上注, 段 25。
  • [6] 同上注, 段 27。
  • [7] 同上注, 段 29 及以下。
  • [8] 同上注, 段 30 及以下。
  • [9] 同上注, 段 34 及以下。
  • [10] 同上注, 段 77。
  • [11] 同上注, 段 65。
  • [12] 同上注, 段 66。
  • [13] 同上注, 段 67。
  • [14] 同上注, 段 72及以下。
  • [15] 同上注, 段 42。
  • [16] 同上注, 段 43。
  • [17] 同上注, 段 46。
  • [18]  同上注, 段 47。
  • [19] 同上注, 段 53。
  • [20] 同上注, 段 53及以下。
  • [21] 同上注, 段 58 及以下。
  • [22] 同上注, 段 61。
  • [23] 同上注, 段 63。
  • [24] 同上注, 段 64。
  • [25] 同上注, 段 68。
  • [26] 同上注, 段 69。

Updated 6 六月 2017

Archos v. Philips, Rechtbank Den Haag

荷兰法院判决
8 二月 2017 - Case No. C/09/505587 / HA ZA 16-206 (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025)

  1. Facts
    Defendant (Koninklijke Philips N.V.) is the proprietor of a number of patents declared essential to ETSI’s UMTS (3G) and LTE (4G) standards. Defendant made FRAND commitments towards ETSI on 15 January 1998 and 26 November 2009. Claimant (Archos S.A.) markets mobile devices which are alleged to infringe upon Defendant’s patents.
    By letter of 5 June 2014, Defendant brought her UMTS and LTE patent portfolio and her licensing program to the attention of Claimant. In this letter, Defendant made clear that Claimant was infringing her patents by marketing products incorporating the UMTS and LTE standards and explained the possibility of obtaining a FRAND license. On 15 September 2014, a meeting took place to inform Claimant of Defendant’s patent portfolio and to discuss the licensing offer. In another meeting on 25 November 2014, Claimant suggested Defendant to grant her a royalty-free license to all of Defendant’s patents (i.e. not only to the UMTS/LTE patents but also to other patents related to so-called ‘Portable Features’) in exchange for the transfer of certain patents of Claimant to Defendant. Defendant informed Claimant by email of 23 December 2014 that it was not interested in Claimant’s patents because it considered them to represent ‘relatively low value’.
    By letter of 28 July 2015 Defendant sent Claimant an updated list of UMTS/LTE patents as well as a draft licensing agreement in which she confirmed her earlier licensing offer. The proposed royalty amounted to $ 0.75 per product containing UMTS and/or LTE functionality. For products already sold, a royalty of $ 1 would need to be paid. At a next meeting on 3 September 2015, it became clear that Claimant did not wish to obtain the license offered. On behalf of Claimant, it was made clear during the meeting that Defendant would have to take legal action if she wished to obtain a license fee. In October 2015, Defendant started proceedings before the Rechtbank Den Haag for infringement of her European Patents EP 1 440 525, EP 1 685 659 and EP 1 623 511.
    By letter of 12 January 2016, Claimant made a written counter offer of 0.071% of her net revenue from products incorporating the UMTS and/or LTE standards. For a net sale price per product of € 100, the offered royalty would amount to 7 eurocent per product.
  2. Court’s reasoning
    Claimant asked the court to declare that Defendant’s licensing offer of 28 July 2015 is not FRAND and to declare that a royalty fee of € 0.007 for every product sold by Claimant incorporating the UMTS standard and a royalty fee of € 0.020 for every product sold by Claimant incorporating the UMTS and LTE standards is FRAND. In addition, Claimant asked the court to rule that its own licensing offer of 12 January 2016 is higher than what a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory royalty fee would require.
    1. Market power and notice of infringement
      The court left open whether the SEPs conferred market power to Defendant since it did, in any case, find no abuse of such potential market power. The court argued that it is generally accepted and to be inferred from the system laid down in the Huawei/ZTE judgment that a FRAND license has a certain bandwidth. After all, the Huawei/ZTE judgment contemplates that the SEP holder makes a FRAND offer first and afterwards, if the SEP user does not agree with the offer, makes a counter offer which also has to be FRAND. During this negotiation process, the characteristics of the SEP user as well as its specific objections can be taken account in the license at the discretion of the parties. As such, the court noted that the fact that Defendant’s initial offer would turn out to be unreasonable for Claimant because she finds itself in the low budget segment of the market and her margins are small does not imply that the offer made by Defendant on 28 July 2015 is not FRAND.
      The court also made clear that until the Huawei/ZTE judgment the initiative to obtain a license was incumbent on the SEP user and not on the SEP holder in line with the common interpretation of the judgment of the Rechtbank Den Haag in Philips/SK Kassetten and the Orange Book ruling of the Bundesgerichtshof. In the view of the court the, on this crucial point, contrary Huawei/ZTE judgment that was delivered on 15 July 2015 constituted a new moment for negotiation between the parties. The court noted that, in line with the Huawei/ZTE judgment, Defendant took initiative with its licensing offer of 28 July 2015. Since Claimant made clear in the meeting on 3 September 2015 that Defendant would have to take legal action if she wished to obtain more than a few thousand euros in licensing fees, it seems unfitting that Archos reproaches Philips to have not been open to negotiation, or at least that position is insufficiently substantiated (par. 4.3).
    2. The SEP owner’s licensing offer
      Claimant put forward a number of arguments for its claim that Defendant’s offer of 28 July 2015 is not FRAND. All of these arguments were rejected by the court on the ground that Claimant had not sufficiently substantiated them. The main arguments raised are as follows.
      Claimant argued that Defendant’s rights regarding devices incorporating Qualcomm baseband chips had been exhausted due to the cross-license that Defendant had already concluded with Qualcomm for these chips. Since a number of Claimant’s products rely on Qualcomm baseband chips, the compensation that Defendant had already received from Qualcomm should, in the view of Claimant, at least have been taken into account in the license offer. The court noted that Claimant had not sufficiently contested that the Qualcomm license did not cover production and sales of mobile phones – as Defendant had made clear before the court – and that Claimant could have raised this point during the negotiations (par. 4.4).
      The court continued by stating that the fact that Defendant’s licensing offer covered both UMTS and LTE SEPS could not affect the FRAND-ness of the offer in the case at hand considering that Claimant’s products do not merely require a license under the LTE SEPs but also under the UMTS SEPs (par. 4.5).
      While the parties agreed that the Defendant’s share of the absolute number of SEPs in the UMTS-SEP portfolio is an important factor for assessing the FRAND-character of Defendant’s offer, they each reached different absolute numbers. The court concluded that the calculations in the consultancy reports on which Claimant relied do not lead to accurate results and are rather speculative in nature. As such, the Claimant downplayed the value of Defendant’s SEPs (par. 4.6-4.7).
      With regard to Claimant’s argument that Defendant’s proposed royalty rate would amount to impermissible royalty stacking, the court argued that this was insufficiently substantiated by Claimant (par. 4.8).
      Claimant also argued that the royalty rate should not be based on the total price of a phone but merely on the part in which the technology at issue is incorporated (the Smallest Saleable Patent-Practising Unit, SSPPU). In this context, the court noted that Defendant rightly pointed out that the requested royalty was set at a fixed amount as a result of which there is no relationship with the market value of the phone. Furthermore, since the SSPPU concept is at the very least subject to debate, the court noted that this issue could have been considered in the negotiations. That the royalty rate suggested by Defendant, which was not based on the SSPPU price, would not be FRAND for that mere reason could not be established by the court (par. 4.10).
      The court also dismissed Claimant’s reference to patent hold-up on the ground that a situation of hold-up can only occur in the case of a non-FRAND license which had not been established in the case at issue (par. 4.13).
      In the end, the court dismissed Claimant’s request to make a declaratory statement that Defendant’s offer of 28 July 2015 was not FRAND.
    3. The standard implementer’s reaction
      Considering that Claimant’s counter offer of 12 January 2016 is more than a factor 10 lower than the Defendant’s offer and is based on an inaccurate (at least insufficiently substantiated) share of Defendant’s SEPs in the relevant UMTS standard, the court refused to declare the counter offer to be FRAND, let alone to declare that this counter offer is higher than a FRAND royalty rate as requested by Claimant (par. 4.17-4.18).
  3. Other important issues
    AA defence that Defendant invoked was that Claimant had no interest (anymore) in the requested declaratory statements because its respective FRAND commitments were exhausted due to the unwilling attitude of Claimant. However, as Claimant’s requests for the declaratory statements were found not to be sufficiently substantiated, there was no need for the court to discuss this issue anymore (par. 4.18).

Updated 3 十二月 2018

IP Bridge v HTC

曼海姆地区法院
28 九月 2018 - Case No. 7 O 165/16

A. Facts

The Claimant, IP Bridge, is a non-practising entity holding a European patent (German part) which was declared essential to the wireless telecommunications standard LTE (Standard Essential Patent or SEP) developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [27] . The previous holder of the SEP in question had made an undertaking towards ETSI according to Article 6.1 of ETSI IPR Policy to make the patent accessible to users on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions [28] .

The Defendant is a German subsidiary of HTC, a company which manufactures and sells electronic devices worldwide, including mobile phones complying with the LTE standard [29] . The Defendant filed an action for invalidity against the Claimant’s SEP in Germany [29] .

In December 2014, the Claimant contacted the Defendant’s parent company (parent company) suggesting that the parties entered into negotiations regarding a licence for Claimant’s patent portfolio which also included the aforementioned SEP [29] . Subsequently, several licensing offers and counter-offers were made by the Claimant and the parent company respectively [29] . On 29 February 2016, the Claimant sent a letter to the parent company explaining how the LTE standard made use of the technology covered by its SEP inter alia under reference to an attached claims chart [30] . In response, the parent company confirmed that it is willing to obtain a licence, among others, by letter dated 7 September 2016 [31] . However, no licensing agreement was concluded.

On 27 September 2016, the Claimant brought an infringement action against the Defendant before the District Court of Mannheim (Court) requesting for a declaratory judgment confirming Defendant’s liability for damages arising from the use of its SEP as well as for information and rendering of accounts [32] .

On 16 February 2018, during the course of the pending proceedings against the Defendant, the Claimant made a further licensing offer to the parent company [33] . On 11 April 2018, after the parent company had signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement, the Claimant presented existing licensing agreements with third parties concerning its relevant patent portfolio (comparable agreements) to the parent company and requested the latter to respond to its last licensing offer of 16 February 2018 within one week (that is until 18 April 2018) [33] . This deadline was extended for almost three weeks until 7 May 2018 [33] .

On 15 May 2018, the Claimant extended its claims in the ongoing proceedings; in addition to its already pending claims, it sought for injunctive relief and also requested the recall and the destruction of products infringing its SEP (claims for injunction) [33] .

With the present judgment the Court ruled that the Defendant is liable for damages arising from the infringement of the SEP in suit [34] . The Court also ordered the Defendant to render accounts and to provide relevant information to the Claimant [34] . On the other hand, the Court dismissed the claim for injunctive relief and the recall and destruction of infringing products as being unenforceable for the time being [35] .


B. Court’s reasoning

The Court held that the products sold by the Defendant in Germany infringe Claimant’s SEP [36] . Thus, the Defendant is obliged to compensate the damages suffered by the Claimant and the previous holder of the patent in suit [34] . Since the Claimant has no knowledge of the details required for the quantification of the damages suffered, the Defendant is obliged to provide information on relevant uses (starting from the publication of the patent grant) and render accounts for such uses (starting from one month after the publication of the patent grant) [34] .

In the Court’s view, the Defendant cannot raise a defence based on a so-called “patent ambush” against these claims [37] . A “patent ambush” requires that the patent holder deliberately – in terms of a willful fraudulent misconduct – misled the participants in the standardisation process and intentionally prevented the adoption of an alternative technology into the standard [38] . Insofar, it needs to be established (by the defendant) that the disclosure of the patent during the standardisation process would have led to an alternative structure of the standard, which would have avoided making use of the teaching of the patent in suit; the mere theoretical possibility of an alternative technical solution does not suffice for supporting the allegation of a “patent ambush” [38] . The Court held that the Defendant failed to establish such fact [37] . Accordingly, the Court left the question regarding the legal consequences of a “patent ambush” open (obligation to licence royalty-free or just an obligation to offer FRAND licences?) [37] .

Furthermore, the Court stressed out that the FRAND undertaking given by the previous holder of the SEP in suit has no impact on both the scope and the enforceability of the above claims [39] .

In the Court’s eyes, the Claimant is bound to the FRAND undertaking made by the previous holder of the SEP in suit towards ETSI [40] . The wording of Article 6.1. ETSI IPR Policy establishes a respective assumption [40] . In any case, the assignee of a SEP abuses its market power, if it is aware of the FRAND-undertaking of its predecessor, but, nevertheless, refuses to fulfil the obligations arising from it [30] . The assignee of an SEP cannot draw benefits from the inclusion of its patent into a standard, without being bound to the FRAND commitment of its predecessor, since the latter enabled the inclusion of the SEP in the standard in the first place [30] . Indeed, antitrust law and particularly Article 101 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) obliges standard development organisations to make the inclusion of patented technology into a standard subject to a FRAND commitment of the patent holder, in order to secure that essential technology will be accessible to users [41] .

Having said that, the Court made clear that SEP holder’s claims for information and rendering of accounts are not limited by the FRAND undertaking [39] . Even if one would assume that such undertaking limits the SEP holder’s claims for damages to the amount of the FRAND royalty (which the Court left undecided), the patent holder would, nevertheless, be entitled, in principle, to information regarding the use of its SEP [39] .

In addition, the Court explained that a FRAND undertaking has also no influence on the enforceability of the claims for damages (on the merits), information and rendering of accounts asserted by the Claimant [39] . In particular, these claims are not subject to the conduct requirements set forth by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the matter Huawei v ZTEHuawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-130/13. (Huawei requirements or framework) with respect to dominant undertakings in terms of Article 102 TFEU [43] .

The opposite is, on the other hand, the case with respect to the claims for injunction asserted by the Claimant. These claims are not enforceable for the time being, since the Claimant failed to fully comply with the Huawei requirements [44] .

Regarding to the SEP in suit, the Court ruled that the Claimant has a dominant market position in terms of Article 102 TFEU: The patent is essential to the LTE standard, which, in turn, cannot be substituted by an alternative standard (from the users’ point of view) [45] .

Looking at the negotiations between the parties involved, the Court did not see any flaws in the parties’ conduct with respect to the first two steps of the framework; the Claimant had effectively notified the Defendant about the infringing use of its SEP and the Defendant (in fact, its parent company) had effectively declared its willingness to obtain a licence covering also the SEP in suit [30] . In this context, the Court pointed out that the SEP holder’s obligation to notify the user of the infringing use of its SEP is also met, when the respective notification is addressed to the parent company of the (alleged) infringer (as is was the case here, especially with the Claimant’s letter to the parent company dated 29 February 2016) [30] .

However, the Court held that the Claimant failed to fulfil its consequent obligation under the Huawei framework, namely to make a FRAND licensing offer to the Defendant (respectively its parent company) [46] .

The Court considered only two offers made by the Claimant to the Defendant’s parent company prior to the extension of its claims in the pending proceedings on 15 May 2018 (since the other offers made were either indisputably not FRAND or were not produced by the Claimant in trial) [31] .

An offer made in February 2016 was found not to be FRAND in terms of content, since it contained a clause, according to which the licensee was obliged to pay the full amount of the royalties agreed, even if only one patent of the licensed portfolio was valid and used by the Defendant [31] .

The Court reached the same conclusion also with respect to the further offer made by the Claimant on 11 April 2018 (that is short before the Claimant extended its claims in the proceedings, adding the claims for injunction) [47] . The Court held that this offer did not comply with the Huawei requirements, since the Defendant was not given sufficient time to assess the offer and eventually make a counter-offer to the Claimant, before the latter asserted the claims for injunction against him in the proceedings [31] .

In the Court’s eyes, a licensing offer complying with the Huawei requirements is only given, when the SEP holder provides the SEP user with all information required from assessing the FRAND conformity of the offer [48] . Only then, the SEP user’s consequent obligation under the Huawei framework to make a FRAND counter-offer to the SEP holder is triggered [48] . In particular, the SEP holder must make the requested royalty amount transparent with reference to a standard licensing programme implemented in the market or to rates actually paid by third parties to a patent pool, covering also patents relevant to the standard [48] . For the assessment of the non-discriminatory character of the offer, information on comparable agreements is needed [48] .

Based on the above considerations, the Court held that the period of 22 workdays between the presentation of the comparable agreements to the parent company (11 April 2018) and the assertion of the injunction claims in the proceedings by the Defendant (15 May 2018) was too short for a competent assessment of the Claimant’s licensing offer [49] . The fact that the Defendant (and/or its parent company) would have had sufficient time to react to the Claimant’s offer until the end of the oral hearings in mid-July 2018 was considered irrelevant by the Court in this respect [49] . The Huawei framework aims at preventing the situation, in which the SEP user agrees to unfavourable licensing conditions under the pressure of pending infringement proceedings (defined by the Court as “patent hold-up”) [49] . In case that the SEP holder has not fulfilled the Huawei requirements prior to the initiation of proceedings (as it was the case here), it has to make sure that the parties can again negotiated without the pressure of an ongoing trial, for instance by asking the court to stay its proceedings pursuant to Article 251 of the German Court of Civil Procedure [50] . Otherwise, the initiation of the infringement proceedings shall be considered as abusive in terms of antitrust law [50] . In the present case, the Claimant chose to not ask for a stay in the proceedings, ignoring the Court’s respective indication [50] .


C. Other issues

The Court explained that the registration in the patent register allows the registered patent holder to assert the patent rights in court [51] . On the other hand, it does not define the ownership of the patent in material legal terms [52] . Nevertheless, the patent registration establishes an assumption of ownership which must be rebutted by the defendant in infringement proceedings based on concrete indications [53] .

Besides that, the Court pointed out that a stay in the infringement proceedings (pursuant to Article 148 of the German Code of Civil Procedure) until the end of parallel invalidation proceedings concerning the patent(s) in suit can be considered only under special circumstances [54] . As a rule, it must be expected with a sufficient degree of probability that the patent(s) in suit will be invalidated [54] . The Defendant failed convince the Court that this was the case with the SEP in suit [54] .

  • [27] District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 28 September 2018, Case-No. 7 O 165/16, page 2 and 23.
  • [28] Ibid, page 23 et seq.
  • [29] Ibid, page 5.
  • [30] Ibid, page 25.
  • [31] Ibid, page 26.
  • [32] Ibid, pages 5 et seq.
  • [33] Ibid, page 6.
  • [34] Ibid, page 19.
  • [35] Ibid,page 23.
  • [36] Ibid, pages 16 et seqq.
  • [37] Ibid, page 20.
  • [38] Ibid, page 21.
  • [39] Ibid, page 22.
  • [40] Ibid, page 24.
  • [41] Ibid, pages 24 et seq.
  • [42] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-130/13.
  • [43] District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 28 September 2018, Case-No. 7 O 165/16, pages 22.
  • [44] Ibid,pages 23 and 25.
  • [45] Ibid, page 23.
  • [46] Ibid, pages 23 and 25 et seq.
  • [47] Ibid, pages 26 et seqq.
  • [48] Ibid, page 27.
  • [49] Ibid, page 28.
  • [50] Ibid, page 29.
  • [51] Ibid, page 10.
  • [52] Ibid, pages 10 et seq.
  • [53] Ibid, page 11.
  • [54] Ibid, page 30.

Updated 9 十一月 2020

诺基亚诉戴姆勒

曼海姆地区法院
18 八月 2020 - Case No. 2 O 34/19

A. 事实

原告是总部位于芬兰的诺基亚集团的一部分(Nokia,以下称“诺基亚”)。诺基亚是一个主要的通信服务提供者,并持有一系列的专利组合,而这些专利组合被宣告为实施欧洲电信标准协会(ETSI)所发展出的数种无线通信标准时(潜在)必要的专利(以下称“标准必要专利”或“SEP”)。

被告戴姆勒(Daimler)是一家遍布全球的德国汽车制造商。戴姆勒在德国生产并销售具有连网功能的汽车,而此一连网功能实施了由欧洲电信标准协会所发展出的标准。

诺基亚就本案涉案专利为实施4G / LTE标准时所必要向欧洲电信标准协会作出宣告。

欧洲电信标准协会要求各专利持有人承诺愿依照公平、合理且无歧视(FRAND)的条款和条件向标准实施人提供实施该标准时必要或可能成为必要的专利。 诺基亚于2016年6月21日通过提供一份列举所有其已向欧洲电信标准协会作出宣告为实施标准时(潜在)必要的专利及专利申请的清单对戴姆勒告知其所持有的标准必要专利组合。戴姆勒回应称其愿意在其产品确实侵害诺基亚专利权的情况下取得许可。

诺基亚在2016年11月9日首次向戴姆勒提出许可要约,并于2016年12月7日向戴姆勒提供了更多与其专利组合相关的信息。戴姆勒于2016年12月14日回覆称对其生产制造戴姆勒汽车中内建的所谓“车载信息控制单元”(TCU)的供应商进行许可将更有效率。自2017年1月起至2019年2月为止,戴姆勒均没有与诺基亚进行进一步的谈判,也没有参与诺基亚与戴姆勒供应商之间的讨论。 诺基亚于2019年2月27日向戴姆勒提出了第二份许可要约,其中更进一步添加了说明其专利与受影响标准的相关部分对应关系的权利要求对照表。戴姆勒于2019年3月19日再度拒绝了此一许可要约,其理由基本上在于,其认为诺基亚所持有的专利组合的许可费应以供应商提供给戴姆勒的组件价格而非按戴姆勒生产的汽车价格为标准计算。

随后,诺基亚在德国慕尼黑、杜塞尔多夫和曼海姆等地的地区法院对戴姆勒提起了数项侵权诉讼。

在侵权诉讼程序开启后不久,戴姆勒于2019年5月9日向诺基亚提出了许可反要约。此许可反要约中针对诺基亚专利组合的许可费的计算标准是依据戴姆勒向其供应商支付的车载信息控制单元的平均售价。诺基亚拒绝了这一许可反要约。

戴姆勒于2020年6月10日向诺基亚提出了第二次反许可要约。此反许可要约中诺基亚将能够单方面决定许可费(根据德国民法典第315条),而戴姆勒将有权就已决定的许可费向法院提出异议。第二次反许可要约也遭到诺基亚拒绝。

德国联邦反垄断办公室(以下称“反垄断办公室“)于2020年6月18日介入了曼海姆地区法院(以下称”法院“)的当前诉讼程序,并建议法院将有关FRAND承诺性质的某些问题提交至欧洲联盟法院进行审查及解释,然而法院并没有遵循反垄断办公室的建议。

法院在当前判决 [55] (引自https://www.juris.de)中对对戴姆勒核发了禁令,并确认戴姆勒应承担实质性损害赔偿的责任。法院还要求戴姆勒必须开立担保帐户并且提供计算诺基亚所受损失必需的相关信息。

 

B. 法院的论理

法院裁定戴姆勒對本案涉案专利構成侵權 [56] 。因此,诺基亚有权获得包含禁令救濟及其它訴訟主張的支持 [57] 。 戴姆勒及其参加诉讼的所屬供应商主張了所谓的“FRAND抗辯”,認為诺基亚提起侵权诉讼的行為構成了對其市場支配地位的滥用,從而违反了《欧洲聯盟運作条约》(TFEU)第102条,因此其禁令救济主张应予否决。特別是,戴姆勒等主張诺基亚未能遵守歐洲聯盟法院(CJEU)在华为诉中兴案中所確立的行為義務(以下稱“华为案判決”或“華為框架”) [58]

法院認為戴姆勒及其供应商所提出的主張無理由,因此驳回了其所提出的FRAND抗辩 [59]

 

华为框架

法院明确指出,标准必要专利持有人并不当然被禁止行使其因持有专利而享有的专属权利 [60] 。其所持有的专利属于标准必要的这一事实,并不意味着专利持有人有义务容忍第三人对其技术的使用,除非是其已经许可了该使用,或者因其处于市场支配地位而有义务必须许可该使用 [60]

当专利持有人已经遵守了其于华为框架下的义务时,则其因为行使专利权而构成对市场支配地位的滥用的情况便不会发生了 [61] 。然而,这些义务是以在未经权利持有人许可的情况下就已经使用了该项受保护技术的实施人愿意按照FRAND条款取得许可为前提条件的 [62] 。法院解释到,专利持有人并不能向法院提出对任一标准实施人“强制施加”许可协议的主张,很大部分的原因在于其并没有主张签署许可协议的法律上权利 [62] 。此外,因处于市场支配地位而衍生的“特殊责任”对标准必要专利持有人的要求在于其付出了“充分的努力”来促进与原则上有意愿取得许可的被许可人间协议的签署 [63]

 

侵权通知

法院认为,这些“努力”包括在提起侵权诉讼之前,就对涉案专利的侵权行为,以及取得许可的可能与需求,向实施人进行通知的义务 [64] 。法院在对本案进行审理后认为,诺基亚已经履行了上述义务 [65] [11]。

就内容而言,侵权通知内必须指明遭受侵权的专利,并描述具体的侵权使用行为与受侵害的实施例 [64] 。对该项侵权行为进行详细的技术上和法律上分析并不是必要的——实施人仅需要被置于一个最终能够在专家和/或法律建议的协助下对其被指控的侵权行为进行评估的地位即可 [64] 。通常情况下,提出权利要求对照表便已经足够(但不是强制性的) [64] 。法院还指出,专利持有人无需向每一个侵害其专利权的终端设备制造商的供应商个别提出单独的侵权通知 [66]

在法院看来,诺基亚于2016年6月21日、2016年11月9日、以及2016年12月7日所发出的电子邮件符合了上述要求 [67] 。诺基亚(至少在最初)没有指出涉案专利具体涉及标准文书中的哪个特定部分这一事实并不被认为是有害的,因为侵权通知的内容并不需要能够促进对侵权行为的最终评估 [68]

此外,法院认为,诺基亚没有必要在其侵权通知中明确指出根据相关标准而产生连网功能的特定组件是哪些(例如:戴姆勒汽车中内建的车载信息控制单元) [69] 。由于戴姆勒购买并在其产品中使用了这些组件,信息不足的情况是不可能发生的 [69]

 

取得许可的意愿

此外,法院认为,戴姆勒并没有充分表达其与诺基亚签订FRAND许可协议的意愿,因此不能主张FRAND抗辩来避免禁令的颁发 [70]

在法院看来,实施人必须“清楚”且“明确”地表明其愿意依照“任何实际上符合FRAND的条款”与标准必要专利持有人达成许可协议,并且随后以一种“目的性导向”的态度来进行许可谈判(引用德国联邦法院2020年5月5日在Sisvel诉Haier案中的判决– Sisvel v Haier, Case No. KZR 36/17以及英格兰和威尔士高等法院2017年4月5日在无线星球诉华为案中所做出的判决[2017] EWHC 711(Pat)-Unwired Planet v Huawei) [71] 。实施人在许可谈判中“目的性导向”的参与具有决定性的重要性,由于实施人通常在许可谈判开始之前就已经使用了该标准化技术专利,拖延许可协议的签署直至该专利到期失效为止对他们而言可能是有利的,然而,这与华为案判决的精神是背道而驰的 [72] 。因此,仅对侵权通知做出表示愿意考虑签署许可协议或就是否以及在何种条件下应该考虑取得许可进行谈判这样的回覆是不足够的 [71]

法院进一步指出,做出附带条件的许可意愿声明是不可接受的 [71] 。并且,拒绝讨论其对专利持有人发出的许可反要约有否存在任何改进的空间也可以被视为实施人一方不具备取得许可意愿的象征 [71]

基于以上所述,法院认为,戴姆勒最初以在其产品确实侵害了诺基亚的专利专利的前提下为签署许可协议的条件,并未能充分表达出其签署FRAND许可协议的意愿 [73] 。法院更表示,戴姆勒所提出的许可反要约同样不能够被认为是取得许可意愿的充分表示,特别是戴姆勒在第二次提出的许可反要约中赋予其对诺基亚单方面设定的许可费率进行挑战的权利,如此一来只会导致当事方间有关许可费率的确定的实质争议再度被拖延至将来的法律诉讼程序 [74]

法院还认为,由于戴姆勒不但没有与诺基亚进行谈判,反而是坚持要求由其供应商直接向诺基亚取得许可,戴姆勒并未扮演出一个“善意”的被许可人的角色 [75] 。此外,戴姆勒坚持以其向供应商购买车载信息控制单元组件的平均销售价格为基准计算诺基亚所持有的标准必要专利组合许可费也再度证明了戴姆勒缺乏取得许可的意愿 [76]

 

FRAND许可费的计算

法院认为,使用车载信息控制单元作为“参考价值”来为诺基亚所持有的标准必要专利组合计算许可费是不恰当的 [77]

一般来说,符合FRAND的条款和条件往往不仅只有一套,通常会存在一系列的许可条款和费用都能符合FRAND [78] 。此外,可以被认为符合FRAND的条款和条件也可能在各个行业之间以及不同的时间下有所差异 [78]

然而,法院指出,专利持有人原则上必须能够在价值链的最后阶段就其技术在可销售终端产品中的经济利益获得一定份额 [79] 。其原因在于,对该项受保护发明的实施“创造“了通过终端产品获取”经济利益“的”机会“ [79] 。法院不认同关于以最终产品的价值作为对专利技术价值的考量将使标准必要专利持有人得以从发生于价值链中其他阶段的创新发明中获益此一观点 [80] 。法院指出,有数种手段可以确保这种情况不会发生 [80]

因此,法院不赞同使用所谓的“最小可销售专利实施单元(SSPPU)“——即某一项产品中所包含的最小技术单元——作为计算FRAND许可费率的基准这一观点 [80] 。专利权穷竭所产生的影响将使得标准必要专利持有人被排除于共享在价值链的最后阶段才创造出的价值的行列之外 [80] 。除此之外,此种做法也将使的对”双重获利“行为的确认与避免变得更加复杂,而这意味着在价值链中的数个不同阶段得以对同一项专利多次进行许可 [80]

尽管如此,法院进一步阐明,上述原则并不全然意味着所有的许可协议都应该仅与终端设备制造商签署 [81] 。法院认为,即使是在供应链的其他阶段,也有多种可能可以就专利技术对可销售终端产品的价值进行评估 [81]

在这种背景下,法院认为,车载信息控制单元的销售价格并不能充分反映诺基亚所持有的标准必要专利对戴姆勒所生产的汽车——即本案中相关终端设备——的价值 [82] 。 车载信息控制单元的销售价格仅仅能够反应出戴姆勒本身的相应成本 [83] 。另一方面,连网功能使戴姆勒得以从为其客户提供其他额外服务中获得收益,节省成本并优化研发费用 [84] 。连网功能确保了创造此一价值的机会 [85] 。此外,法院指出,戴姆勒的几个主要竞争对手均接受了Avanci平台的许可模式(即专门向汽车制造商授予许可)这一事实更进一步展现出着重于受保护技术对终端产品的价值在汽车行业中也是合理的 [86]

 

无歧视

此外,法院认为,诺基亚对戴姆勒所提出的专利权主张并不具有歧视性,是以戴姆勒坚持许可必须由其供应商取得的主张无理由 [87]

法院进一步阐明,专利持有人原则上有权自由选择于供应链中的哪一个阶段主张其权利 [88] 。而这对处于市场支配地位的专利持有人而言亦无不同,因为竞争法本身并不当然限制此种可能性 [88] 。并且,处于市场支配地为的专利持有人也没有义务向所有潜在的被许可人提供一个“标准费率” [88]

《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条所规定的无歧视义务旨在防止对上游或下游市场竞争的妨碍,然而,其并不排除当有充分的理由存在时给予被许可人不同的待遇 [89]

在本案中,法院认为没有迹象表明诺基亚主张使用终端产品作为计算其专利许可费的基础将会对竞争产生影响 [90] 。特别是,尽管在汽车行业中存在通常由供应商取得出售给汽车制造商的零部件的使用许可这一事实,也不意味着诺基亚需要改变其通常惯例,尤其是通过Avanci平台授予戴姆勒竞争对手许可的实例已经表明,该于通信行业盛行的相应惯例已经在汽车行业中获得采纳 [91] 。此外,法院也不认为对终端设备制造商主张标准必要专利权可能会导致对其生产、销售和技术发展层面的限制从而损害消费者权益 [92] 。在这方面,法院引用了所谓的“委托制造权”,根据ETSI知识产权政策,该权利应被包含在FRAND许可协议中,并允许零组件制造商生产、销售和开发其产品 [93]

 

标准必要专利持有人所提出的许可要约 / 信息披露义务

此外,法院认为,戴姆勒无法通过主张诺基亚拒绝提供与其所提出的许可要约相关的充分信息来合理化自身不愿意取得许可的意愿 [94]

法院指出,标准必要专利持有人有义务证明其所提出的许可要约具备FRAND符合性 [95] 。如果专利持有人已经与第三方被许可人签订了非标准条款的许可协议,则专利持有人通常有义务以某种使实施人得以对其是否被提供了不同的商业条款进行评估的方式披露并呈现(至少包含)关键合同条款在内的协议内容 [95] 。关于此项义务所包含的范围与详细程度应依个案具体情况决定 [95]

考虑到这一点,法院认为,通过提交包含一项有关连网汽车价值的研究以及其与另一家主要汽车制造商间签署的许可协议在内的各项信息,诺基亚已经向戴姆勒提供了足够的信息 [96] 。于此脉络下,法院否认了诺基亚有向戴姆勒披露其与智能手机制造商间签署的许可协议的义务。法院拒绝了有关标准必要专利持有人的信息披露义务应延伸至涵盖此前签署的每一个许可协议的全部内容,并且标准必要专利持有人有义务披露所有现存许可协议的观点 [97] 。此外,法院更指出,通信行业中的许可协议对于评估汽车行业中的许可协议是否符合FRAND而言并无关联 [97]

 

供应商提出的FRAND抗辩

除上述几点外,法院还强调,戴姆勒无法从其参加本诉讼程序的供应商所提出的FRAND抗辩中获益 [98]

法院并未就关于被起诉的终端设备制造商原则上是否可以倚仗其供应商之一所提出的FRAND抗辩这一问题作出明确答覆。然而,法院认为,这将取决于该供应商在任何情况下均愿意由专利持有人处取得以终端产品为标准计算涉案专利价值(而非该产品的组件)的许可 [99] 。而在当前诉讼中情况并非如此 [100]

法院并没有忽略供应商可能将其向标准必要专利持有人支付的许可费转嫁在其客户身上这一问题 [101] 。然而,与第三方之间的合同约定(此处为供应商与终端设备制造商之间的协议),在法院看来,不应导致一个不允许标准必要专利持有人共享其专利技术为终端产品创造出的价值的许可协议的结果 [101]
 

C. 其他重要问题

最后,法院做出与反垄断办公室的建议相反的裁定,认为没有必要中止诉讼程序并将围绕着标准必要专利持有人的FRAND承诺是否将赋予价值链中的每一参与者直接对其主张获取双边许可的权利(即“对所有人进行许可”观点),抑或者是只对取得并使用标准化技术有主张的权利(即“所有人皆有权使用”的观点)等一系列问题提交欧洲联盟法院寻求答覆。

法院并未就此问题做出答覆,因为不论是戴姆勒还是其供应商均不愿意以该受保护技术为戴姆勒制造的汽车所创造出的价值为基准向诺基亚取得符合FRAND条款的许可 [102] 。法院还指出,就本案涉案专利将于从现在开始起算的几年后到期失效这一事实而言,也不应该中止本诉讼程序 [103]
 

  • [55] Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 18 August 2020, Case-No. 2 O 34/19。
  • [56] 同上注, 段 49-136。
  • [57] 同上注, 段 138。
  • [58] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13。
  • [59] Nokia v Daimler, District Court of Mannheim, judgment dated 18 August 2020, Case-No. 2 O 34/19, 段 144。
  • [60] 同上注, 段 146。
  • [61] 同上注, 段 147。
  • [62] 同上注, 段 148。
  • [63] 同上注, 段 149。
  • [64] 同上注, 段 152。
  • [65] 同上注, 段 151-156。
  • [66] 同上注, 段 248。
  • [67] 同上注, 段 153 及以下。
  • [68] 同上注, 段 154。
  • [69] 同上注, 段 155。
  • [70] 同上注, 段 157-231。
  • [71] 同上注, 段 158。
  • [72] 同上注, 段 159。
  • [73] 同上注, 段 161。
  • [74] 同上注, 段 197-199。
  • [75] 同上注, 段 157, 160 及 162-164。
  • [76] 同上注, 段 160 及 165-168。
  • [77] 同上注, 段 169。
  • [78] 同上注, 段 170。
  • [79] 同上注, 段 171。
  • [80] 同上注, 段 172。
  • [81] 同上注, 段 173。
  • [82] 同上注, 段 174 及以下。
  • [83] 同上注, 段 174。
  • [84] 同上注, 段 177。
  • [85] 同上注, 段 180。
  • [86] 同上注, 段 187 及以下。
  • [87] 同上注, 段 201-212。
  • [88] 同上注, 段 202。
  • [89] 同上注, 段 203。
  • [90] 同上注, 段 205。
  • [91] 同上注, 段 210。
  • [92] 同上注, 段 213。
  • [93] 同上注, 段 215。
  • [94] 同上注, 段 216 及以下。
  • [95] 同上注, 段 217。
  • [96] 同上注, 段 218。
  • [97] 同上注, 段 230。
  • [98] 同上注, 段 232 及以下。
  • [99] 同上注, 段 234, 236 及以下。
  • [100] 同上注, 段 240 及以下。
  • [101] 同上注, 段 239。
  • [102] 同上注, 段 253 及 291。
  • [103] 同上注, 段 291。

Updated 30 十月 2018

Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal

英国法院判决
23 十月 2018 - Case No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344

A. Facts

The Claimant, Unwired Planet International Limited, holds a significant portfolio of patents which are essential for the implementation of the 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE wireless telecommunications standards (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs). The Defendants, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Huawei Technologies (UK) Co. Ltd., manufacture and sell mobile devices complying with the above standards worldwide.

Starting in September 2013, the Claimant contacted the Defendants several times, requesting the latter to engage in discussions for a licence regarding its SEP portfolio. [104] In March 2014, the Claimant sued the Defendants as well as Samsung and Google for infringement of five of its UK SEPs before the UK High Court of Justice (High Court). [105] The Claimant also initiated parallel infringement proceedings against the Defendants in Germany. [106]

The High Court conducted three technical trials first, focusing on the validity and essentiality of four of the SEPs in suit. [107] By April 2016, these trials were completed; the High Court held that two of the SEPs in suit were both valid and essential, whereas two other patents were found to be invalid. [107] The parties agreed to postpone further technical trials indefinitely. [107]

In July 2016, Samsung took a licence from the Claimant covering, among other, the SEPs in suit. [108] The Claimant also settled the infringement proceedings with Google. [109]

In late 2016, the trial concerned with questions regarding to the licensing of the SEPs in suit commenced between the Claimant and the Defendants. Over the course of these proceedings the parties made licensing offers to the each other. However, they failed to reach an agreement. The Defendants indicated they were willing to take a licence under Claimant’s UK patent portfolio, whereas the Claimant contended that it was entitled to insist upon a worldwide licence. [110]

In April 2017, the High Court granted an UK injunction against the Defendant, until such time as it entered into a worldwide licensing agreement with the Claimant on the specific rates, which the court determined to be Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) [111] in accordance with the undertaking given by the Claimant towards the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). [112] Pending appeal, the High Court stayed the injunction. [113]

Shortly after the High Court delivered its decision, the Defendants began proceedings against the Claimant in China, which are still pending. [114]

With the present judgment, the UK Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendants’ appeal against the decision of the High Court. [115]


B. Court’s reasoning

The Defendants appealed the decision of the High Court on the following three grounds:

1. The High Court’s finding that only a worldwide licence was FRAND is erroneous; the imposition of such a licence on terms set by this court based on a national finding of infringement of UK patents is wrong in principle. [116]

2. The offer imposed to the Defendants by the High Court is discriminatory in violation of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking, since the rates offered are higher than the rates reflected in the licence granted by the Claimant to Samsung. [117]

3. The Claimant is not entitled to injunctive relief; by bringing the infringement proceedings against the Defendants, without meeting the requirements established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in the matter Huawei v ZTE [118] (Huawei judgment) before, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). [119]

Notably, the High Court’s determination of the rates which apply to the worldwide licence that the court requested the Defendants to take was not challenged by any of the parties to the proceedings. [120]


1. Worldwide licences

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Defendants’ notion that imposing a worldwide licence on an implementer is wrong, because it amounts to an (indirect) interference with foreign court proceedings relating to patents subsisting in foreign territories, which would have been subject to materially different approaches to the assessment of FRAND royalty rates and could, therefore, lead to different results (particularly the ongoing litigation between the parties in China and Germany). [121]

The Court of Appeal explained that in imposing a worldwide licence the High Court did neither adjudicate on issues of infringement or validity concerning any foreign SEPs, nor was it deciding what the appropriate relief for infringement of any foreign SEPs might be (particularly since it made clear that a FRAND licence should not prevent a licensee from challenging the validity or essentiality of any foreign SEPs and should make provision for sales in non-patent countries which do not require a licence) [122] . [123]

Moreover, the High Court simply determined the terms of the licence that the Claimant was required to offer to the Defendants pursuant to its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI. [124] Such an undertaking has international effect. [125] It applies to all SEPs of the patent holder irrespective of the territory in which they subsist. [126] This is necessary for two reasons: first, to protect implementers whose equipment may be sold and used in a number of different jurisdictions. [126] Second, to enable SEP holders to prevent implementers from “free-riding” on their innovations and secure an appropriate reward for carrying out their research and development activities and for engaging with the standardisation process. [127]

Accordingly, the High Court had not erred in finding that a worldwide licence was FRAND. On the contrary, there may be circumstances in which only a worldwide licence or at least a multi-territorial licence would be FRAND. [128] German Courts (in Pioneer Acer [129] and St. Lawrence v Vodafone [130] ) as well as the European Commission in its Communication dated 29 November 2017 [131] had also adopted a similar approach. [132]

Having said that, the Court of Appeal recognized that it may be “wholly impractical” for a SEP holder to seek to negotiate a licence for its patents on a country-by-country basis, just as it may be “prohibitively expensive” to seek to enforce its SEPs by litigating in each country in which they subsist. [127] In addition, if in the FRAND context the implementer could only be required to take country-by-country licences, there would be no prospect of any effective injunctive relief being granted to the SEP holder against it: the implementer could avoid an injunction, if it agreed to pay the royalties in respect of its activities in any particular country, once those activities had been found to infringe. [133] In this way, the implementer would have an incentive to hold out country-by-country, until it was compelled to pay. [133]

In its discussion of this topic, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the view taken by the High Court that in every given set of circumstances only one true set of FRAND terms exists. Nevertheless, the court did not consider that the opposite assumption of the High Court had a material effect to the its decision. [134]

In the eyes of the Court of Appeal, it is “unreal” to suggest that two parties, acting fairly and reasonably, will necessarily arrive at precisely the same set of licence terms as two other parties, also acting fairly and reasonably and faced with the same set of circumstances. [135] The reality is that a number of sets of terms may all be fair and reasonable in a given set of circumstances. [135] Whether there is only one true set of FRAND terms or not, is, therefore, more of a “theoretical problem” than a real one. [136] If the parties cannot reach an agreement, then the court (or arbitral tribunal) which will have to determine the licensing terms will normally declare one set of terms as FRAND. The SEP holder would then have to offer that specific set of terms to the implementer. On the other hand, in case that the court finds that two different sets of terms are FRAND, then the SEP holder will satisfy its FRAND undertaking towards ETSI, if it offers either one of them to the implementer. [136]

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal dismissed Defendants’ claim that imposing a worldwide licence is contrary to public policy and disproportionate. [137] In particular, the Defendants argued that this approach encourages over-declaration of patents [138] and is not compatible with the spirit of the Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, [139] which requires relief for patent infringement to be proportionate. [140]

Although the Court of Appeal recognised the existence of the practice of over-declaration and acknowledged that it is a problem, it held that this phenomenon cannot justify “condemning” SEP holders with large portfolios to “impossibly expensive” litigation in every territory in respect of which they seek to recover royalties. [141] The court also found that there was nothing disproportionate about the approach taken by the High Court, since the Defendants had the option to avoid an injunction by taking a licence on the terms which the court had determined. [142]


2. Non-discrimination

The Court of Appeal rejected the Defendants’ argument [143] that the non-discrimination component of Claimant’s FRAND undertaking towards ETSI obliges the Claimant to offer to the Defendants the same rates as those contained in the licence granted to Samsung. [144]

The Court of Appeal made clear that the obligation of the SEP holder not to discriminate is, in principle, engaged in the present case, since the Claimant’s transaction with the Defendants is equivalent to the licence it granted to Samsung. [145] In the court’s eyes, when deciding whether two transactions are equivalent one needs to focus first on the transactions themselves. Insofar, differences in the circumstances in which the transactions were entered into, particularly economic circumstances, such as the parties’ financial position [146] or market conditions (e.g. cost of raw materials), cannot make two otherwise identical transactions non-equivalent (releasing, therefore, the patent holder from the obligation not to discriminate). Changes in such circumstances could only amount to an objective justification for a difference in treatment. [147]

Considering the specific content of the SEP holder’s respective obligation, the Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court’s finding that the non-discrimination element of a SEP holder’s FRAND undertaking does not imply a so-called “hard-edged” component (imposing on the patent holder an obligation to offer the same rate to similarly situated implementers). [148] It argued that the “hard-edged” approach is “excessively strict” and fails to achieve a balance between a fair return to the SEP owner and universal access to the technology. [149] It could have the effect of compelling the SEP holder to accept a level of compensation for the use of its invention which does not reflect the value of the licensed technology and, therefore, harm the technological development of standards. [150]

Furthermore, the “hard-edged” discrimination approach should be rejected also because its effects would result in the insertion of the “most favoured licensee” clause in the FRAND undertaking. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the industry would most likely have regarded such a clause as inconsistent with the overall objective of the FRAND undertaking. [151]

Conversely, the Court of Appeal followed the notion described by the High Court as the “general” non-discrimination approach: [152] the FRAND undertaking prevents the SEP holder from securing rates higher than a “benchmark” rate which mirrors a fair valuation of its patent(s), but it does not prevent the patent holder from granting licences at lower rates. [152] For determining the benchmark rate, prior licences granted by the SEP holder to third parties will likely form the “best comparables”. [153]

The Court of Appeal argued that the “general” approach is in line with the objectives of the FRAND undertaking, since it ensures that the SEP holder is not able to “hold-up” implementation of the standard by demanding more than its patent(s) is worth. [154] However, the FRAND undertaking does not aim at leveling down the royalty owed to the SEP holder to a point where it no longer represents a fair return for its patent(s), or to removing its discretion to agree royalty rates lower than the benchmark rate, if it chooses to do so. [154]

In this context, the Court of Appeal made clear that it does not consider differential pricing as per se objectionable, since it can in some circumstances be beneficial to consumer welfare. [155] The court sees no value in mandating equal pricing for its own sake. On the contrary, once the hold-up effect is dealt with by ensuring that licences are available at the benchmark rate, there is no reason for preventing the SEP holder from charging less than the licence is worth. [155] Should discrimination appear below the benchmark rate, it should be addressed through the application of competition law; as long as granting licences at rates lower than the benchmark rate causes no competitive harm, there is no reason to assume that the FRAND undertaking constrains the ability of the SEP holder to do so. [156]


3. Abuse of dominant Position / Huawei v ZTE

The Court of Appeal further rejected Defendants’ argument that, by bringing the infringement proceedings prior to fulfilling the obligations arising from the Huawei judgment, the Claimant abused its dominant market position in violation of Article 102 TFEU. [157]

To begin with, the Court of Appeal confirmed the finding of the High Court that the Claimant held a dominant market position and dismissed the respective challenge by the latter. [158] It did not find any flaw in the High Court’s view that the SEP holder has a 100% market share with respect to each SEP (since it is “common ground” that the relevant market for the purpose of assessing dominance in the case of each SEP is the market for the licensing of that SEP [159] ) and that the constrains imposed upon the SEP holder’s market power by the limitations attached to the FRAND undertaking [160] and the risk of hold-out that is immanent to the structure of the respective market, [161] can either alone or together rebut the assumption that it most likely holds market power. [162]

Notwithstanding the above, the Court of Appeal held that the Claimant had not abused its market power in the present case. [163]

The court agreed with the finding of the High Court that the Huawei judgment did not lay down “mandatory conditions”, in a sense that that non-compliance will per se render the initiation of infringement proceedings a breach of Article 102 TFEU. [164] The language used in the Huawei judgment implies that the CJEU intended to create a “safe harbor”: if the SEP holder complies with the respective framework, the commencement of an action will not, in and of itself, amount to an abuse. [165] If the SEP holder steps outside this framework, the question whether its behaviour has been abusive must be assessed in light of all of the circumstances. [166]

In the court’s eyes, the only mandatory condition that must be satisfied by the SEP holder before proceedings are commenced, is giving notice to the implementer about the infringing use of its patents. [167] This follows from the clear language used by the CJEU with respect to this obligation. [168] The precise content of such notice will depend upon all the circumstances of the particular case. [168] In general, if an alleged infringer is familiar with the technical details of the products it is dealing and the SEP it may be infringing, but has no intention of taking a licence on FRAND terms, it will not be justified to deny the SEP holder an injunction, simply because it had not made a formal notification prior to the commencement of proceedings. [169]

On the merits, the court accepted the High Court’s assessment that the Claimant had not behaved abusively and particularly the finding, that the Defendants, who were in contact with the Claimant prior to the proceedings, had sufficient notice that the Claimant held SEPs which ought to be licensed, if found infringed and essential. [170]

Considering further that the respective conduct requirements were not established at the point in time, in which the infringement action was filed (since the present proceedings were initiated before the CJEU delivered the Huawei judgment), the Court of Appeal noted that it would very likely not be fair to accuse the Claimant of abusive behavior. [171] Insofar the court agreed with the respective approach developed by German courts in co-called “transitional” cases (Pioneer v Acer, [172] St. Lawrence v Vodafone [172] and Sisvel v Haier [173] ) [174] .

  • [104] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, Case-No. A3/2017/1784, [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, para. 233.
  • [105] Ibid, para. 6 et seqq.
  • [106] Ibid, para. 233.
  • [107] Ibid, para. 7.
  • [108] Ibid, paras. 8 and 137 et seqq.
  • [109] Ibid, para. 8.
  • [110] Ibid, para. 9 et seqq.; para. 31 et seqq.
  • [111] Ibid, para 17.
  • [112] Ibid, para 130.
  • [113] Ibid, para 18.
  • [114] Ibid, para 112.
  • [115] Ibid, para 291.
  • [116] Ibid, paras. 19 and 45 et seqq.
  • [117] Ibid, paras. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [118] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgement dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13.
  • [119] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [120] Ibid, para. 17.
  • [121] Ibid, paras. 74 and 77 et seq.
  • [122] Ibid, para. 82.
  • [123] Ibid, para. 80.
  • [124] Ibid, para. 79 et seq.
  • [125] Ibid, para. 26.
  • [126] Ibid, para. 53.
  • [127] Ibid, para. 54 et seq., para. 59.
  • [128] Ibid, para. 56.
  • [129] Pioneer v Acer, District Court of Mannheim, judgement dated 8 January 2016, Case No. 7 O 96/14.
  • [130] St. Lawrence v Vodafone, District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 31 March 2016, Case No. 4a O 73/14.
  • [131] Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, “Setting out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents”, 29 November 2017, COM(2017) 712 final.
  • [132] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 74.
  • [133] Ibid, para. 111.
  • [134] Ibid, para. 128.
  • [135] Ibid, para. 121.
  • [136] Ibid, para. 125.
  • [137] Ibid, para. 75.
  • [138] Ibid, para. 92
  • [139] Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Official Journal of the EU L 195, 02/06/2004, p. 16)
  • [140] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 94.
  • [141] Ibid, para. 96.
  • [142] Ibid, para. 98.
  • [143] Ibid, para. 20 and 132 et seqq.
  • [144] Ibid, paras. 207 and 210.
  • [145] Ibid, para. 176.
  • [146] Ibid, para. 173.
  • [147] Ibid, para. 169 et seq.
  • [148] Ibid, paras. 194 et seqq.
  • [149] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [150] Ibid, para. 198.
  • [151] Ibid, para. 199.
  • [152] Ibid, para. 195.
  • [153] Ibid, para. 202.
  • [154] Ibid, para. 196.
  • [155] Ibid, para. 197.
  • [156] Ibid, para. 200.
  • [157] Ibid, para. 21, paras. 211 et seqq and para. 251.
  • [158] Ibid, para. 212.
  • [159] Ibid, para. 216.
  • [160] Ibid, para. 219.
  • [161] Ibid, para. 220.
  • [162] Ibid, para. 229.
  • [163] Ibid, para. 284.
  • [164] Ibid, para. 269.
  • [165] Ibid, para. 270.
  • [166] Ibid, para. 269 and 282.
  • [167] Ibid, para. 253 and 281.
  • [168] Ibid, para. 271.
  • [169] Ibid, para. 273.
  • [170] Ibid, para. 284
  • [171] Ibid, para. 275
  • [172] See above
  • [173] Sisvel v Haier, Higher District Court of Düsseldorf, judgement dated 30 March 2017, Case No. 15 U 66-15.
  • [174] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, 23 October 2018, para. 279.

Updated 6 十月 2020

无线星球诉华为 暨 康文森诉华为及中兴通讯

英国法院判决
26 八月 2020 - Case No. [2020] UKSC 37

A. 事实

本案中,英国最高法院(以下称“最高法院”)针对就两个个别独立案件所提出的上诉进行判决。这两个案件均涉及由欧洲电信标准协会(ETSI)所制定的对实施无线电通信技术标准必不可少(或潜在不必可少)的专利(标准必要专利或SEP)的侵权行为。根据欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策的要求,该协会鼓励标准必要专利持有人对其愿依照公平、合理且无歧视(FRAND)的条款与条件向标准实施人提供其所持有的标准必要专利做出承诺。

1. 无线星球诉华为

第一个案件涉及一家拥有一组符合数项无线通信技术标准的标准必要专利组合的公司—— 无线星球国际有限公司(Unwired Planet International Limited,以下称“无线星球”)与另一家中国制造商和供应商——华为集团旗下的两家公司之间,关于使用此项标准的手机设备以及一些其他项目的纠纷。

2014年3月,无线星球于英格兰和威尔士高等法院(以下称“高等法院”)起诉华为、三星以及另一家公司侵害其所持有的五项英国标准必要专利。在这些诉讼进行的过程中,无线星球向华为提出了几项许可要约,然而最终并未能达成协议。另一方面,无线星球在诉讼进行中与三星公司签署了许可协议。

高等法院于2017年4月5日对华为核发了禁令,禁令的期限直到该公司与无线星球签订了法院认为符合FRAND原则的特定条款的全球许可协议为止 [175] 。华为对该决定提起了上诉,在上诉程序确定之前,高等法院中止了对该禁令的执行。

英国上诉法院(以下称“上诉法院”)于2018年10月23日驳回了华为对高等法院判决的上诉 [176] 。随后,华为向英国最高法院(以下称“最高法院”)提出了上诉。

2. 康文森诉华为及中兴通讯 第二起案件涉及一家专利许可公司——康文森无线许可有限公司(Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L.,以下称“康文森”)与华为以及中兴通讯集团(ZTE,以下称“中兴通讯”)旗下的两家公司之间的纠纷。中兴通讯是一家中国公司,生产网络设备、手机和消费电子产品,并销往世界各地。

康文森于2017年向高等法院提起了对华为以及中兴通信的侵权诉讼。除了一些其他的主张外,康文森还向高等法院提出了对其所持有的四项英国专利权侵权行为的禁令救济,同时也要求高等法院就其所持有的标准必要专利组合确定符合FRAND的全球许可条款。华为和中兴通信都对高等法院是否具备审理和裁决此案的管辖权提出异议,于此同时,并在中国提起诉讼,对康文森所持有的中国专利的有效性进行挑战。

高等法院于2018年4月16日确认了其对包括确定该专利组合的全球许可条款在内的,此一系列争议的管辖权限 [177] 。华为和中兴通信对高等法院的判决不服并提起上诉。 2019年1月30日,上诉法院驳回了该上诉,并以该侵权行为侵害英国专利为由,确认了英国法院对包含确定全球许可条款在内的各项纷争的管辖权 [178] 。华为和中兴通信对此判决不服,从而再向最高法院提起上诉。

根据目前的判决 [179] ,最高法院全体一致同意驳回了这两个案件的上诉。

B. 法院的论理

最高法院指出并解决了上诉中提出的如下五个问题:

1. 管辖权

最高法院在其判决中确认,英国法院对跨国标准必要专利组合的全球FRAND许可条款判定事宜有管辖权,因此,如果标准实施人拒绝签订此类许可,则英国法院有权基于其中的英国标准必要专利授予禁令 [180]

法院认为,根据欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策,标准必要专利持有人并未被禁止于各国家法院系统中寻求禁令救济[7]。相反地,透过国家法院授予的禁令来阻止侵权行为的可能性被认为是“知识产权政策寻求平衡下的必要组成部分”,借此并能够确保实施人有动力去进行FRAND许可谈判 [181]

除了有权基于英国专利授与禁令外,英国法院也有权决定涉及全球范围的FRAND许可条款。最高法院认为,欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策所确立的“合同关系”赋予英国法院各自行使管辖权的权利 [182]

在最高法院看来,欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策订定时即“有意使其具备国际效力”,因为此政策的制定即是为了尝试“反映电信行业中的商业惯例” [183] 。在电信行业中,通常的做法是,即便是在不明确知道究竟有多少被许可的专利是有效的或者是侵权的的情况下,仍然以专利组合为单位签署全球范围的许可 [184]

此原因一方面在于,专利持有人无法在其宣告该专利具备(或可能具备)标准必要性之时,就预测到在接下来标准不断发展的过程中,该专利将持续有效或者产生侵权 [184] ;另一方面,实施人在实施标准之时也不会知道其中哪些专利是有效的或者哪些专利是侵权的 [184]

这种“不可避免的不确定性”,是通过以一种“基本上能够反映专利组合中必然含有许多未经验证的专利此一性质“的价格[10]而缔结一次性涵盖全球范围内专利持有人所持有的全部已宣告的标准必要专利组合的许可协议来解决的。借由获取这种许可,实施人购买“实施标准的权利”与“确定性”,确保其有权使用符合该项标准的所有技术 [184]

由于依照商业惯例,FRAND许可必然包括“未经验证”的专利,最高法院认为,确定涵盖全球范围的许可条款和条件并不意味着必须评估其所涵盖的所有专利的有效性。因此,在设定全球范围的专利组合许可条款时,英国法院并不会就外国专利的有效性以及是否侵权这一实际上应由授予该项专利的各国国家法院享有专属管辖权的问题于进行裁决 [185] 。因此,通常来说,实施人“保留在各相关外国法院对这些专利或这些专利的样本提出挑战,并借此要求专利持有人提供一个对许可费率进行调整的机制的权利”将是“公平合理的” [186]

在此范围内,最高法院强调,上述见解并非英国法院独有,而与其他司法管辖区,特别是美国、德国、中国和日本的相关判例所采取的见解一致 [187]

2. 合适的法庭(便利法庭原则)

最高法院审查的第二个问题同样涉及英国法院的管辖权问题。在康文森诉华为一案中,被告抗辩称,在中国法院对康文森所持有的中国专利的有效性做出裁决之前,英国法院本应该拒绝其管辖权,转而选择由中国法院进行管辖,或者至少应该中止该诉讼程序。 然而,最高法院认为,英国法院没有义务拒绝其管辖权转而选择由中国法院进行管辖 [188] 。所谓的“便利法庭原则”在本案中不适用,其原因在于,与英国法院不同的是,由于本案当事人并没有达成协议由中国法院对涵盖全球范围的FRAND专利组合许可条款的决定等相关事项行使管辖权,中国法院于此类争议上没有管辖的权利 [188] 。此外,法院认为,在目前的情况下,可能无法合理预期康文森会同意将管辖权授予中国法院 [188]

在最高法院的眼中,涉及本次争议的英国法院也没有义务为了等待进行中的中国专利有效性诉讼的结果而中止其诉讼程序[15]。其原因在于,此有效性诉讼仅涉及康文森所持有的中国专利的有效性,而在英国提起的这一诉讼所涉及的却是对康文森所持有的全球范围内标准必要专利组合的FRAND许可条款的确定 [189]

3. 无歧视

最高法院审查的第三个问题涉及对FRAND承诺中无歧视义务的解释。在此前的诉讼程序中产生了一个争议点,即无线星球是否会因为其向华为所提供的许可条款比起审判开始后与三星达成协议的条款更为不利而违反了FRAND的无歧视义务。

最高法院对高等法院以及上诉法院就此问题的决定均表示赞同,并指出此一区别不会构成对FRAND的无歧视义务的违反。法院解释到,FRAND并不意味着所谓的“严格无歧视义务”而要求专利持有人向所有条件相似的被许可人提供完全相同或者相似的条款 [190]

根据欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策(第6.1条)的要求,专利持有人必须承诺按照FRAND条款提供许可。在最高法院看来,这是一个“单一且整体性的义务”,而并非三项各自独立的义务,要求许可条款分别应公平、分别应合理、分别应无歧视 [191] 。因此,这些条款和条件“在通常情况下应能够由任何市场参与者以公平的市场价格获得”,并且应能够反映标准必要专利组合的“真实价值”,同时不须根据特定被许可人的个别特征进行调整 [192]

最高法院更进一步地明确表示,在欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策要求下所进行的FRAND承诺并不代表所谓的“最惠许可”条款而表示专利持有人被要求必须以相当于最惠许可条款的许可条件向所有类似情况的被许可人授予许可 [193] 。在仔细查看欧洲电信标准协会知识产权政策的创建过程后,法院认为欧洲电信标准协会先前曾明确地表示拒绝将此类条款纳入FRAND承诺的提案 [194]

此外,法院指出,有关差别费率会损害所涉及的私人或公共利益的“一般性推定”并不存在 [195] 。相反地,在某些情况下,标准必要专利持有人选择向特定被许可人提供低于基准费率的许可费这一选择在商业上是合理的 [196] 。举例言之,此种做法适用于所谓的“先行者优势”,法院承认,与第一位被许可人达成费率较低的许可协议具备“经济上的合理性“以及”商业上的重要性“,因为如此一来除了能为标准必要专利创造初始收入,更可以透过许可协议的签署于市场中对专利组合进行“验证”,并促进未来许可协议的达成[22]。此外,对于所谓的“减价销售”而言,情况亦是如此。在这种情况下,专利持有人为了确保其能够在市场上生存而被迫以较低的费率进行许可,而当初在无线星球与三星签署许可协议之时即是属于这种情况 [197]

4. 滥用市场支配地位/华为框架

最高法院审查的第四个问题是,无线星球是否会因为其对华为提起了侵权诉讼,而违反《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条所称的滥用了市场支配地位,并且因此不能主张禁令救济。尤其是,华为曾经提出抗辩指称,由于无线星球并未遵守欧洲联盟法院于华为诉中兴案中所确立的行为义务(华为判决或华为框架),因此其禁令救济主张应予否决 [198] 。 然而,最高法院认为情况并非如此 [199] 。在法院看来,华为判决确立了一项义务,即专利持有人在提出禁令救济诉讼前,必须就标准实施人对涉案标准必要专利的侵权使用行为向其进行通知,而如果标准必要专利持有人违反了此项义务,则将构成《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102条下的滥用行为[26]。这项义务的“性质”将取决于每个个案的具体情况来进行个案判断 [200] 。本案中,法院认为,无线星球在提起本侵权诉讼之前已经对华为进行了适当的通知 [201]

有关华为判决所确立的其他各项义务,最高法院赞同了先前高等法院和上诉法院的观点,即认为华为框架并不是“强制性的”,而只是建立了一个“路线图”,如果专利持有人能严格遵循此一路线图行事,则其寻求禁令救济的权利将能够获得保障,而不会产生违反第102条的风险 [202] 。此外,华为判决还提供了“多项能帮助评估许可各方是否有按照FRAND条款达成许可协议的意愿此一核心问题的参考点” [201] 。话虽如此,最高法院认为,无线星球一直以来都有按照FRAND条款对华为进行许可的意愿,因此不能认为其表现出滥用行为 [201]

5. 损害赔偿而非禁令救济?

最高法院审查的第五个(也是最后一个问题)涉及对标准必要专利侵权行为的适当补偿措施。在最高法院的上诉程序中,就无线星球所持有的标准必要专利所遭受侵权损害此一事实而言,最适当且符合比例原则的补偿措施应是判给损害赔偿金而不是核发禁令此一抗辩首次被提出。

最高法院认为,在本案中,以损害赔偿取代禁令救济的做法没有依据 [203] 。无线星球和康文森都不可能利用“申请禁令救济”作为向华为或中兴收取“过高费用”的威胁手段,因为他们只有在提交了其条款可能符合法院认定的FRAND许可要约后,才有权获得强制令 [204]

此外,法院认为,判给损害赔偿金“不太可能能够恰当地替代因不能核发禁令所可能造成的损失”,因为如此一来标准必要专利持有人就必须就每一个个别专利在各个国家逐一对实施人提起专利诉讼,而这被认为是“不切实际的” [205] 。更有甚者,标准实施人将“产生动机持续性地为侵权行为,直到其就逐个专利在逐个国家中被迫支付许可费为止”,而这将使得FRAND许可变得更加困难,正如同最高法院所指出的,对侵权者而言,主动取得许可不具备“经济上意义” [206]

另一方面,禁令救济“可能是更有效的补救方法”,通过对各种侵权行为的全面性禁止,禁令带给侵权人的可能只剩下接受标准必要专利持有人所提供的FRAND许可条款这一“有限的选择”,“如果其希望能继续留在市场当中” [206] 。出于上述原因,最高法院强调,禁令救济是“维持司法公正所必需的” [207]

  • [175] Unwired Planet v Huawei, High Court of Justice for England and Wales, judgment dated 5 April 2017, Case No. [2017] EWHC 711(Pat)。
  • [176] Unwired Planet v Huawei, UK Court of Appeal, judgment dated 23 October 2018, Case No. [2018] EWCA Civ 2344。
  • [177] Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, High Court of Justice for England and Wales, judgment dated 16 April 2018, Case No. [2018] EWHC 808 (Pat)。
  • [178] Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Court of Appeal, judgment dated 30 January 2019, Case No. [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [179] Unwired Planet v Huawei and Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Supreme Court, judgment dated 30 January 2019, Case No. [2019] EWCA Civ 38。
  • [180] 同上注, 段 49 及以下。
  • [181] 同上注, 段 61。
  • [182] 同上注, 段 58。
  • [183] 同上注, 段 62。
  • [184] 同上注, 段 60。
  • [185] 同上注, 段 63。
  • [186] 同上注, 段 64。
  • [187] 同上注, 段 68-84。
  • [188] 同上注, 段 97。
  • [189] 同上注, 段 99 及以下。
  • [190] 同上注, 段 112 及以下。
  • [191] 同上注, 段 113。
  • [192] 同上注, 段 114。
  • [193] 同上注, 段 116。
  • [194] 同上注, 段 116 及以下。
  • [195] 同上注, 段 123。
  • [196] 同上注, 段 125。
  • [197] 同上注, 段 126。
  • [198] Huawei v ZTE, Court of Justice of the EU, judgment dated 16 July 2015, Case No. C-170/13。
  • [199] Unwired Planet v Huawei and Conversant v Huawei and ZTE, UK Supreme Court, judgment dated 30 January 2019, Case No. [2019] EWCA Civ 38, 段 149 及以下。
  • [200] 同上注, 段 150。
  • [201] 同上注, 段 158。
  • [202] 同上注, 段 157 及 158。
  • [203] 同上注, 段 163。
  • [204] 同上注, 段 164。
  • [205] 同上注, 段 166。
  • [206] 同上注, 段 167。
  • [207] 同上注, 段 169。